xref: /linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c (revision 3ae22f4d94e5b69b8d9b8b1ce2702043e4aca43d)
1 /*
2  * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
3  * Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
4  *
5  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
7  * published by the Free Software Foundation.
8  */
9 
10 #include <linux/netdevice.h>
11 #include <linux/types.h>
12 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
13 #include <linux/compiler.h>
14 #include <linux/ieee80211.h>
15 #include <linux/gfp.h>
16 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
17 #include <net/mac80211.h>
18 #include <crypto/aes.h>
19 
20 #include "ieee80211_i.h"
21 #include "michael.h"
22 #include "tkip.h"
23 #include "aes_ccm.h"
24 #include "aes_cmac.h"
25 #include "wpa.h"
26 
27 ieee80211_tx_result
28 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
29 {
30 	u8 *data, *key, *mic;
31 	size_t data_len;
32 	unsigned int hdrlen;
33 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
34 	struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
35 	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
36 	int tail;
37 
38 	hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
39 	if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
40 	    skb->len < 24 || !ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
41 		return TX_CONTINUE;
42 
43 	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
44 	if (skb->len < hdrlen)
45 		return TX_DROP;
46 
47 	data = skb->data + hdrlen;
48 	data_len = skb->len - hdrlen;
49 
50 	if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) {
51 		/* Need to use software crypto for the test */
52 		info->control.hw_key = NULL;
53 	}
54 
55 	if (info->control.hw_key &&
56 	    (info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_DONTFRAG ||
57 	     tx->local->ops->set_frag_threshold) &&
58 	    !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC)) {
59 		/* hwaccel - with no need for SW-generated MMIC */
60 		return TX_CONTINUE;
61 	}
62 
63 	tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
64 	if (!info->control.hw_key)
65 		tail += IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
66 
67 	if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
68 		    skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN))
69 		return TX_DROP;
70 
71 	key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY];
72 	mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
73 	michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
74 	if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE))
75 		mic[0]++;
76 
77 	return TX_CONTINUE;
78 }
79 
80 
81 ieee80211_rx_result
82 ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
83 {
84 	u8 *data, *key = NULL;
85 	size_t data_len;
86 	unsigned int hdrlen;
87 	u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN];
88 	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
89 	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
90 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
91 
92 	/*
93 	 * it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other
94 	 * than data frames.
95 	 */
96 	if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
97 		return RX_CONTINUE;
98 
99 	/*
100 	 * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it or
101 	 * the IV with the key index. In this case we have solely rely
102 	 * on the driver to set RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR in the event of a
103 	 * MIC failure report.
104 	 */
105 	if (status->flag & (RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) {
106 		if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
107 			goto mic_fail_no_key;
108 
109 		if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) && rx->key &&
110 		    rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP)
111 			goto update_iv;
112 
113 		return RX_CONTINUE;
114 	}
115 
116 	/*
117 	 * Some hardware seems to generate Michael MIC failure reports; even
118 	 * though, the frame was not encrypted with TKIP and therefore has no
119 	 * MIC. Ignore the flag them to avoid triggering countermeasures.
120 	 */
121 	if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
122 	    !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
123 		return RX_CONTINUE;
124 
125 	if (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP && rx->key->conf.keyidx) {
126 		/*
127 		 * APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC
128 		 * errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for
129 		 * group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast
130 		 * frames in the BSS.
131 		 */
132 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
133 	}
134 
135 	if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
136 		goto mic_fail;
137 
138 	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
139 	if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
140 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
141 
142 	if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
143 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
144 	hdr = (void *)skb->data;
145 
146 	data = skb->data + hdrlen;
147 	data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
148 	key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
149 	michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
150 	if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0)
151 		goto mic_fail;
152 
153 	/* remove Michael MIC from payload */
154 	skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
155 
156 update_iv:
157 	/* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
158 	rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
159 	rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
160 
161 	return RX_CONTINUE;
162 
163 mic_fail:
164 	rx->key->u.tkip.mic_failures++;
165 
166 mic_fail_no_key:
167 	/*
168 	 * In some cases the key can be unset - e.g. a multicast packet, in
169 	 * a driver that supports HW encryption. Send up the key idx only if
170 	 * the key is set.
