1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2026 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10 #include <stdio.h>
11 #include <stdlib.h>
12 #include <ctype.h>
13 #include <openssl/objects.h>
14 #include <openssl/evp.h>
15 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
16 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
17 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
18 #include <openssl/conf.h>
19 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
20 #include <openssl/dh.h>
21 #include <openssl/bn.h>
22 #include <openssl/provider.h>
23 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
24 #include "internal/nelem.h"
25 #include "internal/sizes.h"
26 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
27 #include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h"
28 #include "ssl_local.h"
29 #include "quic/quic_local.h"
30 #include <openssl/ct.h>
31
32 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
33 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
34
35 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
36 tls1_setup_key_block,
37 tls1_generate_master_secret,
38 tls1_change_cipher_state,
39 tls1_final_finish_mac,
40 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
41 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
42 tls1_alert_code,
43 tls1_export_keying_material,
44 0,
45 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
46 tls_close_construct_packet,
47 ssl3_handshake_write
48 };
49
50 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
51 tls1_setup_key_block,
52 tls1_generate_master_secret,
53 tls1_change_cipher_state,
54 tls1_final_finish_mac,
55 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
56 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
57 tls1_alert_code,
58 tls1_export_keying_material,
59 0,
60 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
61 tls_close_construct_packet,
62 ssl3_handshake_write
63 };
64
65 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
66 tls1_setup_key_block,
67 tls1_generate_master_secret,
68 tls1_change_cipher_state,
69 tls1_final_finish_mac,
70 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
72 tls1_alert_code,
73 tls1_export_keying_material,
74 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
75 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
76 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
77 tls_close_construct_packet,
78 ssl3_handshake_write
79 };
80
81 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
82 tls13_setup_key_block,
83 tls13_generate_master_secret,
84 tls13_change_cipher_state,
85 tls13_final_finish_mac,
86 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
87 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
88 tls13_alert_code,
89 tls13_export_keying_material,
90 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
91 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
92 tls_close_construct_packet,
93 ssl3_handshake_write
94 };
95
tls1_default_timeout(void)96 OSSL_TIME tls1_default_timeout(void)
97 {
98 /*
99 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
100 * http, the cache would over fill
101 */
102 return ossl_seconds2time(60 * 60 * 2);
103 }
104
tls1_new(SSL * s)105 int tls1_new(SSL *s)
106 {
107 if (!ssl3_new(s))
108 return 0;
109 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
110 return 0;
111
112 return 1;
113 }
114
tls1_free(SSL * s)115 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
116 {
117 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
118
119 if (sc == NULL)
120 return;
121
122 OPENSSL_free(sc->ext.session_ticket);
123 ssl3_free(s);
124 }
125
tls1_clear(SSL * s)126 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
127 {
128 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
129
130 if (sc == NULL)
131 return 0;
132
133 if (!ssl3_clear(s))
134 return 0;
135
136 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
137 sc->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
138 else
139 sc->version = s->method->version;
140
141 return 1;
142 }
143
144 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
145 static const struct {
146 int nid;
147 uint16_t group_id;
148 } nid_to_group[] = {
149 { NID_sect163k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1 },
150 { NID_sect163r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1 },
151 { NID_sect163r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2 },
152 { NID_sect193r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1 },
153 { NID_sect193r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2 },
154 { NID_sect233k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1 },
155 { NID_sect233r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1 },
156 { NID_sect239k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1 },
157 { NID_sect283k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1 },
158 { NID_sect283r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1 },
159 { NID_sect409k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1 },
160 { NID_sect409r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1 },
161 { NID_sect571k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1 },
162 { NID_sect571r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1 },
163 { NID_secp160k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1 },
164 { NID_secp160r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1 },
165 { NID_secp160r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2 },
166 { NID_secp192k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1 },
167 { NID_X9_62_prime192v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1 },
168 { NID_secp224k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1 },
169 { NID_secp224r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1 },
170 { NID_secp256k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1 },
171 { NID_X9_62_prime256v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1 },
172 { NID_secp384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1 },
173 { NID_secp521r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1 },
174 { NID_brainpoolP256r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1 },
175 { NID_brainpoolP384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1 },
176 { NID_brainpoolP512r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1 },
177 { EVP_PKEY_X25519, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519 },
178 { EVP_PKEY_X448, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448 },
179 { NID_brainpoolP256r1tls13, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13 },
180 { NID_brainpoolP384r1tls13, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13 },
181 { NID_brainpoolP512r1tls13, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13 },
182 { NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A },
183 { NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B },
184 { NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C },
185 { NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D },
186 { NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A },
187 { NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B },
188 { NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C },
189 { NID_ffdhe2048, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048 },
190 { NID_ffdhe3072, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072 },
191 { NID_ffdhe4096, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096 },
192 { NID_ffdhe6144, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144 },
193 { NID_ffdhe8192, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192 }
194 };
195
196 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
197 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
198 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
199 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
200 };
201
202 /* Group list string of the built-in pseudo group DEFAULT */
203 #define DEFAULT_GROUP_NAME "DEFAULT"
204 #define TLS_DEFAULT_GROUP_LIST \
205 "?*X25519MLKEM768 / ?*X25519:?secp256r1 / ?X448:?secp384r1:?secp521r1 / ?ffdhe2048:?ffdhe3072"
206
207 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
208 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1,
209 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1,
210 };
211
212 /* Group list string of the built-in pseudo group DEFAULT_SUITE_B */
213 #define SUITE_B_GROUP_NAME "DEFAULT_SUITE_B"
214 #define SUITE_B_GROUP_LIST "?secp256r1:?secp384r1",
215
216 struct provider_ctx_data_st {
217 SSL_CTX *ctx;
218 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider;
219 };
220
221 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
222 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups;
add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params[],void * data)223 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *data)
224 {
225 struct provider_ctx_data_st *pgd = data;
226 SSL_CTX *ctx = pgd->ctx;
227 const OSSL_PARAM *p;
228 TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = NULL;
229 EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt;
230 unsigned int gid;
231 unsigned int is_kem = 0;
232 int ret = 0;
233
234 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == ctx->group_list_len) {
235 TLS_GROUP_INFO *tmp = NULL;
236
237 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == 0)
238 tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO)
239 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
240 else
241 tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->group_list,
242 (ctx->group_list_max_len
243 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE)
244 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO));
245 if (tmp == NULL)
246 return 0;
247 ctx->group_list = tmp;
248 memset(tmp + ctx->group_list_max_len,
249 0,
250 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
251 ctx->group_list_max_len += TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE;
252 }
253
254 ginf = &ctx->group_list[ctx->group_list_len];
255
256 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME);
257 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
258 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
259 goto err;
260 }
261 ginf->tlsname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
262 if (ginf->tlsname == NULL)
263 goto err;
264
265 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL);
266 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
267 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
268 goto err;
269 }
270 ginf->realname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
271 if (ginf->realname == NULL)
272 goto err;
273
274 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID);
275 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &gid) || gid > UINT16_MAX) {
276 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
277 goto err;
278 }
279 ginf->group_id = (uint16_t)gid;
280
281 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG);
282 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
283 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
284 goto err;
285 }
286 ginf->algorithm = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
287 if (ginf->algorithm == NULL)
288 goto err;
289
290 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS);
291 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &ginf->secbits)) {
292 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
293 goto err;
294 }
295
296 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_IS_KEM);
297 if (p != NULL && (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &is_kem) || is_kem > 1)) {
298 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
299 goto err;
300 }
301 ginf->is_kem = 1 & is_kem;
302
303 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS);
304 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mintls)) {
305 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
306 goto err;
307 }
308
309 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS);
310 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxtls)) {
311 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
312 goto err;
313 }
314
315 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS);
316 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mindtls)) {
317 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
318 goto err;
319 }
320
321 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS);
322 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxdtls)) {
323 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
324 goto err;
325 }
326 /*
327 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
328 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
329 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
330 * it.
331 */
332 ret = 1;
333 ERR_set_mark();
334 keymgmt = EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx->libctx, ginf->algorithm, ctx->propq);
335 if (keymgmt != NULL) {
336 /* We have successfully fetched the algorithm, we can use the group. */
337 ctx->group_list_len++;
338 ginf = NULL;
339 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt);
340 }
341 ERR_pop_to_mark();
342 err:
343 if (ginf != NULL) {
344 OPENSSL_free(ginf->tlsname);
345 OPENSSL_free(ginf->realname);
346 OPENSSL_free(ginf->algorithm);
347 ginf->algorithm = ginf->tlsname = ginf->realname = NULL;
348 }
349 return ret;
350 }
351
discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER * provider,void * vctx)352 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, void *vctx)
353 {
354 struct provider_ctx_data_st pgd;
355
356 pgd.ctx = vctx;
357 pgd.provider = provider;
358 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider, "TLS-GROUP",
359 add_provider_groups, &pgd);
360 }
361
ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX * ctx)362 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX *ctx)
363 {
364 if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx->libctx, discover_provider_groups, ctx))
365 return 0;
366
367 return SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list(ctx, TLS_DEFAULT_GROUP_LIST);
368 }
369
inferred_keytype(const TLS_SIGALG_INFO * sinf)370 static const char *inferred_keytype(const TLS_SIGALG_INFO *sinf)
371 {
372 return (sinf->keytype != NULL
373 ? sinf->keytype
374 : (sinf->sig_name != NULL
375 ? sinf->sig_name
376 : sinf->sigalg_name));
377 }
378
379 #define TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
380 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_sigalgs;
add_provider_sigalgs(const OSSL_PARAM params[],void * data)381 static int add_provider_sigalgs(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *data)
382 {
383 struct provider_ctx_data_st *pgd = data;
384 SSL_CTX *ctx = pgd->ctx;
385 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider = pgd->provider;
386 const OSSL_PARAM *p;
387 TLS_SIGALG_INFO *sinf = NULL;
388 EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt;
389 const char *keytype;
390 unsigned int code_point = 0;
391 int ret = 0;
392
393 if (ctx->sigalg_list_max_len == ctx->sigalg_list_len) {
394 TLS_SIGALG_INFO *tmp = NULL;
395
396 if (ctx->sigalg_list_max_len == 0)
397 tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_SIGALG_INFO)
398 * TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
399 else
400 tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->sigalg_list,
401 (ctx->sigalg_list_max_len
402 + TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE)
403 * sizeof(TLS_SIGALG_INFO));
404 if (tmp == NULL)
405 return 0;
406 ctx->sigalg_list = tmp;
407 memset(tmp + ctx->sigalg_list_max_len, 0,
408 sizeof(TLS_SIGALG_INFO) * TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
409 ctx->sigalg_list_max_len += TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE;
410 }
411
412 sinf = &ctx->sigalg_list[ctx->sigalg_list_len];
413
414 /* First, mandatory parameters */
415 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_NAME);
416 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
417 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
418 goto err;
419 }
420 OPENSSL_free(sinf->sigalg_name);
421 sinf->sigalg_name = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
422 if (sinf->sigalg_name == NULL)
423 goto err;
424
425 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_IANA_NAME);
426 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
427 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
428 goto err;
429 }
430 OPENSSL_free(sinf->name);
431 sinf->name = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
432 if (sinf->name == NULL)
433 goto err;
434
435 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
436 OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_CODE_POINT);
437 if (p == NULL
438 || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &code_point)
439 || code_point > UINT16_MAX) {
440 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
441 goto err;
442 }
443 sinf->code_point = (uint16_t)code_point;
444
445 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
446 OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_SECURITY_BITS);
447 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &sinf->secbits)) {
448 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
449 goto err;
450 }
451
452 /* Now, optional parameters */
453 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_OID);
454 if (p == NULL) {
455 sinf->sigalg_oid = NULL;
456 } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
457 goto err;
458 } else {
459 OPENSSL_free(sinf->sigalg_oid);
460 sinf->sigalg_oid = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
461 if (sinf->sigalg_oid == NULL)
462 goto err;
463 }
464
465 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_SIG_NAME);
466 if (p == NULL) {
467 sinf->sig_name = NULL;
468 } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
469 goto err;
470 } else {
471 OPENSSL_free(sinf->sig_name);
472 sinf->sig_name = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
473 if (sinf->sig_name == NULL)
474 goto err;
475 }
476
477 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_SIG_OID);
478 if (p == NULL) {
479 sinf->sig_oid = NULL;
480 } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
481 goto err;
482 } else {
483 OPENSSL_free(sinf->sig_oid);
484 sinf->sig_oid = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
485 if (sinf->sig_oid == NULL)
486 goto err;
487 }
488
489 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_HASH_NAME);
490 if (p == NULL) {
491 sinf->hash_name = NULL;
492 } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
493 goto err;
494 } else {
495 OPENSSL_free(sinf->hash_name);
496 sinf->hash_name = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
497 if (sinf->hash_name == NULL)
498 goto err;
499 }
500
501 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_HASH_OID);
502 if (p == NULL) {
503 sinf->hash_oid = NULL;
504 } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
505 goto err;
506 } else {
507 OPENSSL_free(sinf->hash_oid);
508 sinf->hash_oid = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
509 if (sinf->hash_oid == NULL)
510 goto err;
511 }
512
513 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_KEYTYPE);
514 if (p == NULL) {
515 sinf->keytype = NULL;
516 } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
517 goto err;
518 } else {
519 OPENSSL_free(sinf->keytype);
520 sinf->keytype = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
521 if (sinf->keytype == NULL)
522 goto err;
523 }
524
525 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_KEYTYPE_OID);
526 if (p == NULL) {
527 sinf->keytype_oid = NULL;
528 } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
529 goto err;
530 } else {
531 OPENSSL_free(sinf->keytype_oid);
532 sinf->keytype_oid = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
533 if (sinf->keytype_oid == NULL)
534 goto err;
535 }
536
537 /* Optional, not documented prior to 3.5 */
538 sinf->mindtls = sinf->maxdtls = -1;
539 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_MIN_DTLS);
540 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &sinf->mindtls)) {
541 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
542 goto err;
543 }
544 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_MAX_DTLS);
545 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &sinf->maxdtls)) {
546 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
547 goto err;
548 }
549 /* DTLS version numbers grow downward */
550 if ((sinf->maxdtls != 0) && (sinf->maxdtls != -1) && ((sinf->maxdtls > sinf->mindtls))) {
551 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
552 goto err;
553 }
554 /* No provider sigalgs are supported in DTLS, reset after checking. */
555 sinf->mindtls = sinf->maxdtls = -1;
556
557 /* The remaining parameters below are mandatory again */
558 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_MIN_TLS);
559 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &sinf->mintls)) {
560 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
561 goto err;
562 }
563 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_MAX_TLS);
564 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &sinf->maxtls)) {
565 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
566 goto err;
567 }
568 if ((sinf->maxtls != 0) && (sinf->maxtls != -1) && ((sinf->maxtls < sinf->mintls))) {
569 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
570 goto err;
571 }
572 if ((sinf->mintls != 0) && (sinf->mintls != -1) && ((sinf->mintls > TLS1_3_VERSION)))
573 sinf->mintls = sinf->maxtls = -1;
574 if ((sinf->maxtls != 0) && (sinf->maxtls != -1) && ((sinf->maxtls < TLS1_3_VERSION)))
575 sinf->mintls = sinf->maxtls = -1;
576
577 /* Ignore unusable sigalgs */
578 if (sinf->mintls == -1 && sinf->mindtls == -1) {
579 ret = 1;
580 goto err;
581 }
582
583 /*
584 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
585 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
586 * successfully processed this signature, even though we may decide not to
587 * use it.
