'\" te
.\" Copyright (C) 2009, Sun Microsystems, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
.\" The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").  You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
.\"  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations under the License. When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.  If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with
.\" the fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
.TH ikecert 1M "10 Jun 2009" "SunOS 5.11" "System Administration Commands"
.SH NAME
ikecert \- manipulates the machine's on-filesystem public-key certificate
databases
.SH SYNOPSIS
.LP
.nf
\fBikecert\fR certlocal 
     [\fB-a\fR | \fB-e\fR | \fB-h\fR | \fB-k\fR | \fB-l\fR | \fB-r\fR | \fB-U\fR | \fB-C\fR | \fB-L\fR] 
     [[\fB-p\fR] \fB-T\fR \fIPKCS#11 token identifier\fR] 
     [\fIoption_specific_arguments\fR]...
.fi

.LP
.nf
\fBikecert\fR certdb [\fB-a\fR | \fB-e\fR | \fB-h\fR | \fB-l\fR | \fB-r\fR | \fB-U\fR | \fB-C\fR | \fB-L\fR] 
     [[\fB-p\fR] \fB-T\fR \fIPKCS#11 token identifier\fR] 
     [\fIoption_specific_arguments\fR]...
.fi

.LP
.nf
\fBikecert\fR certrldb [\fB-a\fR | \fB-e\fR | \fB-h\fR | \fB-l\fR | \fB-r\fR] 
     [\fIoption_specific_arguments\fR]...
.fi

.LP
.nf
\fBikecert\fR tokens
.fi

.SH DESCRIPTION
.sp
.LP
The \fBikecert\fR command manipulates the machine's on-filesystem public-key
certificate databases. See the "Files" section, below.
.sp
.LP
\fBikecert\fR has three subcommands, one for each of the three major
repositories, plus one for listing available hardware tokens:
.RS +4
.TP
.ie t \(bu
.el o
\fBcertlocal\fR deals with the private-key repository,
.RE
.RS +4
.TP
.ie t \(bu
.el o
\fBcertdb\fR deals with the public-key repository, and:
.RE
.RS +4
.TP
.ie t \(bu
.el o
\fBcertrldb\fR deals with the certificate revocation list (\fBCRL\fR)
repository.
.RE
.RS +4
.TP
.ie t \(bu
.el o
\fBtokens\fR shows the available PKCS#11 tokens for a given PKCS#11 library.
.RE
.sp
.LP
The only supported PKCS#11 library and hardware is the Sun Cryptographic
Accelerator 4000.
.SH OPTIONS
.sp
.LP
Except for \fBtokens\fR, each subcommand requires one option, possibly followed
by one or more option-specific arguments.
.sp
.LP
The \fBtokens\fR subcommand lists all available tokens in the PKCS#11 library
specified in \fB/etc/inet/ike/config\fR.
.sp
.LP
The following options are supported:
.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB-a\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBcertlocal\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
When specified with the \fBcertlocal\fR subcommand, this option installs (adds)
a private key into the Internet Key Exchange (\fBIKE\fR) local \fBID\fR
database. The key data is read from standard input, and is in either
Solaris-only format or unencrypted PKCS#8 DER format. Key format is
automatically detected. PKCS#8 key files in PEM format and files in password
protected, encrypted format are not recognized, but can be converted
appropriately using tools available in OpenSSL.
.sp
This option cannot be used with PKCS#11 hardware objects when the corresponding
public certificate is not already present in the \fBIKE\fR database. When
importing both a public certificate and a private key, the public portion must
be imported first using the \fBcertdb\fR subcommand.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBcertdb\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
When specified with the \fBcertdb\fR subcommand, this option reads a
certificate from standard input and adds it to the \fBIKE\fR certificate
database. The certificate must be a \fBX.509\fR certificate in \fBPEM Base64\fR
or \fBASN.1 BER\fR encoding. The certificate adopts the name of its identity.
.sp
This option can import a certificate into a PKCS#11 hardware key store one of
two ways: Either a matching public key object \fBand\fR an existing private key
object were created using the \fBcertlocal\fR \fB-kc\fR option, or if a PKCS#11
token is explicitly specified using the \fB-T\fR option.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBcertrldb\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
When specified with the \fBcertrldb\fR subcommand, this option installs (adds)
a \fBCRL\fR into the \fBIKE\fR database. The \fBCRL\fR reads from standard
input.
.RE