171 	 */
172 	mac80211_ev_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata,
173 					rx->key ? rx->key->conf.keyidx : -1,
174 					(void *) skb->data, NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
175 	return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
176 }
177 
178 
179 static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
180 {
181 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
182 	struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
183 	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
184 	unsigned int hdrlen;
185 	int len, tail;
186 	u8 *pos;
187 
188 	if (info->control.hw_key &&
189 	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
190 	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
191 		/* hwaccel - with no need for software-generated IV */
192 		return 0;
193 	}
194 
195 	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
196 	len = skb->len - hdrlen;
197 
198 	if (info->control.hw_key)
199 		tail = 0;
200 	else
201 		tail = IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
202 
203 	if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
204 		    skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN))
205 		return -1;
206 
207 	pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
208 	memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen);
209 	skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) +
210 				    IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
211 	pos += hdrlen;
212 
213 	/* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
214 	if (info->control.hw_key &&
215 	    (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
216 		return 0;
217 
218 	/* Increase IV for the frame */
219 	spin_lock(&key->u.tkip.txlock);
220 	key->u.tkip.tx.iv16++;
221 	if (key->u.tkip.tx.iv16 == 0)
222 		key->u.tkip.tx.iv32++;
223 	pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, key);
224 	spin_unlock(&key->u.tkip.txlock);
225 
226 	/* hwaccel - with software IV */
227 	if (info->control.hw_key)
228 		return 0;
229 
230 	/* Add room for ICV */
231 	skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
232 
233 	return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(tx->local->wep_tx_tfm,
234 					   key, skb, pos, len);
235 }
236 
237 
238 ieee80211_tx_result
239 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
240 {
241 	struct sk_buff *skb;
242 
243 	ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
244 
245 	skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
246 		if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
247 			return TX_DROP;
248 	}
249 
250 	return TX_CONTINUE;
251 }
252 
253 
254 ieee80211_rx_result
255 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
256 {
257 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data;
258 	int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0;
259 	struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
260 	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
261 	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
262 
263 	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
264 
265 	if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
266 		return RX_CONTINUE;
267 
268 	if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12)
269 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
270 
271 	/* it may be possible to optimize this a bit more */
272 	if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
273 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
274 	hdr = (void *)skb->data;
275 
276 	/*
277 	 * Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption.
278 	 * In the case where hardware checks the IV as well,
279 	 * we don't even get here, see ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt()
280 	 */
281 	if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)
282 		hwaccel = 1;
283 
284 	res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(rx->local->wep_rx_tfm,
285 					  key, skb->data + hdrlen,
286 					  skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
287 					  hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx,
288 					  &rx->tkip_iv32,
289 					  &rx->tkip_iv16);
290 	if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
291 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
292 
293 	/* Trim ICV */
294 	skb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
295 
296 	/* Remove IV */
297 	memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
298 	skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
299 
300 	return RX_CONTINUE;
301 }
302 
303 
304 static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad)
305 {
306 	__le16 mask_fc;
307 	int a4_included, mgmt;
308 	u8 qos_tid;
309 	u16 len_a;
310 	unsigned int hdrlen;
311 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
312 
313 	/*
314 	 * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
315 	 * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
316 	 */
317 	mgmt = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control);
318 	mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
319 	mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
320 				IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
321 	if (!mgmt)
322 		mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
323 	mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
324 
325 	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
326 	len_a = hdrlen - 2;
327 	a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control);
328 
329 	if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
330 		qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) & IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
331 	else
332 		qos_tid = 0;
333 
334 	/* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC
335 	 * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived
336 	 * from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the
337 	 * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take
338 	 * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting
339 	 * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs.