588 */
589 ret = 1;
590 ERR_set_mark();
591 keytype = inferred_keytype(sinf);
592 keymgmt = EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx->libctx, keytype, ctx->propq);
593 if (keymgmt != NULL) {
594 /*
595 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
596 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
597 *
598 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
599 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
600 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
601 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
602 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
603 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
604 * behaviour)?
605 */
606 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_provider(keymgmt) == provider) {
607 /*
608 * We have a match - so we could use this signature;
609 * Check proper object registration first, though.
610 * Don't care about return value as this may have been
611 * done within providers or previous calls to
612 * add_provider_sigalgs.
613 */
614 OBJ_create(sinf->sigalg_oid, sinf->sigalg_name, NULL);
615 /* sanity check: Without successful registration don't use alg */
616 if ((OBJ_txt2nid(sinf->sigalg_name) == NID_undef) || (OBJ_nid2obj(OBJ_txt2nid(sinf->sigalg_name)) == NULL)) {
617 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
618 goto err;
619 }
620 if (sinf->sig_name != NULL)
621 OBJ_create(sinf->sig_oid, sinf->sig_name, NULL);
622 if (sinf->keytype != NULL)
623 OBJ_create(sinf->keytype_oid, sinf->keytype, NULL);
624 if (sinf->hash_name != NULL)
625 OBJ_create(sinf->hash_oid, sinf->hash_name, NULL);
626 OBJ_add_sigid(OBJ_txt2nid(sinf->sigalg_name),
627 (sinf->hash_name != NULL
628 ? OBJ_txt2nid(sinf->hash_name)
629 : NID_undef),
630 OBJ_txt2nid(keytype));
631 ctx->sigalg_list_len++;
632 sinf = NULL;
633 }
634 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt);
635 }
636 ERR_pop_to_mark();
637 err:
638 if (sinf != NULL) {
639 OPENSSL_free(sinf->name);
640 sinf->name = NULL;
641 OPENSSL_free(sinf->sigalg_name);
642 sinf->sigalg_name = NULL;
643 OPENSSL_free(sinf->sigalg_oid);
644 sinf->sigalg_oid = NULL;
645 OPENSSL_free(sinf->sig_name);
646 sinf->sig_name = NULL;
647 OPENSSL_free(sinf->sig_oid);
648 sinf->sig_oid = NULL;
649 OPENSSL_free(sinf->hash_name);
650 sinf->hash_name = NULL;
651 OPENSSL_free(sinf->hash_oid);
652 sinf->hash_oid = NULL;
653 OPENSSL_free(sinf->keytype);
654 sinf->keytype = NULL;
655 OPENSSL_free(sinf->keytype_oid);
656 sinf->keytype_oid = NULL;
657 }
658 return ret;
659 }
660
discover_provider_sigalgs(OSSL_PROVIDER * provider,void * vctx)661 static int discover_provider_sigalgs(OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, void *vctx)
662 {
663 struct provider_ctx_data_st pgd;
664
665 pgd.ctx = vctx;
666 pgd.provider = provider;
667 OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider, "TLS-SIGALG",
668 add_provider_sigalgs, &pgd);
669 /*
670 * Always OK, even if provider doesn't support the capability:
671 * Reconsider testing retval when legacy sigalgs are also loaded this way.
672 */
673 return 1;
674 }
675
ssl_load_sigalgs(SSL_CTX * ctx)676 int ssl_load_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
677 {
678 size_t i;
679 SSL_CERT_LOOKUP lu;
680
681 if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx->libctx, discover_provider_sigalgs, ctx))
682 return 0;
683
684 /* now populate ctx->ssl_cert_info */
685 if (ctx->sigalg_list_len > 0) {
686 OPENSSL_free(ctx->ssl_cert_info);
687 ctx->ssl_cert_info = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(lu) * ctx->sigalg_list_len);
688 if (ctx->ssl_cert_info == NULL)
689 return 0;
690 for (i = 0; i < ctx->sigalg_list_len; i++) {
691 const char *keytype = inferred_keytype(&ctx->sigalg_list[i]);
692 ctx->ssl_cert_info[i].pkey_nid = OBJ_txt2nid(keytype);
693 ctx->ssl_cert_info[i].amask = SSL_aANY;
694 }
695 }
696
697 /*
698 * For now, leave it at this: legacy sigalgs stay in their own
699 * data structures until "legacy cleanup" occurs.
700 */
701
702 return 1;
703 }
704
tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX * ctx,const char * name)705 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
706 {
707 size_t i;
708
709 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
710 if (OPENSSL_strcasecmp(ctx->group_list[i].tlsname, name) == 0
711 || OPENSSL_strcasecmp(ctx->group_list[i].realname, name) == 0)
712 return ctx->group_list[i].group_id;
713 }
714
715 return 0;
716 }
717
tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX * ctx,uint16_t group_id)718 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t group_id)
719 {
720 size_t i;
721
722 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
723 if (ctx->group_list[i].group_id == group_id)
724 return &ctx->group_list[i];
725 }
726
727 return NULL;
728 }
729
tls1_group_id2name(SSL_CTX * ctx,uint16_t group_id)730 const char *tls1_group_id2name(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t group_id)
731 {
732 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls_group_info = tls1_group_id_lookup(ctx, group_id);
733
734 if (tls_group_info == NULL)
735 return NULL;
736
737 return tls_group_info->tlsname;
738 }
739
tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id,int include_unknown)740 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id, int include_unknown)
741 {
742 size_t i;
743
744 if (group_id == 0)
745 return NID_undef;
746
747 /*
748 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
749 * work for groups we don't know about.
750 */
751 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++) {
752 if (nid_to_group[i].group_id == group_id)
753 return nid_to_group[i].nid;
754 }
755 if (!include_unknown)
756 return NID_undef;
757 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown | (int)group_id;
758 }
759
tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)760 uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
761 {
762 size_t i;
763
764 /*
765 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
766 * work for groups we don't know about.
767 */
768 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++) {
769 if (nid_to_group[i].nid == nid)
770 return nid_to_group[i].group_id;
771 }
772
773 return 0;
774 }
775
776 /*
777 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
778 * the number of groups supported.
779 */
tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL_CONNECTION * s,const uint16_t ** pgroups,size_t * pgroupslen)780 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
781 size_t *pgroupslen)
782 {
783 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
784
785 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
786 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
787 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
788 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
789 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
790 break;
791
792 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
793 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
794 *pgroupslen = 1;
795 break;
796
797 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
798 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
799 *pgroupslen = 1;
800 break;
801
802 default:
803 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
804 *pgroups = sctx->ext.supportedgroups;
805 *pgroupslen = sctx->ext.supportedgroups_len;
806 } else {
807 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
808 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
809 }
810 break;
811 }
812 }
813
814 /*
815 * Some comments for the function below:
816 * s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL means legacy syntax (no [*,/,-]) from built-in group array.
817 * In this case, we need to send exactly one key share, which MUST be the first (leftmost)
818 * eligible group from the legacy list. Therefore, we provide the entire list of supported
819 * groups in this case.
820 *
821 * A 'flag' to indicate legacy syntax is created by setting the number of key shares to 1,
822 * but the groupID to 0.
823 * The 'flag' is checked right at the beginning in tls_construct_ctos_key_share and either
824 * the "list of requested key share groups" is used, or the "list of supported groups" in
825 * combination with setting add_only_one = 1 is applied.
826 */
tls1_get_requested_keyshare_groups(SSL_CONNECTION * s,const uint16_t ** pgroups,size_t * pgroupslen)827 void tls1_get_requested_keyshare_groups(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
828 size_t *pgroupslen)
829 {
830 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
831
832 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
833 *pgroups = sctx->ext.supportedgroups;
834 *pgroupslen = sctx->ext.supportedgroups_len;
835 } else {
836 *pgroups = s->ext.keyshares;
837 *pgroupslen = s->ext.keyshares_len;
838 }
839 }
840
tls1_get_group_tuples(SSL_CONNECTION * s,const size_t ** ptuples,size_t * ptupleslen)841 void tls1_get_group_tuples(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const size_t **ptuples,
842 size_t *ptupleslen)
843 {
844 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
845
846 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
847 *ptuples = sctx->ext.tuples;
848 *ptupleslen = sctx->ext.tuples_len;
849 } else {
850 *ptuples = s->ext.tuples;
851 *ptupleslen = s->ext.tuples_len;
852 }
853 }
854
tls_valid_group(SSL_CONNECTION * s,uint16_t group_id,int minversion,int maxversion,int isec,int * okfortls13)855 int tls_valid_group(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id,
856 int minversion, int maxversion,
857 int isec, int *okfortls13)
858 {
859 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
860 group_id);
861 int ret;
862 int group_minversion, group_maxversion;
863
864 if (okfortls13 != NULL)
865 *okfortls13 = 0;
866
867 if (ginfo == NULL)
868 return 0;
869
870 group_minversion = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? ginfo->mindtls : ginfo->mintls;
871 group_maxversion = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? ginfo->maxdtls : ginfo->maxtls;
872
873 if (group_minversion < 0 || group_maxversion < 0)
874 return 0;
875 if (group_maxversion == 0)
876 ret = 1;
877 else
878 ret = (ssl_version_cmp(s, minversion, group_maxversion) <= 0);
879 if (group_minversion > 0)
880 ret &= (ssl_version_cmp(s, maxversion, group_minversion) >= 0);
881
882 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
883 if (ret && okfortls13 != NULL && maxversion == TLS1_3_VERSION)
884 *okfortls13 = (group_maxversion == 0)
885 || (group_maxversion >= TLS1_3_VERSION);
886 }
887 ret &= !isec
888 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "EC") == 0
889 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "X25519") == 0
890 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "X448") == 0;
891
892 return ret;
893 }
894
895 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
tls_group_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION * s,uint16_t group,int op)896 int tls_group_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group, int op)
897 {
898 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
899 group);
900 unsigned char gtmp[2];
901
902 if (ginfo == NULL)
903 return 0;
904
905 gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
906 gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
907 return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits,
908 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo->group_id, 0), (void *)gtmp);
909 }
910
911 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
tls1_in_list(uint16_t id,const uint16_t * list,size_t listlen)912 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
913 {
914 size_t i;
915 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
916 if (list[i] == id)
917 return 1;
918 return 0;
919 }
920
921 typedef struct {
922 TLS_GROUP_INFO *grp;
923 size_t ix;
924 } TLS_GROUP_IX;
925
DEFINE_STACK_OF(TLS_GROUP_IX)926 DEFINE_STACK_OF(TLS_GROUP_IX)
927
928 static void free_wrapper(TLS_GROUP_IX *a)
929 {
930 OPENSSL_free(a);
931 }
932
tls_group_ix_cmp(const TLS_GROUP_IX * const * a,const TLS_GROUP_IX * const * b)933 static int tls_group_ix_cmp(const TLS_GROUP_IX *const *a,
934 const TLS_GROUP_IX *const *b)
935 {
936 int idcmpab = (*a)->grp->group_id < (*b)->grp->group_id;
937 int idcmpba = (*b)->grp->group_id < (*a)->grp->group_id;
938 int ixcmpab = (*a)->ix < (*b)->ix;
939 int ixcmpba = (*b)->ix < (*a)->ix;
940
941 /* Ascending by group id */
942 if (idcmpab != idcmpba)
943 return (idcmpba - idcmpab);
944 /* Ascending by original appearance index */
945 return ixcmpba - ixcmpab;
946 }
947
tls1_get0_implemented_groups(int min_proto_version,int max_proto_version,TLS_GROUP_INFO * grps,size_t num,long all,STACK_OF (OPENSSL_CSTRING)* out)948 int tls1_get0_implemented_groups(int min_proto_version, int max_proto_version,
949 TLS_GROUP_INFO *grps, size_t num, long all,
950 STACK_OF(OPENSSL_CSTRING) *out)
951 {
952 STACK_OF(TLS_GROUP_IX) *collect = NULL;
953 TLS_GROUP_IX *gix;
954 uint16_t id = 0;
955 int ret = 0;
956 size_t ix;
957
958 if (grps == NULL || out == NULL)
959 return 0;
960 if ((collect = sk_TLS_GROUP_IX_new(tls_group_ix_cmp)) == NULL)
961 return 0;
962 for (ix = 0; ix < num; ++ix, ++grps) {
963 if (grps->mintls > 0 && max_proto_version > 0
964 && grps->mintls > max_proto_version)
965 continue;
966 if (grps->maxtls > 0 && min_proto_version > 0
967 && grps->maxtls < min_proto_version)
968 continue;
969
970 if ((gix = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*gix))) == NULL)
971 goto end;
972 gix->grp = grps;
973 gix->ix = ix;
974 if (sk_TLS_GROUP_IX_push(collect, gix) <= 0) {
975 OPENSSL_free(gix);
976 goto end;
977 }
978 }
979
980 sk_TLS_GROUP_IX_sort(collect);
981 num = sk_TLS_GROUP_IX_num(collect);
982 for (ix = 0; ix < num; ++ix) {
983 gix = sk_TLS_GROUP_IX_value(collect, ix);
984 if (!all && gix->grp->group_id == id)
985 continue;
986 id = gix->grp->group_id;
987 if (sk_OPENSSL_CSTRING_push(out, gix->grp->tlsname) <= 0)
988 goto end;
989 }
990 ret = 1;
991
992 end:
993 sk_TLS_GROUP_IX_pop_free(collect, free_wrapper);
994 return ret;
995 }
996
997 /*-
998 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
999 * if there is no match.
1000 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
1001 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
1002 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
1003 */
tls1_shared_group(SSL_CONNECTION * s,int nmatch)1004 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int nmatch)
1005 {
1006 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
1007 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
1008 int k;
1009 SSL_CTX *ctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1010
1011 /* Can't do anything on client side */
1012 if (s->server == 0)
1013 return 0;
1014 if (nmatch == -2) {
1015 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1016 /*
1017 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
1018 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
1019 */
1020 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
1021
1022 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
1023 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1;
1024 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
1025 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1;
1026 /* Should never happen */
1027 return 0;
1028 }
1029 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
1030 nmatch = 0;
1031 }
1032 /*
1033 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
1034 * otherwise peer decides.
