/* * Copyright 2005 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. * Use is subject to license terms. */ #pragma ident "%Z%%M% %I% %E% SMI" /* * The basic framework for this code came from the reference * implementation for MD5. That implementation is Copyright (C) * 1991-2, RSA Data Security, Inc. Created 1991. All rights reserved. * * License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it * is identified as the "RSA Data Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest * Algorithm" in all material mentioning or referencing this software * or this function. * * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided * that such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Data * Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm" in all material * mentioning or referencing the derived work. * * RSA Data Security, Inc. makes no representations concerning either * the merchantability of this software or the suitability of this * software for any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" * without express or implied warranty of any kind. * * These notices must be retained in any copies of any part of this * documentation and/or software. * * NOTE: Cleaned-up and optimized, version of SHA1, based on the FIPS 180-1 * standard, available at http://www.itl.nist.gov/div897/pubs/fip180-1.htm * Not as fast as one would like -- further optimizations are encouraged * and appreciated. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef _KERNEL #include #include #include #include #include #include /* * The sha1 module is created with two modlinkages: * - a modlmisc that allows consumers to directly call the entry points * SHA1Init, SHA1Update, and SHA1Final. * - a modlcrypto that allows the module to register with the Kernel * Cryptographic Framework (KCF) as a software provider for the SHA1 * mechanisms. */ #endif /* _KERNEL */ #ifndef _KERNEL #include #include #include #include #endif /* !_KERNEL */ static void Encode(uint8_t *, uint32_t *, size_t); static void SHA1Transform(uint32_t, uint32_t, uint32_t, uint32_t, uint32_t, SHA1_CTX *, const uint8_t *); static uint8_t PADDING[64] = { 0x80, /* all zeros */ }; /* * F, G, and H are the basic SHA1 functions. */ #define F(b, c, d) (((b) & (c)) | ((~b) & (d))) #define G(b, c, d) ((b) ^ (c) ^ (d)) #define H(b, c, d) (((b) & (c)) | ((b) & (d)) | ((c) & (d))) /* * ROTATE_LEFT rotates x left n bits. */ #define ROTATE_LEFT(x, n) \ (((x) << (n)) | ((x) >> ((sizeof (x) * NBBY)-(n)))) #ifdef _KERNEL static struct modlmisc modlmisc = { &mod_miscops, "SHA1 Message-Digest Algorithm" }; static struct modlcrypto modlcrypto = { &mod_cryptoops, "SHA1 Kernel SW Provider %I%" }; static struct modlinkage modlinkage = { MODREV_1, &modlmisc, &modlcrypto, NULL }; /* * CSPI information (entry points, provider info, etc.) */ typedef enum sha1_mech_type { SHA1_MECH_INFO_TYPE, /* SUN_CKM_SHA1 */ SHA1_HMAC_MECH_INFO_TYPE, /* SUN_CKM_SHA1_HMAC */ SHA1_HMAC_GEN_MECH_INFO_TYPE /* SUN_CKM_SHA1_HMAC_GENERAL */ } sha1_mech_type_t; #define SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH 20 /* SHA1 digest length in bytes */ #define SHA1_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE 64 /* SHA1-HMAC block size */ #define SHA1_HMAC_MIN_KEY_LEN 8 /* SHA1-HMAC min key length in bits */ #define SHA1_HMAC_MAX_KEY_LEN INT_MAX /* SHA1-HMAC max key length in bits */ #define SHA1_HMAC_INTS_PER_BLOCK (SHA1_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE/sizeof (uint32_t)) /* * Context for SHA1 mechanism. */ typedef struct sha1_ctx { sha1_mech_type_t sc_mech_type; /* type of context */ SHA1_CTX sc_sha1_ctx; /* SHA1 context */ } sha1_ctx_t; /* * Context for SHA1-HMAC and SHA1-HMAC-GENERAL mechanisms. */ typedef struct sha1_hmac_ctx { sha1_mech_type_t hc_mech_type; /* type of context */ uint32_t hc_digest_len; /* digest len in bytes */ SHA1_CTX hc_icontext; /* inner SHA1 context */ SHA1_CTX hc_ocontext; /* outer SHA1 context */ } sha1_hmac_ctx_t; /* * Macros to access the SHA1 or SHA1-HMAC contexts from a context passed * by KCF to one of the entry points. */ #define PROV_SHA1_CTX(ctx) ((sha1_ctx_t *)(ctx)->cc_provider_private) #define PROV_SHA1_HMAC_CTX(ctx) ((sha1_hmac_ctx_t *)(ctx)->cc_provider_private) /* to extract the digest length passed as mechanism parameter */ #define PROV_SHA1_GET_DIGEST_LEN(m, len) { \ if (IS_P2ALIGNED((m)->cm_param, sizeof (ulong_t))) \ (len) = (uint32_t)*((ulong_t *)mechanism->cm_param); \ else { \ ulong_t tmp_ulong; \ bcopy((m)->cm_param, &tmp_ulong, sizeof (ulong_t)); \ (len) = (uint32_t)tmp_ulong; \ } \ } #define PROV_SHA1_DIGEST_KEY(ctx, key, len, digest) { \ SHA1Init(ctx); \ SHA1Update(ctx, key, len); \ SHA1Final(digest, ctx); \ } /* * Mechanism info structure passed to KCF during registration. */ static crypto_mech_info_t sha1_mech_info_tab[] = { /* SHA1 */ {SUN_CKM_SHA1, SHA1_MECH_INFO_TYPE, CRYPTO_FG_DIGEST | CRYPTO_FG_DIGEST_ATOMIC, 0, 0, CRYPTO_KEYSIZE_UNIT_IN_BITS}, /* SHA1-HMAC */ {SUN_CKM_SHA1_HMAC, SHA1_HMAC_MECH_INFO_TYPE, CRYPTO_FG_MAC | CRYPTO_FG_MAC_ATOMIC, SHA1_HMAC_MIN_KEY_LEN, SHA1_HMAC_MAX_KEY_LEN, CRYPTO_KEYSIZE_UNIT_IN_BITS}, /* SHA1-HMAC GENERAL */ {SUN_CKM_SHA1_HMAC_GENERAL, SHA1_HMAC_GEN_MECH_INFO_TYPE, CRYPTO_FG_MAC | CRYPTO_FG_MAC_ATOMIC, SHA1_HMAC_MIN_KEY_LEN, SHA1_HMAC_MAX_KEY_LEN, CRYPTO_KEYSIZE_UNIT_IN_BITS} }; static void sha1_provider_status(crypto_provider_handle_t, uint_t *); static crypto_control_ops_t sha1_control_ops = { sha1_provider_status }; static int sha1_digest_init(crypto_ctx_t *, crypto_mechanism_t *, crypto_req_handle_t); static int sha1_digest(crypto_ctx_t *, crypto_data_t *, crypto_data_t *, crypto_req_handle_t); static int sha1_digest_update(crypto_ctx_t *, crypto_data_t *, crypto_req_handle_t); static int sha1_digest_final(crypto_ctx_t *, crypto_data_t *, crypto_req_handle_t); static int sha1_digest_atomic(crypto_provider_handle_t, crypto_session_id_t, crypto_mechanism_t *, crypto_data_t *, crypto_data_t *, crypto_req_handle_t); static crypto_digest_ops_t sha1_digest_ops = { sha1_digest_init, sha1_digest, sha1_digest_update, NULL, sha1_digest_final, sha1_digest_atomic }; static int sha1_mac_init(crypto_ctx_t *, crypto_mechanism_t *, crypto_key_t *, crypto_spi_ctx_template_t, crypto_req_handle_t); static int sha1_mac_update(crypto_ctx_t *, crypto_data_t *, crypto_req_handle_t); static int sha1_mac_final(crypto_ctx_t *, crypto_data_t *, crypto_req_handle_t); static int sha1_mac_atomic(crypto_provider_handle_t, crypto_session_id_t, crypto_mechanism_t *, crypto_key_t *, crypto_data_t *, crypto_data_t *, crypto_spi_ctx_template_t, crypto_req_handle_t); static int sha1_mac_verify_atomic(crypto_provider_handle_t, crypto_session_id_t, crypto_mechanism_t *, crypto_key_t *, crypto_data_t *, crypto_data_t *, crypto_spi_ctx_template_t, crypto_req_handle_t); static crypto_mac_ops_t sha1_mac_ops = { sha1_mac_init, NULL, sha1_mac_update, sha1_mac_final, sha1_mac_atomic, sha1_mac_verify_atomic }; static int sha1_create_ctx_template(crypto_provider_handle_t, crypto_mechanism_t *, crypto_key_t *, crypto_spi_ctx_template_t *, size_t *, crypto_req_handle_t); static int sha1_free_context(crypto_ctx_t *); static crypto_ctx_ops_t sha1_ctx_ops = { sha1_create_ctx_template, sha1_free_context }; static crypto_ops_t sha1_crypto_ops = { &sha1_control_ops, &sha1_digest_ops, NULL, &sha1_mac_ops, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &sha1_ctx_ops }; static crypto_provider_info_t sha1_prov_info = { CRYPTO_SPI_VERSION_1, "SHA1 Software Provider", CRYPTO_SW_PROVIDER, {&modlinkage}, NULL, &sha1_crypto_ops, sizeof (sha1_mech_info_tab)/sizeof (crypto_mech_info_t), sha1_mech_info_tab }; static crypto_kcf_provider_handle_t sha1_prov_handle = NULL; int _init() { int ret; if ((ret = mod_install(&modlinkage)) != 0) return (ret); /* * Register with KCF. If the registration fails, log an * error but do not uninstall the module, since the functionality * provided by misc/sha1 should still be available. */ if ((ret = crypto_register_provider(&sha1_prov_info, &sha1_prov_handle)) != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) cmn_err(CE_WARN, "sha1 _init: " "crypto_register_provider() failed (0x%x)", ret); return (0); } int _info(struct modinfo *modinfop) { return (mod_info(&modlinkage, modinfop)); } #endif /* _KERNEL */ /* * SHA1Init() * * purpose: initializes the sha1 context and begins and sha1 digest operation * input: SHA1_CTX * : the context to initializes. * output: void */ void SHA1Init(SHA1_CTX *ctx) { ctx->count[0] = ctx->count[1] = 0; /* * load magic initialization constants. Tell lint * that these constants are unsigned by using U. */ ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301U; ctx->state[1] = 0xefcdab89U; ctx->state[2] = 0x98badcfeU; ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476U; ctx->state[4] = 0xc3d2e1f0U; } #ifdef VIS_SHA1 #ifdef _KERNEL #include #include #include /* the alignment for block stores to save fp registers */ #define VIS_ALIGN (64) extern int sha1_savefp(kfpu_t *, int); extern void sha1_restorefp(kfpu_t *); uint32_t vis_sha1_svfp_threshold = 128; #else /* !