xref: /freebsd/contrib/llvm-project/clang/lib/StaticAnalyzer/Checkers/MallocOverflowSecurityChecker.cpp (revision 8ddb146abcdf061be9f2c0db7e391697dafad85c)
1 // MallocOverflowSecurityChecker.cpp - Check for malloc overflows -*- C++ -*-=//
2 //
3 // Part of the LLVM Project, under the Apache License v2.0 with LLVM Exceptions.
4 // See https://llvm.org/LICENSE.txt for license information.
5 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception
6 //
7 //===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
8 //
9 // This checker detects a common memory allocation security flaw.
10 // Suppose 'unsigned int n' comes from an untrusted source. If the
11 // code looks like 'malloc (n * 4)', and an attacker can make 'n' be
12 // say MAX_UINT/4+2, then instead of allocating the correct 'n' 4-byte
13 // elements, this will actually allocate only two because of overflow.
14 // Then when the rest of the program attempts to store values past the
15 // second element, these values will actually overwrite other items in
16 // the heap, probably allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary code.
17 //
18 //===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
19 
20 #include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Checkers/BuiltinCheckerRegistration.h"
21 #include "clang/AST/EvaluatedExprVisitor.h"
22 #include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/BugReporter/BugReporter.h"
23 #include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/Checker.h"
24 #include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/PathSensitive/AnalysisManager.h"
25 #include "llvm/ADT/APSInt.h"
26 #include "llvm/ADT/SmallVector.h"
27 #include <utility>
28 
29 using namespace clang;
30 using namespace ento;
31 using llvm::APSInt;
32 
33 namespace {
34 struct MallocOverflowCheck {
35   const CallExpr *call;
36   const BinaryOperator *mulop;
37   const Expr *variable;
38   APSInt maxVal;
39 
40   MallocOverflowCheck(const CallExpr *call, const BinaryOperator *m,
41                       const Expr *v, APSInt val)
42       : call(call), mulop(m), variable(v), maxVal(std::move(val)) {}
43 };
44 
45 class MallocOverflowSecurityChecker : public Checker<check::ASTCodeBody> {
46 public:
47   void checkASTCodeBody(const Decl *D, AnalysisManager &mgr,
48                         BugReporter &BR) const;
49 
50   void CheckMallocArgument(
51       SmallVectorImpl<MallocOverflowCheck> &PossibleMallocOverflows,
52       const CallExpr *TheCall, ASTContext &Context) const;
53 
54   void OutputPossibleOverflows(
55     SmallVectorImpl<MallocOverflowCheck> &PossibleMallocOverflows,
56     const Decl *D, BugReporter &BR, AnalysisManager &mgr) const;
57 
58 };
59 } // end anonymous namespace
60 
61 // Return true for computations which evaluate to zero: e.g., mult by 0.
62 static inline bool EvaluatesToZero(APSInt &Val, BinaryOperatorKind op) {
63   return (op == BO_Mul) && (Val == 0);
64 }
65 
66 void MallocOverflowSecurityChecker::CheckMallocArgument(
67     SmallVectorImpl<MallocOverflowCheck> &PossibleMallocOverflows,
68     const CallExpr *TheCall, ASTContext &Context) const {
69 
70   /* Look for a linear combination with a single variable, and at least
71    one multiplication.
72    Reject anything that applies to the variable: an explicit cast,
73    conditional expression, an operation that could reduce the range
74    of the result, or anything too complicated :-).  */
75   const Expr *e = TheCall->getArg(0);
76   const BinaryOperator * mulop = nullptr;
77   APSInt maxVal;
78 
79   for (;;) {
80     maxVal = 0;
81     e = e->IgnoreParenImpCasts();
82     if (const BinaryOperator *binop = dyn_cast<BinaryOperator>(e)) {
83       BinaryOperatorKind opc = binop->getOpcode();
84       // TODO: ignore multiplications by 1, reject if multiplied by 0.
85       if (mulop == nullptr && opc == BO_Mul)
86         mulop = binop;
87       if (opc != BO_Mul && opc != BO_Add && opc != BO_Sub && opc != BO_Shl)
88         return;
89 
90       const Expr *lhs = binop->getLHS();
91       const Expr *rhs = binop->getRHS();
92       if (rhs->isEvaluatable(Context)) {
93         e = lhs;
94         maxVal = rhs->EvaluateKnownConstInt(Context);
95         if (EvaluatesToZero(maxVal, opc))
96           return;
97       } else if ((opc == BO_Add || opc == BO_Mul) &&
98                  lhs->isEvaluatable(Context)) {
99         maxVal = lhs->EvaluateKnownConstInt(Context);
100         if (EvaluatesToZero(maxVal, opc))
101           return;
102         e = rhs;
103       } else
104         return;
105     } else if (isa<DeclRefExpr, MemberExpr>(e))
106       break;
107     else
108       return;
109   }
110 
111   if (mulop == nullptr)
112     return;
113 
114   //  We've found the right structure of malloc argument, now save
115   // the data so when the body of the function is completely available
116   // we can check for comparisons.
