'\" te
.\" Copyright (c) 2009, Sun Microsystems, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
.\" The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
.\"  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations under the License. When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
.\" fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
.TH IKE.CONFIG 4 "Apr 27, 2009"
.SH NAME
ike.config \- configuration file for IKE policy
.SH SYNOPSIS
.LP
.nf
\fB/etc/inet/ike/config\fR
.fi

.SH DESCRIPTION
.sp
.LP
The \fB/etc/inet/ike/config\fR file contains rules for matching inbound IKE
requests. It also contains rules for preparing outbound \fBIKE\fR requests.
.sp
.LP
You can test the syntactic correctness of an \fB/etc/inet/ike/config\fR file by
using the \fB-c\fR or \fB-f\fR options of \fBin.iked\fR(1M). You must use the
\fB-c\fR option to test a \fBconfig\fR file. You might need to use the \fB-f\fR
option if it is not in \fB/etc/inet/ike/config\fR.
.SS "Lexical Components"
.sp
.LP
On any line, an unquoted \fB#\fR character introduces a comment. The remainder
of that line is ignored. Additionally, on any line, an unquoted \fB//\fR
sequence introduces a comment. The remainder of that line is ignored.
.sp
.LP
There are several types of lexical tokens in the \fBike.config\fR file:
.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fB\fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
A decimal, hex, or octal number representation is as in 'C'.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fB\fIIPaddr\fR/\fIprefix\fR/\fIrange\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
An IPv4 or IPv6 address with an optional /\fINNN\fR suffix, (where \fINNN\fR is
a \fInum\fR) that indicates an address (\fBCIDR\fR) prefix (for example,
\fB10.1.2.0/24\fR). An optional /\fIADDR\fR suffix (where \fIADDR\fR is a
second IP address) indicates an address/mask pair (for example,
\fB10.1.2.0/255.255.255.0\fR). An optional -\fIADDR\fR suffix (where \fIADDR\fR
is a second IPv4 address) indicates an inclusive range of addresses (for
example, \fB10.1.2.0-10.1.2.255\fR). The \fB/\fR or \fB-\fR can be surrounded
by an arbitrary amount of white space.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fB\fBXXX\fR | \fBYYY\fR | \fBZZZ\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Either the words \fBXX\fRX, \fBYYY\fR, or \fBZZZ\fR, for example, {yes,no}.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBp1-id-type\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
An IKE phase 1 identity type. IKE phase 1 identity types include:
.br
.in +2
\fBdn, DN\fR
.in -2
.br
.in +2
\fBdns, DNS\fR
.in -2
.br
.in +2
\fBfqdn, FQDN\fR
.in -2
.br
.in +2
\fBgn, GN\fR
.in -2
.br
.in +2
\fBip, IP\fR
.in -2
.br
.in +2
\fBipv4\fR
.in -2
.br
.in +2
\fBipv4_prefix\fR
.in -2
.br
.in +2
\fBipv4_range\fR
.in -2
.br
.in +2
\fBipv6\fR
.in -2
.br
.in +2
\fBipv6_prefix\fR
.in -2
.br
.in +2
\fBipv6_range\fR
.in -2
.br
.in +2
\fBmbox, MBOX\fR
.in -2
.br
.in +2
\fBuser_fqdn\fR
.in -2
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fB\fB"\fR\fIstring\fR\fB"\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
A quoted string.
.sp
Examples include:\fB"Label foo"\fR, or \fB"C=US, OU=Sun Microsystems\\, Inc.,
N=olemcd@eng.example.com"\fR
.sp
A backslash (\fB\e\fR) is an escape character. If the string needs an actual
backslash, two must be specified.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fB\fIcert-sel\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
A certificate selector, a \fIstring\fR which specifies the identities of zero
or more certificates. The specifiers can conform to \fBX.509\fR naming
conventions.
.sp
A \fIcert-sel\fR can also use various shortcuts to match either subject
alternative names, the filename or \fBslot\fR of a certificate in
\fB/etc/inet/ike/publickeys\fR, or even the \fBISSUER\fR. For example:
.sp
.in +2
.nf
"SLOT=0"
"EMAIL=postmaster@domain.org"
"webmaster@domain.org" # Some just work w/o TYPE=
"IP=10.0.0.1"
"10.21.11.11"          # Some just work w/o TYPE=
"DNS=www.domain.org"
"mailhost.domain.org"  # Some just work w/o TYPE=
"ISSUER=C=US, O=Sun Microsystems\\, Inc., CN=Sun CA"
.fi
.in -2
.sp

