1 /* 2 * Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved 4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 5 * 6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use 7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy 8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at 9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html 10 */ 11 12 #include <stdio.h> 13 #include "../ssl_local.h" 14 #include "statem_local.h" 15 #include "internal/constant_time.h" 16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h" 17 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 18 #include <openssl/rand.h> 19 #include <openssl/objects.h> 20 #include <openssl/evp.h> 21 #include <openssl/x509.h> 22 #include <openssl/dh.h> 23 #include <openssl/rsa.h> 24 #include <openssl/bn.h> 25 #include <openssl/md5.h> 26 #include <openssl/trace.h> 27 #include <openssl/core_names.h> 28 #include <openssl/asn1t.h> 29 30 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8 31 32 typedef struct { 33 ASN1_TYPE *kxBlob; 34 ASN1_TYPE *opaqueBlob; 35 } GOST_KX_MESSAGE; 36 37 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) 38 39 ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) = { 40 ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, kxBlob, ASN1_ANY), 41 ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, opaqueBlob, ASN1_ANY), 42 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) 43 44 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) 45 46 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); 47 48 /* 49 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed 50 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from 51 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. 52 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. 53 * 54 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error 55 * (transition not allowed) 56 */ 57 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) 58 { 59 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 60 61 /* 62 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have 63 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by 64 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() 65 */ 66 switch (st->hand_state) { 67 default: 68 break; 69 70 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: 71 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { 72 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { 73 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; 74 return 1; 75 } 76 break; 77 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) { 78 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) { 79 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; 80 return 1; 81 } 82 break; 83 } 84 /* Fall through */ 85 86 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: 87 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: 88 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) { 89 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 90 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; 91 return 1; 92 } 93 } else { 94 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 95 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; 96 return 1; 97 } 98 } 99 break; 100 101 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: 102 if (s->session->peer == NULL) { 103 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 104 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; 105 return 1; 106 } 107 } else { 108 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { 109 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; 110 return 1; 111 } 112 } 113 break; 114 115 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: 116 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 117 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; 118 return 1; 119 } 120 break; 121 122 case TLS_ST_OK: 123 /* 124 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of 125 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert) 126 */ 127 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING) 128 break; 129 130 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE 131 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { 132 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; 133 return 1; 134 } 135 136 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) { 137 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE; 138 return 1; 139 } 140 break; 141 } 142 143 /* No valid transition found */ 144 return 0; 145 } 146 147 /* 148 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed 149 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the 150 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The 151 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. 152 * 153 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error 154 * (transition not allowed) 155 */ 156 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) 157 { 158 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 159 160 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 161 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt)) 162 goto err; 163 return 1; 164 } 165 166 switch (st->hand_state) { 167 default: 168 break; 169 170 case TLS_ST_BEFORE: 171 case TLS_ST_OK: 172 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 173 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { 174 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; 175 return 1; 176 } 177 break; 178 179 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: 180 /* 181 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either 182 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate 183 * OR 184 * 2) If we did request one then 185 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned 186 * AND 187 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0 188 * list if we requested a certificate) 189 */ 190 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 191 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) { 192 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { 193 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) 194 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 195 /* 196 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just 197 * not going to accept it because we require a client 198 * cert. 199 */ 200 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 201 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 202 return 0; 203 } 204 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; 205 return 1; 206 } 207 } else { 208 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; 209 return 1; 210 } 211 } else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) { 212 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 213 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; 214 return 1; 215 } 216 } 217 break; 218 219 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: 220 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 221 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; 222 return 1; 223 } 224 break; 225 226 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: 227 /* 228 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have 229 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| 230 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is 231 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in 232 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be 233 * set. 234 */ 235 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) { 236 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 237 /* 238 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH 239 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is 240 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses 241 * its key from the certificate for key exchange. 242 */ 243 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; 244 return 1; 245 } 246 } else { 247 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { 248 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; 249 return 1; 250 } 251 } 252 break; 253 254 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: 255 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 256 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; 257 return 1; 258 } 259 break; 260 261 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: 262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 263 if (s->s3.npn_seen) { 264 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) { 265 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO; 266 return 1; 267 } 268 } else { 269 #endif 270 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 271 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; 272 return 1; 273 } 274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 275 } 276 #endif 277 break; 278 279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 280 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: 281 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 282 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; 283 return 1; 284 } 285 break; 286 #endif 287 288 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: 289 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 290 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; 291 return 1; 292 } 293 break; 294 } 295 296 err: 297 /* No valid transition found */ 298 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 299 BIO *rbio; 300 301 /* 302 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably 303 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it. 304 */ 305 s->init_num = 0; 306 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 307 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); 308 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio); 309 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); 310 return 0; 311 } 312 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 313 return 0; 314 } 315 316 /* 317 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message? 318 * 319 * Valid return values are: 320 * 1: Yes 321 * 0: No 322 */ 323 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 324 { 325 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 326 327 /* 328 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a 329 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For 330 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if 331 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, 332 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for 333 * key exchange. 334 */ 335 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE) 336 /* 337 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if 338 * provided 339 */ 340 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 341 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */ 342 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) 343 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint) 344 /* For other PSK always send SKE */ 345 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK))) 346 #endif 347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 348 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ 349 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) 350 #endif 351 ) { 352 return 1; 353 } 354 355 return 0; 356 } 357 358 /* 359 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message? 360 * 361 * Valid return values are: 362 * 1: Yes 363 * 0: No 364 */ 365 int send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 366 { 367 if ( 368 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ 369 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER 370 /* 371 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing 372 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3: 373 */ 374 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE) 375 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) 376 /* 377 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert 378 * a second time: 379 */ 380 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 || 381 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) 382 /* 383 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see 384 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in 385 * RFC 2246): 386 */ 387 && (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) 388 /* 389 * ... except when the application insists on 390 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts 391 * this for SSL 3) 392 */ 393 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 394 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ 395 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) 396 /* 397 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests 398 * are omitted 399 */ 400 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) { 401 return 1; 402 } 403 404 return 0; 405 } 406 407 /* 408 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to 409 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the 410 * client. 411 */ 412 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s) 413 { 414 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 415 416 /* 417 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated 418 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition() 419 */ 420 421 switch (st->hand_state) { 422 default: 423 /* Shouldn't happen */ 424 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 425 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; 426 427 case TLS_ST_OK: 428 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { 429 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE; 430 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 431 } 432 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { 433 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; 434 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 435 } 436 if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) { 437 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; 438 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 439 } 440 /* Try to read from the client instead */ 441 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 442 443 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: 444 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; 445 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 446 447 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: 448 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 449 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE) 450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; 451 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) 452 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; 453 else 454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; 455 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 456 457 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: 458 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) 459 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; 460 else 461 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; 462 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 463 464 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: 465 if (s->hit) 466 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; 467 else if (send_certificate_request(s)) 468 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; 469 else 470 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; 471 472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 473 474 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: 475 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { 476 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED; 477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 478 } else { 479 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; 480 } 481 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 482 483 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: 484 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY; 485 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 486 487 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: 488 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; 489 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 490 491 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: 492 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; 493 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 494 495 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: 496 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 497 498 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: 499 /* 500 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're 501 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets 502 * immediately. 503 */ 504 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { 505 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED; 506 } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) { 507 /* 508 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the 509 * handshake at this point. 510 */ 511 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 512 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 513 } 514 if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets) 515 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; 516 else 517 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 518 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 519 520 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: 521 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: 522 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 523 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 524 525 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: 526 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket. 527 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have 528 * been configured for. 529 */ 530 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) { 531 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 532 } else if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) { 533 /* We've written enough tickets out. */ 534 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 535 } 536 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 537 } 538 } 539 540 /* 541 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move 542 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client. 