xref: /freebsd/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c (revision 66df505066f51e6d8411b966765d828817f88971)
1 /* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.278 2021/04/03 06:18:41 djm Exp $ */
2 /*
3  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
4  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
5  *                    All rights reserved
6  * The authentication agent program.
7  *
8  * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
9  * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
10  * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
11  * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
12  * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
13  *
14  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
15  *
16  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
17  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
18  * are met:
19  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
20  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
21  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
22  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
23  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
24  *
25  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
26  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
27  * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
28  * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
29  * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
30  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
31  * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
32  * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
33  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
34  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
35  */
36 
37 #include "includes.h"
38 __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
39 
40 #include <sys/types.h>
41 #include <sys/param.h>
42 #include <sys/resource.h>
43 #include <sys/stat.h>
44 #include <sys/socket.h>
45 #include <sys/wait.h>
46 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
47 # include <sys/time.h>
48 #endif
49 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
50 # include <sys/un.h>
51 #endif
52 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
53 
54 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
55 #include <openssl/evp.h>
56 #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
57 #endif
58 
59 #include <errno.h>
60 #include <fcntl.h>
61 #include <limits.h>
62 #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
63 # include <paths.h>
64 #endif
65 #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
66 # include <poll.h>
67 #endif
68 #include <signal.h>
69 #include <stdarg.h>
70 #include <stdio.h>
71 #include <stdlib.h>
72 #include <time.h>
73 #include <string.h>
74 #include <unistd.h>
75 #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
76 # include <util.h>
77 #endif
78 
79 #include "xmalloc.h"
80 #include "ssh.h"
81 #include "ssh2.h"
82 #include "sshbuf.h"
83 #include "sshkey.h"
84 #include "authfd.h"
85 #include "compat.h"
86 #include "log.h"
87 #include "misc.h"
88 #include "digest.h"
89 #include "ssherr.h"
90 #include "match.h"
91 #include "msg.h"
92 #include "ssherr.h"
93 #include "pathnames.h"
94 #include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
95 #include "sk-api.h"
96 
97 #ifndef DEFAULT_ALLOWED_PROVIDERS
98 # define DEFAULT_ALLOWED_PROVIDERS "/usr/lib*/*,/usr/local/lib*/*"
99 #endif
100 
101 /* Maximum accepted message length */
102 #define AGENT_MAX_LEN	(256*1024)
103 /* Maximum bytes to read from client socket */
104 #define AGENT_RBUF_LEN	(4096)
105 
106 typedef enum {
107 	AUTH_UNUSED = 0,
108 	AUTH_SOCKET = 1,
109 	AUTH_CONNECTION = 2,
110 } sock_type;
111 
112 typedef struct socket_entry {
113 	int fd;
114 	sock_type type;
115 	struct sshbuf *input;
116 	struct sshbuf *output;
117 	struct sshbuf *request;
118 } SocketEntry;
119 
120 u_int sockets_alloc = 0;
121 SocketEntry *sockets = NULL;
122 
123 typedef struct identity {
124 	TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
125 	struct sshkey *key;
126 	char *comment;
127 	char *provider;
128 	time_t death;
129 	u_int confirm;
130 	char *sk_provider;
131 } Identity;
132 
133 struct idtable {
134 	int nentries;
135 	TAILQ_HEAD(idqueue, identity) idlist;
136 };
137 
138 /* private key table */
139 struct idtable *idtab;
140 
141 int max_fd = 0;
142 
143 /* pid of shell == parent of agent */
144 pid_t parent_pid = -1;
145 time_t parent_alive_interval = 0;
146 
147 /* pid of process for which cleanup_socket is applicable */
148 pid_t cleanup_pid = 0;
149 
150 /* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */
151 char socket_name[PATH_MAX];
152 char socket_dir[PATH_MAX];
153 
154 /* Pattern-list of allowed PKCS#11/Security key paths */
155 static char *allowed_providers;
156 
157 /* locking */
158 #define LOCK_SIZE	32
159 #define LOCK_SALT_SIZE	16
160 #define LOCK_ROUNDS	1
161 int locked = 0;
162 u_char lock_pwhash[LOCK_SIZE];
163 u_char lock_salt[LOCK_SALT_SIZE];
164 
165 extern char *__progname;
166 
167 /* Default lifetime in seconds (0 == forever) */
168 static int lifetime = 0;
169 
170 static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
171 
172 /* Refuse signing of non-SSH messages for web-origin FIDO keys */
173 static int restrict_websafe = 1;
174 
175 /*
176  * Client connection count; incremented in new_socket() and decremented in
177  * close_socket().  When it reaches 0, ssh-agent will exit.  Since it is
178  * normally initialized to 1, it will never reach 0.  However, if the -x
179  * option is specified, it is initialized to 0 in main(); in that case,
180  * ssh-agent will exit as soon as it has had at least one client but no
181  * longer has any.
182  */
183 static int xcount = 1;
184 
185 static void
186 close_socket(SocketEntry *e)
187 {
188 	int last = 0;
189 
190 	if (e->type == AUTH_CONNECTION) {
191 		debug("xcount %d -> %d", xcount, xcount - 1);
192 		if (--xcount == 0)
193 			last = 1;
194 	}
195 	close(e->fd);
196 	sshbuf_free(e->input);
197 	sshbuf_free(e->output);
198 	sshbuf_free(e->request);
199 	memset(e, '\0', sizeof(*e));
200 	e->fd = -1;
201 	e->type = AUTH_UNUSED;
202 	if (last)
203 		cleanup_exit(0);
204 }
205 
206 static void
207 idtab_init(void)
208 {
209 	idtab = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*idtab));
210 	TAILQ_INIT(&idtab->idlist);
211 	idtab->nentries = 0;
212 }
213 
214 static void
215 free_identity(Identity *id)
216 {
217 	sshkey_free(id->key);
218 	free(id->provider);
219 	free(id->comment);
220 	free(id->sk_provider);
221 	free(id);
222 }
223 
224 /* return matching private key for given public key */
225 static Identity *
226 lookup_identity(struct sshkey *key)
227 {
228 	Identity *id;
229 
230 	TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &idtab->idlist, next) {
231 		if (sshkey_equal(key, id->key))
232 			return (id);
233 	}
234 	return (NULL);
235 }
236 
237 /* Check confirmation of keysign request */
238 static int
239 confirm_key(Identity *id, const char *extra)
240 {
241 	char *p;
242 	int ret = -1;
243 
244 	p = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
245 	if (p != NULL &&
246 	    ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.%s%s",
247 	    id->comment, p,
248 	    extra == NULL ? "" : "\n", extra == NULL ? "" : extra))
249 		ret = 0;
250 	free(p);
251 
252 	return (ret);
253 }
254 
255 static void
256 send_status(SocketEntry *e, int success)
257 {
258 	int r;
259 
260 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(e->output, 1)) != 0 ||
261 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(e->output, success ?
