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bc9e75d7 |
| 13-Dec-2002 |
Alfred Perlstein <alfred@FreeBSD.org> |
Backout removal SCARGS, the code freeze is only "selectively" over.
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0bbe7292 |
| 13-Dec-2002 |
Alfred Perlstein <alfred@FreeBSD.org> |
Remove SCARGS.
Reviewed by: md5
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990b4b2d |
| 09-Dec-2002 |
Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> |
Remove dm_root entry from struct devfs_mount. It's never set, and is unused. Replace it with a dm_mount back-pointer to the struct mount that the devfs_mount is associated with. Export that pointe
Remove dm_root entry from struct devfs_mount. It's never set, and is unused. Replace it with a dm_mount back-pointer to the struct mount that the devfs_mount is associated with. Export that pointer to MAC Framework entry points, where all current policies don't use the pointer. This permits the SEBSD port of SELinux's FLASK/TE to compile out-of-the-box on 5.0-CURRENT with full file system labeling support.
Approved by: re (murray) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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4d10c0ce |
| 26-Nov-2002 |
Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> |
Un-staticize mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms() so that it may be used by policy modules making use of downgrades in the MAC AST event. This is required by the mac_lomac port of LOMAC to the MAC Framewor
Un-staticize mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms() so that it may be used by policy modules making use of downgrades in the MAC AST event. This is required by the mac_lomac port of LOMAC to the MAC Framework.
Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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2555374c |
| 20-Nov-2002 |
Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> |
Introduce p_label, extensible security label storage for the MAC framework in struct proc. While the process label is actually stored in the struct ucred pointed to by p_ucred, there is a need for t
Introduce p_label, extensible security label storage for the MAC framework in struct proc. While the process label is actually stored in the struct ucred pointed to by p_ucred, there is a need for transient storage that may be used when asynchronous (deferred) updates need to be performed on the "real" label for locking reasons. Unlike other label storage, this label has no locking semantics, relying on policies to provide their own protection for the label contents, meaning that a policy leaf mutex may be used, avoiding lock order issues. This permits policies that act based on historical process behavior (such as audit policies, the MAC Framework port of LOMAC, etc) can update process properties even when many existing locks are held without violating the lock order. No currently committed policies implement use of this label storage.
Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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a3df768b |
| 19-Nov-2002 |
Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> |
Merge kld access control checks from the MAC tree: these access control checks permit policy modules to augment the system policy for permitting kld operations. This permits policies to limit access
Merge kld access control checks from the MAC tree: these access control checks permit policy modules to augment the system policy for permitting kld operations. This permits policies to limit access to kld operations based on credential (and other) properties, as well as to perform checks on the kld being loaded (integrity, etc).
Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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a96acd1a |
| 13-Nov-2002 |
Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> |
Introduce a condition variable to avoid returning EBUSY when the MAC policy list is busy during a load or unload attempt. We assert no locks held during the cv wait, meaning we should be fairly deadl
Introduce a condition variable to avoid returning EBUSY when the MAC policy list is busy during a load or unload attempt. We assert no locks held during the cv wait, meaning we should be fairly deadlock-safe. Because of the cv model and busy count, it's possible for a cv waiter waiting for exclusive access to the policy list to be starved by active and long-lived access control/labeling events. For now, we accept that as a necessary tradeoff.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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63b6f478 |
| 12-Nov-2002 |
Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> |
Garbage collect mac_create_devfs_vnode() -- it hasn't been used since we brought in the new cache and locking model for vnode labels. We now rely on mac_associate_devfs_vnode().
Obtained from: Trus
Garbage collect mac_create_devfs_vnode() -- it hasn't been used since we brought in the new cache and locking model for vnode labels. We now rely on mac_associate_devfs_vnode().
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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2d43d24e |
| 11-Nov-2002 |
Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> |
Garbage collect definition of M_MACOPVEC -- we no longer perform a dynamic mapping of an operation vector into an operation structure, rather, we rely on C99 sparse structure initialization.
