Searched hist:"55 ce74d4bfe1b9444436264c637f39a152d1e5ac" (Results 1 – 4 of 4) sorted by relevance
/linux/drivers/md/ |
H A D | raid1.h | diff 55ce74d4bfe1b9444436264c637f39a152d1e5ac Fri Aug 14 03:11:10 CEST 2015 NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> md/raid1: ensure device failure recorded before write request returns.
When a write to one of the legs of a RAID1 fails, the failure is recorded in the metadata of the other leg(s) so that after a restart the data on the failed drive wont be trusted even if that drive seems to be working again (maybe a cable was unplugged).
Similarly when we record a bad-block in response to a write failure, we must not let the write complete until the bad-block update is safe.
Currently there is no interlock between the write request completing and the metadata update. So it is possible that the write will complete, the app will confirm success in some way, and then the machine will crash before the metadata update completes.
This is an extremely small hole for a racy to fit in, but it is theoretically possible and so should be closed.
So: - set MD_CHANGE_PENDING when requesting a metadata update for a failed device, so we can know with certainty when it completes - queue requests that experienced an error on a new queue which is only processed after the metadata update completes - call raid_end_bio_io() on bios in that queue when the time comes.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
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H A D | raid1.c | diff a452744bcbf706eac65abb4c98496a366820c60a Thu Oct 01 21:17:43 CEST 2015 Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> crash in md-raid1 and md-raid10 due to incorrect list manipulation
The commit 55ce74d4bfe1b9444436264c637f39a152d1e5ac (md/raid1: ensure device failure recorded before write request returns) is causing crash in the LVM2 testsuite test shell/lvchange-raid.sh. For me the crash is 100% reproducible.
The reason for the crash is that the newly added code in raid1d moves the list from conf->bio_end_io_list to tmp, then tests if tmp is non-empty and then incorrectly pops the bio from conf->bio_end_io_list (which is empty because the list was alrady moved).
Raid-10 has a similar bug.
Kernel Fault: Code=15 regs=000000006ccb8640 (Addr=0000000100000000) CPU: 3 PID: 1930 Comm: mdX_raid1 Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-bisect+ #35 task: 000000006cc1f258 ti: 000000006ccb8000 task.ti: 000000006ccb8000
YZrvWESTHLNXBCVMcbcbcbcbOGFRQPDI PSW: 00001000000001001111111000001111 Not tainted r00-03 000000ff0804fe0f 000000001059d000 000000001059f818 000000007f16be38 r04-07 000000001059d000 000000007f16be08 0000000000200200 0000000000000001 r08-11 000000006ccb8260 000000007b7934d0 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 r12-15 000000004056f320 0000000000000000 0000000000013dd0 0000000000000000 r16-19 00000000f0d00ae0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 r20-23 000000000800000f 0000000042200390 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 r24-27 0000000000000001 000000000800000f 000000007f16be08 000000001059d000 r28-31 0000000100000000 000000006ccb8560 000000006ccb8640 0000000000000000 sr00-03 0000000000249800 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000249800 sr04-07 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
IASQ: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 IAOQ: 000000001059f61c 000000001059f620 IIR: 0f8010c6 ISR: 0000000000000000 IOR: 0000000100000000 CPU: 3 CR30: 000000006ccb8000 CR31: 0000000000000000 ORIG_R28: 000000001059d000 IAOQ[0]: call_bio_endio+0x34/0x1a8 [raid1] IAOQ[1]: call_bio_endio+0x38/0x1a8 [raid1] RP(r2): raid_end_bio_io+0x88/0x168 [raid1] Backtrace: [<000000001059f818>] raid_end_bio_io+0x88/0x168 [raid1] [<00000000105a4f64>] raid1d+0x144/0x1640 [raid1] [<000000004017fd5c>] kthread+0x144/0x160
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Fixes: 55ce74d4bfe1 ("md/raid1: ensure device failure recorded before write request returns.") Fixes: 95af587e95aa ("md/raid10: ensure device failure recorded before write request returns.") Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> diff 55ce74d4bfe1b9444436264c637f39a152d1e5ac Fri Aug 14 03:11:10 CEST 2015 NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> md/raid1: ensure device failure recorded before write request returns.
When a write to one of the legs of a RAID1 fails, the failure is recorded in the metadata of the other leg(s) so that after a restart the data on the failed drive wont be trusted even if that drive seems to be working again (maybe a cable was unplugged).
