/* * CDDL HEADER START * * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions * and limitations under the License. * * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] * * CDDL HEADER END */ /* * Copyright 2006 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. * Use is subject to license terms. */ #pragma ident "%Z%%M% %I% %E% SMI" #include #include #include #include #include "kernelGlobal.h" #include "kernelObject.h" #include "kernelSession.h" CK_RV C_VerifyInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) { CK_RV rv; kernel_session_t *session_p; kernel_object_t *key_p; boolean_t ses_lock_held = B_FALSE; crypto_verify_init_t verify_init; crypto_mech_type_t k_mech_type; int r; if (!kernel_initialized) return (CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED); if (pMechanism == NULL) { return (CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD); } /* Get the kernel's internal mechanism number. */ rv = kernel_mech(pMechanism->mechanism, &k_mech_type); if (rv != CKR_OK) return (rv); /* Obtain the session pointer. */ rv = handle2session(hSession, &session_p); if (rv != CKR_OK) return (rv); /* Obtain the object pointer. */ HANDLE2OBJECT(hKey, key_p, rv); if (rv != CKR_OK) { REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held); return (rv); } /* Check to see if key object supports verification. */ if (key_p->is_lib_obj && !(key_p->bool_attr_mask & VERIFY_BOOL_ON)) { rv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; goto clean_exit; } (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex); ses_lock_held = B_TRUE; /* * This active flag will remain ON until application calls either * C_Verify or C_VerifyFinal to verify a signature on data. */ session_p->verify.flags = CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE; if (!key_p->is_lib_obj) { verify_init.vi_key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_REFERENCE; verify_init.vi_key.ck_obj_id = key_p->k_handle; } else { if (key_p->class == CKO_SECRET_KEY) { verify_init.vi_key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW; verify_init.vi_key.ck_data = get_symmetric_key_value(key_p); if (verify_init.vi_key.ck_data == NULL) { rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; goto clean_exit; } verify_init.vi_key.ck_length = OBJ_SEC(key_p)->sk_value_len << 3; } else if (key_p->key_type == CKK_RSA) { if (get_rsa_public_key(key_p, &verify_init.vi_key) != CKR_OK) { rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; goto clean_exit; } } else if (key_p->key_type == CKK_DSA) { if (get_dsa_public_key(key_p, &verify_init.vi_key) != CKR_OK) { rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; goto clean_exit; } } else { rv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; goto clean_exit; } } verify_init.vi_session = session_p->k_session; (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex); ses_lock_held = B_FALSE; verify_init.vi_mech.cm_type = k_mech_type; verify_init.vi_mech.cm_param = pMechanism->pParameter; verify_init.vi_mech.cm_param_len = pMechanism->ulParameterLen; while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_VERIFY_INIT, &verify_init)) < 0) { if (errno != EINTR) break; } if (r < 0) { rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; } else { rv = crypto2pkcs11_error_number(verify_init.vi_return_value); } /* free the memory allocated for verify_init.vi_key */ if (key_p->is_lib_obj) { if (key_p->class == CKO_SECRET_KEY) { free(verify_init.vi_key.ck_data); } else { free_key_attributes(&verify_init.vi_key); } } if (rv != CKR_OK) { (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex); session_p->verify.flags &= ~CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE; ses_lock_held = B_TRUE; } clean_exit: OBJ_REFRELE(key_p); REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held); return (rv); } CK_RV C_Verify(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen) { CK_RV rv; kernel_session_t *session_p; boolean_t ses_lock_held = B_FALSE; crypto_verify_t verify; int r; if (!kernel_initialized) return (CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED); /* Obatin the session pointer */ rv = handle2session(hSession, &session_p); if (rv != CKR_OK) return (rv); (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex); ses_lock_held = B_TRUE; /* Application must call C_VerifyInit before calling C_Verify. */ if (!