262 	    SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0)
263 		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
264 }
265 
266 /* send list of supported public keys to 'client' */
267 static void
268 process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e)
269 {
270 	Identity *id;
271 	struct sshbuf *msg;
272 	int r;
273 
274 	debug2_f("entering");
275 
276 	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
277 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
278 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 ||
279 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, idtab->nentries)) != 0)
280 		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
281 	TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &idtab->idlist, next) {
282 		if ((r = sshkey_puts_opts(id->key, msg,
283 		    SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO)) != 0 ||
284 		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, id->comment)) != 0) {
285 			error_fr(r, "compose key/comment");
286 			continue;
287 		}
288 	}
289 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
290 		fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");
291 	sshbuf_free(msg);
292 }
293 
294 
295 static char *
296 agent_decode_alg(struct sshkey *key, u_int flags)
297 {
298 	if (key->type == KEY_RSA) {
299 		if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256)
300 			return "rsa-sha2-256";
301 		else if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512)
302 			return "rsa-sha2-512";
303 	} else if (key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT) {
304 		if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256)
305 			return "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com";
306 		else if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512)
307 			return "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com";
308 	}
309 	return NULL;
310 }
311 
312 /*
313  * Attempt to parse the contents of a buffer as a SSH publickey userauth
314  * request, checking its contents for consistency and matching the embedded
315  * key against the one that is being used for signing.
316  * Note: does not modify msg buffer.
317  * Optionally extract the username and session ID from the request.
318  */
319 static int
320 parse_userauth_request(struct sshbuf *msg, const struct sshkey *expected_key,
321     char **userp, struct sshbuf **sess_idp)
322 {
323 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sess_id = NULL;
324 	char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *pkalg = NULL;
325 	int r;
326 	u_char t, sig_follows;
327 	struct sshkey *mkey = NULL;
328 
329 	if (userp != NULL)
330 		*userp = NULL;
331 	if (sess_idp != NULL)
332 		*sess_idp = NULL;
333 	if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(msg)) == NULL)
334 		fatal_f("sshbuf_fromb");
335 
336 	/* SSH userauth request */
337 	if ((r = sshbuf_froms(b, &sess_id)) != 0)
338 		goto out;
339 	if (sshbuf_len(sess_id) == 0) {
340 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
341 		goto out;
342 	}
343 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &t)) != 0 || /* SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST */
344 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &user, NULL)) != 0 || /* server user */
345 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &service, NULL)) != 0 || /* service */
346 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &method, NULL)) != 0 || /* method */
347 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &sig_follows)) != 0 || /* sig-follows */
348 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 || /* alg */
349 	    (r = sshkey_froms(b, &mkey)) != 0) /* key */
350 		goto out;
351 	if (t != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST ||
352 	    sig_follows != 1 ||
353 	    strcmp(service, "ssh-connection") != 0 ||
354 	    !sshkey_equal(expected_key, mkey) ||
355 	    sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg) != expected_key->type) {
356 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
357 		goto out;
358 	}
359 	if (strcmp(method, "publickey") != 0) {
360 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
361 		goto out;
362 	}
363 	if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
364 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
365 		goto out;
366 	}
367 	/* success */
368 	r = 0;
369 	debug3_f("well formed userauth");
370 	if (userp != NULL) {
371 		*userp = user;
372 		user = NULL;
373 	}
374 	if (sess_idp != NULL) {
375 		*sess_idp = sess_id;
376 		sess_id = NULL;
377 	}
378  out:
379 	sshbuf_free(b);
380 	sshbuf_free(sess_id);
381 	free(user);
382 	free(service);
383 	free(method);
384 	free(pkalg);
385 	sshkey_free(mkey);
386 	return r;
387 }
388 
389 /*
390  * Attempt to parse the contents of a buffer as a SSHSIG signature request.
391  * Note: does not modify buffer.
392  */
393 static int
394 parse_sshsig_request(struct sshbuf *msg)
395 {
396 	int r;
397 	struct sshbuf *b;
398 
399 	if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(msg)) == NULL)
400 		fatal_f("sshbuf_fromb");
401 
402 	if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(b, 0, "SSHSIG", 6)) != 0 ||
403 	    (r = sshbuf_consume(b, 6)) != 0 ||
404 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* namespace */
405 	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */
406 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* hashalg */
407 	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0) /* H(msg) */
408 		goto out;
409 	if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
410 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
411 		goto out;
412 	}
413 	/* success */
414 	r = 0;
415  out:
416 	sshbuf_free(b);
417 	return r;
418 }
419 
420 /*
421  * This function inspects a message to be signed by a FIDO key that has a
422  * web-like application string (i.e. one that does not begin with "ssh:".
423  * It checks that the message is one of those expected for SSH operations
424  * (pubkey userauth, sshsig, CA key signing) to exclude signing challenges
425  * for the web.