_KERNEL */ static boolean_t checked_vis = B_FALSE; static int usevis = 0; static int havevis() { char *buf = NULL; char *isa_token; char *lasts; int ret = 0; size_t bufsize = 255; /* UltraSPARC III needs 115 chars */ int v9_isa_token, vis_isa_token, isa_token_num; if (checked_vis) { return (usevis); } if ((buf = malloc(bufsize)) == NULL) { return (0); } if ((ret = sysinfo(SI_ISALIST, buf, bufsize)) == -1) { free(buf); return (0); } else if (ret > bufsize) { /* We lost some because our buffer was too small */ if ((buf = realloc(buf, bufsize = ret)) == NULL) { return (0); } if ((ret = sysinfo(SI_ISALIST, buf, bufsize)) == -1) { free(buf); return (0); } } /* * Check the relative posistions of sparcv9 & sparcv9+vis * because they are listed in (best) performance order. * For example: The Niagara chip reports it has VIS but the * SHA1 code runs faster without this optimisation. */ isa_token = strtok_r(buf, " ", &lasts); v9_isa_token = vis_isa_token = -1; isa_token_num = 0; do { if (strcmp(isa_token, "sparcv9") == 0) { v9_isa_token = isa_token_num; } else if (strcmp(isa_token, "sparcv9+vis") == 0) { vis_isa_token = isa_token_num; } isa_token_num++; } while (isa_token = strtok_r(NULL, " ", &lasts)); if (vis_isa_token != -1 && vis_isa_token < v9_isa_token) usevis = 1; free(buf); checked_vis = B_TRUE; return (usevis); } #endif /* _KERNEL */ /* * VIS SHA-1 consts. */ static uint64_t VIS[] = { 0x8000000080000000ULL, 0x0002000200020002ULL, 0x5a8279996ed9eba1ULL, 0x8f1bbcdcca62c1d6ULL, 0x012389ab456789abULL}; extern void SHA1TransformVIS(uint64_t *, uint64_t *, uint32_t *, uint64_t *); /* * SHA1Update() * * purpose: continues an sha1 digest operation, using the message block * to update the context. * input: SHA1_CTX * : the context to update * uint8_t * : the message block * uint32_t : the length of the message block in bytes * output: void */ void SHA1Update(SHA1_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *input, uint32_t input_len) { uint32_t i, buf_index, buf_len; uint64_t X0[40], input64[8]; #ifdef _KERNEL int usevis = 0; #endif /* _KERNEL */ /* check for noop */ if (input_len == 0) return; /* compute number of bytes mod 64 */ buf_index = (ctx->count[1] >> 3) & 0x3F; /* update number of bits */ if ((ctx->count[1] += (input_len << 3)) < (input_len << 3)) ctx->count[0]++; ctx->count[0] += (input_len >> 29); buf_len = 64 - buf_index; /* transform as many times as possible */ i = 0; if (input_len >= buf_len) { #ifdef _KERNEL uint8_t fpua[sizeof (kfpu_t) + GSR_SIZE + VIS_ALIGN]; kfpu_t *fpu; uint32_t len = (input_len + buf_index) & ~0x3f; int svfp_ok; fpu = (kfpu_t *)P2ROUNDUP((uintptr_t)fpua, 64); svfp_ok = ((len >= vis_sha1_svfp_threshold) ? 1 : 0); usevis = fpu_exists && sha1_savefp(fpu, svfp_ok); #else if (!checked_vis) usevis = havevis(); #endif /* _KERNEL */ /* * general optimization: * * only do initial bcopy() and SHA1Transform() if * buf_index != 0. if buf_index == 0, we're just * wasting our time doing the bcopy() since there * wasn't any data left over from a previous call to * SHA1Update(). */ if (buf_index) { bcopy(input, &ctx->buf_un.buf8[buf_index], buf_len); if (usevis) { SHA1TransformVIS(X0, (uint64_t *)ctx->buf_un.buf8, &ctx->state[0], VIS); } else { SHA1Transform(ctx->state[0], ctx->state[1], ctx->state[2], ctx->state[3], ctx->state[4], ctx, ctx->buf_un.buf8); } i = buf_len; } /* * VIS SHA-1: uses the VIS 1.0 instructions to accelerate * SHA-1 processing. This is achieved by "offloading" the * computation of the message schedule (MS) to the VIS units. * This allows the VIS computation of the message schedule * to be performed in parallel with the standard integer * processing of the remainder of the SHA-1 computation. * performance by up to around 1.37X, compared to an optimized * integer-only implementation. * * The VIS implementation of SHA1Transform has a different API * to the standard integer version: * * void SHA1TransformVIS( * uint64_t *, // Pointer to MS for ith block * uint64_t *, // Pointer to ith block of message data * uint32_t *, // Pointer to SHA state i.e ctx->state * uint64_t *, // Pointer to various VIS constants * ) * * Note: the message data must by 4-byte aligned. * * Function requires VIS 1.0 support. * * Handling is provided to deal with arbitrary byte alingment * of the input data but the performance gains are reduced * for alignments other than 4-bytes. */ if (usevis) { if (((uint64_t)(uintptr_t)(&input[i]) & 0x3)) { /* * Main processing loop - input misaligned */ for (; i + 63 < input_len; i += 64) { bcopy(&input[i], input64, 64); SHA1TransformVIS(X0, input64, &ctx->state[0], VIS); } } else { /* * Main processing loop - input 8-byte aligned */ for (; i + 63 < input_len; i += 64) { SHA1TransformVIS(X0, (uint64_t *)&input[i], &ctx->state[0], VIS); } } #ifdef _KERNEL sha1_restorefp(fpu); #endif /* _KERNEL */ } else { for (; i + 63 < input_len; i += 64) { SHA1Transform(ctx->state[0], ctx->state[1], ctx->state[2], ctx->state[3], ctx->state[4], ctx, &input[i]); } } /* * general optimization: * * if i and input_len are the same, return now instead * of calling bcopy(), since the bcopy() in this case * will be an expensive nop. */ if (input_len == i) return; buf_index = 0; } /* buffer remaining input */ bcopy(&input[i], &ctx->buf_un.buf8[buf_index], input_len - i); } #else /* VIS_SHA1 */ void SHA1Update(SHA1_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *input, uint32_t input_len) { uint32_t i, buf_index, buf_len; /* check for noop */ if (input_len == 0) return; /* compute number of bytes mod 64 */ buf_index = (ctx->count[1] >> 3) & 0x3F; /* update number of bits */ if ((ctx->count[1] += (input_len << 3)) < (input_len << 3)) ctx->count[0]++; ctx->count[0] += (input_len >> 29); buf_len = 64 - buf_index; /* transform as many times as possible */ i = 0; if (input_len >= buf_len) { /* * general optimization: * * only do initial bcopy() and SHA1Transform() if * buf_index != 0. if buf_index == 0, we're just * wasting our time doing the bcopy() since there * wasn't any data left over from a previous call to * SHA1Update(). */ if (buf_index) { bcopy(input, &ctx->buf_un.buf8[buf_index], buf_len); SHA1Transform(ctx->state[0], ctx->state[1], ctx->state[2], ctx->state[3], ctx->state[4], ctx, ctx->buf_un.buf8); i = buf_len; } for (; i + 63 < input_len; i += 64) SHA1Transform(ctx->state[0], ctx->state[1], ctx->state[2], ctx->state[3], ctx->state[4], ctx, &input[i]); /* * general optimization: * * if i and input_len are the same, return now instead * of calling bcopy(), since the bcopy() in this case * will be an expensive nop. */ if (input_len == i) return; buf_index = 0; } /* buffer remaining input */ bcopy(&input[i], &ctx->buf_un.buf8[buf_index], input_len - i); } #endif /* VIS_SHA1 */ /* * SHA1Final() * * purpose: ends an sha1 digest operation, finalizing the message digest and * zeroing the context. * input: uint8_t * : a buffer to store the digest in * SHA1_CTX * : the context to finalize, save, and zero * output: void */ void SHA1Final(uint8_t *digest, SHA1_CTX *ctx) { uint8_t bitcount_be[sizeof (ctx->count)]; uint32_t index = (ctx->count[1] >> 3) & 0x3f; /* store bit count, big endian */ Encode(bitcount_be, ctx->count, sizeof (bitcount_be)); /* pad out to 56 mod 64 */ SHA1Update(ctx, PADDING, ((index < 56) ? 56 : 120) - index); /* append length (before padding) */ SHA1Update(ctx, bitcount_be, sizeof (bitcount_be)); /* store state in digest */ Encode(digest, ctx->state, sizeof (ctx->state)); } /* * sparc optimization: * * on the sparc, we can load big endian 32-bit data easily. note that * special care must be taken to ensure the address is 32-bit aligned. * in the interest of speed, we don't check to make sure, since * careful programming can guarantee this for us. */ #if defined(_BIG_ENDIAN) #define LOAD_BIG_32(addr) (*(uint32_t *)(addr)) #else /* little endian -- will work on big endian, but slowly */ #define LOAD_BIG_32(addr) \ (((addr)[0] << 24) | ((addr)[1] << 16) | ((addr)[2] << 8) | (addr)[3]) #endif /* * sparc register window optimization: * * `a', `b', `c', `d', and `e' are passed into SHA1Transform * explicitly since it increases the number of registers available to * the compiler. under this scheme, these variables can be held in * %i0 - %i4, which leaves more local and out registers available. */ /* * SHA1Transform() * * purpose: sha1 transformation -- updates the digest based on `block' * input: uint32_t : bytes 1 - 4 of the digest * uint32_t : bytes 5 - 8 of the digest * uint32_t : bytes 9 - 12 of the digest * uint32_t : bytes 12 - 16 of the digest * uint32_t : bytes 16 - 20 of the digest * SHA1_CTX * : the context to update * uint8_t [64]: the block to use to update the digest * output: void */ void SHA1Transform(uint32_t a, uint32_t b, uint32_t c, uint32_t d, uint32_t e, SHA1_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t blk[64]) { /* * sparc optimization: * * while it is somewhat counter-intuitive, on sparc, it is * more efficient to place all the constants used in this * function in an array and load the values out of the array * than to manually load the constants. this is because * setting a register to a 32-bit value takes two ops in most * cases: a `sethi' and an `or', but loading a 32-bit value * from memory only takes one `ld' (or `lduw' on v9). while * this increases memory usage, the compiler can find enough * other things to do while waiting to keep the pipeline does * not stall. additionally, it is likely that many of these * constants are cached so that later accesses do not even go * out to the bus. * * this array is declared `static' to keep the compiler from * having to bcopy() this array onto the stack frame of * SHA1Transform() each time it is called -- which is * unacceptably expensive. * * the `const' is to ensure that callers are good citizens and * do not try to munge the array. since these routines are * going to be called from inside multithreaded kernelland, * this is a good safety check. -- `sha1_consts' will end up in * .rodata. * * unfortunately, loading from an array in this manner hurts * performance under intel. so, there is a macro, * SHA1_CONST(), used in SHA1Transform(), that either expands to * a reference to this array, or to the actual constant, * depending on what platform this code is compiled for. */ #if defined(__sparc) static const uint32_t sha1_consts[] = { SHA1_CONST_0, SHA1_CONST_1, SHA1_CONST_2, SHA1_CONST_3, }; #endif /* * general optimization: * * use individual integers instead of using an array. this is a * win, although the amount it wins by seems to vary quite a bit. */ uint32_t w_0, w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4, w_5, w_6, w_7; uint32_t w_8, w_9, w_10, w_11, w_12, w_13, w_14, w_15; /* * sparc optimization: * * if `block' is already aligned on a 4-byte boundary, use * LOAD_BIG_32() directly. otherwise, bcopy() into a * buffer that *is* aligned on a 4-byte boundary and then do * the LOAD_BIG_32() on that buffer. benchmarks have shown * that using the bcopy() is better than loading the bytes * individually and doing the endian-swap by hand. * * even though it's quite tempting to assign to do: * * blk = bcopy(ctx->buf_un.buf32, blk, sizeof (ctx->buf_un.buf32)); * * and only have one set of LOAD_BIG_32()'s, the compiler * *does not* like that, so please resist the urge. */ #if defined(__sparc) if ((uintptr_t)blk & 0x3) { /* not 4-byte aligned? */ bcopy(blk, ctx->buf_un.buf32, sizeof (ctx->buf_un.buf32)); w_15 = LOAD_BIG_32(ctx->buf_un.buf32 + 15); w_14 = LOAD_BIG_32(ctx->buf_un.buf32 + 14); w_13 = LOAD_BIG_32(ctx->buf_un.buf32 + 13); w_12 = LOAD_BIG_32(ctx->buf_un.buf32 + 12); w_11 = LOAD_BIG_32(ctx->buf_un.buf32 + 11); w_10 = LOAD_BIG_32(ctx->buf_un.buf32 + 10); w_9 = LOAD_BIG_32(ctx->buf_un.buf32 + 9); w_8 = LOAD_BIG_32(ctx->buf_un.buf32 + 8); w_7 = LOAD_BIG_32(ctx->buf_un.buf32 + 7); w_6 = LOAD_BIG_32(ctx->buf_un.buf32 + 6); w_5 = LOAD_BIG_32(ctx->buf_un.buf32 + 5); w_4 = LOAD_BIG_32(ctx->buf_un.buf32 + 4); w_3 = LOAD_BIG_32(ctx->buf_un.buf32 + 3); w_2 = LOAD_BIG_32(ctx->buf_un.buf32 + 2); w_1 = LOAD_BIG_32(ctx->buf_un.buf32 + 1); w_0 = LOAD_BIG_32(ctx->buf_un.buf32 + 0); } else { /*LINTED*/ w_15 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 60); /*LINTED*/ w_14 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 56); /*LINTED*/ w_13 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 52); /*LINTED*/ w_12 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 48); /*LINTED*/ w_11 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 44); /*LINTED*/ w_10 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 40); /*LINTED*/ w_9 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 36); /*LINTED*/ w_8 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 32); /*LINTED*/ w_7 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 28); /*LINTED*/ w_6 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 24); /*LINTED*/ w_5 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 20); /*LINTED*/ w_4 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 16); /*LINTED*/ w_3 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 12); /*LINTED*/ w_2 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 8); /*LINTED*/ w_1 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 4); /*LINTED*/ w_0 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 0); } #else w_15 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 60); w_14 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 56); w_13 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 52); w_12 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 48); w_11 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 44); w_10 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 40); w_9 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 36); w_8 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 32); w_7 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 28); w_6 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 24); w_5 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 20); w_4 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 16); w_3 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 12); w_2 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 8); w_1 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 4); w_0 = LOAD_BIG_32(blk + 0); #endif /* * general optimization: * * even though this approach is described in the standard as * being slower algorithmically, it is 30-40% faster than the * "faster" version under SPARC, because this version has more * of the constraints specified at compile-time and uses fewer * variables (and therefore has better register utilization) * than its "speedier" brother. (i've tried both, trust me) * * for either method given in the spec, there is an "assignment" * phase where the following takes place: * * tmp = (main_computation); * e = d; d = c; c = rotate_left(b, 30); b = a; a = tmp; * * we can make the algorithm go faster by not doing this work, * but just pretending that `d' is now `e', etc. this works * really well and obviates the need for a temporary variable. * however, we still explictly perform the rotate action, * since it is cheaper on SPARC to do it once than to have to * do it over and over again. */ /* round 1 */ e = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 5) + F(b, c, d) + e + w_0 + SHA1_CONST(0); /* 0 */ b = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 30); d = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 5) + F(a, b, c) + d + w_1 + SHA1_CONST(0); /* 1 */ a = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 30); c = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 5) + F(e, a, b) + c + w_2 + SHA1_CONST(0); /* 2 */ e = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 30); b = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 5) + F(d, e, a) + b + w_3 + SHA1_CONST(0); /* 3 */ d = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 30); a = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 5) + F(c, d, e) + a + w_4 + SHA1_CONST(0); /* 4 */ c = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 30); e = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 5) + F(b, c, d) + e + w_5 + SHA1_CONST(0); /* 5 */ b = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 30); d = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 5) + F(a, b, c) + d + w_6 + SHA1_CONST(0); /* 6 */ a = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 30); c = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 5) + F(e, a, b) + c + w_7 + SHA1_CONST(0); /* 7 */ e = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 30); b = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 5) + F(d, e, a) + b + w_8 + SHA1_CONST(0); /* 8 */ d = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 30); a = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 5) + F(c, d, e) + a + w_9 + SHA1_CONST(0); /* 9 */ c = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 30); e = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 5) + F(b, c, d) + e + w_10 + SHA1_CONST(0); /* 10 */ b = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 30); d = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 5) + F(a, b, c) + d + w_11 + SHA1_CONST(0); /* 11 */ a = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 30); c = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 5) + F(e, a, b) + c + w_12 + SHA1_CONST(0); /* 12 */ e = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 30); b = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 5) + F(d, e, a) + b + w_13 + SHA1_CONST(0); /* 13 */ d = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 30); a = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 5) + F(c, d, e) + a + w_14 + SHA1_CONST(0); /* 14 */ c = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 30); e = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 5) + F(b, c, d) + e + w_15 + SHA1_CONST(0); /* 15 */ b = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 30); w_0 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_13 ^ w_8 ^ w_2 ^ w_0), 1); /* 16 */ d = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 5) + F(a, b, c) + d + w_0 + SHA1_CONST(0); a = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 30); w_1 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_14 ^ w_9 ^ w_3 ^ w_1), 1); /* 17 */ c = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 5) + F(e, a, b) + c + w_1 + SHA1_CONST(0); e = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 30); w_2 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_15 ^ w_10 ^ w_4 ^ w_2), 1); /* 18 */ b = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 5) + F(d, e, a) + b + w_2 + SHA1_CONST(0); d = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 30); w_3 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_0 ^ w_11 ^ w_5 ^ w_3), 1); /* 19 */ a = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 5) + F(c, d, e) + a + w_3 + SHA1_CONST(0); c = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 30); /* round 2 */ w_4 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_1 ^ w_12 ^ w_6 ^ w_4), 1); /* 20 */ e = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 5) + G(b, c, d) + e + w_4 + SHA1_CONST(1); b = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 30); w_5 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_2 ^ w_13 ^ w_7 ^ w_5), 1); /* 21 */ d = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 5) + G(a, b, c) + d + w_5 + SHA1_CONST(1); a = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 30); w_6 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_3 ^ w_14 ^ w_8 ^ w_6), 1); /* 22 */ c = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 5) + G(e, a, b) + c + w_6 + SHA1_CONST(1); e = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 30); w_7 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_4 ^ w_15 ^ w_9 ^ w_7), 1); /* 23 */ b = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 5) + G(d, e, a) + b + w_7 + SHA1_CONST(1); d = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 30); w_8 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_5 ^ w_0 ^ w_10 ^ w_8), 1); /* 24 */ a = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 5) + G(c, d, e) + a + w_8 + SHA1_CONST(1); c = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 30); w_9 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_6 ^ w_1 ^ w_11 ^ w_9), 1); /* 25 */ e = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 5) + G(b, c, d) + e + w_9 + SHA1_CONST(1); b = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 30); w_10 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_7 ^ w_2 ^ w_12 ^ w_10), 1); /* 26 */ d = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 5) + G(a, b, c) + d + w_10 + SHA1_CONST(1); a = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 30); w_11 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_8 ^ w_3 ^ w_13 ^ w_11), 1); /* 27 */ c = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 5) + G(e, a, b) + c + w_11 + SHA1_CONST(1); e = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 30); w_12 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_9 ^ w_4 ^ w_14 ^ w_12), 1); /* 28 */ b = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 5) + G(d, e, a) + b + w_12 + SHA1_CONST(1); d = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 30); w_13 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_10 ^ w_5 ^ w_15 ^ w_13), 1); /* 29 */ a = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 5) + G(c, d, e) + a + w_13 + SHA1_CONST(1); c = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 30); w_14 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_11 ^ w_6 ^ w_0 ^ w_14), 1); /* 30 */ e = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 5) + G(b, c, d) + e + w_14 + SHA1_CONST(1); b = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 30); w_15 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_12 ^ w_7 ^ w_1 ^ w_15), 1); /* 31 */ d = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 5) + G(a, b, c) + d + w_15 + SHA1_CONST(1); a = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 30); w_0 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_13 ^ w_8 ^ w_2 ^ w_0), 1); /* 32 */ c = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 5) + G(e, a, b) + c + w_0 + SHA1_CONST(1); e = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 30); w_1 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_14 ^ w_9 ^ w_3 ^ w_1), 1); /* 33 */ b = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 5) + G(d, e, a) + b + w_1 + SHA1_CONST(1); d = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 30); w_2 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_15 ^ w_10 ^ w_4 ^ w_2), 1); /* 34 */ a = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 5) + G(c, d, e) + a + w_2 + SHA1_CONST(1); c = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 30); w_3 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_0 ^ w_11 ^ w_5 ^ w_3), 1); /* 35 */ e = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 5) + G(b, c, d) + e + w_3 + SHA1_CONST(1); b = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 30); w_4 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_1 ^ w_12 ^ w_6 ^ w_4), 1); /* 36 */ d = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 5) + G(a, b, c) + d + w_4 + SHA1_CONST(1); a = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 30); w_5 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_2 ^ w_13 ^ w_7 ^ w_5), 1); /* 37 */ c = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 5) + G(e, a, b) + c + w_5 + SHA1_CONST(1); e = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 30); w_6 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_3 ^ w_14 ^ w_8 ^ w_6), 1); /* 38 */ b = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 5) + G(d, e, a) + b + w_6 + SHA1_CONST(1); d = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 30); w_7 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_4 ^ w_15 ^ w_9 ^ w_7), 1); /* 39 */ a = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 5) + G(c, d, e) + a + w_7 + SHA1_CONST(1); c = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 30); /* round 3 */ w_8 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_5 ^ w_0 ^ w_10 ^ w_8), 1); /* 40 */ e = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 5) + H(b, c, d) + e + w_8 + SHA1_CONST(2); b = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 30); w_9 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_6 ^ w_1 ^ w_11 ^ w_9), 1); /* 41 */ d = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 5) + H(a, b, c) + d + w_9 + SHA1_CONST(2); a = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 30); w_10 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_7 ^ w_2 ^ w_12 ^ w_10), 1); /* 42 */ c = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 5) + H(e, a, b) + c + w_10 + SHA1_CONST(2); e = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 30); w_11 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_8 ^ w_3 ^ w_13 ^ w_11), 1); /* 43 */ b = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 5) + H(d, e, a) + b + w_11 + SHA1_CONST(2); d = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 30); w_12 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_9 ^ w_4 ^ w_14 ^ w_12), 1); /* 44 */ a = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 5) + H(c, d, e) + a + w_12 + SHA1_CONST(2); c = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 30); w_13 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_10 ^ w_5 ^ w_15 ^ w_13), 1); /* 45 */ e = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 5) + H(b, c, d) + e + w_13 + SHA1_CONST(2); b = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 30); w_14 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_11 ^ w_6 ^ w_0 ^ w_14), 1); /* 46 */ d = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 5) + H(a, b, c) + d + w_14 + SHA1_CONST(2); a = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 30); w_15 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_12 ^ w_7 ^ w_1 ^ w_15), 1); /* 47 */ c = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 5) + H(e, a, b) + c + w_15 + SHA1_CONST(2); e = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 30); w_0 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_13 ^ w_8 ^ w_2 ^ w_0), 1); /* 48 */ b = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 5) + H(d, e, a) + b + w_0 + SHA1_CONST(2); d = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 30); w_1 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_14 ^ w_9 ^ w_3 ^ w_1), 1); /* 49 */ a = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 5) + H(c, d, e) + a + w_1 + SHA1_CONST(2); c = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 30); w_2 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_15 ^ w_10 ^ w_4 ^ w_2), 1); /* 50 */ e = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 5) + H(b, c, d) + e + w_2 + SHA1_CONST(2); b = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 30); w_3 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_0 ^ w_11 ^ w_5 ^ w_3), 1); /* 51 */ d = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 5) + H(a, b, c) + d + w_3 + SHA1_CONST(2); a = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 30); w_4 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_1 ^ w_12 ^ w_6 ^ w_4), 1); /* 52 */ c = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 5) + H(e, a, b) + c + w_4 + SHA1_CONST(2); e = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 30); w_5 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_2 ^ w_13 ^ w_7 ^ w_5), 1); /* 53 */ b = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 5) + H(d, e, a) + b + w_5 + SHA1_CONST(2); d = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 30); w_6 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_3 ^ w_14 ^ w_8 ^ w_6), 1); /* 54 */ a = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 5) + H(c, d, e) + a + w_6 + SHA1_CONST(2); c = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 30); w_7 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_4 ^ w_15 ^ w_9 ^ w_7), 1); /* 55 */ e = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 5) + H(b, c, d) + e + w_7 + SHA1_CONST(2); b = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 30); w_8 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_5 ^ w_0 ^ w_10 ^ w_8), 1); /* 56 */ d = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 5) + H(a, b, c) + d + w_8 + SHA1_CONST(2); a = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 30); w_9 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_6 ^ w_1 ^ w_11 ^ w_9), 1); /* 57 */ c = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 5) + H(e, a, b) + c + w_9 + SHA1_CONST(2); e = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 30); w_10 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_7 ^ w_2 ^ w_12 ^ w_10), 1); /* 58 */ b = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 5) + H(d, e, a) + b + w_10 + SHA1_CONST(2); d = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 30); w_11 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_8 ^ w_3 ^ w_13 ^ w_11), 1); /* 59 */ a = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 5) + H(c, d, e) + a + w_11 + SHA1_CONST(2); c = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 30); /* round 4 */ w_12 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_9 ^ w_4 ^ w_14 ^ w_12), 1); /* 60 */ e = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 5) + G(b, c, d) + e + w_12 + SHA1_CONST(3); b = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 30); w_13 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_10 ^ w_5 ^ w_15 ^ w_13), 1); /* 61 */ d = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 5) + G(a, b, c) + d + w_13 + SHA1_CONST(3); a = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 30); w_14 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_11 ^ w_6 ^ w_0 ^ w_14), 1); /* 62 */ c = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 