1035 */
1036 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
1037 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
1038 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
1039 } else {
1040 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
1041 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
1042 }
1043
1044 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
1045 uint16_t id = pref[i];
1046 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *inf;
1047 int minversion, maxversion;
1048
1049 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
1050 || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
1051 continue;
1052 inf = tls1_group_id_lookup(ctx, id);
1053 if (!ossl_assert(inf != NULL))
1054 return 0;
1055
1056 minversion = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1057 ? inf->mindtls
1058 : inf->mintls;
1059 maxversion = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1060 ? inf->maxdtls
1061 : inf->maxtls;
1062 if (maxversion == -1)
1063 continue;
1064 if ((minversion != 0 && ssl_version_cmp(s, s->version, minversion) < 0)
1065 || (maxversion != 0
1066 && ssl_version_cmp(s, s->version, maxversion) > 0))
1067 continue;
1068
1069 if (nmatch == k)
1070 return id;
1071 k++;
1072 }
1073 if (nmatch == -1)
1074 return k;
1075 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
1076 return 0;
1077 }
1078
tls1_set_groups(uint16_t ** grpext,size_t * grpextlen,uint16_t ** ksext,size_t * ksextlen,size_t ** tplext,size_t * tplextlen,int * groups,size_t ngroups)1079 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **grpext, size_t *grpextlen,
1080 uint16_t **ksext, size_t *ksextlen,
1081 size_t **tplext, size_t *tplextlen,
1082 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
1083 {
1084 uint16_t *glist = NULL, *kslist = NULL;
1085 size_t *tpllist = NULL;
1086 size_t i;
1087 /*
1088 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
1089 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
1090 */
1091 unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
1092 unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
1093 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
1094
1095 if (ngroups == 0) {
1096 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1097 return 0;
1098 }
1099 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL)
1100 goto err;
1101 if ((kslist = OPENSSL_malloc(1 * sizeof(*kslist))) == NULL)
1102 goto err;
1103 if ((tpllist = OPENSSL_malloc(1 * sizeof(*tpllist))) == NULL)
1104 goto err;
1105 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
1106 unsigned long idmask;
1107 uint16_t id;
1108 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
1109 if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
1110 goto err;
1111 idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
1112 dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
1113 if (!id || ((*dup_list) & idmask))
1114 goto err;
1115 *dup_list |= idmask;
1116 glist[i] = id;
1117 }
1118 OPENSSL_free(*grpext);
1119 OPENSSL_free(*ksext);
1120 OPENSSL_free(*tplext);
1121 *grpext = glist;
1122 *grpextlen = ngroups;
1123 /*
1124 * No * prefix was used, let tls_construct_ctos_key_share choose a key
1125 * share. This has the advantage that it will filter unsupported groups
1126 * before choosing one, which this function does not do. See also the
1127 * comment for tls1_get_requested_keyshare_groups.
1128 */
1129 kslist[0] = 0;
1130 *ksext = kslist;
1131 *ksextlen = 1;
1132 tpllist[0] = ngroups;
1133 *tplext = tpllist;
1134 *tplextlen = 1;
1135 return 1;
1136 err:
1137 OPENSSL_free(glist);
1138 OPENSSL_free(kslist);
1139 OPENSSL_free(tpllist);
1140 return 0;
1141 }
1142
1143 /*
1144 * Definition of DEFAULT[_XYZ] pseudo group names.
1145 * A pseudo group name is actually a full list of groups, including prefixes
1146 * and or tuple delimiters. It can be hierarchically defined (for potential future use).
1147 * IMPORTANT REMARK: For ease of use, in the built-in lists of groups, unknown groups or
1148 * groups not backed by a provider will always silently be ignored, even without '?' prefix
1149 */
1150 typedef struct {
1151 const char *list_name; /* The name of this pseudo group */
1152 const char *group_string; /* The group string of this pseudo group */
1153 } default_group_string_st; /* (can include '?', '*'. '-', '/' as needed) */
1154
1155 /* Built-in pseudo group-names must start with a (D or d) */
1156 static const char *DEFAULT_GROUPNAME_FIRST_CHARACTER = "D";
1157
1158 /* The list of all built-in pseudo-group-name structures */
1159 static const default_group_string_st default_group_strings[] = {
1160 { DEFAULT_GROUP_NAME, TLS_DEFAULT_GROUP_LIST },
1161 { SUITE_B_GROUP_NAME, SUITE_B_GROUP_LIST }
1162 };
1163
1164 /*
1165 * Some GOST names are not resolved by tls1_group_name2id,
1166 * hence we'll check for those manually
1167 */
1168 typedef struct {
1169 const char *group_name;
1170 uint16_t groupID;
1171 } name2id_st;
1172 static const name2id_st name2id_arr[] = {
1173 { "GC256A", OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A },
1174 { "GC256B", OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B },
1175 { "GC256C", OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C },
1176 { "GC256D", OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D },
1177 { "GC512A", OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A },
1178 { "GC512B", OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B },
1179 { "GC512C", OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C },
1180 };
1181
1182 /*
1183 * Group list management:
1184 * We establish three lists along with their related size counters:
1185 * 1) List of (unique) groups
1186 * 2) List of number of groups per group-priority-tuple
1187 * 3) List of (unique) key share groups
1188 */
1189 #define GROUPLIST_INCREMENT 32 /* Memory allocation chunk size (64 Bytes chunks ~= cache line) */
1190 #define GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH 64 /* Max length of a group name */
1191
1192 /*
1193 * Preparation of the prefix used to indicate the desire to send a key share,
1194 * the characters used as separators between groups or tuples of groups, the
1195 * character to indicate that an unknown group should be ignored, and the
1196 * character to indicate that a group should be deleted from a list
1197 */
1198 #ifndef TUPLE_DELIMITER_CHARACTER
1199 /* The prefix characters to indicate group tuple boundaries */
1200 #define TUPLE_DELIMITER_CHARACTER '/'
1201 #endif
1202 #ifndef GROUP_DELIMITER_CHARACTER
1203 /* The prefix characters to indicate group tuple boundaries */
1204 #define GROUP_DELIMITER_CHARACTER ':'
1205 #endif
1206 #ifndef IGNORE_UNKNOWN_GROUP_CHARACTER
1207 /* The prefix character to ignore unknown groups */
1208 #define IGNORE_UNKNOWN_GROUP_CHARACTER '?'
1209 #endif
1210 #ifndef KEY_SHARE_INDICATOR_CHARACTER
1211 /* The prefix character to trigger a key share addition */
1212 #define KEY_SHARE_INDICATOR_CHARACTER '*'
1213 #endif
1214 #ifndef REMOVE_GROUP_INDICATOR_CHARACTER
1215 /* The prefix character to trigger a key share removal */
1216 #define REMOVE_GROUP_INDICATOR_CHARACTER '-'
1217 #endif
1218 static const char prefixes[] = { TUPLE_DELIMITER_CHARACTER,
1219 GROUP_DELIMITER_CHARACTER,
1220 IGNORE_UNKNOWN_GROUP_CHARACTER,
1221 KEY_SHARE_INDICATOR_CHARACTER,
1222 REMOVE_GROUP_INDICATOR_CHARACTER,
1223 '\0' };
1224
1225 /*
1226 * High-level description of how group strings are analyzed:
1227 * A first call back function (tuple_cb) is used to process group tuples, and a
1228 * second callback function (gid_cb) is used to process the groups inside a tuple.
1229 * Those callback functions are (indirectly) called by CONF_parse_list with
1230 * different separators (nominally ':' or '/'), a variable based on gid_cb_st
1231 * is used to keep track of the parsing results between the various calls
1232 */
1233
1234 typedef struct {
1235 SSL_CTX *ctx;
1236 /* Variables to hold the three lists (groups, requested keyshares, tuple structure) */
1237 size_t gidmax; /* The memory allocation chunk size for the group IDs */
1238 size_t gidcnt; /* Number of groups */
1239 uint16_t *gid_arr; /* The IDs of the supported groups (flat list) */
1240 size_t tplmax; /* The memory allocation chunk size for the tuple counters */
1241 size_t tplcnt; /* Number of tuples */
1242 size_t *tuplcnt_arr; /* The number of groups inside a tuple */
1243 size_t ksidmax; /* The memory allocation chunk size */
1244 size_t ksidcnt; /* Number of key shares */
1245 uint16_t *ksid_arr; /* The IDs of the key share groups (flat list) */
1246 /* Variable to keep state between execution of callback or helper functions */
1247 int inner; /* Are we expanding a DEFAULT list */
1248 int first; /* First tuple of possibly nested expansion? */
1249 } gid_cb_st;
1250
1251 /* Forward declaration of tuple callback function */
1252 static int tuple_cb(const char *tuple, int len, void *arg);
1253
1254 /*
1255 * Extract and process the individual groups (and their prefixes if present)
1256 * present in a tuple. Note: The argument 'elem' is a NON-\0-terminated string
1257 * and must be appended by a \0 if used as \0-terminated string
1258 */
gid_cb(const char * elem,int len,void * arg)1259 static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
1260 {
1261 gid_cb_st *garg = arg;
1262 size_t i, j, k;
1263 uint16_t gid = 0;
1264 int found_group = 0;
1265 char etmp[GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH];
1266 int retval = 1; /* We assume success */
1267 const char *current_prefix;
1268 int ignore_unknown = 0;
1269 int add_keyshare = 0;
1270 int remove_group = 0;
1271 size_t restored_prefix_index = 0;
1272 char *restored_default_group_string;
1273 int continue_while_loop = 1;
1274
1275 /* Sanity checks */
1276 if (garg == NULL || elem == NULL || len <= 0) {
1277 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONFIG_VALUE);
1278 return 0;
1279 }
1280
1281 /* Check the possible prefixes (remark: Leading and trailing spaces already cleared) */
1282 while (continue_while_loop && len > 0
1283 && ((current_prefix = strchr(prefixes, elem[0])) != NULL
1284 || OPENSSL_strncasecmp(current_prefix = (char *)DEFAULT_GROUPNAME_FIRST_CHARACTER, elem, 1) == 0)) {
1285
1286 switch (*current_prefix) {
1287 case TUPLE_DELIMITER_CHARACTER:
1288 /* tuple delimiter not allowed here -> syntax error */
1289 return -1;
1290 break;
1291 case GROUP_DELIMITER_CHARACTER:
1292 return -1; /* Not a valid prefix for a single group name-> syntax error */
1293 break;
1294 case KEY_SHARE_INDICATOR_CHARACTER:
1295 if (add_keyshare)
1296 return -1; /* Only single key share prefix allowed -> syntax error */
1297 add_keyshare = 1;
1298 ++elem;
1299 --len;
1300 break;
1301 case REMOVE_GROUP_INDICATOR_CHARACTER:
1302 if (remove_group)
1303 return -1; /* Only single remove group prefix allowed -> syntax error */
1304 remove_group = 1;
1305 ++elem;
1306 --len;
1307 break;
1308 case IGNORE_UNKNOWN_GROUP_CHARACTER:
1309 if (ignore_unknown)
1310 return -1; /* Only single ? allowed -> syntax error */
1311 ignore_unknown = 1;
1312 ++elem;
1313 --len;
1314 break;
1315 default:
1316 /*
1317 * Check whether a DEFAULT[_XYZ] 'pseudo group' (= a built-in
1318 * list of groups) should be added
1319 */
1320 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(default_group_strings); i++) {
1321 if ((size_t)len == (strlen(default_group_strings[i].list_name))
1322 && OPENSSL_strncasecmp(default_group_strings[i].list_name, elem, len) == 0) {
1323 int saved_first;
1324
1325 /*
1326 * We're asked to insert an entire list of groups from a
1327 * DEFAULT[_XYZ] 'pseudo group' which we do by
1328 * recursively calling this function (indirectly via
1329 * CONF_parse_list and tuple_cb); essentially, we treat a DEFAULT
1330 * group string like a tuple which is appended to the current tuple
1331 * rather then starting a new tuple.
1332 */
1333 if (ignore_unknown || remove_group)
1334 return -1; /* removal or ignore not allowed here -> syntax error */
1335
1336 /*
1337 * First, we restore any keyshare prefix in a new zero-terminated string
1338 * (if not already present)
1339 */
1340 restored_default_group_string = OPENSSL_malloc((1 /* max prefix length */ + strlen(default_group_strings[i].group_string) + 1 /* \0 */) * sizeof(char));
1341 if (restored_default_group_string == NULL)
1342 return 0;
1343 if (add_keyshare
1344 /* Remark: we tolerate a duplicated keyshare indicator here */
1345 && default_group_strings[i].group_string[0]
1346 != KEY_SHARE_INDICATOR_CHARACTER)
1347 restored_default_group_string[restored_prefix_index++] = KEY_SHARE_INDICATOR_CHARACTER;
1348
1349 memcpy(restored_default_group_string + restored_prefix_index,
1350 default_group_strings[i].group_string,
1351 strlen(default_group_strings[i].group_string));
1352 restored_default_group_string[strlen(default_group_strings[i].group_string) + restored_prefix_index] = '\0';
1353 /*
1354 * Append first tuple of result to current tuple, and don't
1355 * terminate the last tuple until we return to a top-level
1356 * tuple_cb.