426  */
427 static int
428 check_websafe_message_contents(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *data)
429 {
430 	if (parse_userauth_request(data, key, NULL, NULL) == 0) {
431 		debug_f("signed data matches public key userauth request");
432 		return 1;
433 	}
434 	if (parse_sshsig_request(data) == 0) {
435 		debug_f("signed data matches SSHSIG signature request");
436 		return 1;
437 	}
438 
439 	/* XXX check CA signature operation */
440 
441 	error("web-origin key attempting to sign non-SSH message");
442 	return 0;
443 }
444 
445 /* ssh2 only */
446 static void
447 process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
448 {
449 	u_char *signature = NULL;
450 	size_t slen = 0;
451 	u_int compat = 0, flags;
452 	int r, ok = -1;
453 	char *fp = NULL;
454 	struct sshbuf *msg = NULL, *data = NULL;
455 	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
456 	struct identity *id;
457 	struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL;
458 
459 	debug_f("entering");
460 
461 	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (data = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
462 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
463 	if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0 ||
464 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(e->request, data)) != 0 ||
465 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &flags)) != 0) {
466 		error_fr(r, "parse");
467 		goto send;
468 	}
469 
470 	if ((id = lookup_identity(key)) == NULL) {
471 		verbose_f("%s key not found", sshkey_type(key));
472 		goto send;
473 	}
474 	if (id->confirm && confirm_key(id, NULL) != 0) {
475 		verbose_f("user refused key");
476 		goto send;
477 	}
478 	if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key)) {
479 		if (strncmp(id->key->sk_application, "ssh:", 4) != 0 &&
480 		    !check_websafe_message_contents(key, data)) {
481 			/* error already logged */
482 			goto send;
483 		}
484 		if ((id->key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
485 			if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
486 			    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
487 				fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
488 			notifier = notify_start(0,
489 			    "Confirm user presence for key %s %s",
490 			    sshkey_type(id->key), fp);
491 		}
492 	}
493 	/* XXX support PIN required FIDO keys */
494 	if ((r = sshkey_sign(id->key, &signature, &slen,
495 	    sshbuf_ptr(data), sshbuf_len(data), agent_decode_alg(key, flags),
496 	    id->sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0) {
497 		error_fr(r, "sshkey_sign");
498 		goto send;
499 	}
500 	/* Success */
501 	ok = 0;
502  send:
503 	notify_complete(notifier, "User presence confirmed");
504 
505 	if (ok == 0) {
506 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE)) != 0 ||
507 		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, signature, slen)) != 0)
508 			fatal_fr(r, "compose");
509 	} else if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0)
510 		fatal_fr(r, "compose failure");
511 
512 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
513 		fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");
514 
515 	sshbuf_free(data);
516 	sshbuf_free(msg);
517 	sshkey_free(key);
518 	free(fp);
519 	free(signature);
520 }
521 
522 /* shared */
523 static void
524 process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e)
525 {
526 	int r, success = 0;
527 	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
528 	Identity *id;
529 
530 	debug2_f("entering");
531 	if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0) {
532 		error_fr(r, "parse key");
533 		goto done;
534 	}
535 	if ((id = lookup_identity(key)) == NULL) {
536 		debug_f("key not found");
537 		goto done;
538 	}
539 	/* We have this key, free it. */
540 	if (idtab->nentries < 1)
541 		fatal_f("internal error: nentries %d", idtab->nentries);
542 	TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
543 	free_identity(id);
544 	idtab->nentries--;
545 	success = 1;
546  done:
547 	sshkey_free(key);
548 	send_status(e, success);
549 }
550 
551 static void
552 process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e)
553 {
554 	Identity *id;
555 
556 	debug2_f("entering");
557 	/* Loop over all identities and clear the keys. */
558 	for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id;
559 	    id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist)) {
560 		TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
561 		free_identity(id);
562 	}
563 
564 	/* Mark that there are no identities. */
565 	idtab->nentries = 0;
566 
567 	/* Send success. */
568 	send_status(e, 1);
569 }
570 
571 /* removes expired keys and returns number of seconds until the next expiry */
572 static time_t
573 reaper(void)
574 {
575 	time_t deadline = 0, now = monotime();
576 	Identity *id, *nxt;
577 
578 	for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
579 		nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next);
580 		if (id->death == 0)
581 			continue;
582 		if (now >= id->death) {
583 			debug("expiring key '%s'", id->comment);
584 			TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
585 			free_identity(id);
586 			idtab->nentries--;
587 		} else
588 			deadline = (deadline == 0) ? id->death :
589 			    MINIMUM(deadline, id->death);
590 	}
591 	if (deadline == 0 || deadline <= now)
592 		return 0;
593 	else
594 		return (deadline - now);
595 }
596 
597 static int
598 parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp)
599 {
600 	char *ext_name = NULL;
601 	int r;
602 
603 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &ext_name, NULL)) != 0) {
604 		error_fr(r, "parse constraint extension");
605 		goto out;
606 	}
607 	debug_f("constraint ext %s", ext_name);
608 	if (strcmp(ext_name, "sk-provider@openssh.com") == 0) {
609 		if (sk_providerp == NULL) {
610 			error_f("%s not valid here", ext_name);
611 			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
612 			goto out;
613 		}
614 		if (*sk_providerp != NULL) {
615 			error_f("%s already set", ext_name);
616 			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
617 			goto out;
618 		}
619 		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, sk_providerp, NULL)) != 0) {
620 			error_fr(r, "parse %s", ext_name);
621 			goto out;
622 		}
623 	} else {
624 		error_f("unsupported constraint \"%s\"", ext_name);
625 		r = SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
626 		goto out;
627 	}
628 	/* success */
629 	r = 0;
630  out:
631 	free(ext_name);
632 	return r;
633 }
634 
635 static int
636 parse_key_constraints(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshkey *k, time_t *deathp,
637     u_int *secondsp, int *confirmp, char **sk_providerp)
638 {
639 	u_char ctype;
640 	int r;
641 	u_int seconds, maxsign = 0;
642 
643 	while (sshbuf_len(m)) {
644 		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &ctype)) != 0) {
645 			error_fr(r, "parse constraint type");
646 			goto out;
647 		}
648 		switch (ctype) {
649 		case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
650 			if (*deathp != 0) {
651 				error_f("lifetime already set");
652 				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