340 	 */
341 	b_0[0] = 0x1;
342 
343 	/* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
344 	 * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
345 	 */
346 	b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
347 	memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
348 	memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
349 
350 	/* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
351 	 * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
352 	put_unaligned_be16(len_a, &aad[0]);
353 	put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
354 	memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
355 
356 	/* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
357 	aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
358 	aad[23] = 0;
359 
360 	if (a4_included) {
361 		memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
362 		aad[30] = qos_tid;
363 		aad[31] = 0;
364 	} else {
365 		memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
366 		aad[24] = qos_tid;
367 	}
368 }
369 
370 
371 static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id)
372 {
373 	hdr[0] = pn[5];
374 	hdr[1] = pn[4];
375 	hdr[2] = 0;
376 	hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
377 	hdr[4] = pn[3];
378 	hdr[5] = pn[2];
379 	hdr[6] = pn[1];
380 	hdr[7] = pn[0];
381 }
382 
383 
384 static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
385 {
386 	pn[0] = hdr[7];
387 	pn[1] = hdr[6];
388 	pn[2] = hdr[5];
389 	pn[3] = hdr[4];
390 	pn[4] = hdr[1];
391 	pn[5] = hdr[0];
392 }
393 
394 
395 static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
396 {
397 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
398 	struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
399 	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
400 	int hdrlen, len, tail;
401 	u8 *pos;
402 	u8 pn[6];
403 	u64 pn64;
404 	u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
405 	u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
406 
407 	if (info->control.hw_key &&
408 	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
409 	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) &&
410 	    !((info->control.hw_key->flags &
411 	       IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) &&
412 	      ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) {
413 		/*
414 		 * hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP
415 		 * header or MIC fields
416 		 */
417 		return 0;
418 	}
419 
420 	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
421 	len = skb->len - hdrlen;
422 
423 	if (info->control.hw_key)
424 		tail = 0;
425 	else
426 		tail = IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN;
427 
428 	if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
429 		    skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
430 		return -1;
431 
432 	pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
433 	memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
434 	skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) +
435 				    IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
436 
437 	/* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
438 	if (info->control.hw_key &&
439 	    (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
440 		return 0;
441 
442 	hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) pos;
443 	pos += hdrlen;
444 
445 	pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.ccmp.tx_pn);
446 
447 	pn[5] = pn64;
448 	pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
449 	pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
450 	pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
451 	pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
452 	pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
453 
454 	ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
455 
456 	/* hwaccel - with software CCMP header */
457 	if (info->control.hw_key)
458 		return 0;
459 
460 	pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
461 	ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
462 	ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len,
463 				  skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN));
464 
465 	return 0;
466 }
467 
468 
469 ieee80211_tx_result
470 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
471 {
472 	struct sk_buff *skb;
473 
474 	ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
475 
476 	skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
477 		if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
478 			return TX_DROP;
479 	}
480 
481 	return TX_CONTINUE;
482 }
483 
484 
485 ieee80211_rx_result
486 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
487 {
488 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
489 	int hdrlen;
490 	struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
491 	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
492 	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
493 	u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN];
494 	int data_len;
495 	int queue;
496 
497 	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
498 
499 	if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
500 	    !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb))
501 		return RX_CONTINUE;
502 
503 	data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN -
504 		   IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN;
505 	if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
506 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
507 
508 	if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
509 		if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
510 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
511 	} else {
512 		if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
513 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
514 	}
515 
516 	ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
517 
518 	queue = rx->security_idx;
519 
520 	if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) {
521 		key->u.ccmp.replays++;
522 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
523 	}
524 
525 	if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
526 		u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
527 		u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
528 		/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
529 		ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
530 
531 		if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
532 			    key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad,
533 			    skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN,
534 			    data_len,
535 			    skb->data + skb->len - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN))
536 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
537 	}
538 
539 	memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
540 
541 	/* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
542 	if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN))
543 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
544 	memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
545 	skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
546 
547 	return RX_CONTINUE;
548 }
549 
550 static ieee80211_tx_result
551 ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx,
552 			    struct sk_buff *skb)
553 {
554 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
555 	struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
556 	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
557 	const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs = key->sta->cipher_scheme;
558 	int hdrlen;
559 	u8 *pos;
560 
561 	if (info->control.hw_key &&
562 	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
563 		/* hwaccel has no need for preallocated head room */
564 		return TX_CONTINUE;
565 	}
566 
567 	if (unlikely(skb_headroom(skb) < cs->hdr_len &&
568 		     pskb_expand_head(skb, cs->hdr_len, 0, GFP_ATOMIC)))
569 		return TX_DROP;
570 
571 	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
