History log of /freebsd/sys/security/mac_mls/mac_mls.c (Results 201 – 225 of 280)
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Revision tags: release/6.2.0_cvs, release/6.2.0
# 0efd6615 23-Dec-2006 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Move src/sys/sys/mac_policy.h, the kernel interface between the MAC
Framework and security modules, to src/sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h,
completing the removal of kernel-only MAC Framework include f

Move src/sys/sys/mac_policy.h, the kernel interface between the MAC
Framework and security modules, to src/sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h,
completing the removal of kernel-only MAC Framework include files from
src/sys/sys. Update the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules. Delete
the old mac_policy.h.

Third party policy modules will need similar updating.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project

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# 430fc756 13-Dec-2006 Christian S.J. Peron <csjp@FreeBSD.org>

Teach the MAC policies which utilize mbuf labeling the new syncache
entry points. Properly initialize the mbuf label based on the label
we copy from the PCB. This fixes an LOR between the PCB and sy

Teach the MAC policies which utilize mbuf labeling the new syncache
entry points. Properly initialize the mbuf label based on the label
we copy from the PCB. This fixes an LOR between the PCB and syncache
code.

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# 6aeb05d7 11-Nov-2006 Tom Rhodes <trhodes@FreeBSD.org>

Merge posix4/* into normal kernel hierarchy.

Reviewed by: glanced at by jhb
Approved by: silence on -arch@ and -standards@


# d94f2a68 12-Sep-2006 Christian S.J. Peron <csjp@FreeBSD.org>

Introduce a new entry point, mac_create_mbuf_from_firewall. This entry point
exists to allow the mandatory access control policy to properly initialize
mbufs generated by the firewall. An example whe

Introduce a new entry point, mac_create_mbuf_from_firewall. This entry point
exists to allow the mandatory access control policy to properly initialize
mbufs generated by the firewall. An example where this might happen is keep
alive packets, or ICMP error packets in response to other packets.

This takes care of kernel panics associated with un-initialize mbuf labels
when the firewall generates packets.

[1] I modified this patch from it's original version, the initial patch
introduced a number of entry points which were programmatically
equivalent. So I introduced only one. Instead, we should leverage
mac_create_mbuf_netlayer() which is used for similar situations,
an example being icmp_error()

This will minimize the impact associated with the MFC

Submitted by: mlaier [1]
MFC after: 1 week

This is a RELENG_6 candidate

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# 9e0d822d 26-Aug-2006 Christian S.J. Peron <csjp@FreeBSD.org>

Fix panic associated with file creation via RPC/NFS when the MLS policy
is loaded. This problem stems from the fact that the policy is not properly
initializing the mac label associated with the NFS

Fix panic associated with file creation via RPC/NFS when the MLS policy
is loaded. This problem stems from the fact that the policy is not properly
initializing the mac label associated with the NFS daemon.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Discussed with: rwatson

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Revision tags: release/5.5.0_cvs, release/5.5.0, release/6.1.0_cvs, release/6.1.0, release/6.0.0_cvs, release/6.0.0
# 36422989 19-Sep-2005 Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@FreeBSD.org>

Add #include <sys/sx.h>, devfs is going to require this shortly.


# 223aaaec 19-Sep-2005 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Remove mac_create_root_mount() and mpo_create_root_mount(), which
provided access to the root file system before the start of the
init process. This was used briefly by SEBSD before it knew about
pr

Remove mac_create_root_mount() and mpo_create_root_mount(), which
provided access to the root file system before the start of the
init process. This was used briefly by SEBSD before it knew about
preloading data in the loader, and using that method to gain
access to data earlier results in fewer inconsistencies in the
approach. Policy modules still have access to the root file system
creation event through the mac_create_mount() entry point.

Removed now, and will be removed from RELENG_6, in order to gain
third party policy dependencies on the entry point for the lifetime
of the 6.x branch.

MFC after: 3 days
Submitted by: Chris Vance <Christopher dot Vance at SPARTA dot com>
Sponsored by: SPARTA

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# d26dd2d9 14-Jul-2005 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

When devfs cloning takes place, provide access to the credential of the
process that caused the clone event to take place for the device driver
creating the device. This allows cloned device drivers

When devfs cloning takes place, provide access to the credential of the
process that caused the clone event to take place for the device driver
creating the device. This allows cloned device drivers to adapt the
device node based on security aspects of the process, such as the uid,
gid, and MAC label.

