2  * validator/val_sigcrypt.c - validator signature crypto functions.
20  * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without
25  * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
29  * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
63 #error "Need crypto library to do digital signature cryptography"
90 	rrset->entry.data;  in rrset_get_count()
92 	return d->count;  in rrset_get_count()
101 	struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)k->entry.data;  in rrset_get_sigcount()
102 	return d->rrsig_count;  in rrset_get_sigcount()
115 	struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)k->entry.data;  in rrset_get_sig_keytag()
116 	log_assert(sig_idx < d->rrsig_count);  in rrset_get_sig_keytag()
117 	if(d->rr_len[d->count + sig_idx] < 2+18)  in rrset_get_sig_keytag()
119 	memmove(&t, d->rr_data[d->count + sig_idx]+2+16, 2);  in rrset_get_sig_keytag()
132 	struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)k->entry.data;  in rrset_get_sig_algo()
133 	log_assert(sig_idx < d->rrsig_count);  in rrset_get_sig_algo()
134 	if(d->rr_len[d->count + sig_idx] < 2+3)  in rrset_get_sig_algo()
136 	return (int)d->rr_data[d->count + sig_idx][2+2];  in rrset_get_sig_algo()
144 	struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)k->entry.data;  in rrset_get_rdata()
145 	log_assert(d && idx < (d->count + d->rrsig_count));  in rrset_get_rdata()
146 	*rdata = d->rr_data[idx];  in rrset_get_rdata()
147 	*len = d->rr_len[idx];  in rrset_get_rdata()
206 	*pklen = (unsigned)len-2-4;  in dnskey_get_pubkey()
245  * Return pointer to the digest in a DS RR.
266 	*len = rdlen - 2 - 4;  in ds_get_sigdata()
270  * Return size of DS digest according to its hash algorithm.
298 	sldns_buffer* b = env->scratch_buffer;  in ds_create_dnskey_digest()
307 	sldns_buffer_write(b, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname,   in ds_create_dnskey_digest()
308 		dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len);  in ds_create_dnskey_digest()
310 	sldns_buffer_write(b, dnskey_rdata+2, dnskey_len-2); /* skip rdatalen*/  in ds_create_dnskey_digest()
345 	digest = regional_alloc(env->scratch, digestlen);  in ds_digest_match_dnskey()
382 	/* do not pass rdatalen to ldns */  in dnskey_calc_keytag()
383 	return sldns_calc_keytag_raw(data+2, len-2);  in dnskey_calc_keytag()
405 	keysize = sldns_rr_dnskey_key_size_raw(rdata+2+4, len-2-4, alg);  in dnskey_size_is_supported()
440 	size_t i, total = n->num;  in algo_needs_init_dnskey_add()
447 		if(n->needs[algo] == 0) {  in algo_needs_init_dnskey_add()
448 			n->needs[algo] = 1;  in algo_needs_init_dnskey_add()
454 	n->num = total;  in algo_needs_init_dnskey_add()
462 	memset(n->needs, 0, sizeof(uint8_t)*ALGO_NEEDS_MAX);  in algo_needs_init_list()
465 		log_assert(n->needs[algo] == 0);  in algo_needs_init_list()
466 		n->needs[algo] = 1;  in algo_needs_init_list()
469 	n->num = total;  in algo_needs_init_list()
479 	memset(n->needs, 0, sizeof(uint8_t)*ALGO_NEEDS_MAX);  in algo_needs_init_ds()
487 		if(n->needs[algo] == 0) {  in algo_needs_init_ds()
488 			n->needs[algo] = 1;  in algo_needs_init_ds()
494 	n->num = total;  in algo_needs_init_ds()
499 	if(n->needs[algo]) {  in algo_needs_set_secure()
500 		n->needs[algo] = 0;  in algo_needs_set_secure()
501 		n->num --;  in algo_needs_set_secure()
502 		if(n->num == 0) /* done! */  in algo_needs_set_secure()
510 	if(n->needs[algo]) n->needs[algo] = 2; /* need it, but bogus */  in algo_needs_set_bogus()
515 	return n->num;  in algo_needs_num_missing()
520 	int i, miss = -1;  in algo_needs_missing()
521 	/* check if a needed algo was bogus - report that;  in algo_needs_missing()
522 	 * check the first missing algo - report that;  in algo_needs_missing()
525 		if(n->needs[i] == 2)  in algo_needs_missing()
527 		if(n->needs[i] == 1 && miss == -1)  in algo_needs_missing()
530 	if(miss != -1) return miss;  in algo_needs_missing()
539  * @param rrset: to be validated.