Any \fIcert-sel\fR preceded by the character \fB!\fR indicates a negative
match, that is, not matching this specifier. These are the same kind of strings
used in \fBikecert\fR(1M).
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fB\fIldap-list\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
A quoted, comma-separated list of LDAP servers and ports.
.sp
For example, \fB"ldap1.example.com"\fR, \fB"ldap1.example.com:389"\fR,
\fB"ldap1.example.com:389,ldap2.example.com"\fR.
.sp
The default port for LDAP is \fB389\fR.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fB\fIparameter-list\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
A list of parameters.
.RE

.SS "File Body Entries"
.sp
.LP
There are four main types of entries:
.RS +4
.TP
.ie t \(bu
.el o
global parameters
.RE
.RS +4
.TP
.ie t \(bu
.el o
IKE phase 1 transform defaults
.RE
.RS +4
.TP
.ie t \(bu
.el o
IKE rule defaults
.RE
.RS +4
.TP
.ie t \(bu
.el o
IKE rules
.RE
.sp
.LP
The global parameter entries are as follows:
.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBcert_root \fIcert-sel\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The X.509 distinguished name of a certificate that is a trusted root CA
certificate.It must be encoded in a file in the \fB/etc/inet/ike/publickeys\fR
directory. It must have a CRL in \fB/etc/inet/ike/crl\fRs. Multiple
\fBcert_root\fR parameters aggregate.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBcert_trust \fIcert-sel\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Specifies an X.509 distinguished name of a certificate that is self-signed, or
has otherwise been verified as trustworthy for signing IKE exchanges. It must
be encoded in a file in \fB/etc/inet/ike/publickeys\fR. Multiple
\fBcert_trust\fR parameters aggregate.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBexpire_timer \fIinteger\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The number of seconds to let a not-yet-complete IKE Phase I (Main Mode)
negotiation linger before deleting it. Default value: 300 seconds.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBignore_crls\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
If this keyword is present in the file, \fBin.iked\fR(1M) ignores Certificate
Revocation Lists (\fBCRL\fRs) for root \fBCA\fRs (as given in \fBcert_root\fR)
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBldap_server \fIldap-list\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
A list of LDAP servers to query for certificates. The list can be additive.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBpkcs11_path \fIstring\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The string that follows is a name of a shared object (\fB\&.so\fR) that
implements the PKCS#11 standard. The name is passed directly into
\fBdlopen\fR(3C) for linking, with all of the semantics of that library call.
By default, \fBin.iked\fR(1M) runs the same ISA as the running kernel, so a
library specified using \fBpkcs11_path\fR and an absolute pathname \fBmust\fR
match the same ISA as the kernel. One can use the start/exec SMF property (see
\fBsvccfg\fR(1M)) to change \fBin.iked\fR's ISA, but it is not recommended.
.sp
If this setting is not present, the default value is set to \fBlibpkcs11.so\fR.
Most cryptographic providers go through the default library, and this parameter
should only be used if a specialized provider of IKE-useful cryptographic
services cannot interface with the Solaris Cryptographic Framework. See
\fBcryptoadm\fR(1M).
.sp
This option is now deprecated, and may be removed in a future release.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBretry_limit \fIinteger\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The number of retransmits before any IKE negotiation is aborted. Default value:
5 times.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBretry_timer_init \fIinteger\fR or \fIfloat\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The initial interval (in seconds) between retransmits. This interval is doubled
until the \fBretry_timer_max\fR value (see below) is reached. Default value:
0.5 seconds.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBretry_timer_max \fIinteger\fR or \fIfloat\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The maximum interval (in seconds) between retransmits. The doubling retransmit
interval stops growing at this limit. Default value: 30 seconds.
.LP
Note -
.sp
.RS 2
This value is never reached with the default configuration. The longest
interval is 8 (0.5 * 2 ^ (5 - 1)) seconds.
.RE
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBproxy \fIstring\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The string following this keyword must be a URL for an HTTP proxy, for example,
\fBhttp://proxy:8080\fR.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBsocks \fIstring\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The string following this keyword must be a URL for a SOCKS proxy, for example,
\fBsocks://socks-proxy\fR.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBuse_http\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
If this keyword is present in the file, \fBin.iked\fR(1M) uses HTTP to retrieve
Certificate Revocation Lists (\fBCRL\fRs).
.RE

