Lines Matching refs:rrsets

317 	vq->chase_reply->rrsets = regional_alloc(qstate->region,
321 	if(!vq->chase_reply->rrsets)
323 	memmove(vq->chase_reply->rrsets, vq->orig_msg->rep->rrsets,
656  * Validate if the ANSWER and AUTHORITY sections contain valid rrsets.
658  * Tries to validate ADDITIONAL rrsets as well, but only to check them.
674  * @return false if any of the rrsets in the an or ns sections of the message 
702 		s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
707 		if(i>0 && ntohs(chase_reply->rrsets[i-1]->rk.type) ==
710 			((struct packed_rrset_data*)chase_reply->rrsets[i-1]->entry.data)->security == sec_status_secure &&
711 			dname_strict_subdomain_c(s->rk.dname, chase_reply->rrsets[i-1]->rk.dname)
767 		s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
802 	/* attempt to validate the ADDITIONAL section rrsets */
807 		s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
917 	if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[ rep->an_numrrsets ]->rk.type) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS)
919 	if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[ rep->an_numrrsets ]
924 		if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[ i ]
941  * 	so we should have signatures for these rrsets and not having
960 			chase_reply->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
961 		if(ntohs(chase_reply->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS
971 		"(likely inserted by forwarder)", chase_reply->rrsets[found]);
976 		if(ntohs(orig_reply->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS
977 			&& query_dname_compare(orig_reply->rrsets[i]->rk.dname,
978 				chase_reply->rrsets[found]->rk.dname) == 0) {
1023 		s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
1048 		s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
1074 			chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets,
1150 		s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
1188 			chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets,
1258 		s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
1286 		/* use NSEC3 proof, both answer and auth rrsets, in case
1289 			chase_reply->rrsets, chase_reply->an_numrrsets+
1344  * Given a referral response, validate rrsets and take least trusted rrset
1361 		s = ((struct packed_rrset_data*)chase_reply->rrsets[i]
1406 	/* all answer and auth rrsets already verified */
1426 		s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
1447 		s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
1474 			chase_reply->rrsets,
1513  * The answer and authority rrsets must already be verified as secure.
1543 		s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
1581 		s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
1607 			chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets,
1643  * The answer and authority rrsets must already be verified as secure.
1680 		s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
1745 			chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets,
1824 			rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.dname;
1826 			rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.dname_len;
1828 			rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.type);
1830 			rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.rrset_class);
1839 		 ntohs(vq->orig_msg->rep->rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.type) ==
1841 		 !(vq->orig_msg->rep->rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->
2161  * After validation, the status is recorded in the message and rrsets,
2260 				"bad rrsets");
2457 		/* If the message is secure, check that all rrsets are
2459 		 * a different signer name). And drop additional rrsets
3011 			msg->rep->rrsets + msg->rep->an_numrrsets,
3071 				rrsets[0]->rk.type)==LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) {