/* * CDDL HEADER START * * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions * and limitations under the License. * * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] * * CDDL HEADER END */ /* * Copyright 2007 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. * Use is subject to license terms. */ #pragma ident "%Z%%M% %I% %E% SMI" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "key_call_uid.h" /* to keep track of codepath */ #define CODEPATH_PAM_SM_AUTHENTICATE 0 #define CODEPATH_PAM_SM_SETCRED 1 #define SUNW_OLDRPCPASS "SUNW-OLD-RPC-PASSWORD" extern int _nfssys(int, void *); /* * int msg(pamh, ...) * * display message to the user */ /*PRINTFLIKE2*/ int msg(pam_handle_t *pamh, char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; char messages[PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG][PAM_MAX_MSG_SIZE]; va_start(ap, fmt); (void) vsnprintf(messages[0], sizeof (messages[0]), fmt, ap); va_end(ap); return (__pam_display_msg(pamh, PAM_ERROR_MSG, 1, messages, NULL)); } /* * Get the secret key for the given netname, key length, and algorithm * type and send it to keyserv if the given pw decrypts it. Update the * following counter args as necessary: get_seckey_cnt, good_pw_cnt, and * set_seckey_cnt. * * Returns 0 on malloc failure, else 1. */ static int get_and_set_seckey( pam_handle_t *pamh, /* in */ const char *netname, /* in */ keylen_t keylen, /* in */ algtype_t algtype, /* in */ const char *pw, /* in */ uid_t uid, /* in */ gid_t gid, /* in */ int *get_seckey_cnt, /* out */ int *good_pw_cnt, /* out */ int *set_seckey_cnt, /* out */ int flags, /* in */ int debug) /* in */ { char *skey; int skeylen; char messages[PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG][PAM_MAX_MSG_SIZE]; skeylen = BITS2NIBBLES(keylen) + 1; if ((skey = malloc(skeylen)) == NULL) { return (0); } if (getsecretkey_g(netname, keylen, algtype, skey, skeylen, pw)) { (*get_seckey_cnt)++; if (skey[0]) { /* password does decrypt secret key */ (*good_pw_cnt)++; if (key_setnet_g_uid(netname, skey, keylen, NULL, 0, algtype, uid, gid) >= 0) { (*set_seckey_cnt)++; } else { if (debug) syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "pam_dhkeys: " "get_and_set_seckey: could not " "set secret key for keytype " "%d-%d", keylen, algtype); } } else { if (pamh && !(flags & PAM_SILENT)) { (void) snprintf(messages[0], sizeof (messages[0]), dgettext(TEXT_DOMAIN, "Password does not " "decrypt secret key (type = %d-%d) " "for '%s'."), keylen, algtype, netname); (void) __pam_display_msg(pamh, PAM_ERROR_MSG, 1, messages, NULL); } } } else { if (debug) syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "pam_dhkeys: get_and_set_seckey: " "could not get secret key for keytype %d-%d", keylen, algtype); } free(skey); return (1); } /* * int establish_key(pamh, flags, debug, netname) * * This routine established the Secure RPC Credentials for the * user specified in PAM_USER, using the password in PAM_AUTHTOK. * * Because this routine is used for both pam_authenticate *and* * pam_setcred, we have to be somewhat careful: * * - if called from pam_sm_authenticate: * 1. if we don't need creds (no NIS+ or not tight), we don't * set them (they will be set by pam_sm_setcred()) and return * PAM_IGNORE. * 2. if we do need to set them (passwd == "*NP*"), we try to * do so. Not having credentials in this case results in * PAM_AUTH_ERR. * * - if called from pam_sm_setcred: * If we are root (uid == 0), we do nothing and return PAM_IGNORE. * Otherwise, we try to establish the credentials. * Not having credentials in this case results in PAM_IGNORE. * * For both modi, we return PAM_IGNORE if the creds are established. * If we fail, we return * - PAM_AUTH_ERR if the password didn't decrypt the cred * - PAM_SYSTEM_ERR if the cred's could not be stored. * * This routine returns the user's netname in "netname". * * All