- Add a cred reference to struct cdev, so that when a device node is
instantiated as a vnode, the cloning credential can be exposed to
MAC.

- Add make_dev_cred(), a version of make_dev() that additionally
accepts the credential to stick in the struct cdev. Implement it and
make_dev() in terms of a back-end make_dev_credv().

- Add a new event handler, dev_clone_cred, which can be registered to
receive the credential instead of dev_clone, if desired.

- Modify the MAC entry point mac_create_devfs_device() to accept an
optional credential pointer (may be NULL), so that MAC policies can
inspect and act on the label or other elements of the credential
when initializing the skeleton device protections.

- Modify tty_pty.c to register clone_dev_cred and invoke make_dev_cred(),
so that the pty clone credential is exposed to the MAC Framework.

While currently primarily focussed on MAC policies, this change is also
a prerequisite for changes to allow ptys to be instantiated with the UID
of the process looking up the pty. This requires further changes to the
pty driver -- in particular, to immediately recycle pty nodes on last
close so that the credential-related state can be recreated on next
lookup.

Submitted by: Andrew Reisse <andrew.reisse@sparta.com>
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
MFC after: 1 week
MFC note: Merge to 6.x, but not 5.x for ABI reasons

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# 3c308b09 06-Jul-2005 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Eliminate MAC entry point mac_create_mbuf_from_mbuf(), which is
redundant with respect to existing mbuf copy label routines. Expose
a new mac_copy_mbuf() routine at the top end of the Framework and

Eliminate MAC entry point mac_create_mbuf_from_mbuf(), which is
redundant with respect to existing mbuf copy label routines. Expose
a new mac_copy_mbuf() routine at the top end of the Framework and
use that; use the existing mpo_copy_mbuf_label() routine on the
bottom end.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA, SPAWAR
Approved by: re (scottl)

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# 3831e7d7 07-Jun-2005 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Gratuitous renaming of four System V Semaphore MAC Framework entry
points to convert _sema() to _sem() for consistency purposes with
respect to the other semaphore-related entry points:

mac_init_sys

Gratuitous renaming of four System V Semaphore MAC Framework entry
points to convert _sema() to _sem() for consistency purposes with
respect to the other semaphore-related entry points:

mac_init_sysv_sema() -> mac_init_sysv_sem()
mac_destroy_sysv_sem() -> mac_destroy_sysv_sem()
mac_create_sysv_sema() -> mac_create_sysv_sem()
mac_cleanup_sysv_sema() -> mac_cleanup_sysv_sem()

Congruent changes are made to the policy interface to support this.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA

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Revision tags: release/5.4.0_cvs, release/5.4.0
# 52648411 04-May-2005 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Introduce MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to label and control
access to POSIX Semaphores:

mac_init_posix_sem() Initialize label for POSIX semaphore
mac_create_posix_sem()

Introduce MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to label and control
access to POSIX Semaphores:

mac_init_posix_sem() Initialize label for POSIX semaphore
mac_create_posix_sem() Create POSIX semaphore
mac_destroy_posix_sem() Destroy POSIX semaphore
mac_check_posix_sem_destroy() Check whether semaphore may be destroyed
mac_check_posix_sem_getvalue() Check whether semaphore may be queried
mac_check_possix_sem_open() Check whether semaphore may be opened
mac_check_posix_sem_post() Check whether semaphore may be posted to
mac_check_posix_sem_unlink() Check whether semaphore may be unlinked
mac_check_posix_sem_wait() Check whether may wait on semaphore

Update Biba, MLS, Stub, and Test policies to implement these entry points.
For information flow policies, most semaphore operations are effectively
read/write.

Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net>
Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee, SPARTA
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project

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# c92163dc 14-Apr-2005 Christian S.J. Peron <csjp@FreeBSD.org>

Move MAC check_vnode_mmap entry point out from being exclusive to
MAP_SHARED so that the entry point gets executed un-conditionally.
This may be useful for security policies which want to perform acc

Move MAC check_vnode_mmap entry point out from being exclusive to
MAP_SHARED so that the entry point gets executed un-conditionally.
This may be useful for security policies which want to perform access
control checks around run-time linking.