.sp
.LP
The following IKE phase 1 transform parameters can be prefigured using
file-level defaults. Values specified within any given transform override these
defaults.
.sp
.LP
The IKE phase 1 transform defaults are as follows:
.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBp1_lifetime_secs \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The proposed default lifetime, in seconds, of an IKE phase 1 security
association (\fBSA\fR).
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBp1_nonce_len \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The length in bytes of the phase 1 (quick mode) nonce data. This cannot be
specified on a per-rule basis.
.RE

.sp
.LP
The following IKE rule parameters can be prefigured using file-level defaults.
Values specified within any given rule override these defaults, unless a rule
cannot.
.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBp2_lifetime_secs \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The proposed default lifetime, in seconds, of an IKE phase 2 security
association (SA). This value is optional. If omitted, a default value is used.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBp2_softlife_secs \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The soft lifetime of a phase 2 SA, in seconds. If this value is specified, the
SA soft expires after the number of seconds specified by
\fBp2_softlife_secs\fR. This causes \fBin.iked\fR to renegotiate a new phase 2
SA before the original SA expires.
.sp
This value is optional, if omitted soft expiry occurs after 90% of the lifetime
specified by \fBp2_lifetime_secs\fR. The value specified by
\fBp2_softlife_secs\fR is ignored if \fBp2_lifetime_secs\fR is not specified.
.sp
Setting \fBp2_softlife_secs\fR to the same value as \fBp2_lifetime_secs\fR
disables soft expires.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBp2_idletime_secs \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The idle lifetime of a phase 2 SA, in seconds. If the value is specified, the
value specifies the lifetime of the SA, if the security association is not used
before the SA is revalidated.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBp2_lifetime_kb \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The lifetime of an SA can optionally be specified in kilobytes. This parameter
specifies the default value. If lifetimes are specified in both seconds and
kilobytes, the SA expires when either the seconds or kilobyte threshholds are
passed.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBp2_softlife_kb \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
This value is the number of kilobytes that can be protected by an SA before a
soft expire occurs (see \fBp2_softlife_secs\fR, above).
.sp
This value is optional. If omitted, soft expiry occurs after 90% of the
lifetime specified by \fBp2_lifetime_kb\fR. The value specified by
\fBp2_softlife_kb\fR is ignored if \fBp2_lifetime_kb\fR is not specified.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBp2_nonce_len \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The length in bytes of the phase 2 (quick mode) nonce data. This cannot be
specified on a per-rule basis.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBlocal_id_type \fIp1-id-type\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The local identity for IKE requires a type. This identity type is reflected in
the IKE exchange. The type can be one of the following:
.RS +4
.TP
.ie t \(bu
.el o
an IP address (for example, \fB10.1.1.2\fR)
.RE
.RS +4
.TP
.ie t \(bu
.el o
DNS name (for example, \fBtest.domain.com\fR)
.RE
.RS +4
.TP
.ie t \(bu
.el o
MBOX RFC 822 name (for example, \fBroot@domain.com\fR)
.RE
.RS +4
.TP
.ie t \(bu
.el o
DNX.509 distinguished name (for example, \fBC=US, O=Sun Microsystems\, Inc.,
CN=Sun Test cert\fR)
.RE
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBp1_xform '{' parameter-list '}\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
A phase 1 transform specifies a method for protecting an IKE phase 1 exchange.
An initiator offers up lists of phase 1 transforms, and a receiver is expected
to only accept such an entry if it matches one in a phase 1 rule. There can be
several of these, and they are additive. There must be either at least one
phase 1 transform in a rule or a global default phase 1 transform list. In a
configuration file without a global default phase 1 transform list \fBand\fR a
rule without a phase, transform list is an invalid file. Unless specified as
optional, elements in the parameter-list must occur exactly once within a given
transform's parameter-list:
.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBoakley_group \fInumber\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The Oakley Diffie-Hellman group used for IKE SA key derivation. The group
numbers are defined in RFC 2409, Appendix A, and RFC 3526. Acceptable values
are currently:
.br
.in +2
1 (768-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
2 (1024-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
5 (1536-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
14 (2048-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
15 (3072-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
16 (4096-bit)
.in -2
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBencr_alg {3des, 3des-cbc, blowfish, blowfish-cdc, des, des-cbc, aes,
aes-cbc}\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
An encryption algorithm, as in \fBipsecconf\fR(1M). However, of the ciphers
listed above, only \fBaes\fR and \fBaes-cbc\fR allow optional key-size setting,
using the "low value-to-high value" syntax. To specify a single AES key size,
the low value must equal the high value. If no range is specified, all three
AES key sizes are allowed.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBauth_alg {md5, sha, sha1, sha256, sha384, sha512}\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
An authentication algorithm.
.sp
Use \fBipsecalgs\fR(1M) with the \fB-l\fR option to list the IPsec protocols
and algorithms currently defined on a system. The \fBcryptoadm list\fR command
diplays a list of installed providers and their mechanisms. See
\fBcryptoadm\fR(1M).
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBauth_method {preshared, rsa_sig, rsa_encrypt, dss_sig}\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The authentication method used for IKE phase 1.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBp1_lifetime_secs \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Optional. The lifetime for a phase 1 SA.
.RE

