History log of /freebsd/sys/security/mac_stub/mac_stub.c (Results 201 – 223 of 223)
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# 63b6f478 12-Nov-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Garbage collect mac_create_devfs_vnode() -- it hasn't been used since
we brought in the new cache and locking model for vnode labels. We
now rely on mac_associate_devfs_vnode().

Obtained from: Trus

Garbage collect mac_create_devfs_vnode() -- it hasn't been used since
we brought in the new cache and locking model for vnode labels. We
now rely on mac_associate_devfs_vnode().

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# ef5def59 08-Nov-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Update MAC modules for changes in arguments for exec MAC policy
entry points to include an explicit execlabel.

Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associat

Update MAC modules for changes in arguments for exec MAC policy
entry points to include an explicit execlabel.

Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# 939b97cb 05-Nov-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Update policy modules for changes in arguments associated with support
for label access on the interpreter, not just the shell script. No
policies currently present in the system rely on the new lab

Update policy modules for changes in arguments associated with support
for label access on the interpreter, not just the shell script. No
policies currently present in the system rely on the new labels.

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# dc858fca 04-Nov-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

License and wording updates: NAI has authorized the removal of clause
three from their BSD-style license. Also, s/NAI Labs/Network Associates
Laboratories/.


# 5c8dd342 30-Oct-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Move to C99 sparse structure initialization for the mac_policy_ops
structure definition, rather than using an operation vector
we translate into the structure. Originally, we used a vector
for two r

Move to C99 sparse structure initialization for the mac_policy_ops
structure definition, rather than using an operation vector
we translate into the structure. Originally, we used a vector
for two reasons:

(1) We wanted to define the structure sparsely, which wasn't
supported by the C compiler for structures. For a policy
with five entry points, you don't want to have to stick in
a few hundred NULL function pointers.

(2) We thought it would improve ABI compatibility allowing modules
to work with kernels that had a superset of the entry points
defined in the module, even if the kernel had changed its
entry point set.

Both of these no longer apply:

(1) C99 gives us a way to sparsely define a static structure.

(2) The ABI problems existed anyway, due to enumeration numbers,
argument changes, and semantic mismatches. Since the going
rule for FreeBSD is that you really need your modules to
pretty closely match your kernel, it's not worth the
complexity.

This submit eliminates the operation vector, dynamic allocation
of the operation structure, copying of the vector to the
structure, and redoes the vectors in each policy to direct
structure definitions. One enourmous benefit of this change
is that we now get decent type checking on policy entry point
implementation arguments.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# 1979061b 30-Oct-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Various minor type, prototype tweaks -- clean up cruft due to lack of
type checking on entry points (to be introduced shortly).

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associa

Various minor type, prototype tweaks -- clean up cruft due to lack of
type checking on entry points (to be introduced shortly).

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

show more ...


# b914de36 30-Oct-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

While 'mode_t' seemed like a good idea for the access mode argument for
MAC access() and open() checks, the argument actually has an int type
where it becomes available. Switch to using 'int' for th

While 'mode_t' seemed like a good idea for the access mode argument for
MAC access() and open() checks, the argument actually has an int type
where it becomes available. Switch to using 'int' for the mode argument
throughout the MAC Framework and policy modules.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# 927f6069 29-Oct-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Hook up no-op stubs for reboot, swapon, sysctl entry points.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories


# 763bbd2f 26-Oct-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Slightly change the semantics of vnode labels for MAC: rather than
"refreshing" the label on the vnode before use, just get the label
right from inception. For single-label file systems, set the lab

Slightly change the semantics of vnode labels for MAC: rather than
"refreshing" the label on the vnode before use, just get the label
right from inception. For single-label file systems, set the label
in the generic VFS getnewvnode() code; for multi-label file systems,
leave the labeling up to the file system. With UFS1/2, this means
reading the extended attribute during vfs_vget() as the inode is
pulled off disk, rather than hitting the extended attributes
frequently during operations later, improving performance. This
also corrects sematics for shared vnode locks, which were not
previously present in the system. This chances the cache
coherrency properties WRT out-of-band access to label data, but in
an acceptable form. With UFS1, there is a small race condition
during automatic extended attribute start -- this is not present
with UFS2, and occurs because EAs aren't available at vnode
inception. We'll introduce a work around for this shortly.

Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# 24e8d0d0 22-Oct-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Adapt MAC policies for the new user API changes; teach policies how
to parse their own label elements (some cleanup to occur here in the
future to use the newly added kernel strsep()). Policies now

Adapt MAC policies for the new user API changes; teach policies how
to parse their own label elements (some cleanup to occur here in the
future to use the newly added kernel strsep()). Policies now
entirely encapsulate their notion of label in the policy module.

Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# 57e2f493 22-Oct-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

mac_none is a stub policy without any functional implementation.
Various cleanups, no functional changes:

- Fix a type in an entry point stub, socket checks accept
sockets, not vnodes.
- Traili

mac_none is a stub policy without any functional implementation.
Various cleanups, no functional changes:

- Fix a type in an entry point stub, socket checks accept
sockets, not vnodes.
- Trailing whitespace
- Entry point sort order

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

show more ...