1357 */
1358 saved_first = garg->first;
1359 garg->inner = garg->first = 1;
1360 retval = CONF_parse_list(restored_default_group_string,
1361 TUPLE_DELIMITER_CHARACTER, 1, tuple_cb, garg);
1362 garg->inner = 0;
1363 garg->first = saved_first;
1364 /* We don't need the \0-terminated string anymore */
1365 OPENSSL_free(restored_default_group_string);
1366
1367 return retval;
1368 }
1369 }
1370 /*
1371 * If we reached this point, a group name started with a 'd' or 'D', but no request
1372 * for a DEFAULT[_XYZ] 'pseudo group' was detected, hence processing of the group
1373 * name can continue as usual (= the while loop checking prefixes can end)
1374 */
1375 continue_while_loop = 0;
1376 break;
1377 }
1378 }
1379
1380 if (len == 0)
1381 return -1; /* Seems we have prefxes without a group name -> syntax error */
1382
1383 /* Memory management in case more groups are present compared to initial allocation */
1384 if (garg->gidcnt == garg->gidmax) {
1385 uint16_t *tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(garg->gid_arr,
1386 (garg->gidmax + GROUPLIST_INCREMENT) * sizeof(*garg->gid_arr));
1387
1388 if (tmp == NULL)
1389 return 0;
1390
1391 garg->gidmax += GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
1392 garg->gid_arr = tmp;
1393 }
1394 /* Memory management for key share groups */
1395 if (garg->ksidcnt == garg->ksidmax) {
1396 uint16_t *tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(garg->ksid_arr,
1397 (garg->ksidmax + GROUPLIST_INCREMENT) * sizeof(*garg->ksid_arr));
1398
1399 if (tmp == NULL)
1400 return 0;
1401 garg->ksidmax += GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
1402 garg->ksid_arr = tmp;
1403 }
1404
1405 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
1406 return -1; /* group name to long -> syntax error */
1407
1408 /*
1409 * Prepare addition or removal of a single group by converting
1410 * a group name into its groupID equivalent
1411 */
1412
1413 /* Create a \0-terminated string and get the gid for this group if possible */
1414 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
1415 etmp[len] = 0;
1416
1417 /* Get the groupID */
1418 gid = tls1_group_name2id(garg->ctx, etmp);
1419 /*
1420 * Handle the case where no valid groupID was returned
1421 * e.g. for an unknown group, which we'd ignore (only) if relevant prefix was set
1422 */
1423 if (gid == 0) {
1424 /* Is it one of the GOST groups ? */
1425 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(name2id_arr); i++) {
1426 if (OPENSSL_strcasecmp(etmp, name2id_arr[i].group_name) == 0) {
1427 gid = name2id_arr[i].groupID;
1428 break;
1429 }
1430 }
1431 if (gid == 0) { /* still not found */
1432 /* Unknown group - ignore if ignore_unknown; trigger error otherwise */
1433 retval = ignore_unknown;
1434 goto done;
1435 }
1436 }
1437
1438 /* Make sure that at least one provider is supporting this groupID */
1439 found_group = 0;
1440 for (j = 0; j < garg->ctx->group_list_len; j++)
1441 if (garg->ctx->group_list[j].group_id == gid) {
1442 found_group = 1;
1443 break;
1444 }
1445
1446 /*
1447 * No provider supports this group - ignore if
1448 * ignore_unknown; trigger error otherwise
1449 */
1450 if (found_group == 0) {
1451 retval = ignore_unknown;
1452 goto done;
1453 }
1454 /* Remove group (and keyshare) from anywhere in the list if present, ignore if not present */
1455 if (remove_group) {
1456 /* Is the current group specified anywhere in the entire list so far? */
1457 found_group = 0;
1458 for (i = 0; i < garg->gidcnt; i++)
1459 if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid) {
1460 found_group = 1;
1461 break;
1462 }
1463 /* The group to remove is at position i in the list of (zero indexed) groups */
1464 if (found_group) {
1465 /* We remove that group from its position (which is at i)... */
1466 for (j = i; j < (garg->gidcnt - 1); j++)
1467 garg->gid_arr[j] = garg->gid_arr[j + 1]; /* ...shift remaining groups left ... */
1468 garg->gidcnt--; /* ..and update the book keeping for the number of groups */
1469
1470 /*
1471 * We also must update the number of groups either in a previous tuple (which we
1472 * must identify and check whether it becomes empty due to the deletion) or in
1473 * the current tuple, pending where the deleted group resides
1474 */
1475 k = 0;
1476 for (j = 0; j < garg->tplcnt; j++) {
1477 k += garg->tuplcnt_arr[j];
1478 /* Remark: i is zero-indexed, k is one-indexed */
1479 if (k > i) { /* remove from one of the previous tuples */
1480 garg->tuplcnt_arr[j]--;
1481 break; /* We took care not to have group duplicates, hence we can stop here */
1482 }
1483 }
1484 if (k <= i) /* remove from current tuple */
1485 garg->tuplcnt_arr[j]--;
1486
1487 /* We also remove the group from the list of keyshares (if present) */
1488 found_group = 0;
1489 for (i = 0; i < garg->ksidcnt; i++)
1490 if (garg->ksid_arr[i] == gid) {
1491 found_group = 1;
1492 break;
1493 }
1494 if (found_group) {
1495 /* Found, hence we remove that keyshare from its position (which is at i)... */
1496 for (j = i; j < (garg->ksidcnt - 1); j++)
1497 garg->ksid_arr[j] = garg->ksid_arr[j + 1]; /* shift remaining key shares */
1498 /* ... and update the book keeping */
1499 garg->ksidcnt--;
1500 }
1501 }
1502 } else { /* Processing addition of a single new group */
1503
1504 /* Check for duplicates */
1505 for (i = 0; i < garg->gidcnt; i++)
1506 if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid) {
1507 /* Duplicate group anywhere in the list of groups - ignore */
1508 goto done;
1509 }
1510
1511 /* Add the current group to the 'flat' list of groups */
1512 garg->gid_arr[garg->gidcnt++] = gid;
1513 /* and update the book keeping for the number of groups in current tuple */
1514 garg->tuplcnt_arr[garg->tplcnt]++;
1515
1516 /* We want to add a key share for the current group */
1517 if (add_keyshare)
1518 garg->ksid_arr[garg->ksidcnt++] = gid;
1519 }
1520
1521 done:
1522 return retval;
1523 }
1524
grow_tuples(gid_cb_st * garg)1525 static int grow_tuples(gid_cb_st *garg)
1526 {
1527 static size_t max_tplcnt = (~(size_t)0) / sizeof(size_t);
1528
1529 /* This uses OPENSSL_realloc_array() in newer releases */
1530 if (garg->tplcnt == garg->tplmax) {
1531 size_t newcnt = garg->tplmax + GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
1532 size_t newsz = newcnt * sizeof(size_t);
1533 size_t *tmp;
1534
1535 if (newsz > max_tplcnt
1536 || (tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(garg->tuplcnt_arr, newsz)) == NULL)
1537 return 0;
1538
1539 garg->tplmax = newcnt;
1540 garg->tuplcnt_arr = tmp;
1541 }
1542 return 1;
1543 }
1544
close_tuple(gid_cb_st * garg)1545 static int close_tuple(gid_cb_st *garg)
1546 {
1547 size_t gidcnt = garg->tuplcnt_arr[garg->tplcnt];
1548
1549 if (gidcnt == 0)
1550 return 1;
1551 if (!grow_tuples(garg))
1552 return 0;
1553
1554 garg->tuplcnt_arr[++garg->tplcnt] = 0;
1555 return 1;
1556 }
1557
1558 /* Extract and process a tuple of groups */
tuple_cb(const char * tuple,int len,void * arg)1559 static int tuple_cb(const char *tuple, int len, void *arg)
1560 {
1561 gid_cb_st *garg = arg;
1562 int retval = 1; /* We assume success */
1563 char *restored_tuple_string;
1564
1565 /* Sanity checks */
1566 if (garg == NULL || tuple == NULL || len <= 0) {
1567 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONFIG_VALUE);
1568 return 0;
1569 }
1570
1571 if (garg->inner && !garg->first && !close_tuple(garg))
1572 return 0;
1573 garg->first = 0;
1574
1575 /* Convert to \0-terminated string */
1576 restored_tuple_string = OPENSSL_malloc((len + 1 /* \0 */) * sizeof(char));
1577 if (restored_tuple_string == NULL)
1578 return 0;
1579 memcpy(restored_tuple_string, tuple, len);
1580 restored_tuple_string[len] = '\0';
1581
1582 /* Analyze group list of this tuple */
1583 retval = CONF_parse_list(restored_tuple_string, GROUP_DELIMITER_CHARACTER, 1, gid_cb, arg);
1584
1585 /* We don't need the \o-terminated string anymore */
1586 OPENSSL_free(restored_tuple_string);
1587
1588 if (!garg->inner && !close_tuple(garg))
1589 return 0;
1590 return retval;
1591 }
1592
1593 /*
1594 * Set groups and prepare generation of keyshares based on a string of groupnames,
1595 * names separated by the group or the tuple delimiter, with per-group prefixes to
1596 * (1) add a key share for this group, (2) ignore the group if unknown to the current
1597 * context, (3) delete a previous occurrence of the group in the current tuple.
1598 *
1599 * The list parsing is done in two hierarchical steps: The top-level step extracts the
1600 * string of a tuple using tuple_cb, while the next lower step uses gid_cb to
1601 * parse and process the groups inside a tuple
1602 */
tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX * ctx,uint16_t ** grpext,size_t * grpextlen,uint16_t ** ksext,size_t * ksextlen,size_t ** tplext,size_t * tplextlen,const char * str)1603 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,
1604 uint16_t **grpext, size_t *grpextlen,
1605 uint16_t **ksext, size_t *ksextlen,
1606 size_t **tplext, size_t *tplextlen,
1607 const char *str)
1608 {
1609 size_t i = 0, j;
1610 int ret = 0, parse_ret = 0;
1611 gid_cb_st gcb;
1612
1613 /* Sanity check */
1614 if (ctx == NULL) {
1615 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
1616 return 0;
1617 }
1618
1619 memset(&gcb, 0, sizeof(gcb));
1620 gcb.gidmax = GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
1621 gcb.tplmax = GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
1622 gcb.ksidmax = GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
1623 gcb.ctx = ctx;
1624
1625 /* Prepare initial chunks of memory for groups, tuples and keyshares groupIDs */
1626 gcb.gid_arr = OPENSSL_malloc(gcb.gidmax * sizeof(*gcb.gid_arr));
1627 if (gcb.gid_arr == NULL)
1628 goto end;
1629 gcb.tuplcnt_arr = OPENSSL_malloc(gcb.tplmax * sizeof(*gcb.tuplcnt_arr));
1630 if (gcb.tuplcnt_arr == NULL)
1631 goto end;
1632 gcb.tuplcnt_arr[0] = 0;
1633 gcb.ksid_arr = OPENSSL_malloc(gcb.ksidmax * sizeof(*gcb.ksid_arr));
1634 if (gcb.ksid_arr == NULL)
1635 goto end;
1636
1637 while (str[0] != '\0' && isspace((unsigned char)*str))
1638 str++;
1639 if (str[0] == '\0')
1640 goto empty_list;
1641
1642 /*
1643 * Start the (potentially recursive) tuple processing by calling CONF_parse_list
1644 * with the TUPLE_DELIMITER_CHARACTER (which will call tuple_cb after cleaning spaces)
1645 */
1646 parse_ret = CONF_parse_list(str, TUPLE_DELIMITER_CHARACTER, 1, tuple_cb, &gcb);
1647
1648 if (parse_ret == 0)
1649 goto end;
1650 if (parse_ret == -1) {
1651 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
1652 "Syntax error in '%s'", str);
1653 goto end;
1654 }
1655
1656 /*
1657 * We check whether a tuple was completely emptied by using "-" prefix
1658 * excessively, in which case we remove the tuple
1659 */
1660 for (i = j = 0; j < gcb.tplcnt; j++) {
1661 if (gcb.tuplcnt_arr[j] == 0)
1662 continue;
1663 /* If there's a gap, move to first unfilled slot */
1664 if (j == i)
1665 ++i;
1666 else
1667 gcb.tuplcnt_arr[i++] = gcb.tuplcnt_arr[j];
1668 }
1669 gcb.tplcnt = i;
1670
1671 if (gcb.ksidcnt > OPENSSL_CLIENT_MAX_KEY_SHARES) {
1672 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
1673 "To many keyshares requested in '%s' (max = %d)",
1674 str, OPENSSL_CLIENT_MAX_KEY_SHARES);
1675 goto end;
1676 }
1677
1678 /*
1679 * For backward compatibility we let the rest of the code know that a key share
1680 * for the first valid group should be added if no "*" prefix was used anywhere
1681 */
1682 if (gcb.gidcnt > 0 && gcb.ksidcnt == 0) {
1683 /*
1684 * No key share group prefix character was used, hence we indicate that a single
1685 * key share should be sent and flag that it should come from the supported_groups list
1686 */
1687 gcb.ksidcnt = 1;
1688 gcb.ksid_arr[0] = 0;
1689 }
1690
1691 empty_list:
1692 /*
1693 * A call to tls1_set_groups_list with any of the args (other than ctx) set
1694 * to NULL only does a syntax check, hence we're done here and report success
1695 */
1696 if (grpext == NULL || ksext == NULL || tplext == NULL || grpextlen == NULL || ksextlen == NULL || tplextlen == NULL) {
1697 ret = 1;
1698 goto end;
1699 }
1700
1701 /*
1702 * tuple_cb and gid_cb combo ensures there are no duplicates or unknown groups so we
1703 * can just go ahead and set the results (after disposing the existing)
1704 */
1705 OPENSSL_free(*grpext);
1706 *grpext = gcb.gid_arr;
1707 *grpextlen = gcb.gidcnt;
1708 OPENSSL_free(*ksext);
1709 *ksext = gcb.ksid_arr;
1710 *ksextlen = gcb.ksidcnt;
1711 OPENSSL_free(*tplext);
1712 *tplext = gcb.tuplcnt_arr;
1713 *tplextlen = gcb.tplcnt;
1714
1715 return 1;
1716
1717 end:
1718 OPENSSL_free(gcb.gid_arr);
1719 OPENSSL_free(gcb.tuplcnt_arr);
1720 OPENSSL_free(gcb.ksid_arr);
1721 return ret;
1722 }
1723
1724 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
tls1_check_group_id(SSL_CONNECTION * s,uint16_t group_id,int check_own_groups)1725 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id,
1726 int check_own_groups)
1727 {
1728 const uint16_t *groups;
1729 size_t groups_len;
1730
1731 if (group_id == 0)
1732 return 0;
1733
1734 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
1735 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
1736 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
1737
1738 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
1739 if (group_id != OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1)
1740 return 0;
1741 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
1742 if (group_id != OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1)
1743 return 0;
1744 } else {
1745 /* Should never happen */
1746 return 0;
1747 }
1748 }
1749
1750 if (check_own_groups) {
1751 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
1752 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
1753 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
1754 return 0;
1755 }
1756
1757 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
1758 return 0;
1759
1760 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
1761 if (!s->server)
1762 return 1;
1763
1764 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
1765 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
1766
1767 /*
1768 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
1769 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
1770 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
1771 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
1772 */
1773 if (groups_len == 0)
1774 return 1;
1775 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
1776 }
1777
tls1_get_formatlist(SSL_CONNECTION * s,const unsigned char ** pformats,size_t * num_formats)1778 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
1779 size_t *num_formats)
1780 {
1781 /*
1782 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
1783 */
1784 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
1785 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
1786 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
1787 } else {
1788 *pformats = ecformats_default;
1789 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
1790 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1791 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
1792 else
1793 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
1794 }
1795 }
1796
1797 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL_CONNECTION * s,EVP_PKEY * pkey)1798 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1799 {
1800 unsigned char comp_id;
1801 size_t i;
1802 int point_conv;
1803
1804 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
1805 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
1806 return 1;
1807
1808 /* Get required compression id */
1809 point_conv = EVP_PKEY_get_ec_point_conv_form(pkey);
1810 if (point_conv == 0)
1811 return 0;
1812 if (point_conv == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
1813 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1814 } else if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1815 /*
1816 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
1817 * this check.
1818 */
1819 return 1;
1820 } else {
1821 int field_type = EVP_PKEY_get_field_type(pkey);
1822
1823 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
1824 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1825 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
1826 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1827 else
1828 return 0;
1829 }
1830 /*
1831 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
1832 * supported (see RFC4492).
1833 */
1834 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
1835 return 1;
1836
1837 for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
1838 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
1839 return 1;
1840 }
1841 return 0;
1842 }
1843
1844 /* Return group id of a key */
tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY * pkey)1845 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1846 {
1847 int curve_nid = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey);
1848
1849 if (curve_nid == NID_undef)
1850 return 0;
1851 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid);
1852 }
1853
1854 /*
1855 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
1856 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
1857 */
tls1_check_cert_param(SSL_CONNECTION * s,X509 * x,int check_ee_md)1858 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
1859 {
1860 uint16_t group_id;
1861 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1862 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1863 if (pkey == NULL)
1864 return 0;
1865 /* If not EC nothing to do */
1866 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
1867 return 1;
1868 /* Check compression */
1869 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
1870 return 0;
1871 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
1872 /*
1873 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
1874 * groups.
1875 */
1876 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
1877 return 0;
1878 /*
1879 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
1880 * SHA384+P-384.
1881 */
1882 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1883 int check_md;
1884 size_t i;
1885
1886 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
1887 if (group_id == OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1)
1888 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
1889 else if (group_id == OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1)
1890 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
1891 else
1892 return 0; /* Should never happen */
1893 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1894 if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
1895 return 1;
1896 }
1897 return 0;
1898 }
1899 return 1;
1900 }
1901
1902 /*
1903 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
1904 * @s: SSL connection
1905 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
1906 *
1907 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
1908 * is compatible with the client extensions.
1909 *
1910 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
1911 */
tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL_CONNECTION * s,unsigned long cid)1912 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned long cid)
1913 {
1914 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
1915 if (!tls1_suiteb(s))
1916 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
1917 /*
1918 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
1919 * curves permitted.