.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBp2_lifetime_secs \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
If configuring the kernel defaults is not sufficient for different tasks, this
parameter can be used on a per-rule basis to set the IPsec \fBSA\fR lifetimes
in seconds.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBp2_pfs \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Use perfect forward secrecy for phase 2 (quick mode). If selected, the oakley
group specified is used for phase 2 PFS. Acceptable values are:
.br
.in +2
0 (do not use Perfect Forward Secrecy for IPsec SAs)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
1 (768-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
2 (1024-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
5 (1536-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
14 (2048-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
15 (3072-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
16 (4096-bit)
.in -2
.RE

.sp
.LP
An IKE rule starts with a right-curly-brace (\fB{\fR), ends with a
left-curly-brace (\fB}\fR), and has the following parameters in between:
.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBlabel \fIstring\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Required parameter. The administrative interface to \fBin.iked\fR looks up
phase 1 policy rules with the label as the search string. The administrative
interface also converts the label into an index, suitable for an extended
ACQUIRE message from PF_KEY - effectively tying IPsec policy to IKE policy in
the case of a node initiating traffic. Only one \fBlabel\fR parameter is
allowed per rule.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBlocal_addr <\fIIPaddr\fR/\fIprefix\fR/\fIrange\fR>\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Required parameter. The local address, address prefix, or address range for
this phase 1 rule. Multiple \fBlocal_addr\fR parameters accumulate within a
given rule.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBremote_addr <\fIIPaddr\fR/\fIprefix\fR/\fIrang\fRe>\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Required parameter. The remote address, address prefix, or address range for
this phase 1 rule. Multiple \fBremote_addr\fR parameters accumulate within a
given rule.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBlocal_id_type \fIp1-id-type\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Which phase 1 identity type I uses. This is needed because a single certificate
can contain multiple values for use in IKE phase 1. Within a given rule, all
phase 1 transforms must either use preshared or non-preshared authentication
(they cannot be mixed). For rules with preshared authentication, the
\fBlocal_id_type\fR parameter is optional, and defaults to \fBIP\fR. For rules
which use non-preshared authentication, the 'local_id_type' parameter is
required. Multiple 'local_id_type' parameters within a rule are not allowed.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBlocal_id \fIcert-sel\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Disallowed for preshared authentication method; required parameter for
non-preshared authentication method. The local identity string or certificate
selector. Only one local identity per rule is used, the first one stated.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBremote_id \fIcert-sel\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Disallowed for preshared authentication method; required parameter for
non-preshared authentication method. Selector for which remote phase 1
identities are allowed by this rule. Multiple \fBremote_id\fR parameters
accumulate within a given rule. If a single empty string (\fB""\fR) is given,
then this accepts any remote \fBID\fR for phase 1. It is recommended that
certificate trust chains or address enforcement be configured strictly to
prevent a breakdown in security if this value for \fBremote_id\fR is used.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBp2_lifetime_secs \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
If configuring the kernel defaults is not sufficient for different tasks, this
parameter can be used on a per-rule basis to set the IPsec \fBSA\fR lifetimes
in seconds.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBp2_pfs \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Use perfect forward secrecy for phase 2 (quick mode). If selected, the oakley
group specified is used for phase 2 PFS. Acceptable values are:
.br
.in +2
0 (do not use Perfect Forward Secrecy for IPsec SAs)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