-add the mmap(2) flags argument to the check_vnode_mmap entry point
so that we can make access control decisions based on the type of
mapped object.
-update any dependent API around this parameter addition such as
function prototype modifications, entry point parameter additions
and the inclusion of sys/mman.h header file.
-Change the MLS, BIBA and LOMAC security policies so that subject
domination routines are not executed unless the type of mapping is
shared. This is done to maintain compatibility between the old
vm_mmap_vnode(9) and these policies.

Reviewed by: rwatson
MFC after: 1 month

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# c77cf2b1 27-Jan-2005 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Remove policy references to mpo_check_vnode_mprotect(), which is
currently unimplemented.

Update copyrights.

Pointed out by: csjp


# 82d16d5e 22-Jan-2005 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Implement MLS confidentiality protection for System V IPC objects
(message queues, semaphores, shared memory).

Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net>
Obtained from:

Implement MLS confidentiality protection for System V IPC objects
(message queues, semaphores, shared memory).

Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net>
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research

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Revision tags: release/4.11.0_cvs, release/4.11.0, release/5.3.0_cvs, release/5.3.0
# 1477f588 28-Jul-2004 Alexander Kabaev <kan@FreeBSD.org>

Introduce SLOT_SET macro and use it in place of casts as lvalues.


# dee57980 16-Jul-2004 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Rename Biba and MLS _single label elements to _effective, which more
accurately represents the intention of the 'single' label element in
Biba and MLS labels. It also approximates the use of 'effect

Rename Biba and MLS _single label elements to _effective, which more
accurately represents the intention of the 'single' label element in
Biba and MLS labels. It also approximates the use of 'effective' in
traditional UNIX credentials, and avoids confusion with 'singlelabel'
in the context of file systems.

Inspired by: trhodes

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# 2220907b 24-Jun-2004 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Introduce a temporary mutex, mac_ifnet_mtx, to lock MAC labels on
network interfaces. This global mutex will protect all ifnet labels.
Acquire the mutex across various MAC activities on interfaces,

Introduce a temporary mutex, mac_ifnet_mtx, to lock MAC labels on
network interfaces. This global mutex will protect all ifnet labels.
Acquire the mutex across various MAC activities on interfaces, such
as security checks, propagating interface labels to mbufs generated
from the interface, retrieving and setting the interface label.

Introduce mpo_copy_ifnet_label MAC policy entry point to copy the
value of an interface label from one label to another. Use this
to avoid performing a label externalize while holding mac_ifnet_mtx;
copy the label to a temporary ifnet label and then externalize that.

Implement mpo_copy_ifnet_label for various MAC policies that
implement interface labeling using generic label copying routines.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee Research

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# 89c9c53d 16-Jun-2004 Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@FreeBSD.org>

Do the dreaded s/dev_t/struct cdev */
Bump __FreeBSD_version accordingly.


Revision tags: release/4.10.0_cvs, release/4.10.0, release/5.2.1_cvs, release/5.2.1
# f6a41092 22-Feb-2004 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Update my personal copyrights and NETA copyrights in the kernel
to use the "year1-year3" format, as opposed to "year1, year2, year3".
This seems to make lawyers more happy, but also prevents the
line

Update my personal copyrights and NETA copyrights in the kernel
to use the "year1-year3" format, as opposed to "year1, year2, year3".
This seems to make lawyers more happy, but also prevents the
lines from getting excessively long as the years start to add up.

Suggested by: imp

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# 4795b82c 01-Feb-2004 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Coalesce pipe allocations and frees. Previously, the pipe code
would allocate two 'struct pipe's from the pipe zone, and malloc a
mutex.

- Create a new "struct pipepair" object holding the two 'str

Coalesce pipe allocations and frees. Previously, the pipe code
would allocate two 'struct pipe's from the pipe zone, and malloc a
mutex.

- Create a new "struct pipepair" object holding the two 'struct
pipe' instances, struct mutex, and struct label reference. Pipe
structures now have a back-pointer to the pipe pair, and a
'pipe_present' flag to indicate whether the half has been
closed.

- Perform mutex init/destroy in zone init/destroy, avoiding
reallocating the mutex for each pipe. Perform most pipe structure
setup in zone constructor.