540  * @param dnskey: DNSKEY rrset, keyset to try.
541  * @param sig_idx: which signature to try to validate.
588 		sec = dnskey_verify_rrset_sig(env->scratch,  in dnskeyset_verify_rrset_sig()
589 			env->scratch_buffer, ve, now, rrset, dnskey, i,  in dnskeyset_verify_rrset_sig()
639 		verbose(VERB_QUERY, "rrset failed to verify due to a lack of "  in dnskeyset_verify_rrset()
658 		sec = dnskeyset_verify_rrset_sig(env, ve, *env->now, rrset,   in dnskeyset_verify_rrset()
673 			verbose(VERB_QUERY, "rrset failed to verify, too many RRSIG validations");  in dnskeyset_verify_rrset()
681 		verbose(VERB_ALGO, "rrset failed to verify: "  in dnskeyset_verify_rrset()
687 		verbose(VERB_ALGO, "rrset failed to verify: "  in dnskeyset_verify_rrset()
697 	if(t&&t->name)  in algo_needs_reason()
699 			t->name);  in algo_needs_reason()
721 		verbose(VERB_QUERY, "rrset failed to verify due to a lack of "  in dnskey_verify_rrset()
734 		sec = dnskey_verify_rrset_sig(env->scratch,  in dnskey_verify_rrset()
735 			env->scratch_buffer, ve, *env->now, rrset,   in dnskey_verify_rrset()
745 			verbose(VERB_QUERY, "rrset failed to verify, too many RRSIG validations");  in dnskey_verify_rrset()
757 		verbose(VERB_ALGO, "rrset failed to verify due to algorithm "  in dnskey_verify_rrset()
764 	verbose(VERB_ALGO, "rrset failed to verify: all signatures are bogus");  in dnskey_verify_rrset()
781  * Compare two RR for canonical order, in a field-style sweep.
784  * @param i: first RR to compare
785  * @param j: first RR to compare
797 	int wfi = -1;	/* current wireformat rdata field (rdf) */  in canonical_compare_byfield()
798 	int wfj = -1;  in canonical_compare_byfield()
799 	uint8_t* di = d->rr_data[i]+2; /* ptr to current rdata byte */  in canonical_compare_byfield()
800 	uint8_t* dj = d->rr_data[j]+2;  in canonical_compare_byfield()
801 	size_t ilen = d->rr_len[i]-2; /* length left in rdata */  in canonical_compare_byfield()
802 	size_t jlen = d->rr_len[j]-2;  in canonical_compare_byfield()
807 	int dname_num_i = (int)desc->_dname_count; /* decreased at root label */  in canonical_compare_byfield()
808 	int dname_num_j = (int)desc->_dname_count;  in canonical_compare_byfield()
811 	 * and still some lowercasing needs to be done; either the dnames  in canonical_compare_byfield()
821 		 	return -1;  in canonical_compare_byfield()
824 		ilen--;  in canonical_compare_byfield()
825 		jlen--;  in canonical_compare_byfield()
831 		 * to process the rest of this rdata field.  in canonical_compare_byfield()
832 		 * The reason to first read the byte, then setup the rdf,  in canonical_compare_byfield()
838 				/* capture length to lowercase */  in canonical_compare_byfield()
843 					dname_num_i--;  in canonical_compare_byfield()
852 				if(desc->_wireformat[wfi]   in canonical_compare_byfield()
858 						dname_num_i--;  in canonical_compare_byfield()
862 				} else if(desc->_wireformat[wfi]   in canonical_compare_byfield()
866 					desc->_wireformat[wfi]) - 1;  in canonical_compare_byfield()
868 		} else	lablen_i--;  in canonical_compare_byfield()
876 					dname_num_j--;  in canonical_compare_byfield()
882 				if(desc->_wireformat[wfj]   in canonical_compare_byfield()
888 						dname_num_j--;  in canonical_compare_byfield()
892 				} else if(desc->_wireformat[wfj]   in canonical_compare_byfield()
896 					desc->_wireformat[wfj]) - 1;  in canonical_compare_byfield()
898 		} else	lablen_j--;  in canonical_compare_byfield()
908 		return -1;  in canonical_compare_byfield()
915 		return -1;  in canonical_compare_byfield()
924  * @param rrset: the rrset in which to perform compares.