543 */ 544 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) 545 { 546 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 547 548 /* 549 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going 550 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later 551 */ 552 553 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) 554 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s); 555 556 switch (st->hand_state) { 557 default: 558 /* Shouldn't happen */ 559 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 560 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; 561 562 case TLS_ST_OK: 563 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) { 564 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */ 565 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ; 566 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE; 567 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 568 } 569 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */ 570 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { 571 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 572 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; 573 } 574 /* Fall through */ 575 576 case TLS_ST_BEFORE: 577 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */ 578 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 579 580 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: 581 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 582 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 583 584 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: 585 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified 586 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) { 587 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; 588 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { 589 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */ 590 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 591 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 592 } else { 593 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; 594 } 595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 596 597 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 598 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 599 600 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: 601 if (s->hit) { 602 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) 603 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; 604 else 605 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; 606 } else { 607 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ 608 /* normal PSK or SRP */ 609 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & 610 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { 611 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; 612 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { 613 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; 614 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) { 615 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; 616 } else { 617 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; 618 } 619 } 620 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 621 622 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: 623 if (s->ext.status_expected) { 624 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS; 625 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 626 } 627 /* Fall through */ 628 629 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: 630 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { 631 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; 632 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 633 } 634 /* Fall through */ 635 636 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: 637 if (send_certificate_request(s)) { 638 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; 639 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 640 } 641 /* Fall through */ 642 643 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: 644 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; 645 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 646 647 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: 648 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 649 650 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: 651 if (s->hit) { 652 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 653 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 654 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { 655 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; 656 } else { 657 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; 658 } 659 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 660 661 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: 662 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; 663 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 664 665 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: 666 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; 667 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 668 669 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: 670 if (s->hit) { 671 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 672 } 673 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 674 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 675 } 676 } 677 678 /* 679 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from 680 * the server to the client. 681 */ 682 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 683 { 684 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 685 686 switch (st->hand_state) { 687 default: 688 /* No pre work to be done */ 689 break; 690 691 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: 692 s->shutdown = 0; 693 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 694 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); 695 break; 696 697 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 698 s->shutdown = 0; 699 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 700 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); 701 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */ 702 st->use_timer = 0; 703 } 704 break; 705 706 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: 707 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 708 /* 709 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and 710 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now 711 */ 712 st->use_timer = 1; 713 } 714 break; 715 716 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: 717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 718 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { 719 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ 720 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); 721 } 722 #endif 723 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 724 725 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: 726 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0 727 && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected == 0) { 728 /* 729 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going 730 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off 731 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active. 732 * 733 * Calls SSLfatal as required. 734 */ 735 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0); 736 } 737 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 738 /* 739 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight 740 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer 741 */ 742 st->use_timer = 0; 743 } 744 break; 745 746 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: 747 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) 748 break; 749 /* Writes to s->session are only safe for initial handshakes */ 750 if (s->session->cipher == NULL) { 751 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher; 752 } else if (s->session->cipher != s->s3.tmp.new_cipher) { 753 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 754 return WORK_ERROR; 755 } 756 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { 757 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 758 return WORK_ERROR; 759 } 760 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 761 /* 762 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight 763 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have 764 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message, 765 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't. 766 */ 767 st->use_timer = 0; 768 } 769 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 770 771 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: 772 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING 773 && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0) 774 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 775 /* Fall through */ 776 777 case TLS_ST_OK: 778 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ 779 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1); 780 } 781 782 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 783 } 784 785 static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void) 786 { 787 switch (get_last_sys_error()) { 788 #if defined(EPIPE) 789 case EPIPE: 790 return 1; 791 #endif 792 #if defined(ECONNRESET) 793 case ECONNRESET: 794 return 1; 795 #endif 796 #if defined(WSAECONNRESET) 797 case WSAECONNRESET: 798 return 1; 799 #endif 800 default: 801 return 0; 802 } 803 } 804 805 /* 806 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the 807 * server to the client. 808 */ 809 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 810 { 811 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 812 813 s->init_num = 0; 814 815 switch (st->hand_state) { 816 default: 817 /* No post work to be done */ 818 break; 819 820 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: 821 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 822 return WORK_MORE_A; 823 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { 824 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 825 return WORK_ERROR; 826 } 827 break; 828 829 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 830 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 831 return WORK_MORE_A; 832 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */ 833 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { 834 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 835 return WORK_ERROR; 836 } 837 /* 838 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to 839 * treat like it was the first packet 840 */ 841 s->first_packet = 1; 842 break; 843 844 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: 845 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { 846 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0 847 && statem_flush(s) != 1) 848 return WORK_MORE_A; 849 break; 850 } 851 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 852 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { 853 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; 854 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; 855 size_t labellen; 856 857 /* 858 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no 859 * SCTP used. 860 */ 861 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, 862 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); 863 864 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */ 865 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1; 866 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG) 867 labellen += 1; 868 869 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, 870 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, 871 labellen, NULL, 0, 872 0) <= 0) { 873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 874 return WORK_ERROR; 875 } 876 877 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, 878 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); 879 } 880 #endif 881 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) 882 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 883 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)) 884 break; 885 /* Fall through */ 886 887 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: 888 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { 889 if (!statem_flush(s)) 890 return WORK_MORE_A; 891 break; 892 } 893 894 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 895 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) 896 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 897 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { 898 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 899 return WORK_ERROR; 900 } 901 902 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED 903 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 904 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { 905 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 906 return WORK_ERROR; 907 } 908 /* 909 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive 910 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted 911 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts. 912 */ 913 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS; 914 break; 915 } 916 917 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 918 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) { 919 /* 920 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if 921 * no SCTP used. 922 */ 923 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 924 0, NULL); 925 } 926 #endif 927 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 928 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 929 { 930 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 931 return WORK_ERROR; 932 } 933 934 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 935 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); 936 break; 937 938 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: 939 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 940 return WORK_MORE_A; 941 break; 942 943 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: 944 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 945 return WORK_MORE_A; 946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 947 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { 948 /* 949 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if 950 * no SCTP used. 951 */ 952 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 953 0, NULL); 954 } 955 #endif 956 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 957 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */ 958 size_t dummy; 959 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 960 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, 961 &dummy) 962 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 963 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 964 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 965 return WORK_ERROR; 966 } 967 break; 968 969 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: 970 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { 971 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 972 return WORK_MORE_A; 973 } 974 break; 975 976 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: 977 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 978 return WORK_MORE_A; 979 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) { 980 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 981 return WORK_ERROR; 982 } 983 break; 984 985 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: 986 clear_sys_error(); 987 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) { 988 if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL 989 && conn_is_closed()) { 990 /* 991 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a 992 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is 993 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client 994 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without 995 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets. 996 */ 997 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 998 break; 999 } 1000 1001 return WORK_MORE_A; 1002 } 1003 break; 1004 } 1005 1006 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 1007 } 1008 1009 /* 1010 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the 1011 * server 1012 * 1013 * Valid return values are: 1014 * 1: Success 1015 * 0: Error 1016 */ 1017 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1018 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) 1019 { 1020 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 1021 1022 switch (st->hand_state) { 1023 default: 1024 /* Shouldn't happen */ 1025 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE); 1026 return 0; 1027 1028 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: 1029 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 1030 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; 1031 else 1032 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; 1033 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; 1034 break; 1035 1036 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 1037 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request; 1038 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; 1039 break; 1040 1041 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: 1042 /* No construction function needed */ 1043 *confunc = NULL; 1044 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; 1045 break; 1046 1047 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: 1048 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello; 1049 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; 1050 break; 1051 1052 