- VM memory mappings for pageable buffers are still done outside of
the UMA zone.

- Change MAC API to speak 'struct pipepair' instead of 'struct pipe',
update many policies. MAC labels are also handled outside of the
UMA zone for now. Label-only policy modules don't have to be
recompiled, but if a module is recompiled, its pipe entry points
will need to be updated. If a module actually reached into the
pipe structures (unlikely), that would also need to be modified.

These changes substantially simplify failure handling in the pipe
code as there are many fewer possible failure modes.

On half-close, pipes no longer free the 'struct pipe' for the closed
half until a full-close takes place. However, VM mapped buffers
are still released on half-close.

Some code refactoring is now possible to clean up some of the back
references, etc; this patch attempts not to change the structure
of most of the pipe implementation, only allocation/free code
paths, so as to avoid introducing bugs (hopefully).

This cuts about 8%-9% off the cost of sequential pipe allocation
and free in system call tests on UP and SMP in my micro-benchmarks.
May or may not make a difference in macro-benchmarks, but doing
less work is good.

Reviewed by: juli, tjr
Testing help: dwhite, fenestro, scottl, et al

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Revision tags: release/5.2.0_cvs, release/5.2.0
# 2d92ec98 17-Dec-2003 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Switch TCP over to using the inpcb label when responding in timed
wait, rather than the socket label. This avoids reaching up to
the socket layer during connection close, which requires locking
chan

Switch TCP over to using the inpcb label when responding in timed
wait, rather than the socket label. This avoids reaching up to
the socket layer during connection close, which requires locking
changes. To do this, introduce MAC Framework entry point
mac_create_mbuf_from_inpcb(), which is called from tcp_twrespond()
instead of calling mac_create_mbuf_from_socket() or
mac_create_mbuf_netlayer(). Introduce MAC Policy entry point
mpo_create_mbuf_from_inpcb(), and implementations for various
policies, which generally just copy label data from the inpcb to
the mbuf. Assert the inpcb lock in the entry point since we
require consistency for the inpcb label reference.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# 56d9e932 06-Dec-2003 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Rename mac_create_cred() MAC Framework entry point to mac_copy_cred(),
and the mpo_create_cred() MAC policy entry point to
mpo_copy_cred_label(). This is more consistent with similar entry
points fo

Rename mac_create_cred() MAC Framework entry point to mac_copy_cred(),
and the mpo_create_cred() MAC policy entry point to
mpo_copy_cred_label(). This is more consistent with similar entry
points for creation and label copying, as mac_create_cred() was
called from crdup() as opposed to during process creation. For
a number of policies, this removes the requirement for special
handling when copying credential labels, and improves consistency.

Approved by: re (scottl)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# 2e8c6b26 18-Nov-2003 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Use UMA zone allocator for Biba and MLS labels rather than MALLOC(9).

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories


# a557af22 18-Nov-2003 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Introduce a MAC label reference in 'struct inpcb', which caches
the MAC label referenced from 'struct socket' in the IPv4 and
IPv6-based protocols. This permits MAC labels to be checked during
net

Introduce a MAC label reference in 'struct inpcb', which caches
the MAC label referenced from 'struct socket' in the IPv4 and
IPv6-based protocols. This permits MAC labels to be checked during
network delivery operations without dereferencing inp->inp_socket
to get to so->so_label, which will eventually avoid our having to
grab the socket lock during delivery at the network layer.

This change introduces 'struct inpcb' as a labeled object to the
MAC Framework, along with the normal circus of entry points:
initialization, creation from socket, destruction, as well as a
delivery access control check.

For most policies, the inpcb label will simply be a cache of the
socket label, so a new protocol switch method is introduced,
pr_sosetlabel() to notify protocols that the socket layer label
has been updated so that the cache can be updated while holding
appropriate locks. Most protocols implement this using
pru_sosetlabel_null(), but IPv4/IPv6 protocols using inpcbs use
the the worker function in_pcbsosetlabel(), which calls into the
MAC Framework to perform a cache update.

Biba, LOMAC, and MLS implement these entry points, as do the stub
policy, and test policy.

Reviewed by: sam, bms
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# 6afba1a9 17-Nov-2003 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Don't implement mpo_destroy() for Biba, LOMAC, and MLS, as they
aren't allowed to be unloaded.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories


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