117 
118   PossibleMallocOverflows.push_back(
119       MallocOverflowCheck(TheCall, mulop, e, maxVal));
120 }
121 
122 namespace {
123 // A worker class for OutputPossibleOverflows.
124 class CheckOverflowOps :
125   public EvaluatedExprVisitor<CheckOverflowOps> {
126 public:
127   typedef SmallVectorImpl<MallocOverflowCheck> theVecType;
128 
129 private:
130     theVecType &toScanFor;
131     ASTContext &Context;
132 
133     bool isIntZeroExpr(const Expr *E) const {
134       if (!E->getType()->isIntegralOrEnumerationType())
135         return false;
136       Expr::EvalResult Result;
137       if (E->EvaluateAsInt(Result, Context))
138         return Result.Val.getInt() == 0;
139       return false;
140     }
141 
142     static const Decl *getDecl(const DeclRefExpr *DR) { return DR->getDecl(); }
143     static const Decl *getDecl(const MemberExpr *ME) {
144       return ME->getMemberDecl();
145     }
146 
147     template <typename T1>
148     void Erase(const T1 *DR,
149                llvm::function_ref<bool(const MallocOverflowCheck &)> Pred) {
150       auto P = [DR, Pred](const MallocOverflowCheck &Check) {
151         if (const auto *CheckDR = dyn_cast<T1>(Check.variable))
152           return getDecl(CheckDR) == getDecl(DR) && Pred(Check);
153         return false;
154       };
155       llvm::erase_if(toScanFor, P);
156     }
157 
158     void CheckExpr(const Expr *E_p) {
159       const Expr *E = E_p->IgnoreParenImpCasts();
160       const auto PrecedesMalloc = [E, this](const MallocOverflowCheck &c) {
161         return Context.getSourceManager().isBeforeInTranslationUnit(
162             E->getExprLoc(), c.call->getExprLoc());
163       };
164       if (const DeclRefExpr *DR = dyn_cast<DeclRefExpr>(E))
165         Erase<DeclRefExpr>(DR, PrecedesMalloc);
166       else if (const auto *ME = dyn_cast<MemberExpr>(E)) {
167         Erase<MemberExpr>(ME, PrecedesMalloc);
168       }
169     }
170 
171     // Check if the argument to malloc is assigned a value
172     // which cannot cause an overflow.
173     // e.g., malloc (mul * x) and,
174     // case 1: mul = <constant value>
175     // case 2: mul = a/b, where b > x
176     void CheckAssignmentExpr(BinaryOperator *AssignEx) {
177       bool assignKnown = false;
178       bool numeratorKnown = false, denomKnown = false;
179       APSInt denomVal;
180       denomVal = 0;
181 
182       // Erase if the multiplicand was assigned a constant value.
183       const Expr *rhs = AssignEx->getRHS();
184       if (rhs->isEvaluatable(Context))
185         assignKnown = true;
186 
187       // Discard the report if the multiplicand was assigned a value,
188       // that can never overflow after multiplication. e.g., the assignment
189       // is a division operator and the denominator is > other multiplicand.
190       const Expr *rhse = rhs->IgnoreParenImpCasts();
191       if (const BinaryOperator *BOp = dyn_cast<BinaryOperator>(rhse)) {
192         if (BOp->getOpcode() == BO_Div) {
193           const Expr *denom = BOp->getRHS()->IgnoreParenImpCasts();
194           Expr::EvalResult Result;
195           if (denom->EvaluateAsInt(Result, Context)) {
196             denomVal = Result.Val.getInt();
197             denomKnown = true;
198           }
199           const Expr *numerator = BOp->getLHS()->IgnoreParenImpCasts();
200           if (numerator->isEvaluatable(Context))
201             numeratorKnown = true;
202         }
203       }
204       if (!assignKnown && !denomKnown)
205         return;
206       auto denomExtVal = denomVal.getExtValue();
207 
208       // Ignore negative denominator.
209       if (denomExtVal < 0)
210         return;
211 
212       const Expr *lhs = AssignEx->getLHS();
213       const Expr *E = lhs->IgnoreParenImpCasts();
214 
215       auto pred = [assignKnown, numeratorKnown,
216                    denomExtVal](const MallocOverflowCheck &Check) {
217         return assignKnown ||
218                (numeratorKnown && (denomExtVal >= Check.maxVal.getExtValue()));
219       };
220 
221       if (const DeclRefExpr *DR = dyn_cast<DeclRefExpr>(E))
222         Erase<DeclRefExpr>(DR, pred);
223       else if (const auto *ME = dyn_cast<MemberExpr>(E))
224         Erase<MemberExpr>(ME, pred);
225     }
226 
227   public:
228     void VisitBinaryOperator(BinaryOperator *E) {
229       if (E->isComparisonOp()) {
230         const Expr * lhs = E->getLHS();
231         const Expr * rhs = E->getRHS();
232         // Ignore comparisons against zero, since they generally don't
233         // protect against an overflow.