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: 1053 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate; 1054 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; 1055 break; 1056 1057 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: 1058 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify; 1059 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; 1060 break; 1061 1062 1063 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: 1064 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange; 1065 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; 1066 break; 1067 1068 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: 1069 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request; 1070 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; 1071 break; 1072 1073 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: 1074 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done; 1075 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 1076 break; 1077 1078 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: 1079 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket; 1080 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; 1081 break; 1082 1083 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: 1084 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status; 1085 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; 1086 break; 1087 1088 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: 1089 *confunc = tls_construct_finished; 1090 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; 1091 break; 1092 1093 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: 1094 *confunc = NULL; 1095 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY; 1096 break; 1097 1098 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: 1099 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions; 1100 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; 1101 break; 1102 1103 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: 1104 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update; 1105 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE; 1106 break; 1107 } 1108 1109 return 1; 1110 } 1111 1112 /* 1113 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message, 1114 * calculated as follows: 1115 * 1116 * 2 + # client_version 1117 * 32 + # only valid length for random 1118 * 1 + # length of session_id 1119 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id 1120 * 2 + # length of cipher suites 1121 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array 1122 * 1 + # length of compression_methods 1123 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods 1124 * 2 + # length of extensions 1125 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions 1126 */ 1127 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396 1128 1129 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048 1130 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514 1131 1132 /* 1133 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are 1134 * reading. Excludes the message header. 1135 */ 1136 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s) 1137 { 1138 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 1139 1140 switch (st->hand_state) { 1141 default: 1142 /* Shouldn't happen */ 1143 return 0; 1144 1145 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: 1146 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; 1147 1148 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: 1149 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH; 1150 1151 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: 1152 return s->max_cert_list; 1153 1154 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: 1155 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; 1156 1157 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: 1158 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; 1159 1160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1161 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: 1162 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH; 1163 #endif 1164 1165 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: 1166 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; 1167 1168 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: 1169 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; 1170 1171 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: 1172 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH; 1173 } 1174 } 1175 1176 /* 1177 * Process a message that the server has received from the client. 1178 */ 1179 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 1180 { 1181 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 1182 1183 switch (st->hand_state) { 1184 default: 1185 /* Shouldn't happen */ 1186 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1187 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 1188 1189 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: 1190 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt); 1191 1192 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: 1193 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt); 1194 1195 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: 1196 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt); 1197 1198 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: 1199 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt); 1200 1201 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: 1202 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); 1203 1204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1205 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: 1206 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt); 1207 #endif 1208 1209 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: 1210 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); 1211 1212 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: 1213 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); 1214 1215 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: 1216 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt); 1217 1218 } 1219 } 1220 1221 /* 1222 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message 1223 * from the client 1224 */ 1225 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 1226 { 1227 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 1228 1229 switch (st->hand_state) { 1230 default: 1231 /* Shouldn't happen */ 1232 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1233 return WORK_ERROR; 1234 1235 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: 1236 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst); 1237 1238 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: 1239 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst); 1240 } 1241 } 1242 1243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1244 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */ 1245 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s) 1246 { 1247 int ret; 1248 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1249 1250 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && 1251 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { 1252 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { 1253 /* 1254 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp 1255 * login name 1256 */ 1257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, 1258 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 1259 return -1; 1260 } else { 1261 ret = ssl_srp_server_param_with_username_intern(s, &al); 1262 if (ret < 0) 1263 return 0; 1264 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { 1265 SSLfatal(s, al, 1266 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY 1267 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND 1268 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1269 return -1; 1270 } 1271 } 1272 } 1273 return 1; 1274 } 1275 #endif 1276 1277 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie, 1278 size_t cookie_len) 1279 { 1280 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */ 1281 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION) 1282 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len)) 1283 return 0; 1284 1285 return 1; 1286 } 1287 1288 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 1289 { 1290 unsigned int cookie_leni; 1291 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || 1292 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, 1293 &cookie_leni) == 0 || 1294 cookie_leni > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) { 1295 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); 1296 return 0; 1297 } 1298 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni; 1299 1300 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie, 1301 s->d1->cookie_len)) { 1302 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1303 return 0; 1304 } 1305 1306 return 1; 1307 } 1308 1309 /*- 1310 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X 1311 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|. 1312 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: 1313 * SNI, 1314 * elliptic_curves 1315 * ec_point_formats 1316 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only) 1317 * 1318 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, 1319 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. 1320 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from 1321 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). 1322 */ 1323 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) 1324 { 1325 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { 1326 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ 1327 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ 1328 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ 1329 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ 1330 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ 1331 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ 1332 1333 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ 1334 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ 1335 0x01, /* 1 point format */ 1336 0x00, /* uncompressed */ 1337 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ 1338 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ 1339 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ 1340 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ 1341 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ 1342 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ 1343 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ 1344 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ 1345 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ 1346 }; 1347 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */ 1348 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18; 1349 unsigned int type; 1350 PACKET sni, tmppkt; 1351 size_t ext_len; 1352 1353 tmppkt = hello->extensions; 1354 1355 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2) 1356 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type) 1357 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) { 1358 return; 1359 } 1360 1361 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 1362 return; 1363 1364 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? 1365 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength; 1366 1367 s->s3.is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock, 1368 ext_len); 1369 } 1370 1371 #define RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(options) \ 1372 ((options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) == 0 \ 1373 && (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION) != 0) 1374 1375 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 1376 { 1377 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */ 1378 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie; 1379 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0; 1380 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL; 1381 1382 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */ 1383 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { 1384 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) { 1385 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1386 goto err; 1387 } 1388 if (!RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(s->options) 1389 || (!s->s3.send_connection_binding 1390 && (s->options 1391 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) { 1392 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1393 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; 1394 } 1395 s->renegotiate = 1; 1396 s->new_session = 1; 1397 } 1398 1399 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello)); 1400 if (clienthello == NULL) { 1401 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1402 goto err; 1403 } 1404 1405 /* 1406 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure. 1407 */ 1408 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer); 1409 PACKET_null_init(&cookie); 1410 1411 if (clienthello->isv2) { 1412 unsigned int mt; 1413 1414 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) 1415 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { 1416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 1417 goto err; 1418 } 1419 1420 /*- 1421 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2 1422 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS 1423 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes 1424 * the rest right through. Its format is: 1425 * Byte Content 1426 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer 1427 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here 1428 * 3-4 version 1429 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length 1430 * 7-8 session_id_length 1431 * 9-10 challenge_length 1432 * ... ... 1433 */ 1434 1435 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt) 1436 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { 1437 /* 1438 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record 1439 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record 1440 * in the first place 1441 */ 1442 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1443 goto err; 1444 } 1445 } 1446 1447 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) { 1448 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1449 goto err; 1450 } 1451 1452 /* Parse the message and load client random. */ 1453 if (clienthello->isv2) { 1454 /* 1455 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello 1456 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format. 1457 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below. 1458 */ 1459 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len; 1460 PACKET challenge; 1461 1462 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len) 1463 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len) 1464 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) { 1465 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1466 goto err; 1467 } 1468 1469 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { 1470 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1471 goto err; 1472 } 1473 1474 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites, 1475 ciphersuite_len) 1476 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len) 1477 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len) 1478 /* No extensions. */ 1479 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 1480 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1481 goto err; 1482 } 1483 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len; 1484 1485 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE 1486 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit 1487 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if 1488 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does. 1489 */ 1490 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE 1491 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len; 1492 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1493 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge, 1494 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - 1495 challenge_len, challenge_len) 1496 /* Advertise only null compression. */ 1497 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) { 1498 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1499 goto err; 1500 } 1501 1502 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); 1503 } else { 1504 /* Regular ClientHello. */ 1505 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) 1506 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id) 1507 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id, 1508 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH, 1509 &clienthello->session_id_len)) { 1510 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1511 goto err; 1512 } 1513 1514 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1515 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) { 1516 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1517 goto err; 1518 } 1519 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie, 1520 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH, 1521 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) { 1522 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1523 goto err; 1524 } 1525 /* 1526 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, 1527 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. 1528 * So check cookie length... 