925  * @param i: first RR to compare
926  * @param j: first RR to compare
927  * @return 0 if RR i== RR j, -1 if <, +1 if >.
933 		rrset->entry.data;  in canonical_compare()
935 	uint16_t type = ntohs(rrset->rk.type);  in canonical_compare()
944 		 * This name has to be canonicalized.*/  in canonical_compare()
956 			if(!dname_valid(d->rr_data[i]+2, d->rr_len[i]-2) ||  in canonical_compare()
957 				!dname_valid(d->rr_data[j]+2, d->rr_len[j]-2))  in canonical_compare()
959 			return query_dname_compare(d->rr_data[i]+2,  in canonical_compare()
960 				d->rr_data[j]+2);  in canonical_compare()
964 		 * and after that a byte-for byte remainder can be compared.  in canonical_compare()
977 		/* RRSIG signer name has to be downcased */  in canonical_compare()
985 			log_assert(desc->_minimum == desc->_maximum);  in canonical_compare()
994 		minlen = d->rr_len[i]-2;  in canonical_compare()
995 		if(minlen > d->rr_len[j]-2)  in canonical_compare()
996 			minlen = d->rr_len[j]-2;  in canonical_compare()
997 		c = memcmp(d->rr_data[i]+2, d->rr_data[j]+2, minlen);  in canonical_compare()
1001 		if(d->rr_len[i] < d->rr_len[j])  in canonical_compare()
1002 			return -1;  in canonical_compare()
1003 		if(d->rr_len[i] > d->rr_len[j])  in canonical_compare()
1016 	log_assert(r1->rrset == r2->rrset);  in canonical_tree_compare()
1017 	return canonical_compare(r1->rrset, r1->rr_idx, r2->rr_idx);  in canonical_tree_compare()
1024  * @param rrset: to sort.
1026  * @param sortree: tree to sort into.
1034 	/* insert into rbtree to sort and detect duplicates */  in canonical_sort()
1035 	for(i=0; i<d->count; i++) {  in canonical_sort()
1047  * @param buf: buffer to insert into at current position.
1059 	int fqdn_labels = dname_signame_label_count(k->rk.dname);  in insert_can_owner()
1063 		sldns_buffer_write(buf, k->rk.dname, k->rk.dname_len);  in insert_can_owner()
1065 		*can_owner_len = k->rk.dname_len;  in insert_can_owner()
1072 		uint8_t* nm = k->rk.dname;  in insert_can_owner()
1073 		size_t len = k->rk.dname_len;  in insert_can_owner()
1074 		/* so skip fqdn_labels-rrsig_labels */  in insert_can_owner()
1075 		for(i=0; i<fqdn_labels-rrsig_labels; i++) {  in insert_can_owner()
1095 	uint8_t* datstart = sldns_buffer_current(buf)-len+2;  in canonicalize_rdata()
1096 	switch(ntohs(rrset->rk.type)) {  in canonicalize_rdata()
1116 				dname_valid(datstart, len-2));  in canonicalize_rdata()
1144 				dname_valid(datstart, len-2-2));  in canonicalize_rdata()
1149 			len -= 2+4;  in canonicalize_rdata()
1153 			len -= (size_t)datstart[0]+1;  in canonicalize_rdata()
1157 			len -= (size_t)datstart[0]+1;  in canonicalize_rdata()
1161 			len -= (size_t)datstart[0]+1;  in canonicalize_rdata()
1181 			/* nothing to do for unknown types */  in canonicalize_rdata()
1191 	struct packed_rrset_data* d1=(struct packed_rrset_data*)k1->entry.data;  in rrset_canonical_equal()
1192 	struct packed_rrset_data* d2=(struct packed_rrset_data*)k2->entry.data;  in rrset_canonical_equal()
1199 	if(k1->rk.dname_len != k2->rk.dname_len ||  in rrset_canonical_equal()
1200 		k1->rk.flags != k2->rk.flags ||  in rrset_canonical_equal()
1201 		k1->rk.type != k2->rk.type ||  in rrset_canonical_equal()
1202 		k1->rk.rrset_class != k2->rk.rrset_class ||  in rrset_canonical_equal()