653 				goto out;
654 			}
655 			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &seconds)) != 0) {
656 				error_fr(r, "parse lifetime constraint");
657 				goto out;
658 			}
659 			*deathp = monotime() + seconds;
660 			*secondsp = seconds;
661 			break;
662 		case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
663 			if (*confirmp != 0) {
664 				error_f("confirm already set");
665 				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
666 				goto out;
667 			}
668 			*confirmp = 1;
669 			break;
670 		case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN:
671 			if (k == NULL) {
672 				error_f("maxsign not valid here");
673 				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
674 				goto out;
675 			}
676 			if (maxsign != 0) {
677 				error_f("maxsign already set");
678 				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
679 				goto out;
680 			}
681 			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &maxsign)) != 0) {
682 				error_fr(r, "parse maxsign constraint");
683 				goto out;
684 			}
685 			if ((r = sshkey_enable_maxsign(k, maxsign)) != 0) {
686 				error_fr(r, "enable maxsign");
687 				goto out;
688 			}
689 			break;
690 		case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION:
691 			if ((r = parse_key_constraint_extension(m,
692 			    sk_providerp)) != 0)
693 				goto out; /* error already logged */
694 			break;
695 		default:
696 			error_f("Unknown constraint %d", ctype);
697 			r = SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
698 			goto out;
699 		}
700 	}
701 	/* success */
702 	r = 0;
703  out:
704 	return r;
705 }
706 
707 static void
708 process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e)
709 {
710 	Identity *id;
711 	int success = 0, confirm = 0;
712 	char *fp, *comment = NULL, *sk_provider = NULL;
713 	char canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
714 	time_t death = 0;
715 	u_int seconds = 0;
716 	struct sshkey *k = NULL;
717 	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
718 
719 	debug2_f("entering");
720 	if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(e->request, &k)) != 0 ||
721 	    k == NULL ||
722 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &comment, NULL)) != 0) {
723 		error_fr(r, "parse");
724 		goto out;
725 	}
726 	if (parse_key_constraints(e->request, k, &death, &seconds, &confirm,
727 	    &sk_provider) != 0) {
728 		error_f("failed to parse constraints");
729 		sshbuf_reset(e->request);
730 		goto out;
731 	}
732 
733 	if (sk_provider != NULL) {
734 		if (!sshkey_is_sk(k)) {
735 			error("Cannot add provider: %s is not an "
736 			    "authenticator-hosted key", sshkey_type(k));
737 			goto out;
738 		}
739 		if (strcasecmp(sk_provider, "internal") == 0) {
740 			debug_f("internal provider");
741 		} else {
742 			if (realpath(sk_provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
743 				verbose("failed provider \"%.100s\": "
744 				    "realpath: %s", sk_provider,
745 				    strerror(errno));
746 				goto out;
747 			}
748 			free(sk_provider);
749 			sk_provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
750 			if (match_pattern_list(sk_provider,
751 			    allowed_providers, 0) != 1) {
752 				error("Refusing add key: "
753 				    "provider %s not allowed", sk_provider);
754 				goto out;
755 			}
756 		}
757 	}
758 	if ((r = sshkey_shield_private(k)) != 0) {
759 		error_fr(r, "shield private");
760 		goto out;
761 	}
762 	if (lifetime && !death)
763 		death = monotime() + lifetime;
764 	if ((id = lookup_identity(k)) == NULL) {
765 		id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
766 		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
767 		/* Increment the number of identities. */
768 		idtab->nentries++;
769 	} else {
770 		/* key state might have been updated */
771 		sshkey_free(id->key);
772 		free(id->comment);
773 		free(id->sk_provider);
774 	}
775 	/* success */
776 	id->key = k;
777 	id->comment = comment;
778 	id->death = death;
779 	id->confirm = confirm;
780 	id->sk_provider = sk_provider;
781 
782 	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(k, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
783 	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
784 		fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
785 	debug_f("add %s %s \"%.100s\" (life: %u) (confirm: %u) "
786 	    "(provider: %s)", sshkey_ssh_name(k), fp, comment, seconds,
787 	    confirm, sk_provider == NULL ? "none" : sk_provider);
788 	free(fp);
789 	/* transferred */
790 	k = NULL;
791 	comment = NULL;
792 	sk_provider = NULL;
793 	success = 1;
794  out:
795 	free(sk_provider);
796 	free(comment);
797 	sshkey_free(k);
798 	send_status(e, success);
799 }
800 
801 /* XXX todo: encrypt sensitive data with passphrase */
802 static void
803 process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock)
804 {
805 	int r, success = 0, delay;
806 	char *passwd;
807 	u_char passwdhash[LOCK_SIZE];
808 	static u_int fail_count = 0;
809 	size_t pwlen;
810 
811 	debug2_f("entering");
812 	/*
813 	 * This is deliberately fatal: the user has requested that we lock,
814 	 * but we can't parse their request properly. The only safe thing to
815 	 * do is abort.
816 	 */
817 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &passwd, &pwlen)) != 0)
818 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
819 	if (pwlen == 0) {
820 		debug("empty password not supported");
821 	} else if (locked && !lock) {
822 		if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt),
823 		    passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0)
824 			fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf");
825 		if (timingsafe_bcmp(passwdhash, lock_pwhash, LOCK_SIZE) == 0) {
826 			debug("agent unlocked");
827 			locked = 0;
828 			fail_count = 0;
829 			explicit_bzero(lock_pwhash, sizeof(lock_pwhash));
830 			success = 1;
831 		} else {
832 			/* delay in 0.1s increments up to 10s */
833 			if (fail_count < 100)
834 				fail_count++;
835 			delay = 100000 * fail_count;
836 			debug("unlock failed, delaying %0.1lf seconds",
837 			    (double)delay/1000000);
838 			usleep(delay);
839 		}
840 		explicit_bzero(passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash));
841 	} else if (!locked && lock) {
842 		debug("agent locked");
843 		locked = 1;
844 		arc4random_buf(lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt));
845 		if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt),
846 		    lock_pwhash, sizeof(lock_pwhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0)
847 			fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf");
848 		success = 1;
849 	}
850 	freezero(passwd, pwlen);
851 	send_status(e, success);
852 }
853 
854 static void
855 no_identities(SocketEntry *e)
856 {
857 	struct sshbuf *msg;
858 	int r;
859 
860 	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
861 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
862 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 ||
863 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0 ||
864 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
865 		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
866 	sshbuf_free(msg);
867 }