tools--but the PAM stack--currently use getpass() to obtain * the user's secure RPC password. We must make sure we don't use more than * the first des_block (eight) characters of whatever is handed down to us. * Therefore, we use a local variable "short_pass" to hold those 8 char's. */ int establish_key(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int codepath, int debug, char *netname) { char *user; char *passwd; char short_pass[sizeof (des_block)+1], *short_passp; int result; uid_t uid; gid_t gid; int err; struct passwd pw; /* Needed to obtain uid */ char *scratch; int scratchlen; int need_cred; /* is not having credentials set a failure? */ char *repository_name = NULL; /* which repository are we using */ char *repository_pass = NULL; /* user's password from that rep */ pwu_repository_t *pwu_rep; struct pam_repository *auth_rep; attrlist attr_pw[2]; mechanism_t **mechs; mechanism_t **mpp; int get_seckey_cnt = 0; int set_seckey_cnt = 0; int good_pw_cnt = 0; int valid_mech_cnt = 0; (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void **)&user); if (user == NULL || *user == '\0') { if (debug) syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "pam_dhkeys: user NULL or empty"); return (PAM_USER_UNKNOWN); } (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK, (void **)&passwd); scratchlen = sysconf(_SC_GETPW_R_SIZE_MAX); if ((scratch = malloc(scratchlen)) == NULL) return (PAM_BUF_ERR); if (getpwnam_r(user, &pw, scratch, scratchlen) == NULL) { result = PAM_USER_UNKNOWN; goto out; } uid = pw.pw_uid; gid = pw.pw_gid; /* * We don't set credentials when root logs in. * We do, however, need to set the credentials if the NIS+ permissions * require so. Thus, we only bail out if we're root and we're * called from pam_setcred. */ if (uid == 0 && codepath == CODEPATH_PAM_SM_SETCRED) { result = PAM_IGNORE; goto out; } /* * Check to see if we REALLY need to set the credentials, i.e. * whether not being able to do so is an error or whether we * can ignore it. * We need to get the password from the repository that we're * currently authenticating against. IFF this password equals * "*NP" *AND* we are authenticating against NIS+, we actually * do need to set the credentials. In all other cases, we * can forget about them. */ (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_REPOSITORY, (void **)&auth_rep); if (auth_rep != NULL) { if ((pwu_rep = calloc(1, sizeof (*pwu_rep))) == NULL) return (PAM_BUF_ERR); pwu_rep->type = auth_rep->type; pwu_rep->scope = auth_rep->scope; pwu_rep->scope_len = auth_rep->scope_len; } else pwu_rep = PWU_DEFAULT_REP; attr_pw[0].type = ATTR_PASSWD; attr_pw[0].next = &attr_pw[1]; attr_pw[1].type = ATTR_REP_NAME; attr_pw[1].next = NULL; result = __get_authtoken_attr(user, pwu_rep, attr_pw); if (pwu_rep != PWU_DEFAULT_REP) free(pwu_rep); if (result == PWU_NOT_FOUND) { if (debug) syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "pam_dhkeys: user %s not found", user); result = PAM_USER_UNKNOWN; goto out; } else if (result != PWU_SUCCESS) { result = PAM_PERM_DENIED; goto out; } repository_name = attr_pw[1].data.val_s; repository_pass = attr_pw[0].data.val_s; need_cred = (strcmp(repository_name, "nisplus") == 0 && strcmp(repository_pass, "*NP*") == 0); if (codepath == CODEPATH_PAM_SM_AUTHENTICATE && need_cred == 0) { /* * No need to set credentials right now. * Will do so later through pam_sm_setcred() */ result = PAM_IGNORE; goto out; } if (uid == 0) /* "root", need to create a host-netname */ err = host2netname(netname, NULL, NULL); else err = user2netname(netname, uid, NULL); if (err != 1) { if (debug) syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "pam_dhkeys: user2netname failed"); if (need_cred) { syslog(LOG_ALERT, "pam_dhkeys: user %s needs " "Secure RPC Credentials to login.", user); result = PAM_SERVICE_ERR; } else result = PAM_SYSTEM_ERR; goto