1529 */ 1530 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { 1531 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) { 1532 OPENSSL_free(clienthello); 1533 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; 1534 } 1535 } 1536 } 1537 1538 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) { 1539 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1540 goto err; 1541 } 1542 1543 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) { 1544 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1545 goto err; 1546 } 1547 1548 /* Could be empty. */ 1549 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { 1550 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); 1551 } else { 1552 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions) 1553 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 1554 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1555 goto err; 1556 } 1557 } 1558 } 1559 1560 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions, 1561 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE, 1562 &clienthello->compressions_len)) { 1563 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1564 goto err; 1565 } 1566 1567 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */ 1568 extensions = clienthello->extensions; 1569 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, 1570 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts, 1571 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) { 1572 /* SSLfatal already been called */ 1573 goto err; 1574 } 1575 s->clienthello = clienthello; 1576 1577 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; 1578 1579 err: 1580 if (clienthello != NULL) 1581 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); 1582 OPENSSL_free(clienthello); 1583 1584 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 1585 } 1586 1587 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s) 1588 { 1589 unsigned int j; 1590 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1591 int protverr; 1592 size_t loop; 1593 unsigned long id; 1594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1595 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; 1596 #endif 1597 const SSL_CIPHER *c; 1598 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; 1599 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL; 1600 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello; 1601 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; 1602 1603 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */ 1604 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */ 1605 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) { 1606 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */ 1607 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) { 1608 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS: 1609 break; 1610 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY: 1611 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB; 1612 return -1; 1613 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR: 1614 default: 1615 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); 1616 goto err; 1617 } 1618 } 1619 1620 /* Set up the client_random */ 1621 memcpy(s->s3.client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1622 1623 /* Choose the version */ 1624 1625 if (clienthello->isv2) { 1626 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION 1627 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00) 1628 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) { 1629 /* 1630 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't 1631 * support it. 1632 */ 1633 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); 1634 goto err; 1635 } 1636 /* SSLv3/TLS */ 1637 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; 1638 } 1639 /* 1640 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check 1641 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later. 1642 */ 1643 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1644 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd); 1645 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION && 1646 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) { 1647 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; 1648 } else { 1649 protverr = 0; 1650 } 1651 1652 if (protverr) { 1653 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { 1654 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ 1655 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; 1656 } 1657 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protverr); 1658 goto err; 1659 } 1660 1661 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */ 1662 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { 1663 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); 1664 goto err; 1665 } 1666 1667 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1668 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */ 1669 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { 1670 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { 1671 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie, 1672 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) { 1673 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 1674 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1675 goto err; 1676 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 1677 } 1678 /* default verification */ 1679 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len 1680 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 1681 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { 1682 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1683 goto err; 1684 } 1685 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1; 1686 } 1687 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { 1688 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd); 1689 if (protverr != 0) { 1690 s->version = s->client_version; 1691 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protverr); 1692 goto err; 1693 } 1694 } 1695 } 1696 1697 s->hit = 0; 1698 1699 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, 1700 clienthello->isv2) || 1701 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs, 1702 clienthello->isv2, 1)) { 1703 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1704 goto err; 1705 } 1706 1707 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 0; 1708 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */ 1709 if (scsvs != NULL) { 1710 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) { 1711 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i); 1712 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) { 1713 if (s->renegotiate) { 1714 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */ 1715 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 1716 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); 1717 goto err; 1718 } 1719 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1; 1720 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV && 1721 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) { 1722 /* 1723 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried 1724 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version 1725 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first 1726 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger 1727 * an insecure downgrade. 1728 */ 1729 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK, 1730 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); 1731 goto err; 1732 } 1733 } 1734 } 1735 1736 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */ 1737 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1738 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = 1739 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1740 1741 if (cipher == NULL) { 1742 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1743 goto err; 1744 } 1745 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING 1746 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL 1747 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) { 1748 /* 1749 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we 1750 * just selected. Something must have changed. 1751 */ 1752 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER); 1753 goto err; 1754 } 1755 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher; 1756 } 1757 1758 /* We need to do this before getting the session */ 1759 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret, 1760 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, 1761 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) { 1762 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1763 goto err; 1764 } 1765 1766 /* 1767 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello. 1768 * In TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty. 1769 * 1770 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in 1771 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally 1772 * ignore resumption requests with flag 1773 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather 1774 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on 1775 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions). 1776 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to 1777 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains 1778 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the 1779 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be 1780 * ignored. 1781 */ 1782 if (clienthello->isv2 || 1783 (s->new_session && 1784 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { 1785 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) { 1786 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1787 goto err; 1788 } 1789 } else { 1790 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello); 1791 if (i == 1) { 1792 /* previous session */ 1793 s->hit = 1; 1794 } else if (i == -1) { 1795 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1796 goto err; 1797 } else { 1798 /* i == 0 */ 1799 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) { 1800 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1801 goto err; 1802 } 1803 } 1804 } 1805 1806 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1807 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id, 1808 s->clienthello->session_id_len); 1809 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len; 1810 } 1811 1812 /* 1813 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check 1814 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption. 1815 */ 1816 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) { 1817 j = 0; 1818 id = s->session->cipher->id; 1819 1820 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) { 1821 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client sent %d ciphers\n", 1822 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); 1823 } 1824 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { 1825 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); 1826 if (trc_out != NULL) 1827 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i, 1828 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); 1829 if (c->id == id) { 1830 j = 1; 1831 break; 1832 } 1833 } 1834 if (j == 0) { 1835 /* 1836 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked 1837 * to reuse it 1838 */ 1839 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1840 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 1841 OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER); 1842 goto err; 1843 } 1844 OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER); 1845 } 1846 1847 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) { 1848 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0) 1849 break; 1850 } 1851 1852 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) { 1853 /* no compress */ 1854 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 1855 goto err; 1856 } 1857 1858 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) 1859 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello); 1860 1861 /* TLS extensions */ 1862 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, 1863 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) { 1864 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1865 goto err; 1866 } 1867 1868 /* 1869 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake 1870 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before 1871 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket 1872 * processing to use it in key derivation. 1873 */ 1874 { 1875 unsigned char *pos; 1876 pos = s->s3.server_random; 1877 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) { 1878 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1879 goto err; 1880 } 1881 } 1882 1883 if (!s->hit 1884 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION 1885 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) 1886 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) 1887 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) { 1888 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; 1889 /* 1890 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for 1891 * backwards compat reasons 1892 */ 1893 int master_key_length; 1894 1895 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); 1896 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, 1897 &master_key_length, ciphers, 1898 &pref_cipher, 1899 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) 1900 && master_key_length > 0) { 1901 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; 1902 s->hit = 1; 1903 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers; 1904 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; 1905 1906 ciphers = NULL; 1907 1908 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ 1909 if (pref_cipher == NULL) 1910 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, 1911 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1912 if (pref_cipher == NULL) { 1913 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1914 goto err; 1915 } 1916 1917 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; 1918 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); 1919 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers); 1920 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); 1921 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers); 1922 } 1923 } 1924 1925 /* 1926 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other 1927 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression 1928 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. 1929 */ 1930 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = NULL; 1931 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1932 /* 1933 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in 1934 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in 1935 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello. 1936 */ 1937 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) { 1938 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1939 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1940 goto err; 1941 } 1942 } 1943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1944 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ 1945 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 1946 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; 1947 unsigned int k; 1948 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ 1949 /* Can't disable compression */ 1950 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { 1951 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 1952 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1953 goto err; 1954 } 1955 /* Look for resumed compression method */ 1956 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { 1957 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); 1958 if (comp_id == comp->id) { 1959 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp; 1960 break; 1961 } 1962 } 1963 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) { 1964 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 1965 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1966 goto err; 1967 } 1968 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ 1969 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) { 1970 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id) 1971 break; 1972 } 1973 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) { 1974 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1975 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); 1976 goto err; 1977 } 1978 } else if (s->hit) { 1979 comp = NULL; 1980 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { 1981 /* See if we have a match */ 1982 int m, nn, v, done = 0; 1983 unsigned int o; 1984 1985 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); 1986 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { 1987 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); 1988 v = comp->id; 1989 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) { 1990 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) { 1991 done = 1; 1992 break; 1993 } 1994 } 1995 if (done) 1996 break; 1997 } 1998 if (done) 1999 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp; 2000 else 2001 comp = NULL; 2002 } 2003 #else 2004 /* 2005 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session 2006 * using compression. 2007 */ 2008 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 2009 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 2010 goto err; 2011 } 2012 #endif 2013 2014 /* 2015 * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher 2016 */ 2017 2018 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 2019 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers); 2020 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers; 2021 if (ciphers == NULL) { 2022 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2023 goto err; 2024 } 2025 ciphers = NULL; 2026 } 2027 2028 if (!s->hit) { 2029 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 2030 s->session->compress_meth = 0; 2031 #else 2032 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; 2033 #endif 2034 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { 2035 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2036 goto err; 2037 } 2038 } 2039 2040 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 2041 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); 2042 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); 2043 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); 2044 s->clienthello = NULL; 2045 return 1; 2046 err: 2047 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 2048 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); 2049 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); 2050 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); 2051 s->clienthello = NULL; 2052 2053 return 0; 2054 } 2055 2056 /* 2057 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1. 