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    <title>Changes in Makefile</title>
    <description></description>
    <language>en</language>
    <copyright>Copyright 2015</copyright>
    <generator>Java</generator><item>
        <title>cd051cfe1e35a471fc2cdf6d32fae6ee23305ecb - Merge tag &apos;vfs-7.3-rc1.failfs&apos; of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs</title>
        <link>http://kernelsources.org:8080/source/history/linux/tools/testing/selftests/filesystems/failfs/Makefile#cd051cfe1e35a471fc2cdf6d32fae6ee23305ecb</link>
        <description>Merge tag &apos;vfs-7.3-rc1.failfs&apos; of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfsPull failfs filesystem from Christian Brauner: &quot;Add failfs and expose a FD_FAILFS_ROOT sentinel.  This allows userspace to shed their filesystem state completely. A  process with its root or working directory in failfs must anchor every  path lookup at an explicit file descriptor. Absolute paths, absolute  symlinks and AT_FDCWD-relative lookups simply fail.  Failfs is the counterpart to nullfs. nullfs says adds a permanently  empty, immutable directory whose lookups fail with ENOENT but which  can be opened, read, stat&apos;d and mounted upon. Failfs on the other hand  fails every operation. The root cannot be opened at all. A single  instance is mounted during early boot via kern_mount(), which makes it  logically distinct from every mount namespace.  This is accompanied by a new fchroot() system call which makes  chrooting via a file descriptor a first class concept. It&apos;s possible  to chroot into failfs as an unprivileged user provided the task has no  new privileges set&quot;* tag &apos;vfs-7.3-rc1.failfs&apos; of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:  Documentation: add failfs documentation  selftests/filesystems: add failfs selftests  arch: hookup fchroot() system call  fs: support FD_FAILFS_ROOT in fchroot()  fs: add fchroot()  fs: support FD_FAILFS_ROOT in fchdir()  fs: add failfs

            List of files:
            /linux/tools/testing/selftests/filesystems/failfs/Makefile</description>
        <pubDate>Mon, 17 Aug 2026 18:15:52 +0200</pubDate>
        <dc:creator>Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;</dc:creator>
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        <title>1d38e750a389e919c1608dbc61cd5c93cd4915dc - Merge patch series &quot;fs: add failfs&quot;</title>
        <link>http://kernelsources.org:8080/source/history/linux/tools/testing/selftests/filesystems/failfs/Makefile#1d38e750a389e919c1608dbc61cd5c93cd4915dc</link>
        <description>Merge patch series &quot;fs: add failfs&quot;Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt; says:nullfs provides a permanently empty and immutable directory. Lookupsfail with ENOENT. The directory can be opened, read, stat, mounted upon.It behaves like nothing is there.Add its counterpart failfs where the semantics are not &quot;there isnothing here&quot; but &quot;nothing is supported here&quot;. Every operation thatreaches the filesystem fails with EOPNOTSUPP. Even statfs()/fstatfs()fail so the filesystem cannot be discovered through an fd to it.EOPNOTSUPP rather than a permission errno keeps that coherent. Thereis no permission model in which anything could ever be allowed andEACCES or EPERM would merely suggest that different credentials mightsucceed while EIO would suggest corruption. It also makes hitting thefailfs boundary mostly quite dinstinguishable. A task anchoring itslookups at real directory file descriptors may be able to tell a failfsrefusal from an ordinary permission failure. I wouldn&apos;t go so far asguaranteeing that but it should mostly work.The root cannot be opened at all not even with O_PATH. It is neverreached by a lookup in a parent directory. The only way to a path-walkterminal at the root is a jump through a /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/{root,cwd} magiclink or by mountpoint traversal. The root also refuses-&gt;d_weak_revalidate() which the VFS calls for jumped terminals. Thatcloses every remaining way to reference it. An O_PATHopen is refused and name_to_handle_at() cannot encode it into a filehandle, and following a magic link into it fails. A plain readlink() ofsuch a link still works and shows &quot;failfs:/&quot;.There is a single instance of failfs mounted during early boot viakern_mount() making it logically distinct from every mount namespace.Since the mount is a member of no mount namespace mounting onto itfails. So nothing can ever be mounted on top of it. It cannot be clonedvia OPEN_TREE_CLONE and it does not show up in statmount()/listmount()or /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/mountinfo. The filesystem is not registered so it isnot visible in /proc/filesystems and cannot be mounted from userspace.This lets tasks shed their filesystem state completely. A process withits root directory or working directory in failfs must anchor every pathlookup at an explicit file descriptor or is doomed to fail any lookup.Absolute paths, absolute symlinks, and AT_FDCWD-relative lookupssimply fail. Followup patches will expose it via a new FD_FAILFS_ROOTfile descriptor sentinel understood by fchdir() and the new fchroot()system call.Fun fact, because of how dynamic binary execution work with PT_INTERPthis also currently prevents execution of dynamic binaries becauseloaders have absolute paths (see selftests).* patches from https://patch.msgid.link/20260724-work-failfs-v2-0-485dabbae185@kernel.org:  Documentation: add failfs documentation  selftests/filesystems: add failfs selftests  arch: hookup fchroot() system call  fs: support FD_FAILFS_ROOT in fchroot()  fs: add fchroot()  fs: support FD_FAILFS_ROOT in fchdir()  fs: add failfsLink: https://patch.msgid.link/20260724-work-failfs-v2-0-485dabbae185@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;

            List of files:
            /linux/tools/testing/selftests/filesystems/failfs/Makefile</description>
        <pubDate>Mon, 27 Jul 2026 11:49:54 +0200</pubDate>
        <dc:creator>Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;</dc:creator>
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        <title>df4b2889ea9a1ef809bfb7e1401e2cdc475956c8 - selftests/filesystems: add failfs selftests</title>
        <link>http://kernelsources.org:8080/source/history/linux/tools/testing/selftests/filesystems/failfs/Makefile#df4b2889ea9a1ef809bfb7e1401e2cdc475956c8</link>
        <description>selftests/filesystems: add failfs selftestsTest the failfs semantics and both new entry points:- fchdir(FD_FAILFS_ROOT):  * working directory lookups and getcwd() fail  * other sentinels are rejected  * the state is recoverable while the root is untouched- fchroot() with regular fds:  * chroot parity  * CAP_SYS_CHROOT required  * ENOTDIR/EBADF/EINVAL checks- fchroot(FD_FAILFS_ROOT):  * absolute lookups, stat, statfs and opens of the root including O_PATH fail with EOPNOTSUPP  * dirfd-anchored I/O keeps working  * &quot;..&quot; walks clamp at the top of the mount tree  * /proc magic links resolve but can&apos;t be stat through  * absolute symlinks fail while relative symlinks keep resolving- Unprivileged entry requires no_new_privs and is rejected for  chrooted callers and for a shared fs_struct- entering makes the task count as chrooted so user namespace creation  fails- Nothing can be mounted on top of failfs and OPEN_TREE_CLONE is  rejected; the overmount test runs in a private mount namespace so a  regression cannot touch the host root- setns() to a kept mount namespace fd restores root and working  directory- The failfs root is inherited across fork() and absolute exec fails- Exec by fd of a dynamically linked binary fails on opening its  absolute PT_INTERP interpreterThe exec tests run the exec in a child so a wrongly successful execcannot replace the test image and masquerade as a pass.Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260724-work-failfs-v2-6-485dabbae185@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;

            List of files:
            /linux/tools/testing/selftests/filesystems/failfs/Makefile</description>
        <pubDate>Fri, 24 Jul 2026 15:41:22 +0200</pubDate>
        <dc:creator>Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;</dc:creator>
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