.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB-e\fR [\fB-f\fR pkcs8] \fIslot\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBcertlocal\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
When specified with the \fBcertlocal\fR subcommand, this option extracts a
private key from the \fBIKE\fR local \fBID\fR database. The key data are
written to standard output. The slot specifies which private key to extract.
Private keys are only extracted in binary/ber format.
.sp
\fBUse this option with extreme caution.\fR See the "Security" section, below.
.sp
This option will not work with PKCS#11 hardware objects.
.sp
When used in conjunction with "\fB-f\fR \fBpkcs8\fR", the private key is
extracted in unencrypted PKCS#8 format.
.RE

.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB-e\fR [\fB-f\fR \fIoutput-format\fR] \fBcertspec\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBcertdb\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
When specified with the \fBcertdb\fR subcommand, this option extracts a
certificate from the IKE certificate database which matches the certspec and
writes it to standard output. The \fIoutput-format\fR option specifies the
encoding format. Valid options are \fBPEM\fR and \fBBER\fR. This extracts the
first matching identity. The default output format is \fBPEM\fR.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBcertrldb\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
When specified with the \fBcertrldb\fR subcommand, this option extracts a
\fBCRL\fR from the IKE database. The key data are written to standard output.
The \fBcertspec\fR specifies which CRL that is extracted. The first one that
matches in the database is extracted. See \fBNOTES\fR, below, for details on
\fBcertspec\fR patterns.
.RE

.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB-kc\fR \fB-m\fR \fIkeysize\fR \fB-t\fR \fIkeytype\fR \fB-D\fR \fIdname\fR
\fB-A\fR \fIaltname\fR[ ... ]\fR
.ad
.br
.na
\fB[\fB-S\fR \fIvalidity start_time\fR][\fB-F\fR \fIvalidity end_time\fR]\fR
.ad
.br
.na
\fB[\fB-T\fR \fIPKCS#11 token identifier\fR]\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBcertlocal\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
When specified with the \fBcertlocal\fR subcommand, this option generates a IKE
public/private key pair and adds it into the local ID database. It also
generates a certificate request and sends that to standard output. For details
on the above options see  for details on the \fIdname\fR argument and see
ALTERNATIVE NAMES for details on the \fIaltname\fR argument(s) to this command.
.sp
If \fB-T\fR is specified, the hardware token will generate the pair of keys.
.sp
If \fB-p\fR is specified with \fB-T\fR, the PKCS#11 token pin is stored in the
clear on-disk, with root-protected file permissions. If not specified, one must
unlock the token with \fBikeadm\fR(1M) once \fBin.iked\fR(1M) is running.
.RE

.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB-ks\fR \fB-m\fR \fIkeysize\fR \fB-t\fR \fIkeytype\fR \fB-D\fR \fIdname\fR
\fB-A\fR \fIaltname\fR[ ... ]\fR
.ad
.br
.na
\fB[\fB-S\fR \fIvalidity start_time\fR][\fB-F\fR \fIvalidity end_time\fR]\fR
.ad
.br
.na
\fB[\fB-f\fR \fIoutput-format\fR][[\fB-p\fR] \fB-T\fR \fIPKCS#11 token
identifier\fR]\fR
.ad
.br
.na
\fB\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBcertlocal\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
When specified with the \fBcertlocal\fR subcommand, generates a public/private
key pair and adds it into the local ID database. This option also generates a
self-signed certificate and installs it into the certificate database. See
\fBNOTES\fR, below, for details on the \fIdname\fR and \fIaltname\fR arguments
to this command.
.sp
If \fB-T\fR is specified, the hardware token will generate the pair of keys,
and the self-signed certificate will also be stored in the hardware.
.RE