1920 */
1921 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
1922 return tls1_check_group_id(s, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1, 1);
1923 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
1924 return tls1_check_group_id(s, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1, 1);
1925
1926 return 0;
1927 }
1928
1929 /* Default sigalg schemes */
1930 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
1931 TLSEXT_SIGALG_mldsa65,
1932 TLSEXT_SIGALG_mldsa87,
1933 TLSEXT_SIGALG_mldsa44,
1934 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1935 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
1936 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
1937 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
1938 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
1939 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256,
1940 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384,
1941 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512,
1942
1943 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
1944 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
1945 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
1946 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1947 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1948 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1949
1950 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1951 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1952 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1953
1954 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1955 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1956
1957 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1958 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1959
1960 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1961 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1962
1963 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1964 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1965 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1966
1967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1968 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1969 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1970 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1971 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1972 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1973 #endif
1974 };
1975
1976 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1977 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1978 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1979 };
1980
1981 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
1982 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256_name,
1983 "ECDSA+SHA256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1984 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1985 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1, 0,
1986 TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0 },
1987 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384_name,
1988 "ECDSA+SHA384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
1989 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1990 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1, 1, 0,
1991 TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0 },
1992 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512_name,
1993 "ECDSA+SHA512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
1994 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1995 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1, 1, 0,
1996 TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0 },
1997
1998 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519_name,
1999 NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
2000 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
2001 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2002 TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0 },
2003 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448_name,
2004 NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
2005 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
2006 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2007 TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0 },
2008
2009 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224_name,
2010 "ECDSA+SHA224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
2011 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
2012 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2013 TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION },
2014 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1_name,
2015 "ECDSA+SHA1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
2016 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
2017 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2018 TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION },
2019
2020 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256_name,
2021 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256_alias,
2022 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256,
2023 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
2024 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_brainpoolP256r1, 1, 0,
2025 TLS1_3_VERSION, 0, -1, -1 },
2026 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384_name,
2027 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384_alias,
2028 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384,
2029 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
2030 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_brainpoolP384r1, 1, 0,
2031 TLS1_3_VERSION, 0, -1, -1 },
2032 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512_name,
2033 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512_alias,
2034 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512,
2035 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
2036 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_brainpoolP512r1, 1, 0,
2037 TLS1_3_VERSION, 0, -1, -1 },
2038
2039 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256_name,
2040 "PSS+SHA256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
2041 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
2042 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2043 TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0 },
2044 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384_name,
2045 "PSS+SHA384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
2046 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
2047 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2048 TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0 },
2049 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512_name,
2050 "PSS+SHA512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
2051 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
2052 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2053 TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0 },
2054
2055 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256_name,
2056 NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
2057 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
2058 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2059 TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0 },
2060 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384_name,
2061 NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
2062 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
2063 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2064 TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0 },
2065 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512_name,
2066 NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
2067 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
2068 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2069 TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0 },
2070
2071 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256_name,
2072 "RSA+SHA256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
2073 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
2074 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2075 TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0 },
2076 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384_name,
2077 "RSA+SHA384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
2078 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
2079 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2080 TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0 },
2081 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512_name,
2082 "RSA+SHA512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
2083 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
2084 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2085 TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0 },
2086
2087 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224_name,
2088 "RSA+SHA224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
2089 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
2090 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2091 TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION },
2092 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1_name,
2093 "RSA+SHA1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
2094 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
2095 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2096 TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION },
2097
2098 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256_name,
2099 "DSA+SHA256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
2100 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
2101 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2102 TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION },
2103 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384_name,
2104 "DSA+SHA384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
2105 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
2106 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2107 TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION },
2108 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512_name,
2109 "DSA+SHA512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
2110 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
2111 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2112 TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION },
2113 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224_name,
2114 "DSA+SHA224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
2115 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
2116 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2117 TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION },
2118 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1_name,
2119 "DSA+SHA1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
2120 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
2121 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2122 TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION },
2123
2124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2125 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic_alias, /* RFC9189 */
2126 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic_name,
2127 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
2128 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
2129 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
2130 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2131 TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION },
2132 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic_alias, /* RFC9189 */
2133 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic_name,
2134 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
2135 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
2136 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
2137 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2138 TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION },
2139
2140 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256_name,
2141 NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
2142 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
2143 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
2144 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2145 TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION },
2146 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512_name,
2147 NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
2148 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
2149 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
2150 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2151 TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION },
2152 { TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411_name,
2153 NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
2154 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
2155 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
2156 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2157 TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION },
2158 #endif
2159 };
2160 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
2161 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
2162 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", NULL, 0,
2163 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
2164 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
2165 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1, 0,
2166 TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION
2167 };
2168
2169 /*
2170 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
2171 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
2172 */
2173 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
2174 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
2175 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
2176 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
2177 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
2178 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
2179 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
2180 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
2181 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
2182 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
2183 };
2184
ssl_setup_sigalgs(SSL_CTX * ctx)2185 int ssl_setup_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
2186 {
2187 size_t i, cache_idx, sigalgs_len, enabled;
2188 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2189 SIGALG_LOOKUP *cache = NULL;
2190 uint16_t *tls12_sigalgs_list = NULL;
2191 EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2192 int istls;
2193 int ret = 0;
2194
2195 if (ctx == NULL)
2196 goto err;
2197
2198 istls = !SSL_CTX_IS_DTLS(ctx);
2199
2200 sigalgs_len = OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) + ctx->sigalg_list_len;
2201
2202 cache = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(const SIGALG_LOOKUP) * sigalgs_len);
2203 if (cache == NULL || tmpkey == NULL)
2204 goto err;
2205
2206 tls12_sigalgs_list = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * sigalgs_len);
2207 if (tls12_sigalgs_list == NULL)
2208 goto err;
2209
2210 ERR_set_mark();
2211 /* First fill cache and tls12_sigalgs list from legacy algorithm list */
2212 for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2213 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
2214 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
2215
2216 cache[i] = *lu;
2217
2218 /*
2219 * Check hash is available.
2220 * This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
2221 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
2222 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
2223 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
2224 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
2225 */
2226 if (lu->hash != NID_undef
2227 && ctx->ssl_digest_methods[lu->hash_idx] == NULL) {
2228 cache[i].available = 0;
2229 continue;
2230 }
2231
2232 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey, lu->sig)) {
2233 cache[i].available = 0;
2234 continue;
2235 }
2236 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx->libctx, tmpkey, ctx->propq);
2237 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
2238 if (pctx == NULL)
2239 cache[i].available = 0;
2240 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2241 }
2242
2243 /* Now complete cache and tls12_sigalgs list with provider sig information */
2244 cache_idx = OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2245 for (i = 0; i < ctx->sigalg_list_len; i++) {
2246 TLS_SIGALG_INFO si = ctx->sigalg_list[i];
2247 cache[cache_idx].name = si.name;
2248 cache[cache_idx].name12 = si.sigalg_name;
2249 cache[cache_idx].sigalg = si.code_point;
2250 tls12_sigalgs_list[cache_idx] = si.code_point;
2251 cache[cache_idx].hash = si.hash_name ? OBJ_txt2nid(si.hash_name) : NID_undef;
2252 cache[cache_idx].hash_idx = ssl_get_md_idx(cache[cache_idx].hash);
2253 cache[cache_idx].sig = OBJ_txt2nid(si.sigalg_name);
2254 cache[cache_idx].sig_idx = i + SSL_PKEY_NUM;
2255 cache[cache_idx].sigandhash = OBJ_txt2nid(si.sigalg_name);
2256 cache[cache_idx].curve = NID_undef;
2257 cache[cache_idx].mintls = TLS1_3_VERSION;
2258 cache[cache_idx].maxtls = TLS1_3_VERSION;
2259 cache[cache_idx].mindtls = -1;
2260 cache[cache_idx].maxdtls = -1;
2261 /* Compatibility with TLS 1.3 is checked on load */
2262 cache[cache_idx].available = istls;
2263 cache[cache_idx].advertise = 0;
2264 cache_idx++;
2265 }
2266 ERR_pop_to_mark();
2267
2268 enabled = 0;
2269 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs); ++i) {
2270 SIGALG_LOOKUP *ent = cache;
2271 size_t j;
2272
2273 for (j = 0; j < sigalgs_len; ent++, j++) {
2274 if (ent->sigalg != tls12_sigalgs[i])
2275 continue;
2276 /* Dedup by marking cache entry as default enabled. */
2277 if (ent->available && !ent->advertise) {
2278 ent->advertise = 1;
2279 tls12_sigalgs_list[enabled++] = tls12_sigalgs[i];
2280 }
2281 break;
2282 }
2283 }
2284
2285 /* Append any provider sigalgs not yet handled */
2286 for (i = OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); i < sigalgs_len; ++i) {
2287 SIGALG_LOOKUP *ent = &cache[i];
2288
2289 if (ent->available && !ent->advertise)
2290 tls12_sigalgs_list[enabled++] = ent->sigalg;
2291 }
2292
2293 ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache = cache;
2294 ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache_len = sigalgs_len;
2295 ctx->tls12_sigalgs = tls12_sigalgs_list;
2296 ctx->tls12_sigalgs_len = enabled;
2297 cache = NULL;
2298 tls12_sigalgs_list = NULL;
2299
2300 ret = 1;
2301 err:
2302 OPENSSL_free(cache);
2303 OPENSSL_free(tls12_sigalgs_list);
2304 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey);
2305 return ret;
2306 }
2307
2308 #define SIGLEN_BUF_INCREMENT 100
2309
SSL_get1_builtin_sigalgs(OSSL_LIB_CTX * libctx)2310 char *SSL_get1_builtin_sigalgs(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
2311 {
2312 size_t i, maxretlen = SIGLEN_BUF_INCREMENT;
2313 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2314 EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2315 char *retval = OPENSSL_malloc(maxretlen);
2316
2317 if (retval == NULL)
2318 return NULL;
2319
2320 /* ensure retval string is NUL terminated */
2321 retval[0] = (char)0;
2322
2323 for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2324 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
2325 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
2326 int enabled = 1;
2327
2328 ERR_set_mark();
2329 /* Check hash is available in some provider. */
2330 if (lu->hash != NID_undef) {
2331 EVP_MD *hash = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, OBJ_nid2ln(lu->hash), NULL);
2332
2333 /* If unable to create we assume the hash algorithm is unavailable */
2334 if (hash == NULL) {
2335 enabled = 0;
2336 ERR_pop_to_mark();
2337 continue;
2338 }
2339 EVP_MD_free(hash);
2340 }
2341
2342 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey, lu->sig)) {
2343 enabled = 0;
2344 ERR_pop_to_mark();
2345 continue;
2346 }
2347 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, tmpkey, NULL);
2348 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
2349 if (pctx == NULL)
2350 enabled = 0;
2351 ERR_pop_to_mark();
2352 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2353
2354 if (enabled) {
2355 const char *sa = lu->name;
2356
2357 if (sa != NULL) {
2358 if (strlen(sa) + strlen(retval) + 1 >= maxretlen) {
2359 char *tmp;
2360
2361 maxretlen += SIGLEN_BUF_INCREMENT;
2362 tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(retval, maxretlen);
2363 if (tmp == NULL) {
2364 OPENSSL_free(retval);
2365 return NULL;
2366 }
2367 retval = tmp;
2368 }
2369 if (strlen(retval) > 0)
2370 OPENSSL_strlcat(retval, ":", maxretlen);
2371 OPENSSL_strlcat(retval, sa, maxretlen);
2372 } else {
2373 /* lu->name must not be NULL */
2374 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2375 }
2376 }
2377 }
2378
2379 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey);
2380 return retval;
2381 }
2382
2383 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL_CTX * ctx,uint16_t sigalg)2384 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL_CTX *ctx,
2385 uint16_t sigalg)
2386 {
2387 size_t i;
2388 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache;
2389
2390 for (i = 0; i < ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache_len; lu++, i++) {
2391 if (lu->sigalg == sigalg) {
2392 if (!lu->available)
2393 return NULL;
2394 return lu;
2395 }
2396 }
2397 return NULL;
2398 }
2399
2400 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX * ctx,const SIGALG_LOOKUP * lu,const EVP_MD ** pmd)2401 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
2402 {
2403 const EVP_MD *md;
2404
2405 if (lu == NULL)
2406 return 0;
2407 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
2408 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
2409 md = NULL;
2410 } else {
2411 md = ssl_md(ctx, lu->hash_idx);
2412 if (md == NULL)
2413 return 0;
2414 }
2415 if (pmd)
2416 *pmd = md;
2417 return 1;
2418 }
2419
2420 /*
2421 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
2422 *
2423 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
2424 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
2425 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
2426 */
2427 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_get_size(md) + 2)
rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX * ctx,const EVP_PKEY * pkey,const SIGALG_LOOKUP * lu)2428 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
2429 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2430 {
2431 const EVP_MD *md;
2432
2433 if (pkey == NULL)
2434 return 0;
2435 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) || md == NULL)
2436 return 0;
2437 if (EVP_MD_get_size(md) <= 0)
2438 return 0;
2439 if (EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
2440 return 0;
2441 return 1;
2442 }
2443
2444 /*
2445 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
2446 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
2447 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
2448 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
2449 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
2450 */
tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL_CONNECTION * s,int idx)2451 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2452 int idx)
2453 {
2454 if (idx == -1) {
2455 if (s->server) {
2456 size_t i;
2457
2458 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
2459 for (i = 0; i < s->ssl_pkey_num; i++) {
2460 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu
2461 = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s));
2462
2463 if (clu == NULL)
2464 continue;
2465 if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
2466 idx = i;
2467 break;
2468 }
2469 }
2470
2471 /*
2472 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
2473 * */
2474 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
2475 int real_idx;
2476
2477 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
2478 real_idx--) {
2479 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
2480 idx = real_idx;
2481 break;
2482 }
2483 }
2484 }
2485 /*
2486 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
2487 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
2488 */
2489 else if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256) {
2490 int real_idx;
2491
2492 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
2493 real_idx--) {
2494 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
2495 idx = real_idx;
2496 break;
2497 }
2498 }
2499 }
2500 } else {
2501 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
2502 }
2503 }
2504 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
2505 return NULL;
2506
2507 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
2508 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
2509 tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
2510
2511 if (lu == NULL)
2512 return NULL;
2513 if (!tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu, NULL))
2514 return NULL;
2515 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
2516 return NULL;
2517 return lu;
2518 }
2519 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
2520 return NULL;
2521 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
2522 }
2523 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION * s,const EVP_PKEY * pkey)2524 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
2525 {
2526 size_t idx;
2527 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2528
2529 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)) == NULL)
2530 return 0;
2531 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
2532 if (lu == NULL)
2533 return 0;
2534 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
2535 return 1;
2536 }
2537
tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION * s,int sent,const uint16_t ** psigs)2538 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
2539 {
2540 /*
2541 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
2542 * preferences.
2543 */
2544 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
2545 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
2546 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
2547 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
2548
2549 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
2550 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
2551 return 1;
2552
2553 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
2554 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
2555 return 1;
2556 }
2557 /*
2558 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
2559 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
2560 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
2561 */
2562 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
2563 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
2564 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
2565 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
2566 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
2567 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
2568 } else {
2569 *psigs = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->tls12_sigalgs;
2570 return SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->tls12_sigalgs_len;
2571 }
2572 }
2573
2574 /*
2575 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
2576 * specified EC curve.
2577 */
tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL_CONNECTION * s,int curve)2578 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int curve)
2579 {
2580 const uint16_t *sigs;
2581 size_t siglen, i;
2582
2583 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
2584 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
2585 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
2586 } else {
2587 sigs = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->tls12_sigalgs;
2588 siglen = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->tls12_sigalgs_len;
2589 }
2590
2591 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
2592 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), sigs[i]);
2593
2594 if (lu == NULL)
2595 continue;
2596 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
2597 && lu->curve != NID_undef
2598 && curve == lu->curve)
2599 return 1;
2600 }
2601
2602 return 0;
2603 }
2604
2605 /*
2606 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
2607 * error.
2608 */
sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX * ctx,const SIGALG_LOOKUP * lu)2609 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2610 {
2611 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2612 int secbits = 0;
2613
2614 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md))
2615 return 0;
2616 if (md != NULL) {
2617 int md_type = EVP_MD_get_type(md);
2618
2619 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
2620 secbits = EVP_MD_get_size(md) * 4;
2621 if (secbits <= 0)
2622 return 0;
2623 /*
2624 * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
2625 * they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
2626 * really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our
2627 * security level 1.
