History log of /freebsd/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c (Results 226 – 250 of 298)
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# bc9e75d7 13-Dec-2002 Alfred Perlstein <alfred@FreeBSD.org>

Backout removal SCARGS, the code freeze is only "selectively" over.


# 0bbe7292 13-Dec-2002 Alfred Perlstein <alfred@FreeBSD.org>

Remove SCARGS.

Reviewed by: md5


# 990b4b2d 09-Dec-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Remove dm_root entry from struct devfs_mount. It's never set, and is
unused. Replace it with a dm_mount back-pointer to the struct mount
that the devfs_mount is associated with. Export that pointe

Remove dm_root entry from struct devfs_mount. It's never set, and is
unused. Replace it with a dm_mount back-pointer to the struct mount
that the devfs_mount is associated with. Export that pointer to MAC
Framework entry points, where all current policies don't use the
pointer. This permits the SEBSD port of SELinux's FLASK/TE to compile
out-of-the-box on 5.0-CURRENT with full file system labeling support.

Approved by: re (murray)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# 4d10c0ce 26-Nov-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Un-staticize mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms() so that it may be used
by policy modules making use of downgrades in the MAC AST event. This
is required by the mac_lomac port of LOMAC to the MAC Framewor

Un-staticize mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms() so that it may be used
by policy modules making use of downgrades in the MAC AST event. This
is required by the mac_lomac port of LOMAC to the MAC Framework.

Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# 2555374c 20-Nov-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Introduce p_label, extensible security label storage for the MAC framework
in struct proc. While the process label is actually stored in the
struct ucred pointed to by p_ucred, there is a need for t

Introduce p_label, extensible security label storage for the MAC framework
in struct proc. While the process label is actually stored in the
struct ucred pointed to by p_ucred, there is a need for transient
storage that may be used when asynchronous (deferred) updates need to
be performed on the "real" label for locking reasons. Unlike other
label storage, this label has no locking semantics, relying on policies
to provide their own protection for the label contents, meaning that
a policy leaf mutex may be used, avoiding lock order issues. This
permits policies that act based on historical process behavior (such
as audit policies, the MAC Framework port of LOMAC, etc) can update
process properties even when many existing locks are held without
violating the lock order. No currently committed policies implement use
of this label storage.

Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# a3df768b 19-Nov-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Merge kld access control checks from the MAC tree: these access control
checks permit policy modules to augment the system policy for permitting
kld operations. This permits policies to limit access

Merge kld access control checks from the MAC tree: these access control
checks permit policy modules to augment the system policy for permitting
kld operations. This permits policies to limit access to kld operations
based on credential (and other) properties, as well as to perform checks
on the kld being loaded (integrity, etc).

Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# a96acd1a 13-Nov-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Introduce a condition variable to avoid returning EBUSY when
the MAC policy list is busy during a load or unload attempt.
We assert no locks held during the cv wait, meaning we should
be fairly deadl

Introduce a condition variable to avoid returning EBUSY when
the MAC policy list is busy during a load or unload attempt.
We assert no locks held during the cv wait, meaning we should
be fairly deadlock-safe. Because of the cv model and busy
count, it's possible for a cv waiter waiting for exclusive
access to the policy list to be starved by active and
long-lived access control/labeling events. For now, we
accept that as a necessary tradeoff.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# 63b6f478 12-Nov-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Garbage collect mac_create_devfs_vnode() -- it hasn't been used since
we brought in the new cache and locking model for vnode labels. We
now rely on mac_associate_devfs_vnode().

Obtained from: Trus

Garbage collect mac_create_devfs_vnode() -- it hasn't been used since
we brought in the new cache and locking model for vnode labels. We
now rely on mac_associate_devfs_vnode().

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# 2d43d24e 11-Nov-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Garbage collect definition of M_MACOPVEC -- we no longer perform a
dynamic mapping of an operation vector into an operation structure,
rather, we rely on C99 sparse structure initialization.