.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB-l\fR [\fB-v\fR] [\fIslot\fR]\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBcertlocal\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
When specified with the \fBcertlocal\fR subcommand, this option lists private
keys in the local ID database. The \fB-v\fR option switches output to a verbose
mode where the entire certificate is printed.
.sp
\fBUse the\fR \fB-v\fR\fBoption with extreme caution.\fR See the "Security"
section, below. The \fB-v\fR option will not work with PKCS#11 hardware
objects.
.RE

.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB-l\fR [\fB-v\fR] [certspec]\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBcertdb\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
When specified with the \fBcertdb\fR subcommand, this option lists certificates
in the IKE certificate database matching the certspec, if any pattern is given.
The list displays the identity string of the certificates, as well as, the
private key if in the key database. The \fB-v\fR switches the output to a
verbose mode where the entire certificate is printed.
.sp
If the matching ceritifcate is on a hardware token, the token ID is also
listed.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBcertrldb\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
When specified with the \fBcertrldb\fR subcommand, this option lists the CRLs
in the IKE database along with any certificates that reside in the database and
match the Issuer Name. \fBcertspec\fR can be used to specify to list a specific
CRL. The \fB-v\fR option switches the output to a verbose mode where the entire
certificate is printed. See \fBNOTES\fR, below, for details on\fBcertspec\fR
patterns.
.RE

.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB-r\fR \fIslot\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBcertlocal\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
When specified with the \fBcertlocal\fR subcommand, deletes the local ID in the
specified slot. If there is a corresponding public key, it is not be deleted.
If this slot is deemed as "corrupted" or otherwise unrecognizable, it is
deleted as well.
.sp
If this is invoked on a PKCS#11 hardware object, it will also delete the
PKCS#11 public key and private key objects. If the public key object was
already deleted by \fBcertdb\fR \fB-r\fR, that is not a problem.
.RE

.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB-r\fR certspec\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBcertdb\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Removes certificates from the IKE certificate database. Certificates matching
the specified certificate pattern are deleted. Any private keys in the
\fBcertlocal\fR database corresponding to these certificates are not deleted.
This removes the first matching identity.
.sp
If the pattern specifies a slot and the slot is deemed as "corrupted" or
otherwise unrecognizable, it is deleted as well.
.sp
If this is invoked on a PKCS#11 hardware object, it will also delete the
certificate and the PKCS#11 public key object. If the public key object was
already deleted by \fBcertlocal\fR \fB-r\fR, that is not a problem.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBcertrldb\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
When specified with the \fBcertrldb\fR subcommand, this option deletes the CRL
with the given \fBcertspec\fR.
.RE

.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB-U\fR slot\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBcertlocal\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
When specified with the \fBcertlocal\fR subcommand and the \fB-T\fR flag, this
option unlinks a PKCS#11 private key object from the IKE database. There will
be no attempt to access the hardware keystore or to validate or remove the
on-token private key object. The object is simply disassociated from the IKE
database.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBcertdb\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
When specified with the \fBcertdb\fR subcommand and the \fB-T\fR flag, this
option unlinks a PKCS#11 certificate object from the IKE database. There will
be no attempt to access the hardware keystore or to validate or remove the
on-token certificate or public key objects. The objects are simply
disassociated from the IKE database.
.RE

.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB-C\fR certspec\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBcertlocal\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
When specified with the \fBcertlocal\fR subcommand, this option copies both the
private key and its corresponding certificate and the public key from the
on-disk keystore to the hardware keystore specified by its PKCS#11 token. This
subcommand attempts to create each of these components, even if one part fails.
In all cases, the original on-disk private key and public certificate are still
retained and must be deleted separately. Some hardware keystores, such as
FIPS-140 compliant devices, may not support migration of private key objects in
this manner.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBcertdb\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
When specified with the \fBcertdb\fR subcommand, this option copies the
certificate matching the given \fBcertspec\fR and corresponding public key from
the on-disk keystore to the hardware keystore specified by its PKCS#11 token.
The original public certificate is still retained and must be deleted
separately, if desired.
.sp
If \fB-p\fR is specified, the PKCS#11 token pin is stored in the clear on-disk,
with root-protected file permissions. If not specified, one must unlock the
token with \fBikeadm\fR(1M) once \fBin.iked\fR(1M) is running.
.RE