2628 * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for
2629 * SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
2630 * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
2631 * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
2632 */
2633 if (md_type == NID_sha1)
2634 secbits = 64;
2635 else if (md_type == NID_md5_sha1)
2636 secbits = 67;
2637 else if (md_type == NID_md5)
2638 secbits = 39;
2639 } else {
2640 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
2641 if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
2642 secbits = 128;
2643 else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
2644 secbits = 224;
2645 }
2646 /*
2647 * For provider-based sigalgs we have secbits information available
2648 * in the (provider-loaded) sigalg_list structure
2649 */
2650 if ((secbits == 0) && (lu->sig_idx >= SSL_PKEY_NUM)
2651 && ((lu->sig_idx - SSL_PKEY_NUM) < (int)ctx->sigalg_list_len)) {
2652 secbits = ctx->sigalg_list[lu->sig_idx - SSL_PKEY_NUM].secbits;
2653 }
2654 return secbits;
2655 }
2656
tls_sigalg_compat(SSL_CONNECTION * sc,const SIGALG_LOOKUP * lu)2657 static int tls_sigalg_compat(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2658 {
2659 int minversion, maxversion;
2660 int minproto, maxproto;
2661
2662 if (!lu->available)
2663 return 0;
2664
2665 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(sc)) {
2666 if (sc->ssl.method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
2667 minproto = sc->min_proto_version;
2668 maxproto = sc->max_proto_version;
2669 } else {
2670 maxproto = minproto = sc->version;
2671 }
2672 minversion = lu->mindtls;
2673 maxversion = lu->maxdtls;
2674 } else {
2675 if (sc->ssl.method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
2676 minproto = sc->min_proto_version;
2677 maxproto = sc->max_proto_version;
2678 } else {
2679 maxproto = minproto = sc->version;
2680 }
2681 minversion = lu->mintls;
2682 maxversion = lu->maxtls;
2683 }
2684 if (minversion == -1 || maxversion == -1
2685 || (minversion != 0 && maxproto != 0
2686 && ssl_version_cmp(sc, minversion, maxproto) > 0)
2687 || (maxversion != 0 && minproto != 0
2688 && ssl_version_cmp(sc, maxversion, minproto) < 0)
2689 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(sc, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
2690 return 0;
2691 return 1;
2692 }
2693
2694 /*
2695 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
2696 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
2697 * s.
2698 */
tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION * s,uint16_t sig,EVP_PKEY * pkey)2699 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
2700 {
2701 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2702 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2703 char sigalgstr[2];
2704 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
2705 int pkeyid = -1;
2706 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2707 int secbits = 0;
2708
2709 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey);
2710
2711 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2712 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
2713 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
2714 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2715 return 0;
2716 }
2717 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
2718 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2719 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
2720 }
2721
2722 /* Is this code point available and compatible with the protocol */
2723 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), sig);
2724 if (lu == NULL || !tls_sigalg_compat(s, lu)) {
2725 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2726 return 0;
2727 }
2728
2729 /* If we don't know the pkey nid yet go and find it */
2730 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_KEYMGMT) {
2731 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *scl = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s));
2732
2733 if (scl == NULL) {
2734 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2735 return 0;
2736 }
2737 pkeyid = scl->pkey_nid;
2738 }
2739
2740 /* Should never happen */
2741 if (pkeyid == -1) {
2742 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2743 return -1;
2744 }
2745
2746 /*
2747 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
2748 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
2749 */
2750 if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2751 && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
2752 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
2753 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
2754 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2755 return 0;
2756 }
2757 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
2758 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(
2759 (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) ? EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) : pkeyid,
2760 &cidx, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s))
2761 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
2762 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2763 return 0;
2764 }
2765
2766 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2767
2768 /* Check point compression is permitted */
2769 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
2770 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2771 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
2772 return 0;
2773 }
2774
2775 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
2776 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
2777 int curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey);
2778
2779 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
2780 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2781 return 0;
2782 }
2783 }
2784 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2785 /* Check curve matches extensions */
2786 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
2787 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2788 return 0;
2789 }
2790 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
2791 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
2792 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
2793 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
2794 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2795 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2796 return 0;
2797 }
2798 }
2799 }
2800 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
2801 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2802 return 0;
2803 }
2804
2805 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2806 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
2807 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
2808 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
2809 break;
2810 }
2811 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
2812 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
2813 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2814 return 0;
2815 }
2816 if (!tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu, &md)) {
2817 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
2818 return 0;
2819 }
2820 /*
2821 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
2822 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
2823 */
2824 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
2825 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
2826 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu);
2827 if (secbits == 0 || !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits, md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef, (void *)sigalgstr)) {
2828 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2829 return 0;
2830 }
2831 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
2832 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
2833 return 1;
2834 }
2835
SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL * s,int * pnid)2836 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
2837 {
2838 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
2839
2840 if (sc == NULL)
2841 return 0;
2842
2843 if (sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
2844 return 0;
2845 *pnid = sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
2846 return 1;
2847 }
2848
SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL * s,int * pnid)2849 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
2850 {
2851 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
2852
2853 if (sc == NULL)
2854 return 0;
2855
2856 if (sc->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
2857 return 0;
2858 *pnid = sc->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
2859 return 1;
2860 }
2861
2862 /*
2863 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
2864 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
2865 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
2866 *
2867 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
2868 * by the client.
2869 *
2870 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
2871 */
ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION * s)2872 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2873 {
2874 s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
2875 s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
2876 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
2877 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
2878 &s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL)
2879 != 0)
2880 return 0;
2881 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2882 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
2883 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
2884 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
2885 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
2886 }
2887 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2888 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2889 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
2890 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
2891 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
2892 }
2893 #endif
2894 return 1;
2895 }
2896
2897 /*
2898 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
2899 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
2900 * @c: cipher to check
2901 * @op: Security check that you want to do
2902 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
2903 *
2904 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
2905 */
ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL_CONNECTION * s,const SSL_CIPHER * c,int op,int ecdhe)2906 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c,
2907 int op, int ecdhe)
2908 {
2909 int minversion = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? c->min_dtls : c->min_tls;
2910 int maxversion = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? c->max_dtls : c->max_tls;
2911
2912 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
2913 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
2914 return 1;
2915 if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
2916 return 1;
2917
2918 if (SSL_IS_QUIC_INT_HANDSHAKE(s))
2919 /* For QUIC, only allow these ciphersuites. */
2920 switch (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c)) {
2921 case TLS1_3_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
2922 case TLS1_3_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
2923 case TLS1_3_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:
2924 break;
2925 default:
2926 return 1;
2927 }
2928
2929 /*
2930 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
2931 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
2932 */
2933 if (minversion == TLS1_VERSION
2934 && ecdhe
2935 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
2936 minversion = SSL3_VERSION;
2937
2938 if (ssl_version_cmp(s, minversion, s->s3.tmp.max_ver) > 0
2939 || ssl_version_cmp(s, maxversion, s->s3.tmp.min_ver) < 0)
2940 return 1;
2941
2942 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
2943 }
2944
tls_use_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION * s)2945 int tls_use_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2946 {
2947 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
2948 return 0;
2949 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
2950 }
2951
tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION * s)2952 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2953 {
2954 size_t i;
2955
2956 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2957 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
2958 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2959 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2960
2961 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2962 if (s->s3.tmp.valid_flags)
2963 memset(s->s3.tmp.valid_flags, 0, s->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(uint32_t));
2964 else
2965 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags = OPENSSL_zalloc(s->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(uint32_t));
2966 if (s->s3.tmp.valid_flags == NULL)
2967 return 0;
2968 /*
2969 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
2970 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
2971 */
2972 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
2973 && s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
2974 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2975 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
2976
2977 for (i = 0; i < s->ssl_pkey_num; i++) {
2978 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
2979 size_t j;
2980
2981 if (lu == NULL)
2982 continue;
2983 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
2984 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
2985 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
2986 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2987 break;
2988 }
2989 }
2990 }
2991 return 1;
2992 }
2993
2994 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2995 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2996 return 0;
2997 }
2998 if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
2999 return 1;
3000
3001 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
3002 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3003 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3004 return 0;
3005 }
3006
3007 /*-
3008 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
3009 *
3010 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
3011 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3012 * point to the resulting session.
3013 */
tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL_CONNECTION * s,CLIENTHELLO_MSG * hello,SSL_SESSION ** ret)3014 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3015 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
3016 SSL_SESSION **ret)
3017 {
3018 size_t size;
3019 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
3020
3021 *ret = NULL;
3022 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
3023
3024 /*
3025 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
3026 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
3027 * resumption.
3028 */
3029 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
3030 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
3031
3032 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
3033 if (!ticketext->present)
3034 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
3035
3036 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
3037
3038 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
3039 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
3040 }
3041
3042 /*-
3043 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3044 *
3045 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
3046 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
3047 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
3048 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
3049 *
3050 * Side effects:
3051 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3052 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3053 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3054 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3055 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3056 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
3057 *
3058 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3059 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
3060 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3061 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3062 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3063 * point to the resulting session.
3064 */
tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION * s,const unsigned char * etick,size_t eticklen,const unsigned char * sess_id,size_t sesslen,SSL_SESSION ** psess)3065 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3066 const unsigned char *etick,
3067 size_t eticklen,
3068 const unsigned char *sess_id,
3069 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3070 {
3071 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
3072 unsigned char *sdec;
3073 const unsigned char *p;
3074 int slen, ivlen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
3075 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
3076 size_t mlen;
3077 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3078 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
3079 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3080 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3081 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3082
3083 if (eticklen == 0) {
3084 /*
3085 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3086 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
3087 */
3088 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
3089 goto end;
3090 }
3091 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
3092 /*
3093 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3094 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3095 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3096 * calculate the master secret later.
3097 */
3098 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
3099 goto end;
3100 }
3101
3102 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
3103 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
3104 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
3105 goto end;
3106 }
3107
3108 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3109 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
3110 if (hctx == NULL) {
3111 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
3112 goto end;
3113 }
3114 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3115 if (ctx == NULL) {
3116 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
3117 goto end;
3118 }
3119 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3120 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
3121 #else
3122 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
3123 #endif
3124 {
3125 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3126 int rv = 0;
3127
3128 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
3129 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s),
3130 nctick,
3131 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
3132 ctx,
3133 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
3134 0);
3135 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3136 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
3137 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3138 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s), nctick,
3139 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
3140 ctx, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 0);
3141 #endif
3142 if (rv < 0) {
3143 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
3144 goto end;
3145 }
3146 if (rv == 0) {
3147 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
3148 goto end;
3149 }
3150 if (rv == 2)
3151 renew_ticket = 1;
3152 } else {
3153 EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
3154
3155 /* Check key name matches */
3156 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3157 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
3158 != 0) {
3159 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
3160 goto end;
3161 }
3162
3163 aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(sctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
3164 sctx->propq);
3165 if (aes256cbc == NULL
3166 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
3167 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
3168 "SHA256")
3169 <= 0
3170 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, aes256cbc, NULL,
3171 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
3172 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
3173 <= 0) {
3174 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
3175 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
3176 goto end;
3177 }
3178 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
3179 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
3180 renew_ticket = 1;
3181 }
3182 /*
3183 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3184 * checks on ticket.
3185 */
3186 mlen = ssl_hmac_size(hctx);
3187 if (mlen == 0) {
3188 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
3189 goto end;
3190 }
3191
3192 ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
3193 if (ivlen < 0) {
3194 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
3195 goto end;
3196 }
3197
3198 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3199 if (eticklen <= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen + mlen) {
3200 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
3201 goto end;
3202 }
3203 eticklen -= mlen;
3204 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3205 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3206 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL, sizeof(tick_hmac)) <= 0) {
3207 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
3208 goto end;
3209 }
3210
3211 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3212 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
3213 goto end;
3214 }
3215 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3216 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3217 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen;
3218 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen;
3219 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3220 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
3221 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3222 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
3223 goto end;
3224 }
3225 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
3226 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3227 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
3228 goto end;
3229 }
3230 slen += declen;
3231 p = sdec;
3232
3233 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION_ex(NULL, &p, slen, sctx->libctx, sctx->propq);
3234 slen -= p - sdec;
3235 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3236 if (sess) {
3237 /* Some additional consistency checks */
3238 if (slen != 0) {
3239 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3240 sess = NULL;
3241 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
3242 goto end;
3243 }
3244 /*
3245 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3246 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3247 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3248 * standard.
3249 */
3250 if (sesslen) {
3251 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3252 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3253 }
3254 if (renew_ticket)
3255 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
3256 else
3257 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
3258 goto end;
3259 }
3260 ERR_clear_error();
3261 /*
3262 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3263 */
3264 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
3265
3266 end:
3267 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3268 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
3269
3270 /*
3271 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
3272 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
3273 * performs any action
3274 */
3275 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
3276 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
3277 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
3278 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
3279 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
3280 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
3281 int retcb;
3282
3283 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
3284 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
3285 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
3286 sess, etick, keyname_len,
3287 ret,
3288 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
3289 switch (retcb) {
3290 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
3291 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
3292 break;
3293
3294 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
3295 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
3296 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3297 sess = NULL;
3298 break;
3299
3300 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
3301 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
3302 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
3303 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
3304 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3305 sess = NULL;
3306 break;
3307
3308 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
3309 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
3310 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
3311 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
3312 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
3313 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
3314 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
3315 else
3316 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
3317 break;
3318
3319 default:
3320 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
3321 }
3322 }
3323
3324 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3325 switch (ret) {
3326 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
3327 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
3328 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
3329 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
3330 }
3331 }
3332
3333 *psess = sess;
3334
3335 return ret;
3336 }
3337
3338 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL_CONNECTION * s,int op,const SIGALG_LOOKUP * lu)3339 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op,
3340 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
3341 {
3342 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
3343 int secbits;
3344
3345 if (lu == NULL || !lu->available)
3346 return 0;
3347 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
3348 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3349 return 0;
3350 /*
3351 * At some point we should fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello as per TLS 1.3
3352 * spec
3353 */
3354 if (!s->server && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
3355 && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
3356 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
3357 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
3358 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
3359 return 0;
3360
3361 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3362 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu->sig_idx))
3363 return 0;
3364
3365 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
3366 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
3367 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3368 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
3369 if (s->server && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
3370 return 0;
3371 if (!s->server
3372 && SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
3373 && s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
3374 int i, num;
3375 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3376
3377 /*
3378 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
3379 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
3380 * ciphersuites enabled.
3381 */
3382
3383 if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
3384 return 0;
3385
3386 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
3387 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
3388 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
3389 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3390
3391 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3392 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3393 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3394 continue;
3395
3396 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kGOST | SSL_kGOST18)) != 0)
3397 break;
3398 }
3399 if (i == num)
3400 return 0;
3401 }
3402 }
3403
3404 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3405 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu);
3406 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
3407 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
3408 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
3409 }
3410
3411 /*
3412 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3413 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3414 * disabled.
3415 */
3416
ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t * pmask_a,SSL_CONNECTION * s,int op)3417 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op)
3418 {
3419 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
3420 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3421 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
3422 /*
3423 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
3424 * in disabled_mask.