2058 * Upon failure, returns 0. 2059 */ 2060 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s) 2061 { 2062 s->ext.status_expected = 0; 2063 2064 /* 2065 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be 2066 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed, 2067 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may 2068 * influence which certificate is sent 2069 */ 2070 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL 2071 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { 2072 int ret; 2073 2074 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ 2075 if (s->s3.tmp.cert != NULL) { 2076 /* 2077 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate 2078 * et al can pick it up. 2079 */ 2080 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert; 2081 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg); 2082 switch (ret) { 2083 /* We don't want to send a status request response */ 2084 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 2085 s->ext.status_expected = 0; 2086 break; 2087 /* status request response should be sent */ 2088 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: 2089 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp) 2090 s->ext.status_expected = 1; 2091 break; 2092 /* something bad happened */ 2093 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 2094 default: 2095 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 2096 return 0; 2097 } 2098 } 2099 } 2100 2101 return 1; 2102 } 2103 2104 /* 2105 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1. 2106 * Upon failure, returns 0. 2107 */ 2108 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s) 2109 { 2110 const unsigned char *selected = NULL; 2111 unsigned char selected_len = 0; 2112 2113 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3.alpn_proposed != NULL) { 2114 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, 2115 s->s3.alpn_proposed, 2116 (unsigned int)s->s3.alpn_proposed_len, 2117 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg); 2118 2119 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 2120 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected); 2121 s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len); 2122 if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) { 2123 s->s3.alpn_selected_len = 0; 2124 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2125 return 0; 2126 } 2127 s->s3.alpn_selected_len = selected_len; 2128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2129 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ 2130 s->s3.npn_seen = 0; 2131 #endif 2132 2133 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */ 2134 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL 2135 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len 2136 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected, 2137 selected_len) != 0) { 2138 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */ 2139 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; 2140 2141 if (!s->hit) { 2142 /* 2143 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have 2144 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the 2145 * selected ALPN. 2146 */ 2147 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) { 2148 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2149 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2150 return 0; 2151 } 2152 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, 2153 selected_len); 2154 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { 2155 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2156 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2157 return 0; 2158 } 2159 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len; 2160 } 2161 } 2162 2163 return 1; 2164 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) { 2165 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, 2166 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL); 2167 return 0; 2168 } 2169 /* 2170 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was 2171 * present. 2172 */ 2173 } 2174 2175 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */ 2176 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) { 2177 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */ 2178 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; 2179 } 2180 2181 return 1; 2182 } 2183 2184 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 2185 { 2186 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; 2187 2188 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { 2189 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s); 2190 if (rv == 0) { 2191 /* SSLfatal() was already called */ 2192 goto err; 2193 } 2194 if (rv < 0) 2195 return WORK_MORE_A; 2196 wst = WORK_MORE_B; 2197 } 2198 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { 2199 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 2200 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ 2201 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) { 2202 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); 2203 if (rv == 0) { 2204 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); 2205 goto err; 2206 } 2207 if (rv < 0) { 2208 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 2209 return WORK_MORE_B; 2210 } 2211 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 2212 } 2213 2214 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */ 2215 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 2216 cipher = 2217 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 2218 2219 if (cipher == NULL) { 2220 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 2221 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 2222 goto err; 2223 } 2224 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher; 2225 } 2226 if (!s->hit) { 2227 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) { 2228 /* SSLfatal already called */ 2229 goto err; 2230 } 2231 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */ 2232 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL) 2233 s->session->not_resumable = 2234 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, 2235 ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey 2236 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0)); 2237 if (s->session->not_resumable) 2238 /* do not send a session ticket */ 2239 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; 2240 } 2241 } else { 2242 /* Session-id reuse */ 2243 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; 2244 } 2245 2246 /*- 2247 * we now have the following setup. 2248 * client_random 2249 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers 2250 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers 2251 * compression - basically ignored right now 2252 * ssl version is set - sslv3 2253 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 2254 * s->hit - session reuse flag 2255 * s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. 2256 */ 2257 2258 /* 2259 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the 2260 * certificate callbacks etc above. 2261 */ 2262 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) { 2263 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2264 goto err; 2265 } 2266 /* 2267 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and 2268 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3 2269 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and 2270 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data. 2271 */ 2272 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) { 2273 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2274 goto err; 2275 } 2276 2277 wst = WORK_MORE_C; 2278 } 2279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2280 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) { 2281 int ret; 2282 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) { 2283 /* 2284 * callback indicates further work to be done 2285 */ 2286 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 2287 return WORK_MORE_C; 2288 } 2289 if (ret < 0) { 2290 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2291 goto err; 2292 } 2293 } 2294 #endif 2295 2296 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; 2297 err: 2298 return WORK_ERROR; 2299 } 2300 2301 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 2302 { 2303 int compm; 2304 size_t sl, len; 2305 int version; 2306 unsigned char *session_id; 2307 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING; 2308 2309 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version; 2310 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version) 2311 /* 2312 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in 2313 * tls_process_client_hello() 2314 */ 2315 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, 2316 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING 2317 ? hrrrandom : s->s3.server_random, 2318 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { 2319 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2320 return 0; 2321 } 2322 2323 /*- 2324 * There are several cases for the session ID to send 2325 * back in the server hello: 2326 * - For session reuse from the session cache, 2327 * we send back the old session ID. 2328 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) 2329 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" 2330 * (which doesn't actually identify the session). 2331 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new 2332 * session ID. 2333 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, 2334 * we send back a 0-length session ID. 2335 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client 2336 * regardless 2337 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, 2338 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed 2339 * to send back. 2340 */ 2341 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 2342 && !s->hit) 2343 s->session->session_id_length = 0; 2344 2345 if (usetls13) { 2346 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len; 2347 session_id = s->tmp_session_id; 2348 } else { 2349 sl = s->session->session_id_length; 2350 session_id = s->session->session_id; 2351 } 2352 2353 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { 2354 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2355 return 0; 2356 } 2357 2358 /* set up the compression method */ 2359 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 2360 compm = 0; 2361 #else 2362 if (usetls13 || s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) 2363 compm = 0; 2364 else 2365 compm = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id; 2366 #endif 2367 2368 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl) 2369 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len) 2370 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) { 2371 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2372 return 0; 2373 } 2374 2375 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, 2376 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING 2377 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST 2378 : (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) 2379 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO 2380 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO), 2381 NULL, 0)) { 2382 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2383 return 0; 2384 } 2385 2386 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { 2387 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */ 2388 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); 2389 s->session = NULL; 2390 s->hit = 0; 2391 2392 /* 2393 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with 2394 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1. 2395 */ 2396 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) { 2397 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2398 return 0; 2399 } 2400 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) 2401 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { 2402 /* SSLfatal() already called */; 2403 return 0; 2404 } 2405 2406 return 1; 2407 } 2408 2409 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 2410 { 2411 if (!s->s3.tmp.cert_request) { 2412 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { 2413 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2414 return 0; 2415 } 2416 } 2417 return 1; 2418 } 2419 2420 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 2421 { 2422 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL; 2423 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 2424 size_t encodedlen = 0; 2425 int curve_id = 0; 2426 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg; 2427 int i; 2428 unsigned long type; 2429 BIGNUM *r[4]; 2430 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); 2431 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; 2432 size_t paramlen, paramoffset; 2433 int freer = 0, ret = 0; 2434 2435 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) { 2436 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2437 goto err; 2438 } 2439 2440 if (md_ctx == NULL) { 2441 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2442 goto err; 2443 } 2444 2445 type = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2446 2447 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; 2448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2449 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */ 2450 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { 2451 } else 2452 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 2453 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { 2454 CERT *cert = s->cert; 2455 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL; 2456 2457 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) { 2458 pkdh = ssl_get_auto_dh(s); 2459 if (pkdh == NULL) { 2460 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2461 goto err; 2462 } 2463 pkdhp = pkdh; 2464 } else { 2465 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp; 2466 } 2467 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0) 2468 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { 2469 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024)); 2470 if (pkdh == NULL) { 2471 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2472 goto err; 2473 } 2474 pkdhp = pkdh; 2475 } 2476 #endif 2477 if (pkdhp == NULL) { 2478 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 2479 goto err; 2480 } 2481 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, 2482 EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) { 2483 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); 2484 goto err; 2485 } 2486 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) { 2487 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2488 goto err; 2489 } 2490 2491 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, pkdhp); 2492 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) { 2493 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2494 goto err; 2495 } 2496 2497 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); 2498 pkdh = NULL; 2499 2500 /* These BIGNUMs need to be freed when we're finished */ 2501 freer = 1; 2502 if (!EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, 2503 &r[0]) 2504 || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, 2505 &r[1]) 2506 || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, 2507 OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, &r[2])) { 2508 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2509 goto err; 2510 } 2511 } else if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { 2512 2513 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) { 2514 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2515 goto err; 2516 } 2517 2518 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ 2519 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2); 2520 if (curve_id == 0) { 2521 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 2522 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 2523 goto err; 2524 } 2525 /* Cache the group used in the SSL_SESSION */ 2526 s->session->kex_group = curve_id; 2527 /* Generate a new key for this curve */ 2528 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id); 2529 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) { 2530 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2531 goto err; 2532 } 2533 2534 /* Encode the public key. */ 2535 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.tmp.pkey, 2536 &encodedPoint); 2537 if (encodedlen == 0) { 2538 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2539 goto err; 2540 } 2541 2542 /* 2543 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we 2544 * can set these to NULLs 2545 */ 2546 r[0] = NULL; 2547 r[1] = NULL; 2548 r[2] = NULL; 2549 r[3] = NULL; 2550 } else 2551 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2552 if (type & SSL_kSRP) { 2553 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || 2554 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || 2555 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { 2556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); 2557 goto err; 2558 } 2559 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; 2560 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; 2561 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; 2562 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; 2563 } else 2564 #endif 2565 { 2566 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 2567 goto