Obtaine
Garbage collect definition of M_MACOPVEC -- we no longer perform a dynamic mapping of an operation vector into an operation structure, rather, we rely on C99 sparse structure initialization.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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9fa3506e |
| 08-Nov-2002 |
Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> |
Add an explicit execlabel argument to exec-related MAC policy entry points, rather than relying on policies to grub around in the image activator instance structure.
Approved by: re Obtained from: T
Add an explicit execlabel argument to exec-related MAC policy entry points, rather than relying on policies to grub around in the image activator instance structure.
Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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670cb89b |
| 05-Nov-2002 |
Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> |
Bring in two sets of changes:
(1) Permit userland applications to request a change of label atomic with an execve() via mac_execve(). This is required for the SEBSD port of SELinux/FLASK.
Bring in two sets of changes:
(1) Permit userland applications to request a change of label atomic with an execve() via mac_execve(). This is required for the SEBSD port of SELinux/FLASK. Attempts to invoke this without MAC compiled in result in ENOSYS, as with all other MAC system calls. Complexity, if desired, is present in policy modules, rather than the framework.
(2) Permit policies to have access to both the label of the vnode being executed as well as the interpreter if it's a shell script or related UNIX nonsense. Because we can't hold both vnode locks at the same time, cache the interpreter label. SEBSD relies on this because it supports secure transitioning via shell script executables. Other policies might want to take both labels into account during an integrity or confidentiality decision at execve()-time.
Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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4443e9ff |
| 05-Nov-2002 |
Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> |
Assert that appropriate vnodes are locked in mac_execve_will_transition(). Allow transitioning to be twiddled off using the process and fs enforcement flags, although at some point this should probab
Assert that appropriate vnodes are locked in mac_execve_will_transition(). Allow transitioning to be twiddled off using the process and fs enforcement flags, although at some point this should probably be its own flag.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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e5e820fd |
| 04-Nov-2002 |
Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> |
Permit MAC policies to instrument the access control decisions for system accounting configuration and for nfsd server thread attach. Policies might use this to protect the integrity or confidentiali
Permit MAC policies to instrument the access control decisions for system accounting configuration and for nfsd server thread attach. Policies might use this to protect the integrity or confidentiality of accounting data, limit the ability to turn on or off accounting, as well as to prevent inappropriately labeled threads from becoming nfs server threads.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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3da87a65 |
| 04-Nov-2002 |
Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> |
Remove mac_cache_fslabel_in_vnode sysctl -- with the new VFS/MAC construction, labels are always cached.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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6201265b |
| 04-Nov-2002 |
Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> |
License clarification and wording changes: NAI has approved removal of clause three, and NAI Labs now goes by the name Network Associates Laboratories.
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4b8d5f2d |
| 03-Nov-2002 |
Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> |
Introduce mac_check_system_settime(), a MAC check allowing policies to augment the system policy for changing the system time.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associat
Introduce mac_check_system_settime(), a MAC check allowing policies to augment the system policy for changing the system time.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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e686e5ae |
| 01-Nov-2002 |
Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> |
Add MAC checks for various kenv() operations: dump, get, set, unset, permitting MAC policies to limit access to the kernel environment.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network
Add MAC checks for various kenv() operations: dump, get, set, unset, permitting MAC policies to limit access to the kernel environment.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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5c8dd342 |
| 30-Oct-2002 |
Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> |
Move to C99 sparse structure initialization for the mac_policy_ops structure definition, rather than using an operation vector we translate into the structure. Originally, we used a vector for two r
Move to C99 sparse structure initialization for the mac_policy_ops structure definition, rather than using an operation vector we translate into the structure. Originally, we used a vector for two reasons:
(1) We wanted to define the structure sparsely, which wasn't supported by the C compiler for structures. For a policy with five entry points, you don't want to have to stick in a few hundred NULL function pointers.
(2) We thought it would improve ABI compatibility allowing modules to work with kernels that had a superset of the entry points defined in the module, even if the kernel had changed its entry point set.
Both of these no longer apply:
(1) C99 gives us a way to sparsely define a static structure.