572 
573 	pos = skb_push(skb, cs->hdr_len);
574 	memmove(pos, pos + cs->hdr_len, hdrlen);
575 	skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) + cs->hdr_len);
576 
577 	return TX_CONTINUE;
578 }
579 
580 static inline int ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(u8 *pn1, u8 *pn2, int len)
581 {
582 	int i;
583 
584 	/* pn is little endian */
585 	for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
586 		if (pn1[i] < pn2[i])
587 			return -1;
588 		else if (pn1[i] > pn2[i])
589 			return 1;
590 	}
591 
592 	return 0;
593 }
594 
595 static ieee80211_rx_result
596 ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
597 {
598 	struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
599 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
600 	const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs = NULL;
601 	int hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
602 	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb);
603 	int data_len;
604 	u8 *rx_pn;
605 	u8 *skb_pn;
606 	u8 qos_tid;
607 
608 	if (!rx->sta || !rx->sta->cipher_scheme ||
609 	    !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
610 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
611 
612 	if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
613 		return RX_CONTINUE;
614 
615 	cs = rx->sta->cipher_scheme;
616 
617 	data_len = rx->skb->len - hdrlen - cs->hdr_len;
618 
619 	if (data_len < 0)
620 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
621 
622 	if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
623 		qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) &
624 				IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
625 	else
626 		qos_tid = 0;
627 
628 	if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
629 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
630 
631 	hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
632 
633 	rx_pn = key->u.gen.rx_pn[qos_tid];
634 	skb_pn = rx->skb->data + hdrlen + cs->pn_off;
635 
636 	if (ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(skb_pn, rx_pn, cs->pn_len) <= 0)
637 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
638 
639 	memcpy(rx_pn, skb_pn, cs->pn_len);
640 
641 	/* remove security header and MIC */
642 	if (pskb_trim(rx->skb, rx->skb->len - cs->mic_len))
643 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
644 
645 	memmove(rx->skb->data + cs->hdr_len, rx->skb->data, hdrlen);
646 	skb_pull(rx->skb, cs->hdr_len);
647 
648 	return RX_CONTINUE;
649 }
650 
651 static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad)
652 {
653 	__le16 mask_fc;
654 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
655 
656 	/* BIP AAD: FC(masked) || A1 || A2 || A3 */
657 
658 	/* FC type/subtype */
659 	/* Mask FC Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData flags to zero */
660 	mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
661 	mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | IEEE80211_FCTL_PM |
662 				IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
663 	put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *) &aad[0]);
664 	/* A1 || A2 || A3 */
665 	memcpy(aad + 2, &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
666 }
667 
668 
669 static inline void bip_ipn_set64(u8 *d, u64 pn)
670 {
671 	*d++ = pn;
672 	*d++ = pn >> 8;
673 	*d++ = pn >> 16;
674 	*d++ = pn >> 24;
675 	*d++ = pn >> 32;
676 	*d = pn >> 40;
677 }
678 
679 static inline void bip_ipn_swap(u8 *d, const u8 *s)
680 {
681 	*d++ = s[5];
682 	*d++ = s[4];
683 	*d++ = s[3];
684 	*d++ = s[2];
685 	*d++ = s[1];
686 	*d = s[0];
687 }
688 
689 
690 ieee80211_tx_result
691 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
692 {
693 	struct sk_buff *skb;
694 	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
695 	struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
696 	struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
697 	u8 aad[20];
698 	u64 pn64;
699 
700 	if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
701 		return TX_DROP;
702 
703 	skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
704 
705 	info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
706 
707 	if (info->control.hw_key)
708 		return TX_CONTINUE;
709 
710 	if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
711 		return TX_DROP;
712 
713 	mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
714 	mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
715 	mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
716 	mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
717 
718 	/* PN = PN + 1 */
719 	pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn);
720 
721 	bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
722 
723 	bip_aad(skb, aad);
724 
725 	/*
726 	 * MIC = AES-128-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 64)
727 	 */
728 	ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
729 			   skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
730 
731 	return TX_CONTINUE;
732 }
733 
734 
735 ieee80211_rx_result
736 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
737 {
738 	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
739 	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
740 	struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
741 	struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
742 	u8 aad[20], mic[8], ipn[6];
743 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
744 
745 	if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
746 		return RX_CONTINUE;
747 
748 	/* management frames are already linear */
749 
750 	if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
751 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
752 
753 	mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *)
754 		(skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
755 	if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
756 	    mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
757 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
758 
759 	bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
760 
761 	if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
762 		key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
763 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
764 	}
765 
766 	if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
767 		/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
768 		bip_aad(skb, aad);
769 		ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
770 				   skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
771 		if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
772 			key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
773 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
774 		}
775 	}
776 
777 	memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
778 
779 	/* Remove MMIE */
780 	skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
781 
782 	return RX_CONTINUE;
783 }
784 
785 ieee80211_tx_result
786 ieee80211_crypto_hw_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
787 {
788 	struct sk_buff *skb;
789 	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = NULL;
790 	ieee80211_tx_result res;
791 
792 	skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
793 		info  = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
794 
795 		/* handle hw-only algorithm */
796 		if (!info->control.hw_key)
797 			return TX_DROP;
798 
799 		if (tx->key->sta->cipher_scheme) {
800 			res = ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(tx, skb);
801 			if (res != TX_CONTINUE)
802 				return res;
803 		}
804 	}
805 
806 	ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
807 
808 	return TX_CONTINUE;
809 }
810 
811 ieee80211_rx_result
812 ieee80211_crypto_hw_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
813 {
814 	if (rx->sta->cipher_scheme)
815 		return ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(rx);
816 
817 	return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
818 }
819