err; 2568 } 2569 2570 if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0) 2571 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) { 2572 lu = NULL; 2573 } else if (lu == NULL) { 2574 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2575 goto err; 2576 } 2577 2578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2579 if (type & SSL_PSK) { 2580 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL) 2581 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); 2582 2583 /* 2584 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already 2585 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case 2586 */ 2587 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN 2588 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, 2589 len)) { 2590 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2591 goto err; 2592 } 2593 } 2594 #endif 2595 2596 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { 2597 unsigned char *binval; 2598 int res; 2599 2600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2601 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { 2602 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt); 2603 } else 2604 #endif 2605 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt); 2606 2607 if (!res) { 2608 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2609 goto err; 2610 } 2611 2612 /*- 2613 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS 2614 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length 2615 * as the prime 2616 */ 2617 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) { 2618 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]); 2619 2620 if (len > 0) { 2621 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) { 2622 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2623 goto err; 2624 } 2625 memset(binval, 0, len); 2626 } 2627 } 2628 2629 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval) 2630 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 2631 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2632 goto err; 2633 } 2634 2635 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval); 2636 } 2637 2638 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { 2639 /* 2640 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the 2641 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] 2642 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded 2643 * point itself 2644 */ 2645 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) 2646 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) 2647 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id) 2648 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) { 2649 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2650 goto err; 2651 } 2652 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 2653 encodedPoint = NULL; 2654 } 2655 2656 /* not anonymous */ 2657 if (lu != NULL) { 2658 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey; 2659 const EVP_MD *md; 2660 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs; 2661 size_t siglen = 0, tbslen; 2662 2663 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) { 2664 /* Should never happen */ 2665 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2666 goto err; 2667 } 2668 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */ 2669 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) { 2670 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2671 goto err; 2672 } 2673 /* send signature algorithm */ 2674 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { 2675 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2676 goto err; 2677 } 2678 2679 if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx, 2680 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md), 2681 s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq, pkey, 2682 NULL) <= 0) { 2683 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2684 goto err; 2685 } 2686 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { 2687 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 2688 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { 2689 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2690 goto err; 2691 } 2692 } 2693 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, 2694 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset, 2695 paramlen); 2696 if (tbslen == 0) { 2697 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2698 goto err; 2699 } 2700 2701 if (EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, NULL, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <=0 2702 || !WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1) 2703 || EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <= 0 2704 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2) 2705 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) { 2706 OPENSSL_free(tbs); 2707 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2708 goto err; 2709 } 2710 OPENSSL_free(tbs); 2711 } 2712 2713 ret = 1; 2714 err: 2715 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); 2716 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 2717 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); 2718 if (freer) { 2719 BN_free(r[0]); 2720 BN_free(r[1]); 2721 BN_free(r[2]); 2722 BN_free(r[3]); 2723 } 2724 return ret; 2725 } 2726 2727 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 2728 { 2729 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 2730 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */ 2731 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { 2732 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context); 2733 s->pha_context_len = 32; 2734 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL) { 2735 s->pha_context_len = 0; 2736 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2737 return 0; 2738 } 2739 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->pha_context, 2740 s->pha_context_len, 0) <= 0 2741 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, 2742 s->pha_context_len)) { 2743 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2744 return 0; 2745 } 2746 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */ 2747 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { 2748 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2749 return 0; 2750 } 2751 } else { 2752 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { 2753 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2754 return 0; 2755 } 2756 } 2757 2758 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, 2759 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL, 2760 0)) { 2761 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2762 return 0; 2763 } 2764 goto done; 2765 } 2766 2767 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ 2768 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) 2769 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 2770 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2771 return 0; 2772 } 2773 2774 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 2775 const uint16_t *psigs; 2776 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs); 2777 2778 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 2779 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH) 2780 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl) 2781 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 2782 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2783 return 0; 2784 } 2785 } 2786 2787 if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) { 2788 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2789 return 0; 2790 } 2791 2792 done: 2793 s->certreqs_sent++; 2794 s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 1; 2795 return 1; 2796 } 2797 2798 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 2799 { 2800 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2801 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; 2802 size_t psklen; 2803 PACKET psk_identity; 2804 2805 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) { 2806 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2807 return 0; 2808 } 2809 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { 2810 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2811 return 0; 2812 } 2813 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { 2814 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); 2815 return 0; 2816 } 2817 2818 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) { 2819 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2820 return 0; 2821 } 2822 2823 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity, 2824 psk, sizeof(psk)); 2825 2826 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { 2827 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2828 return 0; 2829 } else if (psklen == 0) { 2830 /* 2831 * PSK related to the given identity not found 2832 */ 2833 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 2834 return 0; 2835 } 2836 2837 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk); 2838 s->s3.tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); 2839 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); 2840 2841 if (s->s3.tmp.psk == NULL) { 2842 s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0; 2843 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2844 return 0; 2845 } 2846 2847 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen; 2848 2849 return 1; 2850 #else 2851 /* Should never happen */ 2852 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2853 return 0; 2854 #endif 2855 } 2856 2857 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 2858 { 2859 size_t outlen; 2860 PACKET enc_premaster; 2861 EVP_PKEY *rsa = NULL; 2862 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL; 2863 int ret = 0; 2864 EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; 2865 OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params; 2866 2867 rsa = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey; 2868 if (rsa == NULL) { 2869 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 2870 return 0; 2871 } 2872 2873 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */ 2874 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 2875 enc_premaster = *pkt; 2876 } else { 2877 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster) 2878 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 2879 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2880 return 0; 2881 } 2882 } 2883 2884 outlen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; 2885 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen); 2886 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) { 2887 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2888 return 0; 2889 } 2890 2891 ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, rsa, s->ctx->propq); 2892 if (ctx == NULL) { 2893 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2894 goto err; 2895 } 2896 2897 /* 2898 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of 2899 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, 2900 * section 7.4.7.1). We use the special padding type 2901 * RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING to do that. It will automaticaly decrypt the 2902 * RSA, check the padding and check that the client version is as expected 2903 * in the premaster secret. If any of that fails then the function appears 2904 * to return successfully but with a random result. The call below could 2905 * still fail if the input is publicly invalid. 2906 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 2907 */ 2908 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0 2909 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING) <= 0) { 2910 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2911 goto err; 2912 } 2913 2914 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION, 2915 (unsigned int *)&s->client_version); 2916 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) != 0) 2917 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint( 2918 OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION, 2919 (unsigned int *)&s->version); 2920 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); 2921 2922 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) 2923 || EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, rsa_decrypt, &outlen, 2924 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster), 2925 PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster)) <= 0) { 2926 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2927 goto err; 2928 } 2929 2930 /* 2931 * This test should never fail (otherwise we should have failed above) but 2932 * we double check anyway. 2933 */ 2934 if (outlen != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2935 OPENSSL_cleanse(rsa_decrypt, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); 2936 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2937 goto err; 2938 } 2939 2940 /* Also cleanses rsa_decrypt (on success or failure) */ 2941 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt, 2942 SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH, 0)) { 2943 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2944 goto err; 2945 } 2946 2947 ret = 1; 2948 err: 2949 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt); 2950 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); 2951 return ret; 2952 } 2953 2954 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 2955 { 2956 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; 2957 unsigned int i; 2958 const unsigned char *data; 2959 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; 2960 int ret = 0; 2961 2962 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) { 2963 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2964 goto err; 2965 } 2966 skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey; 2967 if (skey == NULL) { 2968 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 2969 goto err; 2970 } 2971 2972 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { 2973 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 2974 goto err; 2975 } 2976 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { 2977 /* We already checked we have enough data */ 2978 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2979 goto err; 2980 } 2981 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); 2982 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) { 2983 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED); 2984 goto err; 2985 } 2986 2987 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i)) { 2988 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2989 goto err; 2990 } 2991 2992 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { 2993 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2994 goto err; 2995 } 2996 2997 ret = 1; 2998 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey); 2999 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL; 3000 err: 3001 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); 3002 return ret; 3003 } 3004 3005 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3006 { 3007 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey; 3008 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; 3009 int ret = 0; 3010 3011 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { 3012 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */ 3013 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 3014 goto err; 3015 } else { 3016 unsigned int i; 3017 const unsigned char *data; 3018 3019 /* 3020 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the 3021 * ClientKeyExchange message. 