Revision tags: release/4.7.0_cvs
# e183f80e 06-Oct-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Sync from MAC tree: break out the single mmap entry point into
seperate entry points for each occasion:

mac_check_vnode_mmap() Check at initial mapping
mac_check_vnode_mprotect() Check at mapping p

Sync from MAC tree: break out the single mmap entry point into
seperate entry points for each occasion:

mac_check_vnode_mmap() Check at initial mapping
mac_check_vnode_mprotect() Check at mapping protection change
mac_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade() Determine if a mapping downgrade
should take place following
subject relabel.

Implement mmap() and mprotect() entry points for labeled vnode
policies. These entry points are currently not hooked up to the
VM system in the base tree. These changes improve the consistency
of the access control interface and offer more flexibility regarding
limiting access to vnode mmaping.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# 83985c26 05-Oct-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Modify label allocation semantics for sockets: pass in soalloc's malloc
flags so that we can call malloc with M_NOWAIT if necessary, avoiding
potential sleeps while holding mutexes in the TCP syncach

Modify label allocation semantics for sockets: pass in soalloc's malloc
flags so that we can call malloc with M_NOWAIT if necessary, avoiding
potential sleeps while holding mutexes in the TCP syncache code.
Similar to the existing support for mbuf label allocation: if we can't
allocate all the necessary label store in each policy, we back out
the label allocation and fail the socket creation. Sync from MAC tree.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

show more ...


# eea8ea31 05-Oct-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Implement mac_create_devfs_symlink() for policies that interact with
vnode labels. Sync from MAC tree.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories


# c27b50f5 05-Oct-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Merge implementation of mpo_check_vnode_link() for various appropriate
file-system aware MAC policies. Sync to MAC tree.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates La

Merge implementation of mpo_check_vnode_link() for various appropriate
file-system aware MAC policies. Sync to MAC tree.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

show more ...


# 96adb909 05-Oct-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch:

- Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy
entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and
mpo_destroy_foo_label(l

Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch:

- Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy
entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and
mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same
entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during
internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes.
- Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and
mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket
main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels.
- Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost
all entry points, implement these entry points using common
implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of
almost identical looking functions.

This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the
merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

show more ...


# 740348c4 20-Aug-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Prefer NULL to 0 when passing a NULL pointer.


# 8a97ecf6 20-Aug-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Provide stub mpo_syscall() implementations for mac_none and mac_test.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs


# 177142e4 19-Aug-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Pass active_cred and file_cred into the MAC framework explicitly
for mac_check_vnode_{poll,read,stat,write}(). Pass in fp->f_cred
when calling these checks with a struct file available. Otherwise,

Pass active_cred and file_cred into the MAC framework explicitly
for mac_check_vnode_{poll,read,stat,write}(). Pass in fp->f_cred
when calling these checks with a struct file available. Otherwise,
pass NOCRED. All currently MAC policies use active_cred, but
could now offer the cached credential semantic used for the base
system security model.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs

show more ...


# c024c3ee 19-Aug-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Break out mac_check_pipe_op() into component check entry points:
mac_check_pipe_poll(), mac_check_pipe_read(), mac_check_pipe_stat(),
and mac_check_pipe_write(). This is improves consistency with ot

Break out mac_check_pipe_op() into component check entry points:
mac_check_pipe_poll(), mac_check_pipe_read(), mac_check_pipe_stat(),
and mac_check_pipe_write(). This is improves consistency with other
access control entry points and permits security modules to only
control the object methods that they are interested in, avoiding
switch statements.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs

show more ...


# 7f724f8b 19-Aug-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Break out mac_check_vnode_op() into three seperate checks:
mac_check_vnode_poll(), mac_check_vnode_read(), mac_check_vnode_write().
This improves the consistency with other existing vnode checks, and

Break out mac_check_vnode_op() into three seperate checks:
mac_check_vnode_poll(), mac_check_vnode_read(), mac_check_vnode_write().
This improves the consistency with other existing vnode checks, and
allows policies to avoid implementing switch statements to determine
what operations they do and do not want to authorize.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs

show more ...


# fb95b5d3 15-Aug-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Rename mac_check_socket_receive() to mac_check_socket_deliver() so that
we can use the names _receive() and _send() for the receive() and send()
checks. Rename related constants, policy implementati

Rename mac_check_socket_receive() to mac_check_socket_deliver() so that
we can use the names _receive() and _send() for the receive() and send()
checks. Rename related constants, policy implementations, etc.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs

show more ...


Revision tags: release/4.6.2_cvs, release/4.6.2
# d8a7b7a3 31-Jul-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.

Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up

Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.

Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.

mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.

mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).

mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.

mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.

mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.

mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).

mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs

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