3425 */
3426 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
3427 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
3428 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), *sigalgs);
3429 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3430
3431 if (lu == NULL)
3432 continue;
3433
3434 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx,
3435 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s));
3436 if (clu == NULL)
3437 continue;
3438
3439 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
3440 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
3441 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
3442 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
3443 }
3444 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
3445 }
3446
tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt,const uint16_t * psig,size_t psiglen)3447 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3448 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
3449 {
3450 size_t i;
3451 int rv = 0;
3452
3453 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
3454 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), *psig);
3455
3456 if (lu == NULL || !tls_sigalg_compat(s, lu))
3457 continue;
3458 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
3459 return 0;
3460 /*
3461 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
3462 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
3463 */
3464 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA && lu->hash != NID_sha1 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
3465 rv = 1;
3466 }
3467 if (rv == 0)
3468 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3469 return rv;
3470 }
3471
3472 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION * s,const SIGALG_LOOKUP ** shsig,const uint16_t * pref,size_t preflen,const uint16_t * allow,size_t allowlen)3473 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3474 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
3475 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
3476 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
3477 {
3478 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
3479 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3480 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
3481 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), *ptmp);
3482
3483 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3484 if (lu == NULL
3485 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
3486 continue;
3487 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
3488 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
3489 nmatch++;
3490 if (shsig)
3491 *shsig++ = lu;
3492 break;
3493 }
3494 }
3495 }
3496 return nmatch;
3497 }
3498
3499 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION * s)3500 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3501 {
3502 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
3503 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3504 size_t nmatch;
3505 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
3506 CERT *c = s->cert;
3507 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3508
3509 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
3510 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3511 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3512 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3513 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3514 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3515 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3516 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3517 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3518 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3519 } else
3520 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
3521 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3522 pref = conf;
3523 preflen = conflen;
3524 allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3525 allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3526 } else {
3527 allow = conf;
3528 allowlen = conflen;
3529 pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3530 preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3531 }
3532 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3533 if (nmatch) {
3534 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL)
3535 return 0;
3536 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3537 } else {
3538 salgs = NULL;
3539 }
3540 s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3541 s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3542 return 1;
3543 }
3544
tls1_save_u16(PACKET * pkt,uint16_t ** pdest,size_t * pdestlen)3545 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
3546 {
3547 unsigned int stmp;
3548 size_t size, i;
3549 uint16_t *buf;
3550
3551 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
3552
3553 /* Invalid data length */
3554 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
3555 return 0;
3556
3557 size >>= 1;
3558
3559 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL)
3560 return 0;
3561 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
3562 buf[i] = stmp;
3563
3564 if (i != size) {
3565 OPENSSL_free(buf);
3566 return 0;
3567 }
3568
3569 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
3570 *pdest = buf;
3571 *pdestlen = size;
3572
3573 return 1;
3574 }
3575
tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt,int cert)3576 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
3577 {
3578 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3579 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3580 return 1;
3581 /* Should never happen */
3582 if (s->cert == NULL)
3583 return 0;
3584
3585 if (cert)
3586 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
3587 &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
3588 else
3589 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
3590 &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
3591 }
3592
3593 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3594
tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION * s)3595 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3596 {
3597 size_t i;
3598 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
3599
3600 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3601 return 0;
3602
3603 for (i = 0; i < s->ssl_pkey_num; i++)
3604 pvalid[i] = 0;
3605
3606 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3607 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3608 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
3609
3610 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
3611 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3612 continue;
3613 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
3614 if (pvalid[idx] == 0
3615 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), idx))
3616 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3617 }
3618 return 1;
3619 }
3620
SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL * s,int idx,int * psign,int * phash,int * psignhash,unsigned char * rsig,unsigned char * rhash)3621 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3622 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3623 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3624 {
3625 uint16_t *psig;
3626 size_t numsigalgs;
3627 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
3628
3629 if (sc == NULL)
3630 return 0;
3631
3632 psig = sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3633 numsigalgs = sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3634
3635 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
3636 return 0;
3637 if (idx >= 0) {
3638 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
3639
3640 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
3641 return 0;
3642 psig += idx;
3643 if (rhash != NULL)
3644 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
3645 if (rsig != NULL)
3646 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
3647 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(sc), *psig);
3648 if (psign != NULL)
3649 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
3650 if (phash != NULL)
3651 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
3652 if (psignhash != NULL)
3653 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
3654 }
3655 return (int)numsigalgs;
3656 }
3657
SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL * s,int idx,int * psign,int * phash,int * psignhash,unsigned char * rsig,unsigned char * rhash)3658 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3659 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3660 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3661 {
3662 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
3663 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
3664
3665 if (sc == NULL)
3666 return 0;
3667
3668 if (sc->shared_sigalgs == NULL
3669 || idx < 0
3670 || idx >= (int)sc->shared_sigalgslen
3671 || sc->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
3672 return 0;
3673 shsigalgs = sc->shared_sigalgs[idx];
3674 if (phash != NULL)
3675 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
3676 if (psign != NULL)
3677 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
3678 if (psignhash != NULL)
3679 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
3680 if (rsig != NULL)
3681 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
3682 if (rhash != NULL)
3683 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
3684 return (int)sc->shared_sigalgslen;
3685 }
3686
3687 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
3688 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
3689
3690 typedef struct {
3691 size_t sigalgcnt;
3692 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
3693 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
3694 SSL_CTX *ctx;
3695 } sig_cb_st;
3696
get_sigorhash(int * psig,int * phash,const char * str)3697 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3698 {
3699 if (OPENSSL_strcasecmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3700 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3701 } else if (OPENSSL_strcasecmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0
3702 || OPENSSL_strcasecmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
3703 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
3704 } else if (OPENSSL_strcasecmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3705 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3706 } else if (OPENSSL_strcasecmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3707 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3708 } else {
3709 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3710 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3711 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3712 }
3713 }
3714 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
3715 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
3716
sig_cb(const char * elem,int len,void * arg)3717 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3718 {
3719 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3720 size_t i = 0;
3721 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
3722 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
3723 const char *iana, *alias;
3724 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3725 int ignore_unknown = 0;
3726
3727 if (elem == NULL)
3728 return 0;
3729 if (elem[0] == '?') {
3730 ignore_unknown = 1;
3731 ++elem;
3732 --len;
3733 }
3734 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
3735 return 0;
3736 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3737 return 0;
3738 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3739 etmp[len] = 0;
3740 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3741 /*
3742 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
3743 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
3744 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
3745 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
3746 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
3747 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
3748 * in the table.
3749 */
3750 if (p == NULL) {
3751 if (sarg->ctx != NULL) {
3752 for (i = 0; i < sarg->ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache_len; i++) {
3753 iana = sarg->ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache[i].name;
3754 alias = sarg->ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache[i].name12;
3755 if ((alias != NULL && OPENSSL_strcasecmp(etmp, alias) == 0)
3756 || OPENSSL_strcasecmp(etmp, iana) == 0) {
3757 /* Ignore known, but unavailable sigalgs. */
3758 if (!sarg->ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache[i].available)
3759 return 1;
3760 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sarg->ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache[i].sigalg;
3761 goto found;
3762 }
3763 }
3764 } else {
3765 /* Syntax checks use the built-in sigalgs */
3766 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
3767 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); i++, s++) {
3768 iana = s->name;
3769 alias = s->name12;
3770 if ((alias != NULL && OPENSSL_strcasecmp(etmp, alias) == 0)
3771 || OPENSSL_strcasecmp(etmp, iana) == 0) {
3772 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
3773 goto found;
3774 }
3775 }
3776 }
3777 } else {
3778 *p = 0;
3779 p++;
3780 if (*p == 0)
3781 return 0;
3782 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3783 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3784 if (sig_alg != NID_undef && hash_alg != NID_undef) {
3785 if (sarg->ctx != NULL) {
3786 for (i = 0; i < sarg->ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache_len; i++) {
3787 s = &sarg->ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache[i];
3788 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
3789 /* Ignore known, but unavailable sigalgs. */
3790 if (!sarg->ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache[i].available)
3791 return 1;
3792 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
3793 goto found;
3794 }
3795 }
3796 } else {
3797 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); i++) {
3798 s = &sigalg_lookup_tbl[i];
3799 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
3800 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
3801 goto found;
3802 }
3803 }
3804 }
3805 }
3806 }
3807 /* Ignore unknown algorithms if ignore_unknown */
3808 return ignore_unknown;
3809
3810 found:
3811 /* Ignore duplicates */
3812 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
3813 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
3814 sarg->sigalgcnt--;
3815 return 1;
3816 }
3817 }
3818 return 1;
3819 }
3820
3821 /*
3822 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3823 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3824 */
tls1_set_sigalgs_list(SSL_CTX * ctx,CERT * c,const char * str,int client)3825 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3826 {
3827 sig_cb_st sig;
3828 sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
3829
3830 if (ctx != NULL)
3831 sig.ctx = ctx;
3832 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3833 return 0;
3834 if (sig.sigalgcnt == 0) {
3835 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
3836 "No valid signature algorithms in '%s'", str);
3837 return 0;
3838 }
3839 if (c == NULL)
3840 return 1;
3841 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3842 }
3843
tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT * c,const uint16_t * psigs,size_t salglen,int client)3844 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
3845 int client)
3846 {
3847 uint16_t *sigalgs;
3848
3849 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL)
3850 return 0;
3851 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
3852
3853 if (client) {
3854 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3855 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3856 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3857 } else {
3858 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3859 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3860 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3861 }
3862
3863 return 1;
3864 }
3865
tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT * c,const int * psig_nids,size_t salglen,int client)3866 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3867 {
3868 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
3869 size_t i;
3870
3871 if (salglen & 1)
3872 return 0;
3873 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL)
3874 return 0;
3875 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3876 size_t j;
3877 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
3878 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
3879 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
3880
3881 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
3882 j++, curr++) {
3883 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
3884 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
3885 break;
3886 }
3887 }
3888
3889 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
3890 goto err;
3891 }
3892
3893 if (client) {
3894 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3895 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3896 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
3897 } else {
3898 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3899 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3900 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
3901 }
3902
3903 return 1;
3904
3905 err:
3906 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3907 return 0;
3908 }
3909
tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION * s,X509 * x,int default_nid)3910 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3911 {
3912 int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
3913 size_t i;
3914 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
3915 size_t sigalgslen;
3916
3917 /*-
3918 * RFC 8446, section 4.2.3:
3919 *
3920 * The signatures on certificates that are self-signed or certificates
3921 * that are trust anchors are not validated, since they begin a
3922 * certification path (see [RFC5280], Section 3.2). A certificate that
3923 * begins a certification path MAY use a signature algorithm that is not
3924 * advertised as being supported in the "signature_algorithms"
3925 * extension.
3926 */
3927 if (default_nid == -1 || X509_self_signed(x, 0))
3928 return 1;
3929 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3930 if (default_nid)
3931 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3932
3933 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
3934 /*
3935 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
3936 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
3937 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
3938 */
3939 sigalgslen = s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
3940 use_pc_sigalgs = 1;
3941 } else {
3942 sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
3943 }
3944 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
3945 int mdnid, pknid;
3946
3947 sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
3948 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
3949 s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
3950 : s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3951 if (sigalg == NULL)
3952 continue;
3953 if (sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
3954 return 1;
3955 if (sigalg->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
3956 continue;
3957 /*
3958 * Accept RSA PKCS#1 signatures in certificates when the signature
3959 * algorithms include RSA-PSS with a matching digest algorithm.
3960 *
3961 * When a TLS 1.3 peer inadvertently omits the legacy RSA PKCS#1 code
3962 * points, and we're doing strict checking of the certificate chain (in
3963 * a cert_cb via SSL_check_chain()) we may then reject RSA signed
3964 * certificates in the chain, but the TLS requirement on PSS should not
3965 * extend to certificates. Though the peer can in fact list the legacy
3966 * sigalgs for just this purpose, it is not likely that a better chain
3967 * signed with RSA-PSS is available.
3968 */
3969 if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &mdnid, &pknid))
3970 continue;
3971 if (pknid == EVP_PKEY_RSA && mdnid == sigalg->hash)
3972 return 1;
3973 }
3974 return 0;
3975 }
3976
3977 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF (X509_NAME)* names,X509 * x)3978 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3979 {
3980 const X509_NAME *nm;
3981 int i;
3982 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3983 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3984 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3985 return 1;
3986 }
3987 return 0;
3988 }
3989
3990 /*
3991 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3992 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3993 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3994 * attempting to use them.
3995 */
3996
3997 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
3998
3999 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4000 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4001 /* Strict mode flags */
4002 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4003 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4004 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4005
tls1_check_chain(SSL_CONNECTION * s,X509 * x,EVP_PKEY * pk,STACK_OF (X509)* chain,int idx)4006 int tls1_check_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk,
4007 STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int idx)
4008 {
4009 int i;
4010 int rv = 0;
4011 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4012 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4013 CERT *c = s->cert;
4014 uint32_t *pvalid;
4015 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4016
4017 /*
4018 * Meaning of idx:
4019 * idx == -1 means SSL_check_chain() invocation
4020 * idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains
4021 * idx >= 0 means checking SSL_PKEY index
4022 *
4023 * For RPK, where there may be no cert, we ignore -1
4024 */
4025 if (idx != -1) {
4026 if (idx == -2) {
4027 cpk = c->key;
4028 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
4029 } else
4030 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4031 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
4032 x = cpk->x509;
4033 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4034 chain = cpk->chain;
4035 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4036 if (tls12_rpk_and_privkey(s, idx)) {
4037 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC") && !tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pk))
4038 return 0;
4039 *pvalid = rv = CERT_PKEY_RPK;
4040 return rv;
4041 }
4042 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4043 if (x == NULL || pk == NULL)
4044 goto end;
4045 } else {
4046 size_t certidx;
4047
4048 if (x == NULL || pk == NULL)
4049 return 0;
4050
4051 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx,
4052 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s))
4053 == NULL)
4054 return 0;
4055 idx = certidx;
4056 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
4057
4058 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4059 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4060 else
4061 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4062 strict_mode = 1;
4063 }
4064
4065 if (suiteb_flags) {
4066 int ok;
4067 if (check_flags)
4068 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4069 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4070 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4071 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4072 else if (!check_flags)
4073 goto end;
4074 }
4075
4076 /*
4077 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4078 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4079 */
4080 if (TLS1_get_version(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
4081 && strict_mode) {
4082 int default_nid;
4083 int rsign = 0;
4084
4085 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
4086 || s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
4087 default_nid = 0;
4088 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4089 } else {
4090 switch (idx) {
4091 case SSL_PKEY_RSA:
4092 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4093 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4094 break;
4095
4096 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4097 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4098 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4099 break;
4100
4101 case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
4102 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4103 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4104 break;
4105
4106 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
4107 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
4108 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
4109 break;
4110
4111 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
4112 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
4113 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
4114 break;
4115
4116 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
4117 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
4118 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
4119 break;
4120
4121 default:
4122 default_nid = -1;
4123 break;
4124 }
4125 }
4126 /*
4127 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4128 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4129 */
4130 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4131 size_t j;
4132 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4133 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
4134 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), *p);
4135
4136 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
4137 break;
4138 }
4139 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4140 if (check_flags)
4141 goto skip_sigs;
4142 else
4143 goto end;
4144 }
4145 }
4146 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4147 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4148 /*
4149 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
4150 * so check_flags is always set.