.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB-L\fR pattern\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBcertlocal\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
When specified with the \fBcertlocal\fR subcommand, this option links an
existing on-token private key object to the \fBIKE\fR database. The object
itself remains on the token. This option simply lets the \fBIKE\fR
infrastructure know that the object exists, as if it had been originally
created on-token with the Solaris \fBIKE\fR utilities.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBcertdb\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
When specified with the \fBcertdb\fR subcommand, this option links an existing
on-token certificate object to the \fBIKE\fR database. The object itself
remains on the token. This option simply lets the \fBIKE\fR infrastructure know
that the object exists, as if it had been originally created on-token with the
Solaris \fBIKE\fR utilities.
.sp
If \fB-p\fR is specified, the PKCS#11 token pin is stored in the clear on-disk,
with root-protected file permissions. If not specified, one must unlock the
token with \fBikeadm\fR(1M) once \fBin.iked\fR(1M) is running.
.RE

.RE

.SH PARAMETERS
.sp
.LP
The following parameters are supported:
.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBcertspec\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Specifies the pattern matching of certificate specifications. Valid
\fBcertspec\fRs are the Subject Name, Issuer Name, and Subject Alternative
Names.
.sp
These can be specified as certificates that match the given \fBcertspec\fR
values and that do not match other \fBcertspec\fR values. To signify a
\fBcertspec\fR value that is not supposed to be present in a certificate, place
an \fB!\fR in front of the tag.
.sp
Valid \fBcertspec\fRs are:
.sp
.in +2
.nf
<Subject Names>
SUBJECT=<Subject Names>
ISSUER=<Issuer Names>
SLOT=<Slot Number in the certificate database>

Example:"ISSUER=C=US, O=SUN" IP=1.2.3.4 !DNS=example.com
Example:"C=US,   O=CALIFORNIA" IP=5.4.2.1 DNS=example.com 
.fi
.in -2
.sp

Valid arguments to the alternative names are as follows:
.sp
.in +2
.nf
IP=<IPv4 address>
DNS=<Domain Name Server address>
EMAIL=<email (RFC 822) address>
URI=<Uniform Resource Indicator value>
DN=<LDAP Directory Name value>
RID=<Registered Identifier value>
.fi
.in -2
.sp

Valid Slot numbers can be specified without the keyword tag. Alternative name
can also be issued with keyword tags.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB-A\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Subject Alternative Names the certificate. The argument that follows the
\fB-A\fR option should be in the form of \fItag\fR=\fIvalue\fR. Valid tags are
\fBIP\fR, \fBDNS\fR, \fBEMAIL\fR, \fBURI\fR, \fBDN\fR, and \fBRID\fR (See
example below).
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB-D\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
\fBX.509\fR distinguished name for the certificate subject. It typically has
the form of: \fBC\fR=country, \fBO\fR=organization, \fBOU\fR=organizational
unit, \fBCN\fR=common name. Valid tags are: \fBC\fR, \fBO\fR, \fBOU\fR, and
\fBCN\fR.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB-f\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Encoding output format. \fBpem\fR for \fBPEM Base64\fR or \fBber\fR for
\fBASN.1 BER\fR. If \fB-f\fR is not specified, \fBpem\fR is assumed.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB-F\fR \fIvalidity end_time\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Finish certificate validity time. If the \fB-F\fR flag is not specified, the
validity end time is calculated at four years from the validity start time. See
\fBNOTES\fR for an explanation for the validity date and time syntax.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB-m\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Key size. It can be \fB512\fR, \fB1024\fR, \fB2048\fR, \fB3072\fR, or
\fB4096\fR. Use the following command to determine the key sizes supported by
the Solaris Cryptographic Framework:
.sp
.in +2
.nf
% \fBcryptoadm list -vm\fR
.fi
.in -2
.sp

The mechanisms displayed by the preceding command are described in
\fBpkcs11_softtoken\fR(5). If your system has hardware acceleration, the
mechanisms supported by the hardware will be listed in a separate section for
each provider. Mechanisms can be any of:
.sp
.in +2
.nf
CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN
CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN
CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN
.fi
.in -2
.sp