868 
869 #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
870 static void
871 process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
872 {
873 	char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
874 	char **comments = NULL;
875 	int r, i, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0;
876 	u_int seconds = 0;
877 	time_t death = 0;
878 	struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k;
879 	Identity *id;
880 
881 	debug2_f("entering");
882 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
883 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) {
884 		error_fr(r, "parse");
885 		goto send;
886 	}
887 	if (parse_key_constraints(e->request, NULL, &death, &seconds, &confirm,
888 	    NULL) != 0) {
889 		error_f("failed to parse constraints");
890 		goto send;
891 	}
892 	if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
893 		verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
894 		    provider, strerror(errno));
895 		goto send;
896 	}
897 	if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, allowed_providers, 0) != 1) {
898 		verbose("refusing PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": "
899 		    "provider not allowed", canonical_provider);
900 		goto send;
901 	}
902 	debug_f("add %.100s", canonical_provider);
903 	if (lifetime && !death)
904 		death = monotime() + lifetime;
905 
906 	count = pkcs11_add_provider(canonical_provider, pin, &keys, &comments);
907 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
908 		k = keys[i];
909 		if (lookup_identity(k) == NULL) {
910 			id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
911 			id->key = k;
912 			keys[i] = NULL; /* transferred */
913 			id->provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
914 			if (*comments[i] != '\0') {
915 				id->comment = comments[i];
916 				comments[i] = NULL; /* transferred */
917 			} else {
918 				id->comment = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
919 			}
920 			id->death = death;
921 			id->confirm = confirm;
922 			TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
923 			idtab->nentries++;
924 			success = 1;
925 		}
926 		/* XXX update constraints for existing keys */
927 		sshkey_free(keys[i]);
928 		free(comments[i]);
929 	}
930 send:
931 	free(pin);
932 	free(provider);
933 	free(keys);
934 	free(comments);
935 	send_status(e, success);
936 }
937 
938 static void
939 process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
940 {
941 	char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
942 	int r, success = 0;
943 	Identity *id, *nxt;
944 
945 	debug2_f("entering");
946 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
947 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) {
948 		error_fr(r, "parse");
949 		goto send;
950 	}
951 	free(pin);
952 
953 	if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
954 		verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
955 		    provider, strerror(errno));
956 		goto send;
957 	}
958 
959 	debug_f("remove %.100s", canonical_provider);
960 	for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
961 		nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next);
962 		/* Skip file--based keys */
963 		if (id->provider == NULL)
964 			continue;
965 		if (!strcmp(canonical_provider, id->provider)) {
966 			TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
967 			free_identity(id);
968 			idtab->nentries--;
969 		}
970 	}
971 	if (pkcs11_del_provider(canonical_provider) == 0)
972 		success = 1;
973 	else
974 		error_f("pkcs11_del_provider failed");
975 send:
976 	free(provider);
977 	send_status(e, success);
978 }
979 #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
980 
981 /*
982  * dispatch incoming message.
983  * returns 1 on success, 0 for incomplete messages or -1 on error.
984  */
985 static int
986 process_message(u_int socknum)
987 {
988 	u_int msg_len;
989 	u_char type;
990 	const u_char *cp;
991 	int r;
992 	SocketEntry *e;
993 
994 	if (socknum >= sockets_alloc)
995 		fatal_f("sock %u >= allocated %u", socknum, sockets_alloc);
996 	e = &sockets[socknum];
997 
998 	if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < 5)
999 		return 0;		/* Incomplete message header. */
1000 	cp = sshbuf_ptr(e->input);
1001 	msg_len = PEEK_U32(cp);
1002 	if (msg_len > AGENT_MAX_LEN) {
1003 		debug_f("socket %u (fd=%d) message too long %u > %u",
1004 		    socknum, e->fd, msg_len, AGENT_MAX_LEN);
1005 		return -1;
1006 	}
1007 	if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < msg_len + 4)
1008 		return 0;		/* Incomplete message body. */
1009 
1010 	/* move the current input to e->request */
1011 	sshbuf_reset(e->request);
1012 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_stringb(e->input, e->request)) != 0 ||
1013 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0) {
1014 		if (r == SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE ||
1015 		    r == SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE) {
1016 			error_fr(r, "parse");
1017 			return -1;
1018 		}
1019 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1020 	}
1021 
1022 	debug_f("socket %u (fd=%d) type %d", socknum, e->fd, type);
1023 
1024 	/* check whether agent is locked */
1025 	if (locked && type != SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK) {
1026 		sshbuf_reset(e->request);
1027 		switch (type) {
1028 		case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES:
1029 			/* send empty lists */
1030 			no_identities(e);
1031 			break;
1032 		default:
1033 			/* send a fail message for all other request types */
1034 			send_status(e, 0);
1035 		}
1036 		return 1;
1037 	}
1038 
1039 	switch (type) {
1040 	case SSH_AGENTC_LOCK:
1041 	case SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK:
1042 		process_lock_agent(e, type == SSH_AGENTC_LOCK);
1043 		break;
1044 	case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES:
1045 		process_remove_all_identities(e); /* safe for !WITH_SSH1 */
1046 		break;
1047 	/* ssh2 */
1048 	case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST:
1049 		process_sign_request2(e);
1050 		break;
1051 	case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES:
1052 		process_request_identities(e);
1053 		break;
1054 	case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY:
1055 	case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED:
1056 		process_add_identity(e);
1057 		break;
1058 	case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY:
1059 		process_remove_identity(e);
1060 		break;
1061 	case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES:
1062 		process_remove_all_identities(e);
1063 		break;
1064 #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
1065 	case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY:
1066 	case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED:
1067 		process_add_smartcard_key(e);
1068 		break;
1069 	case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY:
1070 		process_remove_smartcard_key(e);
1071 		break;
1072 #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
1073 	default:
1074 		/* Unknown message.  Respond with failure. */
1075 		error("Unknown message %d", type);
1076 		sshbuf_reset(e->request);