4151 */
4152 if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
4153 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4154 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
4155 if (!check_flags)
4156 goto end;
4157 } else
4158 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4159 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4160 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4161 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4162 if (check_flags) {
4163 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4164 break;
4165 } else
4166 goto end;
4167 }
4168 }
4169 }
4170 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4171 else if (check_flags)
4172 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4173 skip_sigs:
4174 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4175 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
4176 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4177 else if (!check_flags)
4178 goto end;
4179 if (!s->server)
4180 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4181 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4182 else if (strict_mode) {
4183 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4184 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4185 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4186 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4187 if (check_flags) {
4188 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4189 break;
4190 } else
4191 goto end;
4192 }
4193 }
4194 }
4195 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4196 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4197 int check_type = 0;
4198
4199 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "RSA"))
4200 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4201 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "DSA"))
4202 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4203 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC"))
4204 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4205
4206 if (check_type) {
4207 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
4208 size_t j;
4209
4210 for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
4211 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
4212 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4213 break;
4214 }
4215 }
4216 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4217 goto end;
4218 } else {
4219 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4220 }
4221
4222 ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
4223
4224 if (ca_dn == NULL
4225 || sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn) == 0
4226 || ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4227 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4228 else
4229 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4230 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4231
4232 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4233 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4234 break;
4235 }
4236 }
4237
4238 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4239 goto end;
4240 } else
4241 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4242
4243 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4244 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4245
4246 end:
4247
4248 if (TLS1_get_version(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4249 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
4250 else
4251 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4252
4253 /*
4254 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4255 * chain is invalid.
4256 */
4257 if (!check_flags) {
4258 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
4259 *pvalid = rv;
4260 } else {
4261 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4262 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4263 return 0;
4264 }
4265 }
4266 return rv;
4267 }
4268
4269 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL_CONNECTION * s)4270 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
4271 {
4272 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
4273 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
4274 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4275 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4276 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4277 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4278 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4279 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
4280 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
4281 }
4282
4283 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
SSL_check_chain(SSL * s,X509 * x,EVP_PKEY * pk,STACK_OF (X509)* chain)4284 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4285 {
4286 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
4287
4288 if (sc == NULL)
4289 return 0;
4290
4291 return tls1_check_chain(sc, x, pk, chain, -1);
4292 }
4293
ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL_CONNECTION * s)4294 EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
4295 {
4296 EVP_PKEY *dhp = NULL;
4297 BIGNUM *p;
4298 int dh_secbits = 80, sec_level_bits;
4299 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
4300 OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
4301 OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
4302 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
4303
4304 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 2) {
4305 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4306 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4307 dh_secbits = 128;
4308 else
4309 dh_secbits = 80;
4310 } else {
4311 if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
4312 return NULL;
4313 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
4314 }
4315 }
4316
4317 /* Do not pick a prime that is too weak for the current security level */
4318 sec_level_bits = ssl_get_security_level_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
4319 NULL, NULL);
4320 if (dh_secbits < sec_level_bits)
4321 dh_secbits = sec_level_bits;
4322
4323 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4324 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4325 else if (dh_secbits >= 152)
4326 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL);
4327 else if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4328 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4329 else if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4330 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL);
4331 else
4332 p = BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL);
4333 if (p == NULL)
4334 goto err;
4335
4336 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx->libctx, "DH", sctx->propq);
4337 if (pctx == NULL
4338 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) != 1)
4339 goto err;
4340
4341 tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
4342 if (tmpl == NULL
4343 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
4344 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_uint(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, 2))
4345 goto err;
4346
4347 params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl);
4348 if (params == NULL
4349 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &dhp, EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1)
4350 goto err;
4351
4352 err:
4353 OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
4354 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
4355 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
4356 BN_free(p);
4357 return dhp;
4358 }
4359
ssl_security_cert_key(SSL_CONNECTION * s,SSL_CTX * ctx,X509 * x,int op)4360 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x,
4361 int op)
4362 {
4363 int secbits = -1;
4364 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4365
4366 if (pkey) {
4367 /*
4368 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4369 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4370 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4371 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4372 */
4373 secbits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkey);
4374 }
4375 if (s != NULL)
4376 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4377 else
4378 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4379 }
4380
ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL_CONNECTION * s,SSL_CTX * ctx,X509 * x,int op)4381 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x,
4382 int op)
4383 {
4384 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4385 int secbits, nid, pknid;
4386
4387 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4388 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4389 return 1;
4390 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
4391 secbits = -1;
4392 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
4393 if (nid == NID_undef)
4394 nid = pknid;
4395 if (s != NULL)
4396 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
4397 else
4398 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
4399 }
4400
ssl_security_cert(SSL_CONNECTION * s,SSL_CTX * ctx,X509 * x,int vfy,int is_ee)4401 int ssl_security_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy,
4402 int is_ee)
4403 {
4404 if (vfy)
4405 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4406 if (is_ee) {
4407 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4408 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4409 } else {
4410 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4411 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4412 }
4413 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4414 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4415 return 1;
4416 }
4417
4418 /*
4419 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
4420 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4421 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4422 */
4423
ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION * s,STACK_OF (X509)* sk,X509 * x,int vfy)4424 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk,
4425 X509 *x, int vfy)
4426 {
4427 int rv, start_idx, i;
4428
4429 if (x == NULL) {
4430 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4431 if (x == NULL)
4432 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
4433 start_idx = 1;
4434 } else
4435 start_idx = 0;
4436
4437 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4438 if (rv != 1)
4439 return rv;
4440
4441 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4442 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4443 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
4444 if (rv != 1)
4445 return rv;
4446 }
4447 return 1;
4448 }
4449
4450 /*
4451 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
4452 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
4453 */
4454
tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL_CONNECTION * s,const SIGALG_LOOKUP * lu)4455 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL_CONNECTION *s,
4456 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
4457 {
4458 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
4459 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx,
4460 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s));
4461
4462 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
4463 if (clu == NULL
4464 || (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
4465 || (clu->pkey_nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
4466 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
4467 return -1;
4468
4469 /* If doing RPK, the CERT_PKEY won't be "valid" */
4470 if (tls12_rpk_and_privkey(s, sig_idx))
4471 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_RPK ? sig_idx : -1;
4472
4473 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
4474 }
4475
4476 /*
4477 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
4478 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
4479 * the key.
4480 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
4481 */
check_cert_usable(SSL_CONNECTION * s,const SIGALG_LOOKUP * sig,X509 * x,EVP_PKEY * pkey)4482 static int check_cert_usable(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig,
4483 X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
4484 {
4485 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
4486 int mdnid, pknid, supported;
4487 size_t i;
4488 const char *mdname = NULL;
4489 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
4490
4491 /*
4492 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot support signing with this digest,
4493 * the answer is simply 'no'.
4494 */
4495 if (sig->hash != NID_undef)
4496 mdname = OBJ_nid2sn(sig->hash);
4497 supported = EVP_PKEY_digestsign_supports_digest(pkey, sctx->libctx,
4498 mdname,
4499 sctx->propq);
4500 if (supported <= 0)
4501 return 0;
4502
4503 /*
4504 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
4505 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
4506 */
4507 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
4508 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
4509 return 0;
4510 for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
4511 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
4512 s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
4513 if (lu == NULL)
4514 continue;
4515
4516 /*
4517 * This does not differentiate between the
4518 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
4519 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
4520 * signing certificate.
4521 */
4522 if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
4523 return 1;
4524 }
4525 return 0;
4526 }
4527
4528 /*
4529 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
4530 * a viable public key is permitted.
4531 */
4532 return 1;
4533 }
4534
4535 /*
4536 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
4537 * with signature scheme |sig|.
4538 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
4539 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
4540 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
4541 */
has_usable_cert(SSL_CONNECTION * s,const SIGALG_LOOKUP * sig,int idx)4542 static int has_usable_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
4543 {
4544 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
4545 if (idx == -1)
4546 idx = sig->sig_idx;
4547 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
4548 return 0;
4549
4550 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
4551 s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
4552 }
4553
4554 /*
4555 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
4556 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
4557 */
is_cert_usable(SSL_CONNECTION * s,const SIGALG_LOOKUP * sig,X509 * x,EVP_PKEY * pkey)4558 static int is_cert_usable(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
4559 EVP_PKEY *pkey)
4560 {
4561 size_t idx;
4562
4563 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)) == NULL)
4564 return 0;
4565
4566 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
4567 if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
4568 return 0;
4569
4570 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
4571 }
4572
4573 /*
4574 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
4575 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
4576 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
4577 */
find_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION * s,X509 * x,EVP_PKEY * pkey)4578 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x,
4579 EVP_PKEY *pkey)
4580 {
4581 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
4582 size_t i;
4583 int curve = -1;
4584 EVP_PKEY *tmppkey;
4585 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
4586
4587 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
4588 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
4589 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
4590 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
4591 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
4592 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
4593 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
4594 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA
4595 || !tls_sigalg_compat(s, lu))
4596 continue;
4597
4598 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
4599 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, NULL))
4600 continue;
4601 if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
4602 || (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
4603 continue;
4604
4605 tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
4606 : s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
4607
4608 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
4609 if (curve == -1)
4610 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(tmppkey);
4611 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
4612 continue;
4613 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
4614 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
4615 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(sctx, tmppkey, lu))
4616 continue;
4617 }
4618 break;
4619 }
4620
4621 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
4622 return NULL;
4623
4624 return lu;
4625 }
4626
4627 /*
4628 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
4629 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
4630 *
4631 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
4632 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
4633 *
4634 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
4635 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
4636 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
4637 */
tls_choose_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION * s,int fatalerrs)4638 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int fatalerrs)
4639 {
4640 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
4641 int sig_idx = -1;
4642
4643 s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
4644 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
4645
4646 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4647 lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
4648 if (lu == NULL) {
4649 if (!fatalerrs)
4650 return 1;
4651 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
4652 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
4653 return 0;
4654 }
4655 } else {
4656 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
4657 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
4658 return 1;
4659 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
4660 return 1;
4661
4662 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
4663 size_t i;
4664 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
4665 int curve = -1;
4666 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
4667
4668 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
4669 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
4670 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]
4671 .privatekey);
4672
4673 /*
4674 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
4675 * cert type
4676 */
4677 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
4678 /* Check the sigalg version bounds */
4679 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
4680 if (!tls_sigalg_compat(s, lu))
4681 continue;
4682 if (s->server) {
4683 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
4684 continue;
4685 } else {
4686 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
4687
4688 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
4689 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
4690 continue;
4691 }
4692 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
4693 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
4694 continue;
4695 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
4696 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
4697 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
4698
4699 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(sctx, pkey, lu))
4700 continue;
4701 }
4702 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
4703 break;
4704 }
4705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
4706 /*
4707 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
4708 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
4709 * we have to assume GOST support.
4710 */
4711 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen
4712 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
4713 & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12))
4714 != 0) {
4715 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
4716 if (!fatalerrs)
4717 return 1;
4718 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
4719 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
4720 return 0;
4721 } else {
4722 i = 0;
4723 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
4724 }
4725 }
4726 #endif
4727 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
4728 if (!fatalerrs)
4729 return 1;
4730 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
4731 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
4732 return 0;
4733 }
4734 } else {
4735 /*
4736 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
4737 */
4738 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
4739 size_t sent_sigslen;
4740
4741 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
4742 if (!fatalerrs)
4743 return 1;
4744 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
4745 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
4746 return 0;
4747 }
4748
4749 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
4750 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
4751 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
4752 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
4753 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
4754 break;
4755 }
4756 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
4757 if (!fatalerrs)
4758 return 1;
4759 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
4760 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
4761 return 0;
4762 }
4763 }
4764 } else {
4765 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
4766 if (!fatalerrs)
4767 return 1;
4768 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4769 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
4770 return 0;
4771 }
4772 }
4773 }
4774 if (sig_idx == -1)
4775 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
4776 s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
4777 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
4778 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
4779 return 1;
4780 }
4781
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX * ctx,uint8_t mode)4782 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
4783 {
4784 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
4785 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
4786 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
4787 return 0;
4788 }
4789
4790 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
4791 return 1;
4792 }
4793
SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL * ssl,uint8_t mode)4794 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
4795 {
4796 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl);
4797
4798 if (sc == NULL
4799 || (IS_QUIC(ssl) && mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED))
4800 return 0;
4801
4802 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
4803 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
4804 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
4805 return 0;
4806 }
4807
4808 sc->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
4809 return 1;
4810 }
4811
SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION * session)4812 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
4813 {
4814 if (session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode == TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_UNSPECIFIED)
4815 return TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED;
4816 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
4817 }
4818
4819 /*
4820 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
4821 */
ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX * ctx)4822 SSL_HMAC *ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
4823 {
4824 SSL_HMAC *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
4825 EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
4826
4827 if (ret == NULL)
4828 return NULL;
4829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
4830 if (ctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb == NULL
4831 && ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
4832 if (!ssl_hmac_old_new(ret))
4833 goto err;
4834 return ret;
4835 }
4836 #endif
4837 mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx->libctx, "HMAC", ctx->propq);
4838 if (mac == NULL || (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL)
4839 goto err;
4840 EVP_MAC_free(mac);
4841 return ret;
4842 err:
4843 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret->ctx);
4844 EVP_MAC_free(mac);
4845 OPENSSL_free(ret);
4846 return NULL;
4847 }
4848
ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC * ctx)4849 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
4850 {
4851 if (ctx != NULL) {
4852 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
4853 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
4854 ssl_hmac_old_free(ctx);
4855 #endif
4856 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
4857 }
4858 }
4859
ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC * ctx)4860 EVP_MAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
4861 {
4862 return ctx->ctx;
4863 }
4864
ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC * ctx,void * key,size_t len,char * md)4865 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC *ctx, void *key, size_t len, char *md)
4866 {
4867 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
4868
4869 if (ctx->ctx != NULL) {
4870 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, md, 0);
4871 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
4872 if (EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx, key, len, params))
4873 return 1;
4874 }
4875 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
4876 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
4877 return ssl_hmac_old_init(ctx, key, len, md);
4878 #endif
4879 return 0;
4880 }
4881
ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC * ctx,const unsigned char * data,size_t len)4882 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
4883 {
4884 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
4885 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx->ctx, data, len);
4886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
4887 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
4888 return ssl_hmac_old_update(ctx, data, len);
4889 #endif
4890 return 0;
4891 }
4892
ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC * ctx,unsigned char * md,size_t * len,size_t max_size)4893 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC *ctx, unsigned char *md, size_t *len,
4894 size_t max_size)
4895 {
4896 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
4897 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx->ctx, md, len, max_size);
4898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
4899 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
4900 return ssl_hmac_old_final(ctx, md, len);
4901 #endif
4902 return 0;
4903 }
4904
ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC * ctx)4905 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC *ctx)
4906 {
4907 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
4908 return EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx->ctx);
4909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
4910 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
4911 return ssl_hmac_old_size(ctx);
4912 #endif
4913 return 0;
4914 }
4915
ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(const EVP_PKEY * pkey)4916 int ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
4917 {
4918 char gname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
4919
4920 if (EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey, gname, sizeof(gname), NULL) > 0)
4921 return OBJ_txt2nid(gname);
4922
4923 return NID_undef;
4924 }
4925
tls13_set_encoded_pub_key(EVP_PKEY * pkey,const unsigned char * enckey,size_t enckeylen)4926 __owur int tls13_set_encoded_pub_key(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
4927 const unsigned char *enckey,
4928 size_t enckeylen)
4929 {
4930 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "DH")) {
4931 int bits = EVP_PKEY_get_bits(pkey);
4932
4933 if (bits <= 0 || enckeylen != (size_t)bits / 8)
4934 /* the encoded key must be padded to the length of the p */
4935 return 0;
4936 } else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC")) {
4937 if (enckeylen < 3 /* point format and at least 1 byte for x and y */
4938 || enckey[0] != 0x04)
4939 return 0;
4940 }
4941
4942 return EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(pkey, enckey, enckeylen);
4943 }
4944