.LP
Note -
.sp
.RS 2
Some hardware does not support all key sizes. For example, the Sun
Cryptographic Accelerator 4000's keystore (when using the \fB-T\fR option,
below), supports only up to 2048-bit keys for RSA and 1024-bit keys for DSA.
.RE
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB-S\fR \fIvalidity start_time\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Start certificate validity time. If the \fB-S\fR flag is not specified, the
current date and time is used for the validity start time. See \fBNOTES\fR,
below, for an explanation for the validity date and time syntax.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB-t\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Key type. It can be \fBrsa-sha1\fR, \fBrsa-md5\fR, or \fBdsa-sha1\fR.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB-T\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
PKCS#11 token identifier for hardware key storage. This specifies a hardware
device instance in conformance to the PKCS#11 standard. A PKCS#11 library must
be specified in \fB/etc/inet/ike/config\fR. (See \fBike.config\fR(4).)
.sp
A token identifier is a 32-character space-filled string. If the token given is
less than 32 characters long, it will be automatically padded with spaces.
.sp
If there is more than one PKCS#11 library on a system, keep in mind that only
one can be specified at a time in \fB/etc/inet/ike/config\fR. There can be
multiple tokens (each with individual key storage) for a single PKCS#11 library
instance.
.RE

.SH SECURITY
.sp
.LP
This command can save private keys of a public-private key pair into a file.
Any exposure of a private key may lead to compromise if the key is somehow
obtained by an adversary.
.sp
.LP
The PKCS#11 hardware object functionality can address some of the shortcomings
of on-disk private keys. Because IKE is a system service, user intervention at
boot is not desireable. The token's PIN, however, is still needed. The PINfor
the PKCS#11 token, therefore, is stored where normally the on-disk
cryptographic keys would reside. This design decision is deemed acceptable
because, with a hardware key store, \fBpossession\fR of the key is still
unavailable, only \fBuse\fR of the key is an issue if the host is compromised.
Beyond the PIN, the security of \fBikecert\fR then reduces to the security of
the PKCS#11 implementation. The PKCS#11 implementation should be scrutinized
also.
.sp
.LP
Refer to the afterword by Matt Blaze in Bruce Schneier's \fIApplied
Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C\fR for additional
information.
.SH EXAMPLES
.LP
\fBExample 1 \fRGenerating a Self-Signed Certificate
.sp
.LP
The following is an example of a self-signed certificate:

.sp
.in +2
.nf
example# \fBikecert certlocal -ks -m 512 -t rsa-md5 -D "C=US, O=SUN" -A\fR
IP=1.2.3.4
Generating, please wait...
Certificate generated.
Certificate added to database.
-----BEGIN X509 CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBRDCB76ADAgECAgEBMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBAUAMBsxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQww
CgYDVQQKEwNTVU4wHhcNMDEwMzE0MDEzMDM1WhcNMDUwMzE0MDEzMDM1WjAbMQsw
CQYDVQQGEwJVUzEMMAoGA1UEChMDU1VOMFowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSQAwRgJB
APDhqpKgjgRoRUr6twTMTtSuNsReEnFoReVer!ztpXpQK6ybYlRH18JIqU/uCV/r
26R/cVXTy5qc5NbMwA40KzcCASOjIDAeMAsGA1UdDwQEAwIFoDAPBgNVHREECDAG
hwQBAgMEMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBAUAA0EApTRD23KzN95GMvPD71hwwClukslKLVg8
f1xm9ZsHLPJLRxHFwsqqjAad4j4wwwriiUmGAHLTGB0lJMl8xsgxag==
-----END X509 CERTIFICATE-----
.fi
.in -2
.sp

.LP
\fBExample 2 \fRGenerating a CA Request
.sp
.LP
Generating a \fBCA\fR request appears the same as the self-signed certificate.
The only differences between the two is the option \fB-c\fR instead of
\fB-s\fR, and the certificate data is a \fBCA\fR request.

.sp
.in +2
.nf
example# \fBikecert certlocal -kc -m 512 -t rsa-md5 \e
   -D "C=US, O=SUN" -A IP=1.2.3.4\fR
.fi
.in -2
.sp

.LP
\fBExample 3 \fRA CA Request Using a Hardware Key Store
.sp
.LP
The following example illustrates the specification of a token using the
\fB-T\fR option.