Similarly when we record a bad-block in response to a write failure, we must not let the write complete until the bad-block update is safe.
Currently there is no interlock between the write request completing and the metadata update. So it is possible that the write will complete, the app will confirm success in some way, and then the machine will crash before the metadata update completes.
This is an extremely small hole for a racy to fit in, but it is theoretically possible and so should be closed.
So: - set MD_CHANGE_PENDING when requesting a metadata update for a failed device, so we can know with certainty when it completes - queue requests that experienced an error on a new queue which is only processed after the metadata update completes - call raid_end_bio_io() on bios in that queue when the time comes.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
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H A D | raid10.c | diff a452744bcbf706eac65abb4c98496a366820c60a Thu Oct 01 21:17:43 CEST 2015 Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> crash in md-raid1 and md-raid10 due to incorrect list manipulation
The commit 55ce74d4bfe1b9444436264c637f39a152d1e5ac (md/raid1: ensure device failure recorded before write request returns) is causing crash in the LVM2 testsuite test shell/lvchange-raid.sh. For me the crash is 100% reproducible.
The reason for the crash is that the newly added code in raid1d moves the list from conf->bio_end_io_list to tmp, then tests if tmp is non-empty and then incorrectly pops the bio from conf->bio_end_io_list (which is empty because the list was alrady moved).
Raid-10 has a similar bug.
Kernel Fault: Code=15 regs=000000006ccb8640 (Addr=0000000100000000) CPU: 3 PID: 1930 Comm: mdX_raid1 Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-bisect+ #35 task: 000000006cc1f258 ti: 000000006ccb8000 task.ti: 000000006ccb8000
YZrvWESTHLNXBCVMcbcbcbcbOGFRQPDI PSW: 00001000000001001111111000001111 Not tainted r00-03 000000ff0804fe0f 000000001059d000 000000001059f818 000000007f16be38 r04-07 000000001059d000 000000007f16be08 0000000000200200 0000000000000001 r08-11 000000006ccb8260 000000007b7934d0 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 r12-15 000000004056f320 0000000000000000 0000000000013dd0 0000000000000000 r16-19 00000000f0d00ae0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 r20-23 000000000800000f 0000000042200390 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 r24-27 0000000000000001 000000000800000f 000000007f16be08 000000001059d000 r28-31 0000000100000000 000000006ccb8560 000000006ccb8640 0000000000000000 sr00-03 0000000000249800 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000249800 sr04-07 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
IASQ: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 IAOQ: 000000001059f61c 000000001059f620 IIR: 0f8010c6 ISR: 0000000000000000 IOR: 0000000100000000 CPU: 3 CR30: 000000006ccb8000 CR31: 0000000000000000 ORIG_R28: 000000001059d000 IAOQ[0]: call_bio_endio+0x34/0x1a8 [raid1] IAOQ[1]: call_bio_endio+0x38/0x1a8 [raid1] RP(r2): raid_end_bio_io+0x88/0x168 [raid1] Backtrace: [<000000001059f818>] raid_end_bio_io+0x88/0x168 [raid1] [<00000000105a4f64>] raid1d+0x144/0x1640 [raid1] [<000000004017fd5c>] kthread+0x144/0x160
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Fixes: 55ce74d4bfe1 ("md/raid1: ensure device failure recorded before write request returns.") Fixes: 95af587e95aa ("md/raid10: ensure device failure recorded before write request returns.") Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
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H A D | md.c | diff 55ce74d4bfe1b9444436264c637f39a152d1e5ac Fri Aug 14 03:11:10 CEST 2015 NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> md/raid1: ensure device failure recorded before write request returns.
When a write to one of the legs of a RAID1 fails, the failure is recorded in the metadata of the other leg(s) so that after a restart the data on the failed drive wont be trusted even if that drive seems to be working again (maybe a cable was unplugged).
Similarly when we record a bad-block in response to a write failure, we must not let the write complete until the bad-block update is safe.
Currently there is no interlock between the write request completing and the metadata update. So it is possible that the write will complete, the app will confirm success in some way, and then the machine will crash before the metadata update completes.
This is an extremely small hole for a racy to fit in, but it is theoretically possible and so should be closed.
So: - set MD_CHANGE_PENDING when requesting a metadata update for a failed device, so we can know with certainty when it completes - queue requests that experienced an error on a new queue which is only processed after the metadata update completes - call raid_end_bio_io() on bios in that queue when the time comes.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
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