1077 		send_status(e, 0);
1078 		break;
1079 	}
1080 	return 1;
1081 }
1082 
1083 static void
1084 new_socket(sock_type type, int fd)
1085 {
1086 	u_int i, old_alloc, new_alloc;
1087 
1088 	debug_f("type = %s", type == AUTH_CONNECTION ? "CONNECTION" :
1089 	    (type == AUTH_SOCKET ? "SOCKET" : "UNKNOWN"));
1090 	if (type == AUTH_CONNECTION) {
1091 		debug("xcount %d -> %d", xcount, xcount + 1);
1092 		++xcount;
1093 	}
1094 	set_nonblock(fd);
1095 
1096 	if (fd > max_fd)
1097 		max_fd = fd;
1098 
1099 	for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++)
1100 		if (sockets[i].type == AUTH_UNUSED) {
1101 			sockets[i].fd = fd;
1102 			if ((sockets[i].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
1103 			    (sockets[i].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
1104 			    (sockets[i].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
1105 				fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
1106 			sockets[i].type = type;
1107 			return;
1108 		}
1109 	old_alloc = sockets_alloc;
1110 	new_alloc = sockets_alloc + 10;
1111 	sockets = xrecallocarray(sockets, old_alloc, new_alloc,
1112 	    sizeof(sockets[0]));
1113 	for (i = old_alloc; i < new_alloc; i++)
1114 		sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED;
1115 	sockets_alloc = new_alloc;
1116 	sockets[old_alloc].fd = fd;
1117 	if ((sockets[old_alloc].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
1118 	    (sockets[old_alloc].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
1119 	    (sockets[old_alloc].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
1120 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
1121 	sockets[old_alloc].type = type;
1122 }
1123 
1124 static int
1125 handle_socket_read(u_int socknum)
1126 {
1127 	struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
1128 	socklen_t slen;
1129 	uid_t euid;
1130 	gid_t egid;
1131 	int fd;
1132 
1133 	slen = sizeof(sunaddr);
1134 	fd = accept(sockets[socknum].fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, &slen);
1135 	if (fd == -1) {
1136 		error("accept from AUTH_SOCKET: %s", strerror(errno));
1137 		return -1;
1138 	}
1139 	if (getpeereid(fd, &euid, &egid) == -1) {
1140 		error("getpeereid %d failed: %s", fd, strerror(errno));
1141 		close(fd);
1142 		return -1;
1143 	}
1144 	if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) {
1145 		error("uid mismatch: peer euid %u != uid %u",
1146 		    (u_int) euid, (u_int) getuid());
1147 		close(fd);
1148 		return -1;
1149 	}
1150 	new_socket(AUTH_CONNECTION, fd);
1151 	return 0;
1152 }
1153 
1154 static int
1155 handle_conn_read(u_int socknum)
1156 {
1157 	char buf[AGENT_RBUF_LEN];
1158 	ssize_t len;
1159 	int r;
1160 
1161 	if ((len = read(sockets[socknum].fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) <= 0) {
1162 		if (len == -1) {
1163 			if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
1164 				return 0;
1165 			error_f("read error on socket %u (fd %d): %s",
1166 			    socknum, sockets[socknum].fd, strerror(errno));
1167 		}
1168 		return -1;
1169 	}
1170 	if ((r = sshbuf_put(sockets[socknum].input, buf, len)) != 0)
1171 		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
1172 	explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
1173 	for (;;) {
1174 		if ((r = process_message(socknum)) == -1)
1175 			return -1;
1176 		else if (r == 0)
1177 			break;
1178 	}
1179 	return 0;
1180 }
1181 
1182 static int
1183 handle_conn_write(u_int socknum)
1184 {
1185 	ssize_t len;
1186 	int r;
1187 
1188 	if (sshbuf_len(sockets[socknum].output) == 0)
1189 		return 0; /* shouldn't happen */
1190 	if ((len = write(sockets[socknum].fd,
1191 	    sshbuf_ptr(sockets[socknum].output),
1192 	    sshbuf_len(sockets[socknum].output))) <= 0) {
1193 		if (len == -1) {
1194 			if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
1195 				return 0;
1196 			error_f("read error on socket %u (fd %d): %s",
1197 			    socknum, sockets[socknum].fd, strerror(errno));
1198 		}
1199 		return -1;
1200 	}
1201 	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(sockets[socknum].output, len)) != 0)
1202 		fatal_fr(r, "consume");
1203 	return 0;
1204 }
1205 
1206 static void
1207 after_poll(struct pollfd *pfd, size_t npfd, u_int maxfds)
1208 {
1209 	size_t i;
1210 	u_int socknum, activefds = npfd;
1211 
1212 	for (i = 0; i < npfd; i++) {
1213 		if (pfd[i].revents == 0)
1214 			continue;
1215 		/* Find sockets entry */
1216 		for (socknum = 0; socknum < sockets_alloc; socknum++) {
1217 			if (sockets[socknum].type != AUTH_SOCKET &&
1218 			    sockets[socknum].type != AUTH_CONNECTION)
1219 				continue;
1220 			if (pfd[i].fd == sockets[socknum].fd)
1221 				break;
1222 		}
1223 		if (socknum >= sockets_alloc) {
1224 			error_f("no socket for fd %d", pfd[i].fd);
1225 			continue;
1226 		}
1227 		/* Process events */
1228 		switch (sockets[socknum].type) {
1229 		case AUTH_SOCKET:
1230 			if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLIN|POLLERR)) == 0)
1231 				break;
1232 			if (npfd > maxfds) {
1233 				debug3("out of fds (active %u >= limit %u); "
1234 				    "skipping accept", activefds, maxfds);
1235 				break;
1236 			}
1237 			if (handle_socket_read(socknum) == 0)
1238 				activefds++;
1239 			break;
1240 		case AUTH_CONNECTION:
1241 			if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLIN|POLLERR)) != 0 &&
1242 			    handle_conn_read(socknum) != 0) {
1243 				goto close_sock;
1244 			}
1245 			if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLOUT|POLLHUP)) != 0 &&
1246 			    handle_conn_write(socknum) != 0) {
1247  close_sock:
1248 				if (activefds == 0)
1249 					fatal("activefds == 0 at close_sock");
1250 				close_socket(&sockets[socknum]);
1251 				activefds--;
1252 				break;
1253 			}
1254 			break;
1255 		default:
1256 			break;
1257 		}
1258 	}
1259 }
1260 
1261 static int
1262 prepare_poll(struct pollfd **pfdp, size_t *npfdp, int *timeoutp, u_int maxfds)
1263 {
1264 	struct pollfd *pfd = *pfdp;
1265 	size_t i, j, npfd = 0;
1266 	time_t deadline;
1267 	int r;
1268 
1269 	/* Count active sockets */
1270 	for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) {
1271 		switch (sockets[i].type) {
1272 		case AUTH_SOCKET:
1273 		case AUTH_CONNECTION:
1274 			npfd++;
1275 			break;
1276 		case AUTH_UNUSED:
1277 			break;
1278 		default:
1279 			fatal("Unknown socket type %d", sockets[i].type);
1280 			break;
1281 		}
1282 	}
1283 	if (npfd != *npfdp &&
1284 	    (pfd = recallocarray(pfd, *npfdp, npfd, sizeof(*pfd))) == NULL)
1285 		fatal_f("recallocarray failed");
1286 	*pfdp = pfd;
1287 	*npfdp = npfd;
1288 
1289 	for (i = j = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) {
1290 		switch (sockets[i].type) {
1291 		case AUTH_SOCKET:
1292 			if (npfd > maxfds) {
1293 				debug3("out of fds (active %zu >= limit %u); "
1294 				    "skipping arming listener", npfd, maxfds);
1295 				break;
1296 			}
1297 			pfd[j].fd = sockets[i].fd;
1298 			pfd[j].revents = 0;
1299 			pfd[j].events = POLLIN;
1300 			j++;
1301 			break;
1302 		case AUTH_CONNECTION:
1303 			pfd[j].fd = sockets[i].fd;
1304 			pfd[j].revents = 0;
1305 			/*
1306 			 * Only prepare to read if we can handle a full-size
1307 			 * input read buffer and enqueue a max size reply..