Obtaine

Garbage collect definition of M_MACOPVEC -- we no longer perform a
dynamic mapping of an operation vector into an operation structure,
rather, we rely on C99 sparse structure initialization.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# 9fa3506e 08-Nov-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Add an explicit execlabel argument to exec-related MAC policy entry
points, rather than relying on policies to grub around in the
image activator instance structure.

Approved by: re
Obtained from: T

Add an explicit execlabel argument to exec-related MAC policy entry
points, rather than relying on policies to grub around in the
image activator instance structure.

Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# 670cb89b 05-Nov-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Bring in two sets of changes:

(1) Permit userland applications to request a change of label atomic
with an execve() via mac_execve(). This is required for the
SEBSD port of SELinux/FLASK.

Bring in two sets of changes:

(1) Permit userland applications to request a change of label atomic
with an execve() via mac_execve(). This is required for the
SEBSD port of SELinux/FLASK. Attempts to invoke this without
MAC compiled in result in ENOSYS, as with all other MAC system
calls. Complexity, if desired, is present in policy modules,
rather than the framework.

(2) Permit policies to have access to both the label of the vnode
being executed as well as the interpreter if it's a shell
script or related UNIX nonsense. Because we can't hold both
vnode locks at the same time, cache the interpreter label.
SEBSD relies on this because it supports secure transitioning
via shell script executables. Other policies might want to
take both labels into account during an integrity or
confidentiality decision at execve()-time.

Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# 4443e9ff 05-Nov-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Assert that appropriate vnodes are locked in mac_execve_will_transition().
Allow transitioning to be twiddled off using the process and fs enforcement
flags, although at some point this should probab

Assert that appropriate vnodes are locked in mac_execve_will_transition().
Allow transitioning to be twiddled off using the process and fs enforcement
flags, although at some point this should probably be its own flag.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# e5e820fd 04-Nov-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Permit MAC policies to instrument the access control decisions for
system accounting configuration and for nfsd server thread attach.
Policies might use this to protect the integrity or confidentiali

Permit MAC policies to instrument the access control decisions for
system accounting configuration and for nfsd server thread attach.
Policies might use this to protect the integrity or confidentiality
of accounting data, limit the ability to turn on or off accounting,
as well as to prevent inappropriately labeled threads from becoming nfs
server threads.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# 3da87a65 04-Nov-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Remove mac_cache_fslabel_in_vnode sysctl -- with the new VFS/MAC
construction, labels are always cached.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories


# 6201265b 04-Nov-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

License clarification and wording changes: NAI has approved removal of
clause three, and NAI Labs now goes by the name Network Associates
Laboratories.


# 4b8d5f2d 03-Nov-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Introduce mac_check_system_settime(), a MAC check allowing policies to
augment the system policy for changing the system time.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associat

Introduce mac_check_system_settime(), a MAC check allowing policies to
augment the system policy for changing the system time.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# e686e5ae 01-Nov-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Add MAC checks for various kenv() operations: dump, get, set, unset,
permitting MAC policies to limit access to the kernel environment.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network

Add MAC checks for various kenv() operations: dump, get, set, unset,
permitting MAC policies to limit access to the kernel environment.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

show more ...


# 5c8dd342 30-Oct-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Move to C99 sparse structure initialization for the mac_policy_ops
structure definition, rather than using an operation vector
we translate into the structure. Originally, we used a vector
for two r

Move to C99 sparse structure initialization for the mac_policy_ops
structure definition, rather than using an operation vector
we translate into the structure. Originally, we used a vector
for two reasons:

(1) We wanted to define the structure sparsely, which wasn't
supported by the C compiler for structures. For a policy
with five entry points, you don't want to have to stick in
a few hundred NULL function pointers.

(2) We thought it would improve ABI compatibility allowing modules
to work with kernels that had a superset of the entry points
defined in the module, even if the kernel had changed its
entry point set.

Both of these no longer apply:

(1) C99 gives us a way to sparsely define a static structure.