(2) The ABI problems existed anyway, due to enumeration numbers, argument changes, and semantic mismatches. Since the going rule for FreeBSD is that you really need your modules to pretty closely match your kernel, it's not worth the complexity.
This submit eliminates the operation vector, dynamic allocation of the operation structure, copying of the vector to the structure, and redoes the vectors in each policy to direct structure definitions. One enourmous benefit of this change is that we now get decent type checking on policy entry point implementation arguments.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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b914de36 |
| 30-Oct-2002 |
Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> |
While 'mode_t' seemed like a good idea for the access mode argument for MAC access() and open() checks, the argument actually has an int type where it becomes available. Switch to using 'int' for th
While 'mode_t' seemed like a good idea for the access mode argument for MAC access() and open() checks, the argument actually has an int type where it becomes available. Switch to using 'int' for the mode argument throughout the MAC Framework and policy modules.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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8b3a8434 |
| 28-Oct-2002 |
Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> |
An inappropriate ASSERT slipped in during the recent merge of the reboot checking; remove.
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9e913ebd |
| 27-Oct-2002 |
Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> |
Centrally manage enforcement of {reboot,swapon,sysctl} using the mac_enforce_system toggle, rather than several separate toggles.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Assoc
Centrally manage enforcement of {reboot,swapon,sysctl} using the mac_enforce_system toggle, rather than several separate toggles.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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d3fc69ee |
| 27-Oct-2002 |
Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> |
Implement mac_check_system_sysctl(), a MAC Framework entry point to permit MAC policies to augment the security protections on sysctl() operations. This is not really a wonderful entry point, as we
Implement mac_check_system_sysctl(), a MAC Framework entry point to permit MAC policies to augment the security protections on sysctl() operations. This is not really a wonderful entry point, as we only have access to the MIB of the target sysctl entry, rather than the more useful entry name, but this is sufficient for policies like Biba that wish to use their notions of privilege or integrity to prevent inappropriate sysctl modification. Affects MAC kernels only. Since SYSCTL_LOCK isn't in sysctl.h, just kern_sysctl.c, we can't assert the SYSCTL subsystem lockin the MAC Framework.
Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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a2ecb9b7 |
| 27-Oct-2002 |
Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> |
Hook up mac_check_system_reboot(), a MAC Framework entry point that permits MAC modules to augment system security decisions regarding the reboot() system call, if MAC is compiled into the kernel.
A
Hook up mac_check_system_reboot(), a MAC Framework entry point that permits MAC modules to augment system security decisions regarding the reboot() system call, if MAC is compiled into the kernel.
Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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03ce2c0c |
| 27-Oct-2002 |
Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> |
Merge from MAC tree: rename mac_check_vnode_swapon() to mac_check_system_swapon(), to reflect the fact that the primary object of this change is the running kernel as a whole, rather than just the vn
Merge from MAC tree: rename mac_check_vnode_swapon() to mac_check_system_swapon(), to reflect the fact that the primary object of this change is the running kernel as a whole, rather than just the vnode. We'll drop additional checks of this class into the same check namespace, including reboot(), sysctl(), et al.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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763bbd2f |
| 26-Oct-2002 |
Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> |
Slightly change the semantics of vnode labels for MAC: rather than "refreshing" the label on the vnode before use, just get the label right from inception. For single-label file systems, set the lab
Slightly change the semantics of vnode labels for MAC: rather than "refreshing" the label on the vnode before use, just get the label right from inception. For single-label file systems, set the label in the generic VFS getnewvnode() code; for multi-label file systems, leave the labeling up to the file system. With UFS1/2, this means reading the extended attribute during vfs_vget() as the inode is pulled off disk, rather than hitting the extended attributes frequently during operations later, improving performance. This also corrects sematics for shared vnode locks, which were not previously present in the system. This chances the cache coherrency properties WRT out-of-band access to label data, but in an acceptable form. With UFS1, there is a small race condition during automatic extended attribute start -- this is not present with UFS2, and occurs because EAs aren't available at vnode inception. We'll introduce a work around for this shortly.
Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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