1203 		query_dname_compare(k1->rk.dname, k2->rk.dname) != 0)  in rrset_canonical_equal()
1205 	if(d1->ttl != d2->ttl ||  in rrset_canonical_equal()
1206 		d1->count != d2->count ||  in rrset_canonical_equal()
1207 		d1->rrsig_count != d2->rrsig_count ||  in rrset_canonical_equal()
1208 		d1->trust != d2->trust ||  in rrset_canonical_equal()
1209 		d1->security != d2->security)  in rrset_canonical_equal()
1221 	if(d1->count > RR_COUNT_MAX || d2->count > RR_COUNT_MAX)  in rrset_canonical_equal()
1223 	rrs1 = regional_alloc(region, sizeof(struct canon_rr)*d1->count);  in rrset_canonical_equal()
1224 	rrs2 = regional_alloc(region, sizeof(struct canon_rr)*d2->count);  in rrset_canonical_equal()
1231 	/* compare canonical-sorted RRs for canonical-equality */  in rrset_canonical_equal()
1238 		flen[0] = d1->rr_len[p1->rr_idx];  in rrset_canonical_equal()
1239 		flen[1] = d2->rr_len[p2->rr_idx];  in rrset_canonical_equal()
1240 		fdata[0] = d1->rr_data[p1->rr_idx];  in rrset_canonical_equal()
1241 		fdata[1] = d2->rr_data[p2->rr_idx];  in rrset_canonical_equal()
1245 		p1 = (struct canon_rr*)rbtree_next(&p1->node);  in rrset_canonical_equal()
1246 		p2 = (struct canon_rr*)rbtree_next(&p2->node);  in rrset_canonical_equal()
1254  * @param buf: the buffer to use.
1255  * @param k: the rrset to insert.
1256  * @param sig: RRSIG rdata to include.
1271 	struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)k->entry.data;  in rrset_canonical()
1282 		if(d->count > RR_COUNT_MAX)  in rrset_canonical()
1284 		rrs = regional_alloc(region, sizeof(struct canon_rr)*d->count);  in rrset_canonical()
1300 			+ d->rr_len[walk->rr_idx]) {  in rrset_canonical()
1301 			log_err("verify: failed to canonicalize, "  in rrset_canonical()
1310 		sldns_buffer_write(buf, &k->rk.type, 2);  in rrset_canonical()
1311 		sldns_buffer_write(buf, &k->rk.rrset_class, 2);  in rrset_canonical()
1313 		sldns_buffer_write(buf, d->rr_data[walk->rr_idx],   in rrset_canonical()
1314 			d->rr_len[walk->rr_idx]);  in rrset_canonical()
1315 		canonicalize_rdata(buf, k, d->rr_len[walk->rr_idx]);  in rrset_canonical()
1320 	 * section, to prevent that a wildcard synthesized NSEC can be used in  in rrset_canonical()
1321 	 * the non-existence proves. */  in rrset_canonical()
1322 	if(ntohs(k->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC &&  in rrset_canonical()
1324 		k->rk.dname = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, can_owner,  in rrset_canonical()
1326 		if(!k->rk.dname)  in rrset_canonical()
1328 		k->rk.dname_len = can_owner_len;  in rrset_canonical()
1340 	struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)k->entry.data;  in rrset_canonicalize_to_buffer()
1350 	if(d->count > RR_COUNT_MAX)  in rrset_canonicalize_to_buffer()
1352 	rrs = regional_alloc(region, sizeof(struct canon_rr)*d->count);  in rrset_canonicalize_to_buffer()
1363 			+ d->rr_len[walk->rr_idx]) {  in rrset_canonicalize_to_buffer()
1364 			log_err("verify: failed to canonicalize, "  in rrset_canonicalize_to_buffer()
1373 			sldns_buffer_write(buf, k->rk.dname, k->rk.dname_len);  in rrset_canonicalize_to_buffer()
1375 			can_owner_len = k->rk.dname_len;  in rrset_canonicalize_to_buffer()