(2) The ABI problems existed anyway, due to enumeration numbers,
argument changes, and semantic mismatches. Since the going
rule for FreeBSD is that you really need your modules to
pretty closely match your kernel, it's not worth the
complexity.

This submit eliminates the operation vector, dynamic allocation
of the operation structure, copying of the vector to the
structure, and redoes the vectors in each policy to direct
structure definitions. One enourmous benefit of this change
is that we now get decent type checking on policy entry point
implementation arguments.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# b914de36 30-Oct-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

While 'mode_t' seemed like a good idea for the access mode argument for
MAC access() and open() checks, the argument actually has an int type
where it becomes available. Switch to using 'int' for th

While 'mode_t' seemed like a good idea for the access mode argument for
MAC access() and open() checks, the argument actually has an int type
where it becomes available. Switch to using 'int' for the mode argument
throughout the MAC Framework and policy modules.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# 8b3a8434 28-Oct-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

An inappropriate ASSERT slipped in during the recent merge of the
reboot checking; remove.


# 9e913ebd 27-Oct-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Centrally manage enforcement of {reboot,swapon,sysctl} using the
mac_enforce_system toggle, rather than several separate toggles.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Assoc

Centrally manage enforcement of {reboot,swapon,sysctl} using the
mac_enforce_system toggle, rather than several separate toggles.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

show more ...


# d3fc69ee 27-Oct-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Implement mac_check_system_sysctl(), a MAC Framework entry point to
permit MAC policies to augment the security protections on sysctl()
operations. This is not really a wonderful entry point, as we

Implement mac_check_system_sysctl(), a MAC Framework entry point to
permit MAC policies to augment the security protections on sysctl()
operations. This is not really a wonderful entry point, as we
only have access to the MIB of the target sysctl entry, rather than
the more useful entry name, but this is sufficient for policies
like Biba that wish to use their notions of privilege or integrity
to prevent inappropriate sysctl modification. Affects MAC kernels
only. Since SYSCTL_LOCK isn't in sysctl.h, just kern_sysctl.c,
we can't assert the SYSCTL subsystem lockin the MAC Framework.

Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# a2ecb9b7 27-Oct-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Hook up mac_check_system_reboot(), a MAC Framework entry point that
permits MAC modules to augment system security decisions regarding
the reboot() system call, if MAC is compiled into the kernel.

A

Hook up mac_check_system_reboot(), a MAC Framework entry point that
permits MAC modules to augment system security decisions regarding
the reboot() system call, if MAC is compiled into the kernel.

Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# 03ce2c0c 27-Oct-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Merge from MAC tree: rename mac_check_vnode_swapon() to
mac_check_system_swapon(), to reflect the fact that the primary
object of this change is the running kernel as a whole, rather
than just the vn

Merge from MAC tree: rename mac_check_vnode_swapon() to
mac_check_system_swapon(), to reflect the fact that the primary
object of this change is the running kernel as a whole, rather
than just the vnode. We'll drop additional checks of this
class into the same check namespace, including reboot(),
sysctl(), et al.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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# 763bbd2f 26-Oct-2002 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Slightly change the semantics of vnode labels for MAC: rather than
"refreshing" the label on the vnode before use, just get the label
right from inception. For single-label file systems, set the lab

Slightly change the semantics of vnode labels for MAC: rather than
"refreshing" the label on the vnode before use, just get the label
right from inception. For single-label file systems, set the label
in the generic VFS getnewvnode() code; for multi-label file systems,
leave the labeling up to the file system. With UFS1/2, this means
reading the extended attribute during vfs_vget() as the inode is
pulled off disk, rather than hitting the extended attributes
frequently during operations later, improving performance. This
also corrects sematics for shared vnode locks, which were not
previously present in the system. This chances the cache
coherrency properties WRT out-of-band access to label data, but in
an acceptable form. With UFS1, there is a small race condition
during automatic extended attribute start -- this is not present
with UFS2, and occurs because EAs aren't available at vnode
inception. We'll introduce a work around for this shortly.

Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

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