1 (768-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
2 (1024-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
5 (1536-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
14 (2048-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
15 (3072-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
16 (4096-bit)
.in -2
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBp1_xform \fB{\fR \fIparameter-list\fR \fB}\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
A phase 1 transform specifies a method for protecting an IKE phase 1 exchange.
An initiator offers up lists of phase 1 transforms, and a receiver is expected
to only accept such an entry if it matches one in a phase 1 rule. There can be
several of these, and they are additive. There must be either at least one
phase 1 transform in a rule or a global default phase 1 transform list. A
\fBike.config\fR file without a global default phase 1transform list \fBand\fR
a rule without a phase 1 transform list is an invalid file. Elements within the
parameter-list; unless specified as optional, must occur exactly once within a
given transform's parameter-list:
.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBoakley_group \fInumber\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The Oakley Diffie-Hellman group used for \fBIKE SA\fR key derivation.
Acceptable values are currently:
.br
.in +2
1 (768-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
2 (1024-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
5 (1536-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
14 (2048-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
15 (3072-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
16 (4096-bit)
.in -2
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBencr_alg {3des, 3des-cbc, blowfish, blowfish-cdc, des, des-cbc, aes,
aes-cbc}\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
An encryption algorithm, as in \fBipsecconf\fR(1M). However, of the ciphers
listed above, only \fBaes\fR and \fBaes-cbc\fR allow optional key-size setting,
using the "low value-to-high value" syntax. To specify a single AES key size,
the low value must equal the high value. If no range is specified, all three
AES key sizes are allowed.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBauth_alg {md5, sha, sha1}\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
An authentication algorithm, as specified in \fBipseckey\fR(1M).
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBauth_method {preshared, rsa_sig, rsa_encrypt, dss_sig}\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The authentication method used for IKE phase 1.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.na
\fBp1_lifetime_secs \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Optional. The lifetime for a phase 1 SA.
.RE

.RE

.SH EXAMPLES
.LP
\fBExample 1 \fRA Sample \fBike.config\fR File
.sp
.LP
The following is an example of an \fBike.config\fR file:

.sp
.in +2
.nf

### BEGINNING OF FILE

### First some global parameters...

### certificate parameters...

# Root certificates. I SHOULD use a full Distinguished Name.
# I must have this certificate in my local filesystem, see ikecert(1m).
cert_root    "C=US, O=Sun Microsystems\\, Inc., CN=Sun CA"

# Explicitly trusted certs that need no signatures, or perhaps
# self-signed ones. Like root certificates, use full DNs for them
# for now.
cert_trust    "EMAIL=root@domain.org"

# Where do I send LDAP requests?
ldap_server        "ldap1.domain.org,ldap2.domain.org:389"

## phase 1 transform defaults...

p1_lifetime_secs 14400
p1_nonce_len 20

## Parameters that might also show up in rules.

p1_xform { auth_method preshared oakley_group 5 auth_alg sha
          encr_alg 3des }
p2_pfs 2



### Now some rules...

{
   label "simple inheritor"
   local_id_type ip
   local_addr 10.1.1.1
   remote_addr 10.1.1.2
}
{
   label "simple inheritor IPv6"
   local_id_type ipv6
   local_addr fe80::a00:20ff:fe7d:6
   remote_addr fe80::a00:20ff:fefb:3780
}

{
   # an index-only rule.  If I'm a receiver, and all I
   # have are index-only rules, what do I do about inbound IKE requests?
   # Answer:  Take them all!

   label "default rule"
   # Use whatever "host" (e.g. IP address) identity is appropriate
   local_id_type ipv4

   local_addr 0.0.0.0/0
   remote_addr 0.0.0.0/0

   p2_pfs 5

   # Now I'm going to have the p1_xforms
   p1_xform
   {auth_method preshared  oakley_group 5  auth_alg md5  encr_alg \e
    blowfish }   p1_xform
   {auth_method preshared  oakley_group 5  auth_alg md5  encr_alg 3des }