5) + G(e, a, b) + c + w_14 + SHA1_CONST(3); e = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 30); w_15 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_12 ^ w_7 ^ w_1 ^ w_15), 1); /* 63 */ b = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 5) + G(d, e, a) + b + w_15 + SHA1_CONST(3); d = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 30); w_0 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_13 ^ w_8 ^ w_2 ^ w_0), 1); /* 64 */ a = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 5) + G(c, d, e) + a + w_0 + SHA1_CONST(3); c = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 30); w_1 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_14 ^ w_9 ^ w_3 ^ w_1), 1); /* 65 */ e = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 5) + G(b, c, d) + e + w_1 + SHA1_CONST(3); b = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 30); w_2 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_15 ^ w_10 ^ w_4 ^ w_2), 1); /* 66 */ d = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 5) + G(a, b, c) + d + w_2 + SHA1_CONST(3); a = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 30); w_3 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_0 ^ w_11 ^ w_5 ^ w_3), 1); /* 67 */ c = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 5) + G(e, a, b) + c + w_3 + SHA1_CONST(3); e = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 30); w_4 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_1 ^ w_12 ^ w_6 ^ w_4), 1); /* 68 */ b = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 5) + G(d, e, a) + b + w_4 + SHA1_CONST(3); d = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 30); w_5 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_2 ^ w_13 ^ w_7 ^ w_5), 1); /* 69 */ a = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 5) + G(c, d, e) + a + w_5 + SHA1_CONST(3); c = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 30); w_6 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_3 ^ w_14 ^ w_8 ^ w_6), 1); /* 70 */ e = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 5) + G(b, c, d) + e + w_6 + SHA1_CONST(3); b = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 30); w_7 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_4 ^ w_15 ^ w_9 ^ w_7), 1); /* 71 */ d = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 5) + G(a, b, c) + d + w_7 + SHA1_CONST(3); a = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 30); w_8 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_5 ^ w_0 ^ w_10 ^ w_8), 1); /* 72 */ c = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 5) + G(e, a, b) + c + w_8 + SHA1_CONST(3); e = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 30); w_9 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_6 ^ w_1 ^ w_11 ^ w_9), 1); /* 73 */ b = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 5) + G(d, e, a) + b + w_9 + SHA1_CONST(3); d = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 30); w_10 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_7 ^ w_2 ^ w_12 ^ w_10), 1); /* 74 */ a = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 5) + G(c, d, e) + a + w_10 + SHA1_CONST(3); c = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 30); w_11 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_8 ^ w_3 ^ w_13 ^ w_11), 1); /* 75 */ e = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 5) + G(b, c, d) + e + w_11 + SHA1_CONST(3); b = ROTATE_LEFT(b, 30); w_12 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_9 ^ w_4 ^ w_14 ^ w_12), 1); /* 76 */ d = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 5) + G(a, b, c) + d + w_12 + SHA1_CONST(3); a = ROTATE_LEFT(a, 30); w_13 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_10 ^ w_5 ^ w_15 ^ w_13), 1); /* 77 */ c = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 5) + G(e, a, b) + c + w_13 + SHA1_CONST(3); e = ROTATE_LEFT(e, 30); w_14 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_11 ^ w_6 ^ w_0 ^ w_14), 1); /* 78 */ b = ROTATE_LEFT(c, 5) + G(d, e, a) + b + w_14 + SHA1_CONST(3); d = ROTATE_LEFT(d, 30); w_15 = ROTATE_LEFT((w_12 ^ w_7 ^ w_1 ^ w_15), 1); /* 79 */ ctx->state[0] += ROTATE_LEFT(b, 5) + G(c, d, e) + a + w_15 + SHA1_CONST(3); ctx->state[1] += b; ctx->state[2] += ROTATE_LEFT(c, 30); ctx->state[3] += d; ctx->state[4] += e; /* zeroize sensitive information */ w_0 = w_1 = w_2 = w_3 = w_4 = w_5 = w_6 = w_7 = w_8 = 0; w_9 = w_10 = w_11 = w_12 = w_13 = w_14 = w_15 = 0; } /* * devpro compiler optimization: * * the compiler can generate better code if it knows that `input' and * `output' do not point to the same source. there is no portable * way to tell the compiler this, but the sun compiler recognizes the * `_Restrict' keyword to indicate this condition. use it if possible. */ #ifdef __RESTRICT #define restrict _Restrict #else #define restrict /* nothing */ #endif /* * Encode() * * purpose: to convert a list of numbers from little endian to big endian * input: uint8_t * : place to store the converted big endian numbers * uint32_t * : place to get numbers to convert from * size_t : the length of the input in bytes * output: void */ static void Encode(uint8_t *restrict output, uint32_t *restrict input, size_t len) { size_t i, j; #if defined(__sparc) if (IS_P2ALIGNED(output, sizeof (uint32_t))) { for (i = 0, j = 0; j < len; i++, j += 4) { /* LINTED: pointer alignment */ *((uint32_t *)(output + j)) = input[i]; } } else { #endif /* little endian -- will work on big endian, but slowly */ for (i = 0, j = 0; j < len; i++, j += 4) { output[j] = (input[i] >> 24) & 0xff; output[j + 1] = (input[i] >> 16) & 0xff; output[j + 2] = (input[i] >> 8) & 0xff; output[j + 3] = input[i] & 0xff; } #if defined(__sparc) } #endif } #ifdef _KERNEL /* * KCF software provider control entry points. */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void sha1_provider_status(crypto_provider_handle_t provider, uint_t *status) { *status = CRYPTO_PROVIDER_READY; } /* * KCF software provider digest entry points. */ static int sha1_digest_init(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_mechanism_t *mechanism, crypto_req_handle_t req) { if (mechanism->cm_type != SHA1_MECH_INFO_TYPE) return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_INVALID); /* * Allocate and initialize SHA1 context. */ ctx->cc_provider_private = kmem_alloc(sizeof (sha1_ctx_t), crypto_kmflag(req)); if (ctx->cc_provider_private == NULL) return (CRYPTO_HOST_MEMORY); PROV_SHA1_CTX(ctx)->sc_mech_type = SHA1_MECH_INFO_TYPE; SHA1Init(&PROV_SHA1_CTX(ctx)->sc_sha1_ctx); return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS); } /* * Helper SHA1 digest update function for uio data. */ static int sha1_digest_update_uio(SHA1_CTX *sha1_ctx, crypto_data_t *data) { off_t offset = data->cd_offset; size_t length = data->cd_length; uint_t vec_idx; size_t cur_len; /* we support only kernel buffer */ if (data->cd_uio->uio_segflg != UIO_SYSSPACE) return (CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD); /* * Jump to the first iovec containing data to be * digested. */ for (vec_idx = 0; vec_idx < data->cd_uio->uio_iovcnt && offset >= data->cd_uio->uio_iov[vec_idx].iov_len; offset -= data->cd_uio->uio_iov[vec_idx++].iov_len); if (vec_idx == data->cd_uio->uio_iovcnt) { /* * The caller specified an offset that is larger than the * total size of the buffers it provided. */ return (CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE); } /* * Now do the digesting on the iovecs. */ while (vec_idx < data->cd_uio->uio_iovcnt && length > 0) { cur_len = MIN(data->cd_uio->uio_iov[vec_idx].iov_len - offset, length); SHA1Update(sha1_ctx, (uint8_t *)data->cd_uio->uio_iov[vec_idx].iov_base + offset, cur_len); length -= cur_len; vec_idx++; offset = 0; } if (vec_idx == data->cd_uio->uio_iovcnt && length > 0) { /* * The end of the specified iovec's was reached but * the length requested could not be processed, i.e. * The caller requested to digest more data than it provided. */ return (CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE); } return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS); } /* * Helper SHA1 digest final function for uio data. * digest_len is the length of the desired digest. If digest_len * is smaller than the default SHA1 digest length, the caller * must pass a scratch buffer, digest_scratch, which must * be at least SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes. */ static int sha1_digest_final_uio(SHA1_CTX *sha1_ctx, crypto_data_t *digest, ulong_t digest_len, uchar_t *digest_scratch) { off_t offset = digest->cd_offset; uint_t vec_idx; /* we support only kernel buffer */ if (digest->cd_uio->uio_segflg != UIO_SYSSPACE) return (CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD); /* * Jump to the first iovec containing ptr to the digest to * be returned. */ for (vec_idx = 0; offset >= digest->cd_uio->uio_iov[vec_idx].iov_len && vec_idx < digest->cd_uio->uio_iovcnt; offset -= digest->cd_uio->uio_iov[vec_idx++].iov_len); if (vec_idx == digest->cd_uio->uio_iovcnt) { /* * The caller specified an offset that is * larger than the total size of the buffers * it provided. */ return (CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE); } if (offset + digest_len <= digest->cd_uio->uio_iov[vec_idx].iov_len) { /* * The computed SHA1 digest will fit in the current * iovec. */ if (digest_len != SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH) { /* * The caller requested a short digest. Digest * into a scratch buffer and return to * the user only what was requested. */ SHA1Final(digest_scratch, sha1_ctx); bcopy(digest_scratch, (uchar_t *)digest-> cd_uio->uio_iov[vec_idx].iov_base + offset, digest_len); } else { SHA1Final((uchar_t *)digest-> cd_uio->uio_iov[vec_idx].iov_base + offset, sha1_ctx); } } else { /* * The computed digest will be