.sp
.in +2
.nf
example# \fB# ikecert certlocal -kc -m 1024 -t rsa-md5 -T vca0-keystore \e
  -D "C=US, O=SUN" -A IP=1.2.3.4\fR
.fi
.in -2
.sp

.SH EXIT STATUS
.sp
.LP
The following exit values are returned:
.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB0\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Successful completion.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBnon-zero\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
An error occurred. Writes an appropriate error message to standard error.
.RE

.SH FILES
.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB/etc/inet/secret/ike.privatekeys/*\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Private keys. A private key \fBmust\fR have a matching public-key certificate
with the same filename in \fB/etc/inet/ike/publickeys/\fR.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB/etc/inet/ike/publickeys/*\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Public-key certificates. The names are only important with regard to matching
private key names.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB/etc/inet/ike/crls/*\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Public key certificate revocation lists.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB/etc/inet/ike/config\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Consulted for the pathname of a PKCS#11 library.
.RE

.SH ATTRIBUTES
.sp
.LP
See \fBattributes\fR(5) for descriptions of the following attributes:
.sp

.sp
.TS
tab() box;
cw(2.75i) |cw(2.75i) 
lw(2.75i) |lw(2.75i) 
.
ATTRIBUTE TYPEATTRIBUTE VALUE
_
Interface StabilityEvolving
.TE

.SH SEE ALSO
.sp
.LP
\fBikeadm\fR(1M), \fBin.iked\fR(1M), \fBgetdate\fR(3C), \fBike.config\fR(4),
\fBattributes\fR(5), \fBpkcs11_softtoken\fR(5)
.sp
.LP
Schneier, Bruce. \fIApplied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source
Code in C\fR. Second Edition. John Wiley & Sons. New York, NY. 1996.
.sp
.LP
RSA Labs, PKCS#11 v2.11: \fICryptographic Token Interface Standards\fR,
November 2001.
.SH NOTES
.sp
.LP
The following is the validity date and time syntax when the \fB-F\fR or
\fB-S\fR flags are used:
.sp
.LP
For relative dates, the syntax is as follows:
.sp
.in +2
.nf
{+,-}[Ns][Nm][Nh][Nd][Nw][NM][Ny]
.fi
.in -2
.sp

.sp
.LP
where:
.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBN\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
represents an integer
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBs\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
represents seconds
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBm\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
represents minutes
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBh\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
represents hours
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBd\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
represents days
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBw\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
represents weeks
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBM\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
represents months
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBy\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
represents years
.RE

.sp
.LP
These parameters can be given in any order. For example, "+3d12h" is three and
a half days from now, and "-3y2M" is three years and 2 months ago.
.sp
.LP
All parameters with fixed values can be added up in absolute seconds. Months
and years, which have variable numbers of seconds, are calculated using
calendar time. Months and years, which are not of fixed length, are defined
such that adding a year or month means the same day next year or month. For
instance, if it is Jan 26, 2005 and the certificate should expire 3 years and 1
month from today, the expiration (end validity time) date will be Feb 26, 2008.
Overflows are dealt with accordingly. For example, one month from Jan 31, 2005
is March 3, 2005, since February has only 28 days.
.sp
.LP
For absolute dates, the syntax of the date formats included in the file
\fB/etc/datemsk\fR are accepted (See \fBgetdate\fR(3C) for details). Any date
string prepended with a "+" or "-" is treated as a time relative to the current
time, while others are treated as absolute dates. Sanity checking is also done
to ensure that the end validity date is greater than the start validity date.
For example, the following command would create a certificate with start date 1
day and 2 hours ago and an end date of Jan 22nd, 2007 at 12:00:00 local time.
.sp
.in +2
.nf
# ikecert certlocal -ks -t rsa-sha1 -m 1024 \e
    -D "CN=mycert, O=Sun, C=US" \e 
    -S -1d2h -F "01/22/2007 12:00:00"
.fi
.in -2
.sp

.sp
.LP
As \fBin.iked\fR(1M) can run only in the global zone and exclusive-IP zones,
this command is not useful in shared-IP zones.