234         if (!isIntZeroExpr(lhs) && !isIntZeroExpr(rhs)) {
235           CheckExpr(lhs);
236           CheckExpr(rhs);
237         }
238       }
239       if (E->isAssignmentOp())
240         CheckAssignmentExpr(E);
241       EvaluatedExprVisitor<CheckOverflowOps>::VisitBinaryOperator(E);
242     }
243 
244     /* We specifically ignore loop conditions, because they're typically
245      not error checks.  */
246     void VisitWhileStmt(WhileStmt *S) {
247       return this->Visit(S->getBody());
248     }
249     void VisitForStmt(ForStmt *S) {
250       return this->Visit(S->getBody());
251     }
252     void VisitDoStmt(DoStmt *S) {
253       return this->Visit(S->getBody());
254     }
255 
256     CheckOverflowOps(theVecType &v, ASTContext &ctx)
257     : EvaluatedExprVisitor<CheckOverflowOps>(ctx),
258       toScanFor(v), Context(ctx)
259     { }
260   };
261 }
262 
263 // OutputPossibleOverflows - We've found a possible overflow earlier,
264 // now check whether Body might contain a comparison which might be
265 // preventing the overflow.
266 // This doesn't do flow analysis, range analysis, or points-to analysis; it's
267 // just a dumb "is there a comparison" scan.  The aim here is to
268 // detect the most blatent cases of overflow and educate the
269 // programmer.
270 void MallocOverflowSecurityChecker::OutputPossibleOverflows(
271   SmallVectorImpl<MallocOverflowCheck> &PossibleMallocOverflows,
272   const Decl *D, BugReporter &BR, AnalysisManager &mgr) const {
273   // By far the most common case: nothing to check.
274   if (PossibleMallocOverflows.empty())
275     return;
276 
277   // Delete any possible overflows which have a comparison.
278   CheckOverflowOps c(PossibleMallocOverflows, BR.getContext());
279   c.Visit(mgr.getAnalysisDeclContext(D)->getBody());
280 
281   // Output warnings for all overflows that are left.
282   for (CheckOverflowOps::theVecType::iterator
283        i = PossibleMallocOverflows.begin(),
284        e = PossibleMallocOverflows.end();
285        i != e;
286        ++i) {
287     BR.EmitBasicReport(
288         D, this, "malloc() size overflow", categories::UnixAPI,
289         "the computation of the size of the memory allocation may overflow",
290         PathDiagnosticLocation::createOperatorLoc(i->mulop,
291                                                   BR.getSourceManager()),
292         i->mulop->getSourceRange());
293   }
294 }
295 
296 void MallocOverflowSecurityChecker::checkASTCodeBody(const Decl *D,
297                                              AnalysisManager &mgr,
298                                              BugReporter &BR) const {
299 
300   CFG *cfg = mgr.getCFG(D);
301   if (!cfg)
302     return;
303 
304   // A list of variables referenced in possibly overflowing malloc operands.
305   SmallVector<MallocOverflowCheck, 2> PossibleMallocOverflows;
306 
307   for (CFG::iterator it = cfg->begin(), ei = cfg->end(); it != ei; ++it) {
308     CFGBlock *block = *it;
309     for (CFGBlock::iterator bi = block->begin(), be = block->end();
310          bi != be; ++bi) {
311       if (Optional<CFGStmt> CS = bi->getAs<CFGStmt>()) {
312         if (const CallExpr *TheCall = dyn_cast<CallExpr>(CS->getStmt())) {
313           // Get the callee.
314           const FunctionDecl *FD = TheCall->getDirectCallee();
315 
316           if (!FD)
317             continue;
318 
319           // Get the name of the callee. If it's a builtin, strip off the prefix.
320           IdentifierInfo *FnInfo = FD->getIdentifier();
321           if (!FnInfo)
322             continue;
323 
324           if (FnInfo->isStr ("malloc") || FnInfo->isStr ("_MALLOC")) {
325             if (TheCall->getNumArgs() == 1)
326               CheckMallocArgument(PossibleMallocOverflows, TheCall,
327                                   mgr.getASTContext());
328           }
329         }
330       }
331     }
332   }
333 
334   OutputPossibleOverflows(PossibleMallocOverflows, D, BR, mgr);
335 }
336 
337 void ento::registerMallocOverflowSecurityChecker(CheckerManager &mgr) {
338   mgr.registerChecker<MallocOverflowSecurityChecker>();
339 }
340 
341 bool ento::shouldRegisterMallocOverflowSecurityChecker(const CheckerManager &mgr) {
342   return true;
343 }
344