crossing one or more iovec's. * This is bad performance-wise but we need to support it. * Allocate a small scratch buffer on the stack and * copy it piece meal to the specified digest iovec's. */ uchar_t digest_tmp[SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH]; off_t scratch_offset = 0; size_t length = digest_len; size_t cur_len; SHA1Final(digest_tmp, sha1_ctx); while (vec_idx < digest->cd_uio->uio_iovcnt && length > 0) { cur_len = MIN(digest->cd_uio->uio_iov[vec_idx].iov_len - offset, length); bcopy(digest_tmp + scratch_offset, digest->cd_uio->uio_iov[vec_idx].iov_base + offset, cur_len); length -= cur_len; vec_idx++; scratch_offset += cur_len; offset = 0; } if (vec_idx == digest->cd_uio->uio_iovcnt && length > 0) { /* * The end of the specified iovec's was reached but * the length requested could not be processed, i.e. * The caller requested to digest more data than it * provided. */ return (CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE); } } return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS); } /* * Helper SHA1 digest update for mblk's. */ static int sha1_digest_update_mblk(SHA1_CTX *sha1_ctx, crypto_data_t *data) { off_t offset = data->cd_offset; size_t length = data->cd_length; mblk_t *mp; size_t cur_len; /* * Jump to the first mblk_t containing data to be digested. */ for (mp = data->cd_mp; mp != NULL && offset >= MBLKL(mp); offset -= MBLKL(mp), mp = mp->b_cont); if (mp == NULL) { /* * The caller specified an offset that is larger than the * total size of the buffers it provided. */ return (CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE); } /* * Now do the digesting on the mblk chain. */ while (mp != NULL && length > 0) { cur_len = MIN(MBLKL(mp) - offset, length); SHA1Update(sha1_ctx, mp->b_rptr + offset, cur_len); length -= cur_len; offset = 0; mp = mp->b_cont; } if (mp == NULL && length > 0) { /* * The end of the mblk was reached but the length requested * could not be processed, i.e. The caller requested * to digest more data than it provided. */ return (CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE); } return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS); } /* * Helper SHA1 digest final for mblk's. * digest_len is the length of the desired digest. If digest_len * is smaller than the default SHA1 digest length, the caller * must pass a scratch buffer, digest_scratch, which must * be at least SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes. */ static int sha1_digest_final_mblk(SHA1_CTX *sha1_ctx, crypto_data_t *digest, ulong_t digest_len, uchar_t *digest_scratch) { off_t offset = digest->cd_offset; mblk_t *mp; /* * Jump to the first mblk_t that will be used to store the digest. */ for (mp = digest->cd_mp; mp != NULL && offset >= MBLKL(mp); offset -= MBLKL(mp), mp = mp->b_cont); if (mp == NULL) { /* * The caller specified an offset that is larger than the * total size of the buffers it provided. */ return (CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE); } if (offset + digest_len <= MBLKL(mp)) { /* * The computed SHA1 digest will fit in the current mblk. * Do the SHA1Final() in-place. */ if (digest_len != SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH) { /* * The caller requested a short digest. Digest * into a scratch buffer and return to * the user only what was requested. */ SHA1Final(digest_scratch, sha1_ctx); bcopy(digest_scratch, mp->b_rptr + offset, digest_len); } else { SHA1Final(mp->b_rptr + offset, sha1_ctx); } } else { /* * The computed digest will be crossing one or more mblk's. * This is bad performance-wise but we need to support it. * Allocate a small scratch buffer on the stack and * copy it piece meal to the specified digest iovec's. */ uchar_t digest_tmp[SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH]; off_t scratch_offset = 0; size_t length = digest_len; size_t cur_len; SHA1Final(digest_tmp, sha1_ctx); while (mp != NULL && length > 0) { cur_len = MIN(MBLKL(mp) - offset, length); bcopy(digest_tmp + scratch_offset, mp->b_rptr + offset, cur_len); length -= cur_len; mp = mp->b_cont; scratch_offset += cur_len; offset = 0; } if (mp == NULL && length > 0) { /* * The end of the specified mblk was reached but * the length requested could not be processed, i.e. * The caller requested to digest more data than it * provided. */ return (CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE); } } return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS); } /* ARGSUSED */ static int sha1_digest(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *data, crypto_data_t *digest, crypto_req_handle_t req) { int ret = CRYPTO_SUCCESS; ASSERT(ctx->cc_provider_private != NULL); /* * We need to just return the length needed to store the output. * We should not destroy the context for the following cases. */ if ((digest->cd_length == 0) || (digest->cd_length < SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH)) { digest->cd_length = SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH; return (CRYPTO_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); } /* * Do the SHA1 update on the specified input data. */ switch (data->cd_format) { case CRYPTO_DATA_RAW: SHA1Update(&PROV_SHA1_CTX(ctx)->sc_sha1_ctx, (uint8_t *)data->cd_raw.iov_base + data->cd_offset, data->cd_length); break; case CRYPTO_DATA_UIO: ret = sha1_digest_update_uio(&PROV_SHA1_CTX(ctx)->sc_sha1_ctx, data); break; case CRYPTO_DATA_MBLK: ret = sha1_digest_update_mblk(&PROV_SHA1_CTX(ctx)->sc_sha1_ctx, data); break; default: ret = CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD; } if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) { /* the update failed, free context and bail */ kmem_free(ctx->cc_provider_private, sizeof (sha1_ctx_t)); ctx->cc_provider_private = NULL; digest->cd_length = 0; return (ret); } /* * Do a SHA1 final, must be done separately since the digest * type can be different than the input data type. */ switch (digest->cd_format) { case CRYPTO_DATA_RAW: SHA1Final((unsigned char *)digest->cd_raw.iov_base + digest->cd_offset, &PROV_SHA1_CTX(ctx)->sc_sha1_ctx); break; case CRYPTO_DATA_UIO: ret = sha1_digest_final_uio(&PROV_SHA1_CTX(ctx)->sc_sha1_ctx, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL); break; case CRYPTO_DATA_MBLK: ret = sha1_digest_final_mblk(&PROV_SHA1_CTX(ctx)->sc_sha1_ctx, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL); break; default: ret = CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD; } /* all done, free context and return */ if (ret == CRYPTO_SUCCESS) { digest->cd_length = SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH; } else { digest->cd_length = 0; } kmem_free(ctx->cc_provider_private, sizeof (sha1_ctx_t)); ctx->cc_provider_private = NULL; return (ret); } /* ARGSUSED */ static int sha1_digest_update(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *data, crypto_req_handle_t req) { int ret = CRYPTO_SUCCESS; ASSERT(ctx->cc_provider_private != NULL); /* * Do the SHA1 update on the specified input data. */ switch (data->cd_format) { case CRYPTO_DATA_RAW: SHA1Update(&PROV_SHA1_CTX(ctx)->sc_sha1_ctx, (uint8_t *)data->cd_raw.iov_base + data->cd_offset, data->cd_length); break; case CRYPTO_DATA_UIO: ret = sha1_digest_update_uio(&PROV_SHA1_CTX(ctx)->sc_sha1_ctx, data); break; case CRYPTO_DATA_MBLK: ret = sha1_digest_update_mblk(&PROV_SHA1_CTX(ctx)->sc_sha1_ctx, data); break; default: ret = CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD; } return (ret); } /* ARGSUSED */ static int sha1_digest_final(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *digest, crypto_req_handle_t req) { int ret = CRYPTO_SUCCESS; ASSERT(ctx->cc_provider_private != NULL); /* * We need to just return the length needed to store the output. * We should not destroy the context for the following cases. */ if ((digest->cd_length == 0) || (digest->cd_length < SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH)) { digest->cd_length = SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH; return (CRYPTO_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); } /* * Do a SHA1 final. */ switch (digest->cd_format) { case CRYPTO_DATA_RAW: SHA1Final((unsigned char *)digest->cd_raw.iov_base + digest->cd_offset, &PROV_SHA1_CTX(ctx)->sc_sha1_ctx); break; case CRYPTO_DATA_UIO: ret = sha1_digest_final_uio(&PROV_SHA1_CTX(ctx)->sc_sha1_ctx, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL); break; case CRYPTO_DATA_MBLK: ret = sha1_digest_final_mblk(&PROV_SHA1_CTX(ctx)->sc_sha1_ctx, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL); break; default: ret = CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD; } /* all done, free context and return */ if (ret == CRYPTO_SUCCESS) { digest->cd_length = SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH; } else { digest->cd_length = 0; } kmem_free(ctx->cc_provider_private, sizeof (sha1_ctx_t)); ctx->cc_provider_private = NULL; return (ret); } /* ARGSUSED */ static int sha1_digest_atomic(crypto_provider_handle_t provider, crypto_session_id_t session_id, crypto_mechanism_t *mechanism, crypto_data_t *data, crypto_data_t *digest, crypto_req_handle_t req) { int ret = CRYPTO_SUCCESS; SHA1_CTX sha1_ctx; if (mechanism->cm_type != SHA1_MECH_INFO_TYPE) return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_INVALID); /* * Do the SHA1 init. */ SHA1Init(&sha1_ctx); /* * Do the SHA1 update on the specified input data. */ switch (data->cd_format) { case CRYPTO_DATA_RAW: SHA1Update(&sha1_ctx, (uint8_t *)data->cd_raw.iov_base + data->cd_offset, data->cd_length); break; case CRYPTO_DATA_UIO: ret = sha1_digest_update_uio(&sha1_ctx, data); break; case CRYPTO_DATA_MBLK: ret = sha1_digest_update_mblk(&sha1_ctx, data); break; default: ret = CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD; } if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) { /* the