out; } /* passwd can be NULL (no passwd or su as root) */ if (passwd) { (void) strlcpy(short_pass, passwd, sizeof (short_pass)); short_passp = short_pass; } else short_passp = NULL; if (mechs = __nis_get_mechanisms(FALSE)) { for (mpp = mechs; *mpp; mpp++) { mechanism_t *mp = *mpp; if (AUTH_DES_COMPAT_CHK(mp)) break; /* fall through to AUTH_DES below */ if (!VALID_MECH_ENTRY(mp)) continue; if (debug) syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "pam_dhkeys: trying " "key type = %d-%d", mp->keylen, mp->algtype); valid_mech_cnt++; if (!get_and_set_seckey(pamh, netname, mp->keylen, mp->algtype, short_passp, uid, gid, &get_seckey_cnt, &good_pw_cnt, &set_seckey_cnt, flags, debug)) { result = PAM_BUF_ERR; goto out; } } __nis_release_mechanisms(mechs); /* fall through to AUTH_DES below */ } else { /* * No usable mechs found in NIS+ security cf thus * fallback to AUTH_DES compat. */ if (debug) syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "pam_dhkeys: no valid mechs " "found. Trying AUTH_DES."); } /* * We always perform AUTH_DES for the benefit of non-NIS+ * services (e.g. NFS) that may depend on the classic des * 192bit key being set. */ if (!get_and_set_seckey(pamh, netname, AUTH_DES_KEYLEN, AUTH_DES_ALGTYPE, short_passp, uid, gid, &get_seckey_cnt, &good_pw_cnt, &set_seckey_cnt, flags, debug)) { result = PAM_BUF_ERR; goto out; } if (debug) { syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "pam_dhkeys: mech key totals:\n"); syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "pam_dhkeys: %d valid mechanism(s)", valid_mech_cnt); syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "pam_dhkeys: %d secret key(s) retrieved", get_seckey_cnt); syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "pam_dhkeys: %d passwd decrypt successes", good_pw_cnt); syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "pam_dhkeys: %d secret key(s) set", set_seckey_cnt); } if (get_seckey_cnt == 0) { /* No credentials */ result = need_cred ? PAM_AUTH_ERR : PAM_IGNORE; goto out; } if (good_pw_cnt == 0) { /* wrong password */ result = PAM_AUTH_ERR; goto out; } if (set_seckey_cnt == 0) { result = PAM_SYSTEM_ERR; goto out; } result = PAM_IGNORE; out: if (repository_name) free(repository_name); if (repository_pass) free(repository_pass); free(scratch); (void) memset(short_pass, '\0', sizeof (short_pass)); return (result); } int pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv) { int i; int debug = 0; int result; char netname[MAXNETNAMELEN + 1]; for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { if (strcmp(argv[i], "debug") == 0) debug = 1; else if (strcmp(argv[i], "nowarn") == 0) flags |= PAM_SILENT; } result = establish_key(pamh, flags, CODEPATH_PAM_SM_AUTHENTICATE, debug, netname); return (result); } int remove_key(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int debug) { int result; char *uname; attrlist attr_pw[2]; struct pam_repository *auth_rep = NULL; pwu_repository_t *pwu_rep; uid_t uid; gid_t gid; struct nfs_revauth_args nra; (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void **)&uname); if (uname == NULL || *uname == NULL) { if (debug) syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "pam_dhkeys: user NULL or empty in remove_key()"); return (PAM_USER_UNKNOWN); } if (strcmp(uname, "root") == 0) { if ((flags & PAM_SILENT) == 0) { char msg[3][PAM_MAX_MSG_SIZE]; (void) snprintf(msg[0], sizeof (msg[0]), dgettext(TEXT_DOMAIN, "removing root credentials would" " break the rpc services that")); (void) snprintf(msg[1], sizeof (msg[1]), dgettext(TEXT_DOMAIN, "use secure rpc on this host!")); (void) snprintf(msg[2], sizeof (msg[2]), dgettext(TEXT_DOMAIN, "root may use keylogout -f to do" " this (at your own risk)!")); (void) __pam_display_msg(pamh, PAM_ERROR_MSG, 3, msg, NULL); } return (PAM_PERM_DENIED); } (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_REPOSITORY, (void **)&auth_rep); if (auth_rep != NULL) { if ((pwu_rep = calloc(1, sizeof (*pwu_rep))) == NULL) return (PAM_BUF_ERR); pwu_rep->type = auth_rep->type; pwu_rep->scope = auth_rep->scope; pwu_rep->scope_len = auth_rep->scope_len; } else pwu_rep = PWU_DEFAULT_REP; /* Retrieve user's uid/gid from the password repository */ attr_pw[0].type = ATTR_UID; attr_pw[0].next = &attr_pw[1]; attr_pw[1].type = ATTR_GID; attr_pw[1].next = NULL; result = __get_authtoken_attr(uname, pwu_rep, attr_pw); if (pwu_rep != PWU_DEFAULT_REP) free(pwu_rep); if (result == PWU_NOT_FOUND) return (PAM_USER_UNKNOWN); if (result == PWU_DENIED) return (PAM_PERM_DENIED); if (result != PWU_SUCCESS) return (PAM_SYSTEM_ERR); uid = (uid_t)attr_pw[0].data.val_i; gid = (gid_t)attr_pw[1].data.val_i; (void) key_removesecret_g_uid(uid, gid); /* Revoke NFS DES credentials */ nra.authtype = AUTH_DES; nra.uid = uid; if (_nfssys(NFS_REVAUTH, &nra) < 0) { if ((flags & PAM_SILENT) == 0) { (void) msg(pamh, dgettext(TEXT_DOMAIN, "Warning: NFS credentials not destroyed")); } return (PAM_AUTH_ERR); } return (PAM_IGNORE); } int pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv) { int i; int debug = 0; int result; char netname[MAXNETNAMELEN + 1]; for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { if (strcmp(argv[i], "debug") == 0) debug = 1; else if (strcmp(argv[i], "nowarn") == 0) flags |= PAM_SILENT; } /* Check for invalid flags */ if (flags && (flags & PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED) == 0 && (flags & PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED) == 0 && (flags & PAM_REFRESH_CRED) == 0 && (flags & PAM_DELETE_CRED) == 0 && (flags & PAM_SILENT) == 0) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "pam_dhkeys: pam_setcred: illegal flags %d", flags); return (PAM_SYSTEM_ERR); } if ((flags & PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED) || (flags & PAM_REFRESH_CRED)) { /* doesn't apply to UNIX */ if (debug) syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "pam_dhkeys: cred reinit/refresh " "ignored\n"); return (PAM_IGNORE); } if (flags & PAM_DELETE_CRED) { if (debug) syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "pam_dhkeys: removing creds\n"); result = remove_key(pamh, flags, debug); } else { result = establish_key(pamh, flags, CODEPATH_PAM_SM_SETCRED, debug, netname); /* Some diagnostics */ if ((flags & PAM_SILENT) == 0) { if (result == PAM_AUTH_ERR) (void) msg(pamh, dgettext(TEXT_DOMAIN, "Password does not decrypt any secret " "keys for %s."), netname); else if (result == PAM_SYSTEM_ERR && netname[0]) (void) msg(pamh, dgettext(TEXT_DOMAIN, "Could not set secret key(s) for %s. " "The key server may be down."), netname); } /* Not having credentials set is not an error... */ result = PAM_IGNORE; } return (result); } /*ARGSUSED*/ void rpc_cleanup(pam_handle_t *pamh, void *data, int pam_status) { if (data) { (void) memset(data, 0, strlen(data)); free(data); } } int pam_sm_chauthtok(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv) { int i; int debug = 0; int res; pam_repository_t *pam_rep; pwu_repository_t *pwu_rep; char *oldpw; char *user; int tries; int oldpw_ok; char *oldrpcpw; char *oldrpcpass; char *data; /* password truncated at 8 chars, see comment at establish_key() */ char short_pass[sizeof (des_block)+1], *short_passp; for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) if (strcmp(argv[i], "debug") == 0) debug = 1; if (debug) syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "pam_dhkeys: entered pam_sm_chauthtok()"); if ((flags & PAM_PRELIM_CHECK) == 0) return (PAM_IGNORE); /* * See if the old secure-rpc password has already been set */ res = pam_get_data(pamh, SUNW_OLDRPCPASS, (const void **)&oldrpcpass); if (res == PAM_SUCCESS) { if (debug) syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "pam_dhkeys: OLDRPCPASS already set"); return (PAM_IGNORE); } (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_REPOSITORY, (void **)&pam_rep); (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void **)&user); (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK, (void **)&oldpw); if (user == NULL || *user == '\0') { if (debug) syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "pam_dhkeys: user NULL or empty"); return (PAM_USER_UNKNOWN); } /* oldpw can be NULL (eg. root changing someone's passwd) */ if (oldpw) { (void) strlcpy(short_pass, oldpw, sizeof (short_pass)); short_passp = short_pass; } else short_passp = NULL; /* * For NIS+ we need to check whether the old password equals * the RPC password. If it doesn't, we won't be able to update * the secure RPC credentials later on in the process. */ if (pam_rep == NULL) pwu_rep = PWU_DEFAULT_REP; else { if ((pwu_rep = calloc(1, sizeof (*pwu_rep))) == NULL) return (PAM_BUF_ERR); pwu_rep->type = pam_rep->type; pwu_rep->scope = pam_rep->scope; pwu_rep->scope_len = pam_rep->scope_len; } switch (__verify_rpc_passwd(user, short_passp, pwu_rep)) { case PWU_SUCCESS: /* oldpw matches RPC password, or no RPC password needed */ if (pwu_rep != PWU_DEFAULT_REP) free(pwu_rep); if (short_passp) { if ((data = strdup(short_pass)) == NULL) { (void) memset(short_pass, '\0', sizeof (short_pass)); return (PAM_BUF_ERR); } } else data = NULL; (void) pam_set_data(pamh, SUNW_OLDRPCPASS, data, rpc_cleanup); return (PAM_IGNORE); case PWU_NOT_FOUND: if (pwu_rep != PWU_DEFAULT_REP) free(pwu_rep); (void) memset(short_pass, '\0', sizeof (short_pass)); return (PAM_USER_UNKNOWN); case PWU_BAD_CREDPASS: /* The old password does not decrypt any credentials */ break; case PWU_CRED_ERROR: /* * Indicates that the user's credentials could not be * retrieved or removed. This could occur when a NIS+ * user is in transition to another account authority. */ if (pwu_rep != PWU_DEFAULT_REP) free(pwu_rep); (void) memset(short_pass, '\0', sizeof (short_pass)); return (PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR); default: if (pwu_rep != PWU_DEFAULT_REP) free(pwu_rep); (void) memset(short_pass, '\0', sizeof (short_pass)); return (PAM_SYSTEM_ERR); } /* * We got here because the OLDAUTHTOK doesn't match the Secure RPC * password. In compliance with the old behavior, we give the * user two chances to get the password right. If that succeeds * all is well; if it doesn't, we'll return an error. */ (void) msg(pamh, dgettext(TEXT_DOMAIN, "This password differs from your secure RPC password.")); tries = 0; oldpw_ok = 0; while (oldpw_ok == 0 && ++tries < 3) { if (tries > 1) (void) msg(pamh, dgettext(TEXT_DOMAIN, "This password does not decrypt your " "secure RPC password.")); res = __pam_get_authtok(pamh, PAM_PROMPT, 0, dgettext(TEXT_DOMAIN, "Please enter your old Secure RPC password: "), &oldpw); if (res != PAM_SUCCESS) { if (pwu_rep != PWU_DEFAULT_REP) free(pwu_rep); return (res); } (void) strlcpy(short_pass, oldpw, sizeof (short_pass)); (void) memset(oldpw, 0, strlen(oldpw)); free(oldpw); oldpw = NULL; if (__verify_rpc_passwd(user, short_pass, pwu_rep) == PWU_SUCCESS) oldpw_ok = 1; } if (pwu_rep != PWU_DEFAULT_REP) free(pwu_rep); if (oldpw_ok == 0) { (void) memset(short_pass, '\0', sizeof (short_pass)); return (PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR); } /* * Since the PAM framework only provides space for two different * password (one old and one current), there is officially no * place to put additional passwords (like our old rpc password). * We have no choice but to stuff it in a data item, and hope it * will be picked up by the password-update routines. */ oldrpcpw = strdup(short_pass); (void) memset(short_pass, '\0', sizeof (short_pass)); if (oldrpcpw == NULL) return (PAM_BUF_ERR); res = pam_set_data(pamh, SUNW_OLDRPCPASS, oldrpcpw, rpc_cleanup); return (res); }