   # After said list, another keyword (or a '}') stops xform
   # parsing.
}

{
   # Let's try something a little more conventional.

   label "host to .80 subnet"
   local_id_type ip
   local_id "10.1.86.51"

   remote_id ""    # Take any, use remote_addr for access control.

   local_addr 10.1.86.51
   remote_addr 10.1.80.0/24

   p1_xform
   { auth_method rsa_sig  oakley_group 5  auth_alg md5  encr_alg 3des }
   p1_xform
   { auth_method rsa_sig  oakley_group 5  auth_alg md5  encr_alg \e
     blowfish }
   p1_xform
   { auth_method rsa_sig  oakley_group 5  auth_alg sha1  encr_alg 3des }
   p1_xform
   { auth_method rsa_sig  oakley_group 5  auth_alg sha1  encr_alg \e
     blowfish }
}

{
   # Let's try something a little more conventional, but with ipv6.

    label "host to fe80::/10 subnet"
    local_id_type ip
    local_id "fe80::a00:20ff:fe7d:6"

    remote_id ""    # Take any, use remote_addr for access control.

    local_addr fe80::a00:20ff:fe7d:6
    remote_addr fe80::/10

    p1_xform
    { auth_method rsa_sig  oakley_group 5  auth_alg md5  encr_alg 3des }
    p1_xform
    { auth_method rsa_sig  oakley_group 5  auth_alg md5  encr_alg \e
      blowfish }
    p1_xform
    { auth_method rsa_sig  oakley_group 5  auth_alg sha1  encr_alg \e
      3des }
    p1_xform
    { auth_method rsa_sig  oakley_group 5  auth_alg sha1  encr_alg \e
      blowfish }
}

{
    # How 'bout something with a different cert type and name?

    label "punchin-point"
    local_id_type mbox
    local_id "ipsec-wizard@domain.org"

    remote_id "10.5.5.128"

    local_addr 0.0.0.0/0
    remote_addr 10.5.5.128

    p1_xform
    { auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 5 auth_alg md5 encr_alg \e
      blowfish }
}

{
   label "receiver side"

   remote_id "ipsec-wizard@domain.org"

   local_id_type ip
   local_id "10.5.5.128"

   local_addr 10.5.5.128
   remote_addr 0.0.0.0/0

   p1_xform
   { auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 5 auth_alg md5 encr_alg blowfish }
   # NOTE:  Specifying preshared null-and-voids the remote_id/local_id
   #        fields.
   p1_xform
   { auth_method preshared oakley_group 5 auth_alg md5 encr_alg \e
     blowfish}

}
.fi
.in -2

.SH ATTRIBUTES
.sp
.LP
See \fBattributes\fR(5) for descriptions of the following attributes:
.sp

.sp
.TS
box;
c | c
l | l .
ATTRIBUTE TYPE	ATTRIBUTE VALUE
_
Interface Stability	Committed
.TE

.SH SEE ALSO
.sp
.LP
\fBcryptoadm\fR(1M), \fBikeadm\fR(1M), \fBin.iked\fR(1M), \fBikecert\fR(1M),
\fBipseckey\fR(1M), \fBipsecalgs\fR(1M), \fBipsecconf\fR(1M), \fBsvccfg\fR(1M),
\fBdlopen\fR(3C), \fBattributes\fR(5), \fBrandom\fR(7D)
.sp
.LP
Harkins, Dan and Carrel, Dave. \fIRFC 2409, Internet Key Exchange (IKE)\fR.
Cisco Systems, November 1998.
.sp
.LP
Maughan, Douglas et. al. \fIRFC 2408, Internet Security Association and Key
Management Protocol (ISAKMP)\fR. National Security Agency, Ft. Meade, MD.
November 1998.
.sp
.LP
Piper, Derrell. \fIRFC 2407, The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation
for ISAKMP\fR. Network Alchemy. Santa Cruz, California. November 1998.
.sp
.LP
Kivinen, T. \fIRFC 3526, More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman Groups
for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)\fR. The Internet Society, Network Working
Group. May 2003.