(session_p->verify.flags & CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE)) { REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held); return (CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED); } /* * C_Verify must be called without intervening C_VerifyUpdate * calls. */ if (session_p->verify.flags & CRYPTO_OPERATION_UPDATE) { /* * C_Verify can not be used to terminate a multi-part * operation, so we'll leave the active verify operation * flag on and let the application continue with the * verify update operation. */ REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held); return (CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED); } verify.cv_session = session_p->k_session; (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex); ses_lock_held = B_FALSE; verify.cv_datalen = ulDataLen; verify.cv_databuf = (char *)pData; verify.cv_signlen = ulSignatureLen; verify.cv_signbuf = (char *)pSignature; while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_VERIFY, &verify)) < 0) { if (errno != EINTR) break; } if (r < 0) { rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; } else { rv = crypto2pkcs11_error_number(verify.cv_return_value); } clean_exit: /* * Always terminate the active verify operation. * Application needs to call C_VerifyInit again for next * verify operation. */ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex); session_p->verify.flags = 0; ses_lock_held = B_TRUE; REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held); return (rv); } CK_RV C_VerifyUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen) { CK_RV rv; kernel_session_t *session_p; boolean_t ses_lock_held = B_FALSE; crypto_verify_update_t verify_update; int r; if (!kernel_initialized) return (CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED); /* Obtain the session pointer */ rv = handle2session(hSession, &session_p); if (rv != CKR_OK) return (rv); if (pPart == NULL) { rv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; goto clean_exit; } (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex); ses_lock_held = B_TRUE; /* * Application must call C_VerifyInit before calling * C_VerifyUpdate. */ if (!(session_p->verify.flags & CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE)) { REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held); return (CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED); } session_p->verify.flags |= CRYPTO_OPERATION_UPDATE; verify_update.vu_session = session_p->k_session; (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex); ses_lock_held = B_FALSE; verify_update.vu_datalen = ulPartLen; verify_update.vu_databuf = (char *)pPart; while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_VERIFY_UPDATE, &verify_update)) < 0) { if (errno != EINTR) break; } if (r < 0) { rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; } else { rv = crypto2pkcs11_error_number(verify_update.vu_return_value); } if (rv == CKR_OK) { REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held); return (rv); } clean_exit: /* * After an error occurred, terminate the current verify * operation by resetting the active and update flags. */ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex); session_p->verify.flags = 0; ses_lock_held = B_TRUE; REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held); return (rv); } CK_RV C_VerifyFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen) { CK_RV rv; kernel_session_t *session_p; boolean_t ses_lock_held = B_FALSE; crypto_verify_final_t verify_final; int r; if (!kernel_initialized) return (CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED); /* Obtain the session pointer */ rv = handle2session(hSession, &session_p); if (rv != CKR_OK) return (rv); (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex); ses_lock_held = B_TRUE; /* * Application must call C_VerifyInit before calling * C_VerifyFinal. */ if (!(session_p->verify.flags & CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE)) { REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held); return (CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED); } verify_final.vf_session = session_p->k_session; (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex); ses_lock_held = B_FALSE; verify_final.vf_signlen = ulSignatureLen; verify_final.vf_signbuf = (char *)pSignature; while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_VERIFY_FINAL, &verify_final)) < 0) { if (errno != EINTR) break; } if (r < 0) { rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; } else { rv = crypto2pkcs11_error_number(verify_final.vf_return_value); } clean_exit: /* Always terminate the active verify operation */ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex); session_p->verify.flags = 0; ses_lock_held = B_TRUE; REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held); return (rv); } CK_RV C_VerifyRecoverInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) { CK_RV rv; kernel_session_t *session_p; kernel_object_t *key_p; boolean_t ses_lock_held = B_FALSE; crypto_verify_recover_init_t vr_init; crypto_mech_type_t k_mech_type; int r; if (!kernel_initialized) return (CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED); if (pMechanism == NULL) { return (CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD); } /* Get the kernel's internal mechanism number. */ rv = kernel_mech(pMechanism->mechanism, &k_mech_type); if (rv != CKR_OK) return (rv); /* Obtain the session pointer. */ rv = handle2session(hSession, &session_p); if (rv != CKR_OK) return (rv); /* Obtain the object pointer. */ HANDLE2OBJECT(hKey, key_p, rv); if (rv != CKR_OK) { REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held); return (rv); } /* * Check to see if key object is a RSA key and if it supports * verify_recover. */ if (key_p->is_lib_obj && !