1308 			 */
1309 			if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(sockets[i].input,
1310 			    AGENT_RBUF_LEN)) == 0 &&
1311 			    (r = sshbuf_check_reserve(sockets[i].output,
1312 			    AGENT_MAX_LEN)) == 0)
1313 				pfd[j].events = POLLIN;
1314 			else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE)
1315 				fatal_fr(r, "reserve");
1316 			if (sshbuf_len(sockets[i].output) > 0)
1317 				pfd[j].events |= POLLOUT;
1318 			j++;
1319 			break;
1320 		default:
1321 			break;
1322 		}
1323 	}
1324 	deadline = reaper();
1325 	if (parent_alive_interval != 0)
1326 		deadline = (deadline == 0) ? parent_alive_interval :
1327 		    MINIMUM(deadline, parent_alive_interval);
1328 	if (deadline == 0) {
1329 		*timeoutp = -1; /* INFTIM */
1330 	} else {
1331 		if (deadline > INT_MAX / 1000)
1332 			*timeoutp = INT_MAX / 1000;
1333 		else
1334 			*timeoutp = deadline * 1000;
1335 	}
1336 	return (1);
1337 }
1338 
1339 static void
1340 cleanup_socket(void)
1341 {
1342 	if (cleanup_pid != 0 && getpid() != cleanup_pid)
1343 		return;
1344 	debug_f("cleanup");
1345 	if (socket_name[0])
1346 		unlink(socket_name);
1347 	if (socket_dir[0])
1348 		rmdir(socket_dir);
1349 }
1350 
1351 void
1352 cleanup_exit(int i)
1353 {
1354 	cleanup_socket();
1355 	_exit(i);
1356 }
1357 
1358 /*ARGSUSED*/
1359 static void
1360 cleanup_handler(int sig)
1361 {
1362 	cleanup_socket();
1363 #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
1364 	pkcs11_terminate();
1365 #endif
1366 	_exit(2);
1367 }
1368 
1369 static void
1370 check_parent_exists(void)
1371 {
1372 	/*
1373 	 * If our parent has exited then getppid() will return (pid_t)1,
1374 	 * so testing for that should be safe.
1375 	 */
1376 	if (parent_pid != -1 && getppid() != parent_pid) {
1377 		/* printf("Parent has died - Authentication agent exiting.\n"); */
1378 		cleanup_socket();
1379 		_exit(2);
1380 	}
1381 }
1382 
1383 static void
1384 usage(void)
1385 {
1386 	fprintf(stderr,
1387 	    "usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Ddx] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n"
1388 	    "                 [-P allowed_providers] [-t life]\n"
1389 	    "       ssh-agent [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-P allowed_providers]\n"
1390 	    "                 [-t life] command [arg ...]\n"
1391 	    "       ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n");
1392 	exit(1);
1393 }
1394 
1395 int
1396 main(int ac, char **av)
1397 {
1398 	int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, D_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0;
1399 	int sock, ch, result, saved_errno;
1400 	char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL;
1401 #ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
1402 	struct rlimit rlim;
1403 #endif
1404 	extern int optind;
1405 	extern char *optarg;
1406 	pid_t pid;
1407 	char pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid];
1408 	size_t len;
1409 	mode_t prev_mask;
1410 	int timeout = -1; /* INFTIM */
1411 	struct pollfd *pfd = NULL;
1412 	size_t npfd = 0;
1413 	u_int maxfds;
1414 
1415 	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
1416 	sanitise_stdfd();
1417 
1418 	/* drop */
1419 	setegid(getgid());
1420 	setgid(getgid());
1421 	setuid(geteuid());
1422 
1423 	platform_disable_tracing(0);	/* strict=no */
1424 
1425 #ifdef RLIMIT_NOFILE
1426 	if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim) == -1)
1427 		fatal("%s: getrlimit: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
1428 #endif
1429 
1430 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
1431 	seed_rng();
1432 
1433 	while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:O:P:t:x")) != -1) {
1434 		switch (ch) {
1435 		case 'E':
1436 			fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
1437 			if (fingerprint_hash == -1)
1438 				fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg);
1439 			break;
1440 		case 'c':
1441 			if (s_flag)
1442 				usage();
1443 			c_flag++;
1444 			break;
1445 		case 'k':
1446 			k_flag++;
1447 			break;
1448 		case 'O':
1449 			if (strcmp(optarg, "no-restrict-websafe") == 0)
1450 				restrict_websafe  = 0;
1451 			else
1452 				fatal("Unknown -O option");
1453 			break;
1454 		case 'P':
1455 			if (allowed_providers != NULL)
1456 				fatal("-P option already specified");
1457 			allowed_providers = xstrdup(optarg);
1458 			break;
1459 		case 's':
1460 			if (c_flag)
1461 				usage();
1462 			s_flag++;
1463 			break;
1464 		case 'd':
1465 			if (d_flag || D_flag)
1466 				usage();
1467 			d_flag++;
1468 			break;
1469 		case 'D':
1470 			if (d_flag || D_flag)
1471 				usage();
1472 			D_flag++;
1473 			break;
1474 		case 'a':
1475 			agentsocket = optarg;
1476 			break;
1477 		case 't':
1478 			if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
1479 				fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n");
1480 				usage();
1481 			}
1482 			break;
1483 		case 'x':
1484 			xcount = 0;
1485 			break;
1486 		default:
1487 			usage();
1488 		}
1489 	}
1490 	ac -= optind;
1491 	av += optind;
1492 
1493 	if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag || D_flag))
1494 		usage();
1495 
1496 	if (allowed_providers == NULL)
1497 		allowed_providers = xstrdup(DEFAULT_ALLOWED_PROVIDERS);
1498 
1499 	if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) {
1500 		shell = getenv("SHELL");
1501 		if (shell != NULL && (len = strlen(shell)) > 2 &&
1502 		    strncmp(shell + len - 3, "csh", 3) == 0)
1503 			c_flag = 1;
1504 	}
1505 	if (k_flag) {
1506 		const char *errstr = NULL;
1507 
1508 		pidstr = getenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
1509 		if (pidstr == NULL) {
1510 			fprintf(stderr, "%s not set, cannot kill agent\n",
1511 			    SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
1512 			exit(1);
1513 		}
1514 		pid = (int)strtonum(pidstr, 2, INT_MAX, &errstr);
1515 		if (errstr) {
1516 			fprintf(stderr,
1517 			    "%s=\"%s\", which is not a good PID: %s\n",
1518 			    SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstr, errstr);
1519 			exit(1);
1520 		}
1521 		if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) == -1) {
1522 			perror("kill");
1523 			exit(1);
1524 		}
1525 		format = c_flag ? "unsetenv %s;\n" : "unset %s;\n";
1526 		printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
1527 		printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
1528 		printf("echo Agent pid %ld killed;\n", (long)pid);
1529 		exit(0);
1530 	}
1531 
1532 	/*
1533 	 * Minimum file descriptors:
1534 	 * stdio (3) + listener (1) + syslog (1 maybe) + connection (1) +
1535 	 * a few spare for libc / stack protectors / sanitisers, etc.