3022 */ 3023 3024 /* Get encoded point length */ 3025 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i) 3026 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 3027 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3028 goto err; 3029 } 3030 if (skey == NULL) { 3031 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 3032 goto err; 3033 } 3034 3035 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); 3036 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) { 3037 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED); 3038 goto err; 3039 } 3040 3041 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i) <= 0) { 3042 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 3043 goto err; 3044 } 3045 } 3046 3047 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { 3048 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3049 goto err; 3050 } 3051 3052 ret = 1; 3053 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey); 3054 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL; 3055 err: 3056 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); 3057 3058 return ret; 3059 } 3060 3061 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3062 { 3063 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 3064 unsigned int i; 3065 const unsigned char *data; 3066 3067 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) 3068 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { 3069 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); 3070 return 0; 3071 } 3072 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) { 3073 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB); 3074 return 0; 3075 } 3076 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { 3077 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); 3078 return 0; 3079 } 3080 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); 3081 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); 3082 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { 3083 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3084 return 0; 3085 } 3086 3087 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) { 3088 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3089 return 0; 3090 } 3091 3092 return 1; 3093 #else 3094 /* Should never happen */ 3095 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3096 return 0; 3097 #endif 3098 } 3099 3100 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3101 { 3102 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST 3103 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; 3104 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; 3105 unsigned char premaster_secret[32]; 3106 const unsigned char *start; 3107 size_t outlen = 32, inlen; 3108 unsigned long alg_a; 3109 GOST_KX_MESSAGE *pKX = NULL; 3110 const unsigned char *ptr; 3111 int ret = 0; 3112 3113 /* Get our certificate private key */ 3114 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 3115 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) { 3116 /* 3117 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too 3118 */ 3119 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey; 3120 if (pk == NULL) { 3121 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey; 3122 } 3123 if (pk == NULL) { 3124 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 3125 } 3126 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) { 3127 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 3128 } 3129 3130 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pk, s->ctx->propq); 3131 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { 3132 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3133 return 0; 3134 } 3135 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { 3136 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3137 goto err; 3138 } 3139 /* 3140 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe 3141 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from 3142 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a 3143 * client certificate for authorization only. 3144 */ 3145 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); 3146 if (client_pub_pkey) { 3147 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) 3148 ERR_clear_error(); 3149 } 3150 3151 ptr = PACKET_data(pkt); 3152 /* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob 3153 * We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */ 3154 pKX = d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL, &ptr, PACKET_remaining(pkt)); 3155 if (pKX == NULL 3156 || pKX->kxBlob == NULL 3157 || ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX->kxBlob) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) { 3158 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 3159 goto err; 3160 } 3161 3162 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, ptr - PACKET_data(pkt))) { 3163 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 3164 goto err; 3165 } 3166 3167 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 3168 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 3169 goto err; 3170 } 3171 3172 inlen = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->length; 3173 start = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->data; 3174 3175 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, 3176 inlen) <= 0) { 3177 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 3178 goto err; 3179 } 3180 /* Generate master secret */ 3181 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, 3182 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) { 3183 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3184 goto err; 3185 } 3186 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ 3187 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, 3188 NULL) > 0) 3189 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1; 3190 3191 ret = 1; 3192 err: 3193 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 3194 GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX); 3195 return ret; 3196 #else 3197 /* Should never happen */ 3198 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3199 return 0; 3200 #endif 3201 } 3202 3203 static int tls_process_cke_gost18(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3204 { 3205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST 3206 unsigned char rnd_dgst[32]; 3207 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL; 3208 EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; 3209 unsigned char premaster_secret[32]; 3210 const unsigned char *start = NULL; 3211 size_t outlen = 32, inlen = 0; 3212 int ret = 0; 3213 int cipher_nid = ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s); 3214 3215 if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) { 3216 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3217 return 0; 3218 } 3219 3220 if (ossl_gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) { 3221 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3222 goto err; 3223 } 3224 3225 /* Get our certificate private key */ 3226 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey != NULL ? 3227 s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey : 3228 s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey; 3229 if (pk == NULL) { 3230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE); 3231 goto err; 3232 } 3233 3234 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pk, s->ctx->propq); 3235 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { 3236 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3237 goto err; 3238 } 3239 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { 3240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3241 goto err; 3242 } 3243 3244 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code depending on size */ 3245 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT, 3246 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) <= 0) { 3247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); 3248 goto err; 3249 } 3250 3251 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT, 3252 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) <= 0) { 3253 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); 3254 goto err; 3255 } 3256 inlen = PACKET_remaining(pkt); 3257 start = PACKET_data(pkt); 3258 3259 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { 3260 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 3261 goto err; 3262 } 3263 /* Generate master secret */ 3264 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, 3265 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) { 3266 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3267 goto err; 3268 } 3269 ret = 1; 3270 3271 err: 3272 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 3273 return ret; 3274 #else 3275 /* Should never happen */ 3276 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3277 return 0; 3278 #endif 3279 } 3280 3281 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3282 { 3283 unsigned long alg_k; 3284 3285 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 3286 3287 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */ 3288 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) { 3289 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3290 goto err; 3291 } 3292 3293 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { 3294 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */ 3295 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 3296 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3297 goto err; 3298 } 3299 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */ 3300 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) { 3301 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3302 goto err; 3303 } 3304 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { 3305 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) { 3306 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3307 goto err; 3308 } 3309 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { 3310 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) { 3311 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3312 goto err; 3313 } 3314 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { 3315 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) { 3316 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3317 goto err; 3318 } 3319 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { 3320 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) { 3321 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3322 goto err; 3323 } 3324 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { 3325 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) { 3326 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3327 goto err; 3328 } 3329 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) { 3330 if (!tls_process_cke_gost18(s, pkt)) { 3331 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3332 goto err; 3333 } 3334 } else { 3335 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 3336 goto err; 3337 } 3338 3339 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; 3340 err: 3341 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 3342 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen); 3343 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL; 3344 s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0; 3345 #endif 3346 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 3347 } 3348 3349 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 3350 { 3351 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 3352 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { 3353 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 3354 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; 3355 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; 3356 size_t labellen; 3357 /* 3358 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP 3359 * used. 3360 */ 3361 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, 3362 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); 3363 3364 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */ 3365 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1; 3366 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG) 3367 labellen += 1; 3368 3369 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, 3370 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, 3371 labellen, NULL, 0, 3372 0) <= 0) { 3373 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3374 return WORK_ERROR; 3375 } 3376 3377 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, 3378 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); 3379 } 3380 } 3381 #endif 3382 3383 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) { 3384 /* 3385 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need 3386 * the handshake_buffer 3387 */ 3388 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { 3389 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3390 return WORK_ERROR; 3391 } 3392 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 3393 } else { 3394 if (!s->s3.handshake_buffer) { 3395 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3396 return WORK_ERROR; 3397 } 3398 /* 3399 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support 3400 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op 3401 */ 3402 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { 3403 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3404 return WORK_ERROR; 3405 } 3406 } 3407 3408 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 3409 } 3410 3411 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3412 { 3413 int i; 3414 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 3415 X509 *x = NULL; 3416 unsigned long l; 3417 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; 3418 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; 3419 PACKET spkt, context; 3420 size_t chainidx; 3421 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL; 3422 3423 /* 3424 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no 3425 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than 3426 * TLSv1.3 3427 */ 3428 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID; 3429 3430 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { 3431 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3432 goto err; 3433 } 3434 3435 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context) 3436 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0) 3437 || (s->pha_context != NULL && 3438 !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) { 3439 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT); 3440 goto err; 3441 } 3442 3443 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt) 3444 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 3445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3446 goto err; 3447 } 3448 3449 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) { 3450 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l) 3451 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) { 3452 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3453 goto err; 3454 } 3455 3456 certstart = certbytes; 3457 x = X509_new_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq); 3458 if (x == NULL) { 3459 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3460 goto err; 3461 } 3462 if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l) == NULL) { 3463 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 3464 goto err; 3465 } 3466 3467 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) { 3468 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3469 goto err; 3470 } 3471 3472 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 3473 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; 3474 PACKET extensions; 3475 3476 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) { 3477 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); 3478 goto err; 3479 } 3480 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, 3481 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts, 3482 NULL, chainidx == 0) 3483 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, 3484 rawexts, x, chainidx, 3485 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) { 3486 OPENSSL_free(rawexts); 3487 goto err; 3488 } 3489 OPENSSL_free(rawexts); 3490 } 3491 3492 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { 3493 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3494 goto err; 3495 } 3496 x = NULL; 3497 } 3498 3499 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { 3500 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ 3501 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { 3502 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 3503 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); 3504 goto err; 3505 } 3506 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ 3507 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3508 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 3509 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED, 3510 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3511 goto err; 3512 } 3513 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ 3514 if (s->s3.handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { 3515 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3516 goto err; 3517 } 3518 } else { 3519 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 3520 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); 3521 if (i <= 0) { 3522 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result), 3523 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); 3524 goto err; 3525 } 3526 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0)); 3527 if (pkey == NULL) { 3528 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 3529 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); 3530 goto err; 3531 } 3532 } 3533 3534 /* 3535 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise 3536 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions, 3537 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time 3538 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the 3539 * session may have already gone into the session cache. 3540 */ 3541 3542 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { 3543 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) { 3544 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3545 goto err; 3546 } 3547 3548 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); 3549 s->session = new_sess; 3550 } 3551 3552 X509_free(s->session->peer); 3553 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); 3554 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 3555 3556 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free); 3557 s->session->peer_chain = sk; 3558 sk = NULL; 3559 3560 /* 3561 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE 3562 * message 3563 */ 3564 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { 3565 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3566 goto err; 3567 } 3568 3569 /* 3570 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own 3571 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c 3572 */ 3573 3574 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ 3575 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 3576 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash, 3577 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash), 3578 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) { 3579 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3580 goto err; 3581 } 3582 3583 /* Resend session tickets */ 3584 s->sent_tickets = 0; 3585 } 3586 3587 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 3588 3589 err: 3590 X509_free(x); 3591 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); 3592 return ret; 3593 } 3594 3595 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 3596 { 3597 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3.tmp.cert; 3598 3599 if (cpk == NULL) { 3600 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3601 return 0; 3602 } 3603 3604 /* 3605 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context 3606 * for the server Certificate message 3607 */ 3608 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { 3609 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3610 return 0; 3611 } 3612 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) { 3613 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3614 return 0; 3615 } 3616 3617 return 1; 3618 } 3619 3620 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add, 3621 unsigned char *tick_nonce) 3622 { 3623 uint32_t timeout = (uint32_t)s->session->timeout; 3624 3625 /* 3626 * Ticket lifetime hint: 3627 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the 3628 * timeout, limited to a 1 week period per RFC8446. 