((key_p->key_type == CKK_RSA) && (key_p->bool_attr_mask & VERIFY_RECOVER_BOOL_ON))) { rv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; goto clean_exit; } (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex); ses_lock_held = B_TRUE; /* * This active flag will remain ON until application calls * C_VerifyRecover to verify a signature on data. */ session_p->verify.flags = CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE; /* Set up the key data */ if (!key_p->is_lib_obj) { vr_init.ri_key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_REFERENCE; vr_init.ri_key.ck_obj_id = key_p->k_handle; } else { if (key_p->key_type == CKK_RSA) { if (get_rsa_public_key(key_p, &vr_init.ri_key) != CKR_OK) { rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; goto clean_exit; } } else { rv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; goto clean_exit; } } vr_init.ri_session = session_p->k_session; (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex); ses_lock_held = B_FALSE; vr_init.ri_mech.cm_type = k_mech_type; vr_init.ri_mech.cm_param = pMechanism->pParameter; vr_init.ri_mech.cm_param_len = pMechanism->ulParameterLen; while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT, &vr_init)) < 0) { if (errno != EINTR) break; } if (r < 0) { rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; } else { rv = crypto2pkcs11_error_number(vr_init.ri_return_value); } /* free the memory allocated for vr_init.ri_key */ if (key_p->is_lib_obj) { free_key_attributes(&vr_init.ri_key); } if (rv != CKR_OK) { (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex); session_p->verify.flags &= ~CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE; ses_lock_held = B_TRUE; } clean_exit: OBJ_REFRELE(key_p); REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held); return (rv); } CK_RV C_VerifyRecover(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen) { CK_RV rv; kernel_session_t *session_p; boolean_t ses_lock_held = B_FALSE; crypto_verify_recover_t verify_recover; int r; if (!kernel_initialized) return (CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED); /* Obtain the session pointer */ rv = handle2session(hSession, &session_p); if (rv != CKR_OK) return (rv); if (pSignature == NULL || pulDataLen == NULL) { rv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; goto clean_exit; } (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex); ses_lock_held = B_TRUE; /* * Application must call C_VerifyRecoverInit before calling * C_Verify. */ if (!(session_p->verify.flags & CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE)) { REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held); return (CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED); } verify_recover.vr_session = session_p->k_session; (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex); ses_lock_held = B_FALSE; verify_recover.vr_signlen = ulSignatureLen; verify_recover.vr_signbuf = (char *)pSignature; verify_recover.vr_datalen = *pulDataLen; verify_recover.vr_databuf = (char *)pData; while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_VERIFY_RECOVER, &verify_recover)) < 0) { if (errno != EINTR) break; } if (r < 0) { rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; } else { rv = crypto2pkcs11_error_number( verify_recover.vr_return_value); } if (rv == CKR_OK || rv == CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) *pulDataLen = verify_recover.vr_datalen; if ((rv == CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) || (rv == CKR_OK && pData == NULL)) { /* * We will not terminate the active verify operation flag, * when the application-supplied buffer is too small, or * the application asks for the length of buffer to hold * the recovered data. */ REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held); return (rv); } clean_exit: /* * Always terminate the active verify operation. * Application needs to call C_VerifyInit again for next * verify operation. */ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex); session_p->verify.flags = 0; ses_lock_held = B_TRUE; REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held); return (rv); }