update failed, bail */ digest->cd_length = 0; return (ret); } /* * Do a SHA1 final, must be done separately since the digest * type can be different than the input data type. */ switch (digest->cd_format) { case CRYPTO_DATA_RAW: SHA1Final((unsigned char *)digest->cd_raw.iov_base + digest->cd_offset, &sha1_ctx); break; case CRYPTO_DATA_UIO: ret = sha1_digest_final_uio(&sha1_ctx, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL); break; case CRYPTO_DATA_MBLK: ret = sha1_digest_final_mblk(&sha1_ctx, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL); break; default: ret = CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD; } if (ret == CRYPTO_SUCCESS) { digest->cd_length = SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH; } else { digest->cd_length = 0; } return (ret); } /* * KCF software provider mac entry points. * * SHA1 HMAC is: SHA1(key XOR opad, SHA1(key XOR ipad, text)) * * Init: * The initialization routine initializes what we denote * as the inner and outer contexts by doing * - for inner context: SHA1(key XOR ipad) * - for outer context: SHA1(key XOR opad) * * Update: * Each subsequent SHA1 HMAC update will result in an * update of the inner context with the specified data. * * Final: * The SHA1 HMAC final will do a SHA1 final operation on the * inner context, and the resulting digest will be used * as the data for an update on the outer context. Last * but not least, a SHA1 final on the outer context will * be performed to obtain the SHA1 HMAC digest to return * to the user. */ /* * Initialize a SHA1-HMAC context. */ static void sha1_mac_init_ctx(sha1_hmac_ctx_t *ctx, void *keyval, uint_t length_in_bytes) { uint32_t ipad[SHA1_HMAC_INTS_PER_BLOCK]; uint32_t opad[SHA1_HMAC_INTS_PER_BLOCK]; uint_t i; bzero(ipad, SHA1_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE); bzero(opad, SHA1_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE); bcopy(keyval, ipad, length_in_bytes); bcopy(keyval, opad, length_in_bytes); /* XOR key with ipad (0x36) and opad (0x5c) */ for (i = 0; i < SHA1_HMAC_INTS_PER_BLOCK; i++) { ipad[i] ^= 0x36363636; opad[i] ^= 0x5c5c5c5c; } /* perform SHA1 on ipad */ SHA1Init(&ctx->hc_icontext); SHA1Update(&ctx->hc_icontext, (uint8_t *)ipad, SHA1_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE); /* perform SHA1 on opad */ SHA1Init(&ctx->hc_ocontext); SHA1Update(&ctx->hc_ocontext, (uint8_t *)opad, SHA1_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE); } /* */ static int sha1_mac_init(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_mechanism_t *mechanism, crypto_key_t *key, crypto_spi_ctx_template_t ctx_template, crypto_req_handle_t req) { int ret = CRYPTO_SUCCESS; uint_t keylen_in_bytes = CRYPTO_BITS2BYTES(key->ck_length); if (mechanism->cm_type != SHA1_HMAC_MECH_INFO_TYPE && mechanism->cm_type != SHA1_HMAC_GEN_MECH_INFO_TYPE) return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_INVALID); /* Add support for key by attributes (RFE 4706552) */ if (key->ck_format != CRYPTO_KEY_RAW) return (CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD); ctx->cc_provider_private = kmem_alloc(sizeof (sha1_hmac_ctx_t), crypto_kmflag(req)); if (ctx->cc_provider_private == NULL) return (CRYPTO_HOST_MEMORY); if (ctx_template != NULL) { /* reuse context template */ bcopy(ctx_template, PROV_SHA1_HMAC_CTX(ctx), sizeof (sha1_hmac_ctx_t)); } else { /* no context template, compute context */ if (keylen_in_bytes > SHA1_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE) { uchar_t digested_key[SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH]; sha1_hmac_ctx_t *hmac_ctx = ctx->cc_provider_private; /* * Hash the passed-in key to get a smaller key. * The inner context is used since it hasn't been * initialized yet. */ PROV_SHA1_DIGEST_KEY(&hmac_ctx->hc_icontext, key->ck_data, keylen_in_bytes, digested_key); sha1_mac_init_ctx(PROV_SHA1_HMAC_CTX(ctx), digested_key, SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH); } else { sha1_mac_init_ctx(PROV_SHA1_HMAC_CTX(ctx), key->ck_data, keylen_in_bytes); } } /* * Get the mechanism parameters, if applicable. */ PROV_SHA1_HMAC_CTX(ctx)->hc_mech_type = mechanism->cm_type; if (mechanism->cm_type == SHA1_HMAC_GEN_MECH_INFO_TYPE) { if (mechanism->cm_param == NULL || mechanism->cm_param_len != sizeof (ulong_t)) ret = CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; PROV_SHA1_GET_DIGEST_LEN(mechanism, PROV_SHA1_HMAC_CTX(ctx)->hc_digest_len); if (PROV_SHA1_HMAC_CTX(ctx)->hc_digest_len > SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH) ret = CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; } if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) { bzero(ctx->cc_provider_private, sizeof (sha1_hmac_ctx_t)); kmem_free(ctx->cc_provider_private, sizeof (sha1_hmac_ctx_t)); ctx->cc_provider_private = NULL; } return (ret); } /* ARGSUSED */ static int sha1_mac_update(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *data, crypto_req_handle_t req) { int ret = CRYPTO_SUCCESS; ASSERT(ctx->cc_provider_private != NULL); /* * Do a SHA1 update of the inner context using the specified * data. */ switch (data->cd_format) { case CRYPTO_DATA_RAW: SHA1Update(&PROV_SHA1_HMAC_CTX(ctx)->hc_icontext, (uint8_t *)data->cd_raw.iov_base + data->cd_offset, data->cd_length); break; case CRYPTO_DATA_UIO: ret = sha1_digest_update_uio( &PROV_SHA1_HMAC_CTX(ctx)->hc_icontext, data); break; case CRYPTO_DATA_MBLK: ret = sha1_digest_update_mblk( &PROV_SHA1_HMAC_CTX(ctx)->hc_icontext, data); break; default: ret = CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD; } return (ret); } /* ARGSUSED */ static int sha1_mac_final(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *mac, crypto_req_handle_t req) { int ret = CRYPTO_SUCCESS; uchar_t digest[SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH]; uint32_t digest_len = SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH; ASSERT(ctx->cc_provider_private != NULL); if (PROV_SHA1_HMAC_CTX(ctx)->hc_mech_type == SHA1_HMAC_GEN_MECH_INFO_TYPE) digest_len = PROV_SHA1_HMAC_CTX(ctx)->hc_digest_len; /* * We need to just return the length needed to store the output. * We should not destroy the context for the following cases. */ if ((mac->cd_length == 0) || (mac->cd_length < digest_len)) { mac->cd_length = digest_len; return (CRYPTO_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); } /* * Do a SHA1 final on the inner context. */ SHA1Final(digest, &PROV_SHA1_HMAC_CTX(ctx)->hc_icontext); /* * Do a SHA1 update on the outer context, feeding the inner * digest as data. */ SHA1Update(&PROV_SHA1_HMAC_CTX(ctx)->hc_ocontext, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH); /* * Do a SHA1 final on the outer context, storing the computing * digest in the users buffer. */ switch (mac->cd_format) { case CRYPTO_DATA_RAW: if (digest_len != SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH) { /* * The caller requested a short digest. Digest * into a scratch buffer and return to * the user only what was requested. */ SHA1Final(digest, &PROV_SHA1_HMAC_CTX(ctx)->hc_ocontext); bcopy(digest, (unsigned char *)mac->cd_raw.iov_base + mac->cd_offset, digest_len); } else { SHA1Final((unsigned char *)mac->cd_raw.iov_base + mac->cd_offset, &PROV_SHA1_HMAC_CTX(ctx)->hc_ocontext); } break; case CRYPTO_DATA_UIO: ret = sha1_digest_final_uio( &PROV_SHA1_HMAC_CTX(ctx)->hc_ocontext, mac, digest_len, digest); break; case CRYPTO_DATA_MBLK: ret = sha1_digest_final_mblk( &PROV_SHA1_HMAC_CTX(ctx)->hc_ocontext, mac, digest_len, digest); break; default: ret = CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD; } if (ret == CRYPTO_SUCCESS) { mac->cd_length = digest_len; } else { mac->cd_length = 0; } bzero(ctx->cc_provider_private, sizeof (sha1_hmac_ctx_t)); kmem_free(ctx->cc_provider_private, sizeof (sha1_hmac_ctx_t)); ctx->cc_provider_private = NULL; return (ret); } #define SHA1_MAC_UPDATE(data, ctx, ret) { \ switch (data->cd_format) { \ case CRYPTO_DATA_RAW: \ SHA1Update(&(ctx).hc_icontext, \ (uint8_t *)data->cd_raw.iov_base + \ data->cd_offset, data->cd_length); \ break; \ case CRYPTO_DATA_UIO: \ ret = sha1_digest_update_uio(&(ctx).hc_icontext, data); \ break; \ case CRYPTO_DATA_MBLK: \ ret = sha1_digest_update_mblk(&(ctx).hc_icontext, \ data); \ break; \ default: \ ret = CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD; \ } \ } /* ARGSUSED */ static int sha1_mac_atomic(crypto_provider_handle_t provider, crypto_session_id_t session_id, crypto_mechanism_t *mechanism, crypto_key_t *key, crypto_data_t *data, crypto_data_t *mac, crypto_spi_ctx_template_t ctx_template, crypto_req_handle_t req) { int ret = CRYPTO_SUCCESS; uchar_t digest[SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH]; sha1_hmac_ctx_t sha1_hmac_ctx; uint32_t digest_len = SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH; uint_t keylen_in_bytes = CRYPTO_BITS2BYTES(key->ck_length); if (mechanism->cm_type != SHA1_HMAC_MECH_INFO_TYPE && mechanism->cm_type != SHA1_HMAC_GEN_MECH_INFO_TYPE) return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_INVALID); /* Add support for key by attributes (RFE 4706552) */ if (key->ck_format != CRYPTO_KEY_RAW) return (CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD); if (ctx_template != NULL) { /* reuse context template */ bcopy(ctx_template, &sha1_hmac_ctx, sizeof (sha1_hmac_ctx_t)); } else { /* no context template, initialize context */ if (keylen_in_bytes > SHA1_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE) { /* * Hash the passed-in key to get a smaller key. * The inner context is used since it hasn't been * initialized yet. */ PROV_SHA1_DIGEST_KEY(&sha1_hmac_ctx.hc_icontext, key->ck_data, keylen_in_bytes, digest); sha1_mac_init_ctx(&sha1_hmac_ctx, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH); } else { sha1_mac_init_ctx(&sha1_hmac_ctx, key->ck_data, keylen_in_bytes); } } /* get the mechanism parameters, if applicable */ if (mechanism->cm_type == SHA1_HMAC_GEN_MECH_INFO_TYPE) { if (mechanism->cm_param == NULL || mechanism->cm_param_len != sizeof (ulong_t)) { ret = CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; goto bail; } PROV_SHA1_GET_DIGEST_LEN(mechanism, digest_len); if (digest_len > SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH) { ret = CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; goto bail; } } /* do a SHA1 update of the inner context using the specified data */ SHA1_MAC_UPDATE(data, sha1_hmac_ctx, ret); if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) /* the update failed, free context and bail */ goto bail; /* * Do a SHA1 final on the inner context. */ SHA1Final(digest, &sha1_hmac_ctx.hc_icontext); /* * Do an SHA1 update on the outer context, feeding the inner * digest as data. */ SHA1Update(&sha1_hmac_ctx.hc_ocontext, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH); /* * Do a SHA1 final on the outer context, storing the computed * digest in the users buffer. */ switch (mac->cd_format) { case CRYPTO_DATA_RAW: if (digest_len != SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH) { /* * The caller requested a short digest. Digest * into a scratch buffer and return to * the user only what was requested. */ SHA1Final(digest, &sha1_hmac_ctx.hc_ocontext); bcopy(digest, (unsigned char *)mac->cd_raw.iov_base + mac->cd_offset, digest_len); } else { SHA1Final((unsigned char *)mac->cd_raw.iov_base + mac->cd_offset, &sha1_hmac_ctx.hc_ocontext); } break; case CRYPTO_DATA_UIO: ret = sha1_digest_final_uio(&sha1_hmac_ctx.hc_ocontext, mac, digest_len, digest); break; case CRYPTO_DATA_MBLK: ret = sha1_digest_final_mblk(&sha1_hmac_ctx.hc_ocontext, mac, digest_len, digest); break; default: ret = CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD; } if (ret == CRYPTO_SUCCESS) { mac->cd_length = digest_len; } else { mac->cd_length = 0; } /* Extra paranoia: zeroize the context on the stack */ bzero(&sha1_hmac_ctx, sizeof (sha1_hmac_ctx_t)); return (ret); bail: bzero(&sha1_hmac_ctx, sizeof (sha1_hmac_ctx_t)); mac->cd_length = 0; return (ret); } /* ARGSUSED */ static int sha1_mac_verify_atomic(crypto_provider_handle_t provider, crypto_session_id_t session_id, crypto_mechanism_t *mechanism, crypto_key_t *key, crypto_data_t *data, crypto_data_t *mac, crypto_spi_ctx_template_t ctx_template, crypto_req_handle_t req) { int ret = CRYPTO_SUCCESS; uchar_t digest[SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH]; sha1_hmac_ctx_t sha1_hmac_ctx; uint32_t digest_len = SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH; uint_t keylen_in_bytes = CRYPTO_BITS2BYTES(key->ck_length); if (mechanism->cm_type != SHA1_HMAC_MECH_INFO_TYPE && mechanism->cm_type != SHA1_HMAC_GEN_MECH_INFO_TYPE) return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_INVALID); /* Add support for key by attributes (RFE 4706552) */ if (key->ck_format != CRYPTO_KEY_RAW) return (CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD); if (ctx_template != NULL) { /* reuse context template */ bcopy(ctx_template, &sha1_hmac_ctx, sizeof (sha1_hmac_ctx_t)); } else { /* no context template, initialize context */ if (keylen_in_bytes > SHA1_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE) { /* * Hash the passed-in key to get a smaller key. * The inner context is used since it hasn't been * initialized yet. */ PROV_SHA1_DIGEST_KEY(&sha1_hmac_ctx.hc_icontext, key->ck_data, keylen_in_bytes, digest); sha1_mac_init_ctx(&sha1_hmac_ctx, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH); } else { sha1_mac_init_ctx(&sha1_hmac_ctx, key->ck_data, keylen_in_bytes); } } /* get the mechanism parameters, if applicable */ if (mechanism->cm_type == SHA1_HMAC_GEN_MECH_INFO_TYPE) { if (mechanism->cm_param == NULL || mechanism->cm_param_len != sizeof (ulong_t)) { ret = CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; goto bail; } PROV_SHA1_GET_DIGEST_LEN(mechanism, digest_len); if (digest_len > SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH) { ret = CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; goto bail; } } if (mac->cd_length != digest_len) { ret = CRYPTO_INVALID_MAC; goto bail; } /* do a SHA1 update of the inner context using the specified data */ SHA1_MAC_UPDATE(data, sha1_hmac_ctx, ret); if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) /* the update failed, free context and bail */ goto bail; /* do a SHA1 final on the inner context */ SHA1Final(digest, &sha1_hmac_ctx.hc_icontext); /* * Do an SHA1 update on the outer context, feeding the inner * digest as data. */ SHA1Update(&sha1_hmac_ctx.hc_ocontext, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH); /* * Do a SHA1 final on the outer context, storing the computed * digest in the users buffer. */ SHA1Final(digest, &sha1_hmac_ctx.hc_ocontext); /* * Compare the computed digest against the expected digest passed * as argument. */ switch (mac->cd_format) { case CRYPTO_DATA_RAW: if (bcmp(digest, (unsigned char *)mac->cd_raw.iov_base + mac->cd_offset, digest_len) != 0) ret = CRYPTO_INVALID_MAC; break; case CRYPTO_DATA_UIO: { off_t offset = mac->cd_offset; uint_t vec_idx; off_t scratch_offset = 0; size_t length = digest_len; size_t cur_len; /* we support only kernel buffer */ if (mac->cd_uio->uio_segflg != UIO_SYSSPACE) return (CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD); /* jump to the first iovec containing the expected digest */ for (vec_idx = 0; offset >= mac->cd_uio->uio_iov[vec_idx].iov_len && vec_idx < mac->cd_uio->uio_iovcnt; offset -= mac->cd_uio->uio_iov[vec_idx++].iov_len); if (vec_idx == mac->cd_uio->uio_iovcnt) { /* * The caller specified an offset that is * larger than the total size of the buffers * it provided. */ ret = CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE; break; } /* do the comparison of computed digest vs specified one */ while (vec_idx < mac->cd_uio->uio_iovcnt && length > 0) { cur_len = MIN(mac->cd_uio->uio_iov[vec_idx].iov_len - offset, length); if (bcmp(digest + scratch_offset, mac->cd_uio->uio_iov[vec_idx].iov_base + offset, cur_len) != 0) { ret = CRYPTO_INVALID_MAC; break; } length -= cur_len; vec_idx++; scratch_offset += cur_len; offset = 0; } break; } case CRYPTO_DATA_MBLK: { off_t offset = mac->cd_offset; mblk_t *mp; off_t scratch_offset = 0; size_t length = digest_len; size_t cur_len; /* jump to the first mblk_t containing the expected digest */ for (mp = mac->cd_mp; mp != NULL && offset >= MBLKL(mp); offset -= MBLKL(mp), mp = mp->b_cont); if (mp == NULL) { /* * The caller specified an offset that is larger than * the total size of the buffers it provided. */ ret = CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE; break; } while (mp != NULL && length > 0) { cur_len = MIN(MBLKL(mp) - offset, length); if (bcmp(digest + scratch_offset, mp->b_rptr + offset, cur_len) != 0) { ret = CRYPTO_INVALID_MAC; break; } length -= cur_len; mp = mp->b_cont; scratch_offset += cur_len; offset = 0; } break; } default: ret = CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD; } bzero(&sha1_hmac_ctx, sizeof (sha1_hmac_ctx_t)); return (ret); bail: bzero(&sha1_hmac_ctx, sizeof (sha1_hmac_ctx_t)); mac->cd_length = 0; return (ret); } /* * KCF software provider context management entry points. */ /* ARGSUSED */ static int sha1_create_ctx_template(crypto_provider_handle_t provider, crypto_mechanism_t *mechanism, crypto_key_t *key, crypto_spi_ctx_template_t *ctx_template, size_t *ctx_template_size, crypto_req_handle_t req) { sha1_hmac_ctx_t *sha1_hmac_ctx_tmpl; uint_t keylen_in_bytes = CRYPTO_BITS2BYTES(key->ck_length); if ((mechanism->cm_type != SHA1_HMAC_MECH_INFO_TYPE) && (mechanism->cm_type != SHA1_HMAC_GEN_MECH_INFO_TYPE)) { return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_INVALID); } /* Add support for key by attributes (RFE 4706552) */ if (key->ck_format != CRYPTO_KEY_RAW) return (CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD); /* * Allocate and initialize SHA1 context. */ sha1_hmac_ctx_tmpl = kmem_alloc(sizeof (sha1_hmac_ctx_t), crypto_kmflag(req)); if (sha1_hmac_ctx_tmpl == NULL) return (CRYPTO_HOST_MEMORY); if (keylen_in_bytes > SHA1_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE) { uchar_t digested_key[SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /* * Hash the passed-in key to get a smaller key. * The inner context is used since it hasn't been * initialized yet. */ PROV_SHA1_DIGEST_KEY(&sha1_hmac_ctx_tmpl->hc_icontext, key->ck_data, keylen_in_bytes, digested_key); sha1_mac_init_ctx(sha1_hmac_ctx_tmpl, digested_key, SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH); } else { sha1_mac_init_ctx(sha1_hmac_ctx_tmpl, key->ck_data, keylen_in_bytes); } sha1_hmac_ctx_tmpl->hc_mech_type = mechanism->cm_type; *ctx_template = (crypto_spi_ctx_template_t)sha1_hmac_ctx_tmpl; *ctx_template_size = sizeof (sha1_hmac_ctx_t); return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS); } static int sha1_free_context(crypto_ctx_t *ctx) { uint_t ctx_len; sha1_mech_type_t mech_type; if (ctx->cc_provider_private == NULL) return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS); /* * We have to free either SHA1 or SHA1-HMAC contexts, which * have different lengths. */ mech_type = PROV_SHA1_CTX(ctx)->sc_mech_type; if (mech_type == SHA1_MECH_INFO_TYPE) ctx_len = sizeof (sha1_ctx_t); else { ASSERT(mech_type == SHA1_HMAC_MECH_INFO_TYPE || mech_type == SHA1_HMAC_GEN_MECH_INFO_TYPE); ctx_len = sizeof (sha1_hmac_ctx_t); } bzero(ctx->cc_provider_private, ctx_len); kmem_free(ctx->cc_provider_private, ctx_len); ctx->cc_provider_private = NULL; return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS); } #endif /* _KERNEL */