3629 * For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this unspecified for 3630 * resumed session (for simplicity). 3631 */ 3632 #define ONE_WEEK_SEC (7 * 24 * 60 * 60) 3633 3634 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 3635 if (s->session->timeout > ONE_WEEK_SEC) 3636 timeout = ONE_WEEK_SEC; 3637 } else if (s->hit) 3638 timeout = 0; 3639 3640 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, timeout)) { 3641 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3642 return 0; 3643 } 3644 3645 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 3646 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add) 3647 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) { 3648 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3649 return 0; 3650 } 3651 } 3652 3653 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */ 3654 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { 3655 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3656 return 0; 3657 } 3658 3659 return 1; 3660 } 3661 3662 /* 3663 * Returns 1 on success, 0 to abort construction of the ticket (non-fatal), or 3664 * -1 on fatal error 3665 */ 3666 static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add, 3667 unsigned char *tick_nonce) 3668 { 3669 unsigned char *senc = NULL; 3670 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; 3671 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL; 3672 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2; 3673 const unsigned char *const_p; 3674 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal; 3675 SSL_SESSION *sess; 3676 size_t hlen; 3677 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx; 3678 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 3679 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH]; 3680 int iv_len, ok = -1; 3681 size_t macoffset, macendoffset; 3682 3683 /* get session encoding length */ 3684 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); 3685 /* 3686 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too 3687 * long 3688 */ 3689 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { 3690 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3691 goto err; 3692 } 3693 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); 3694 if (senc == NULL) { 3695 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3696 goto err; 3697 } 3698 3699 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); 3700 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx); 3701 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) { 3702 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3703 goto err; 3704 } 3705 3706 p = senc; 3707 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) { 3708 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3709 goto err; 3710 } 3711 3712 /* 3713 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up 3714 */ 3715 const_p = senc; 3716 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); 3717 if (sess == NULL) { 3718 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3719 goto err; 3720 } 3721 3722 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); 3723 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { 3724 /* shouldn't ever happen */ 3725 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3726 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3727 goto err; 3728 } 3729 p = senc; 3730 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { 3731 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3732 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3733 goto err; 3734 } 3735 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3736 3737 /* 3738 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does 3739 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. 3740 */ 3741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0 3742 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) 3743 #else 3744 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL) 3745 #endif 3746 { 3747 int ret = 0; 3748 3749 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL) 3750 ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, 3751 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx), 3752 1); 3753 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0 3754 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) 3755 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */ 3756 ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, 3757 ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 1); 3758 #endif 3759 3760 if (ret == 0) { 3761 /* 3762 * In TLSv1.2 we construct a 0 length ticket. In TLSv1.3 a 0 3763 * length ticket is not allowed so we abort construction of the 3764 * ticket 3765 */ 3766 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 3767 ok = 0; 3768 goto err; 3769 } 3770 /* Put timeout and length */ 3771 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0) 3772 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { 3773 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3774 goto err; 3775 } 3776 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3777 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); 3778 ssl_hmac_free(hctx); 3779 return 1; 3780 } 3781 if (ret < 0) { 3782 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); 3783 goto err; 3784 } 3785 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx); 3786 if (iv_len < 0) { 3787 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3788 goto err; 3789 } 3790 } else { 3791 EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC", 3792 s->ctx->propq); 3793 3794 if (cipher == NULL) { 3795 /* Error is already recorded */ 3796 SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3797 goto err; 3798 } 3799 3800 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(cipher); 3801 if (iv_len < 0 3802 || RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, iv, iv_len, 0) <= 0 3803 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, 3804 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv) 3805 || !ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key, 3806 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key), 3807 "SHA256")) { 3808 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher); 3809 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3810 goto err; 3811 } 3812 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher); 3813 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name, 3814 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)); 3815 } 3816 3817 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) { 3818 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3819 goto err; 3820 } 3821 3822 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset) 3823 /* Output key name */ 3824 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name)) 3825 /* output IV */ 3826 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len) 3827 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH, 3828 &encdata1) 3829 /* Encrypt session data */ 3830 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen) 3831 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2) 3832 || encdata1 != encdata2 3833 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal) 3834 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2) 3835 || encdata1 + len != encdata2 3836 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 3837 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset) 3838 || !ssl_hmac_update(hctx, 3839 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset, 3840 macendoffset - macoffset) 3841 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1) 3842 || !ssl_hmac_final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) 3843 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE 3844 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2) 3845 || macdata1 != macdata2) { 3846 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3847 goto err; 3848 } 3849 3850 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */ 3851 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 3852 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3853 goto err; 3854 } 3855 3856 ok = 1; 3857 err: 3858 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3859 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); 3860 ssl_hmac_free(hctx); 3861 return ok; 3862 } 3863 3864 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add, 3865 unsigned char *tick_nonce) 3866 { 3867 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) { 3868 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3869 return 0; 3870 } 3871 3872 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id, 3873 s->session->session_id_length) 3874 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 3875 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3876 return 0; 3877 } 3878 3879 return 1; 3880 } 3881 3882 static void tls_update_ticket_counts(SSL *s) 3883 { 3884 /* 3885 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets| 3886 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake 3887 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not. If we're sending extra 3888 * tickets, decrement the count of pending extra tickets. 3889 */ 3890 s->sent_tickets++; 3891 s->next_ticket_nonce++; 3892 if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) 3893 s->ext.extra_tickets_expected--; 3894 } 3895 3896 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 3897 { 3898 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx; 3899 unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE]; 3900 union { 3901 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)]; 3902 uint32_t age_add; 3903 } age_add_u; 3904 int ret = 0; 3905 3906 age_add_u.age_add = 0; 3907 3908 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 3909 size_t i, hashlen; 3910 uint64_t nonce; 3911 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption"; 3912 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); 3913 int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md); 3914 3915 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */ 3916 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) { 3917 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3918 goto err; 3919 } 3920 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni; 3921 3922 /* 3923 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then 3924 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it. 3925 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that. 3926 */ 3927 if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) { 3928 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0); 3929 3930 if (new_sess == NULL) { 3931 /* SSLfatal already called */ 3932 goto err; 3933 } 3934 3935 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); 3936 s->session = new_sess; 3937 } 3938 3939 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) { 3940 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3941 goto err; 3942 } 3943 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, age_add_u.age_add_c, 3944 sizeof(age_add_u), 0) <= 0) { 3945 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3946 goto err; 3947 } 3948 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add; 3949 3950 nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce; 3951 for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) { 3952 tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff); 3953 nonce >>= 8; 3954 } 3955 3956 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret, 3957 nonce_label, 3958 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1, 3959 tick_nonce, 3960 TICKET_NONCE_SIZE, 3961 s->session->master_key, 3962 hashlen, 1)) { 3963 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3964 goto err; 3965 } 3966 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen; 3967 3968 s->session->time = time(NULL); 3969 ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session); 3970 if (s->s3.alpn_selected != NULL) { 3971 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected); 3972 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = 3973 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len); 3974 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { 3975 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0; 3976 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3977 goto err; 3978 } 3979 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len; 3980 } 3981 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data; 3982 } 3983 3984 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL && 3985 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0) { 3986 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3987 goto err; 3988 } 3989 /* 3990 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if 3991 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there 3992 * is no point in using full stateless tickets. 3993 */ 3994 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) 3995 && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0 3996 || (s->max_early_data > 0 3997 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) { 3998 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) { 3999 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4000 goto err; 4001 } 4002 } else { 4003 int tmpret; 4004 4005 tmpret = construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, 4006 tick_nonce); 4007 if (tmpret != 1) { 4008 if (tmpret == 0) { 4009 ret = 2; /* Non-fatal. Abort construction but continue */ 4010 /* We count this as a success so update the counts anwyay */ 4011 tls_update_ticket_counts(s); 4012 } 4013 /* else SSLfatal() already called */ 4014 goto err; 4015 } 4016 } 4017 4018 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 4019 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, 4020 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, 4021 NULL, 0)) { 4022 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4023 goto err; 4024 } 4025 tls_update_ticket_counts(s); 4026 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 4027 } 4028 4029 ret = 1; 4030 err: 4031 return ret; 4032 } 4033 4034 /* 4035 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to 4036 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. 4037 */ 4038 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 4039 { 4040 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type) 4041 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, 4042 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) { 4043 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4044 return 0; 4045 } 4046 4047 return 1; 4048 } 4049 4050 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 4051 { 4052 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { 4053 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4054 return 0; 4055 } 4056 4057 return 1; 4058 } 4059 4060 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 4061 /* 4062 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. 4063 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found 4064 */ 4065 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 4066 { 4067 PACKET next_proto, padding; 4068 size_t next_proto_len; 4069 4070 /*- 4071 * The payload looks like: 4072 * uint8 proto_len; 4073 * uint8 proto[proto_len]; 4074 * uint8 padding_len; 4075 * uint8 padding[padding_len]; 4076 */ 4077 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto) 4078 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding) 4079 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { 4080 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 4081 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 4082 } 4083 4084 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) { 4085 s->ext.npn_len = 0; 4086 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4087 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 4088 } 4089 4090 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len; 4091 4092 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 4093 } 4094 #endif 4095 4096 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 4097 { 4098 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, 4099 NULL, 0)) { 4100 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4101 return 0; 4102 } 4103 4104 return 1; 4105 } 4106 4107 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 4108 { 4109 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 4110 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 4111 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 4112 } 4113 4114 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING 4115 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) { 4116 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4117 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 4118 } 4119 4120 /* 4121 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on 4122 * a record boundary. 4123 */ 4124 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { 4125 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); 4126 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 4127 } 4128 4129 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING; 4130 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 4131 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { 4132 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4133 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 4134 } 4135 4136 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 4137 } 4138