1377 		sldns_buffer_write(buf, &k->rk.type, 2);  in rrset_canonicalize_to_buffer()
1378 		sldns_buffer_write(buf, &k->rk.rrset_class, 2);  in rrset_canonicalize_to_buffer()
1379 		sldns_buffer_write_u32(buf, d->rr_ttl[walk->rr_idx]);  in rrset_canonicalize_to_buffer()
1380 		sldns_buffer_write(buf, d->rr_data[walk->rr_idx],  in rrset_canonicalize_to_buffer()
1381 			d->rr_len[walk->rr_idx]);  in rrset_canonicalize_to_buffer()
1382 		canonicalize_rdata(buf, k, d->rr_len[walk->rr_idx]);  in rrset_canonicalize_to_buffer()
1427 	if(ve->date_override) {  in check_dates()
1428 		if(ve->date_override == -1) {  in check_dates()
1432 		now = ve->date_override;  in check_dates()
1442 			/* from RFC8914 on Signature Not Yet Valid: The resolver  in check_dates()
1443 			 * attempted to perform DNSSEC validation, but no  in check_dates()
1452 		/* within skew ? (calc here to avoid calculation normally) */  in check_dates()
1454 		if(skew < (uint32_t)ve->skew_min) skew = ve->skew_min;  in check_dates()
1455 		if(skew > (uint32_t)ve->skew_max) skew = ve->skew_max;  in check_dates()
1469 		if(skew < (uint32_t)ve->skew_min) skew = ve->skew_min;  in check_dates()
1470 		if(skew > (uint32_t)ve->skew_max) skew = ve->skew_max;  in check_dates()
1485 /** adjust rrset TTL for verified rrset, compare to original TTL and expi */
1492 		(struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset->entry.data;  in adjust_ttl()
1503 	if(ve->date_override) {  in adjust_ttl()
1504 		now = ve->date_override;  in adjust_ttl()
1506 	expittl = (int32_t)((uint32_t)expi - (uint32_t)now);  in adjust_ttl()
1509 	 * d->ttl: rrset ttl read from message or cache. May be reduced  in adjust_ttl()
1517 	if(MIN_TTL > (time_t)origttl && d->ttl > MIN_TTL) {  in adjust_ttl()
1519 			" TTL, adjusting TTL downwards to minimum ttl");  in adjust_ttl()
1520 		d->ttl = MIN_TTL;  in adjust_ttl()
1522 	else if(MIN_TTL <= origttl && d->ttl > (time_t)origttl) {  in adjust_ttl()
1524 		"adjusting TTL downwards to original ttl");  in adjust_ttl()
1525 		d->ttl = origttl;  in adjust_ttl()
1528 	if(expittl > 0 && d->ttl > (time_t)expittl) {  in adjust_ttl()
1531 		d->ttl = expittl;  in adjust_ttl()
1584 	signer_len = dname_valid(signer, siglen-2-18);  in dnskey_verify_rrset_sig()
1592 	if(!dname_subdomain_c(rrset->rk.dname, signer)) {  in dnskey_verify_rrset_sig()
1593 		verbose(VERB_QUERY, "verify: signer name is off-tree");  in dnskey_verify_rrset_sig()
1594 		*reason = "signer name off-tree";  in dnskey_verify_rrset_sig()
1607 	sigblock_len = (unsigned int)(siglen - 2 - 18 - signer_len);  in dnskey_verify_rrset_sig()
1610 	if(query_dname_compare(signer, dnskey->rk.dname) != 0) {  in dnskey_verify_rrset_sig()
1615 			dnskey->rk.dname, 0, 0);  in dnskey_verify_rrset_sig()
1624 	if(memcmp(sig+2, &rrset->rk.type, 2) != 0) {  in dnskey_verify_rrset_sig()
1649 	if((int)sig[2+3] > dname_signame_label_count(rrset->rk.dname)) {  in dnskey_verify_rrset_sig()
1664 			log_err("verify: failed due to alloc error");  in dnskey_verify_rrset_sig()
1682 		/* check if TTL is too high - reduce if so */  in dnskey_verify_rrset_sig()
1686 		 * Do this last so that if you ignore expired-sigs the  in dnskey_verify_rrset_sig()
1687 		 * rest is sure to be OK. */  in dnskey_verify_rrset_sig()