1536 	 */
1537 #define SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS (3+1+1+1+4)
1538 	if (rlim.rlim_cur < SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS)
1539 		fatal("%s: file descriptor rlimit %lld too low (minimum %u)",
1540 		    __progname, (long long)rlim.rlim_cur, SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS);
1541 	maxfds = rlim.rlim_cur - SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS;
1542 
1543 	parent_pid = getpid();
1544 
1545 	if (agentsocket == NULL) {
1546 		/* Create private directory for agent socket */
1547 		mktemp_proto(socket_dir, sizeof(socket_dir));
1548 		if (mkdtemp(socket_dir) == NULL) {
1549 			perror("mkdtemp: private socket dir");
1550 			exit(1);
1551 		}
1552 		snprintf(socket_name, sizeof socket_name, "%s/agent.%ld", socket_dir,
1553 		    (long)parent_pid);
1554 	} else {
1555 		/* Try to use specified agent socket */
1556 		socket_dir[0] = '\0';
1557 		strlcpy(socket_name, agentsocket, sizeof socket_name);
1558 	}
1559 
1560 	/*
1561 	 * Create socket early so it will exist before command gets run from
1562 	 * the parent.
1563 	 */
1564 	prev_mask = umask(0177);
1565 	sock = unix_listener(socket_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0);
1566 	if (sock < 0) {
1567 		/* XXX - unix_listener() calls error() not perror() */
1568 		*socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink any existing file */
1569 		cleanup_exit(1);
1570 	}
1571 	umask(prev_mask);
1572 
1573 	/*
1574 	 * Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present
1575 	 * the socket data.  The child continues as the authentication agent.
1576 	 */
1577 	if (D_flag || d_flag) {
1578 		log_init(__progname,
1579 		    d_flag ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
1580 		    SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
1581 		format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
1582 		printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
1583 		    SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
1584 		printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)parent_pid);
1585 		fflush(stdout);
1586 		goto skip;
1587 	}
1588 	pid = fork();
1589 	if (pid == -1) {
1590 		perror("fork");
1591 		cleanup_exit(1);
1592 	}
1593 	if (pid != 0) {		/* Parent - execute the given command. */
1594 		close(sock);
1595 		snprintf(pidstrbuf, sizeof pidstrbuf, "%ld", (long)pid);
1596 		if (ac == 0) {
1597 			format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
1598 			printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
1599 			    SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
1600 			printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf,
1601 			    SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
1602 			printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)pid);
1603 			exit(0);
1604 		}
1605 		if (setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, 1) == -1 ||
1606 		    setenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, 1) == -1) {
1607 			perror("setenv");
1608 			exit(1);
1609 		}
1610 		execvp(av[0], av);
1611 		perror(av[0]);
1612 		exit(1);
1613 	}
1614 	/* child */
1615 	log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0);
1616 
1617 	if (setsid() == -1) {
1618 		error("setsid: %s", strerror(errno));
1619 		cleanup_exit(1);
1620 	}
1621 
1622 	(void)chdir("/");
1623 	if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, 1) == -1)
1624 		error_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
1625 
1626 #ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
1627 	/* deny core dumps, since memory contains unencrypted private keys */
1628 	rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0;
1629 	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) == -1) {
1630 		error("setrlimit RLIMIT_CORE: %s", strerror(errno));
1631 		cleanup_exit(1);
1632 	}
1633 #endif
1634 
1635 skip:
1636 
1637 	cleanup_pid = getpid();
1638 
1639 #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
1640 	pkcs11_init(0);
1641 #endif
1642 	new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock);
1643 	if (ac > 0)
1644 		parent_alive_interval = 10;
1645 	idtab_init();
1646 	ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
1647 	ssh_signal(SIGINT, (d_flag | D_flag) ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN);
1648 	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler);
1649 	ssh_signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler);
1650 
1651 	if (pledge("stdio rpath cpath unix id proc exec", NULL) == -1)
1652 		fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
1653 	platform_pledge_agent();
1654 
1655 	while (1) {
1656 		prepare_poll(&pfd, &npfd, &timeout, maxfds);
1657 		result = poll(pfd, npfd, timeout);
1658 		saved_errno = errno;
1659 		if (parent_alive_interval != 0)
1660 			check_parent_exists();
1661 		(void) reaper();	/* remove expired keys */
1662 		if (result == -1) {
1663 			if (saved_errno == EINTR)
1664 				continue;
1665 			fatal("poll: %s", strerror(saved_errno));
1666 		} else if (result > 0)
1667 			after_poll(pfd, npfd, maxfds);
1668 	}
1669 	/* NOTREACHED */
1670 }
1671