/* * CDDL HEADER START * * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions * and limitations under the License. * * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] * * CDDL HEADER END */ /* * Copyright 2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. * Use is subject to license terms. */ /* * vtdaemon is responsible for the session secure switch via hotkeys. * * vtdaemon itself, like ttymon(1M), is also running on a virtual * console device (/dev/vt/1), and provides a text console session * for password input and authentication. The /dev/vt/1 special text * console is reserved and end users cannot switch to it via hotkeys. * * * The hotkey event request can come from either kernel or Xserver, * and a door server is setup to handle the request: * * 1) All text console hotkeys (e.g. "Alt + F#") are intercepted by * the kernel console driver which sends a door upcall to the * vtdaemon via door_upcall (target_vt). * * 2) All Xserver hotkeys ("Alt + Ctrl + F#") are intercepted by * Xserver which sends a door call to the vtdaemon via * door_call (target_vt). * * * server_for_door receives and handles any door server requests: * * Firstly, check source session: * * . If it's from kernel for a text console source session, * then directly go to check the target session. * * . If it's from Xserver for a graphical source session and the vt * associated with the Xserver is currently active: * check if a user has logged in, if true, issue an internal * VT_EV_LOCK event to the main thread to request lock for * the graphical source session; else, directly go to check * the target session. * * . otherwise, discard this request. * * * Secondly, check the target session * * . if the target session is a text one that no one has logged in * or a graphical one, issue an internal VT_EV_ACTIVATE event to * the main thread to request the actual VT switch. * * . otherwise, the target session is a text one that someone has * logged in, issue an internal VT_EV_AUTH event to the main * thread to request authentication for the target session. * * * The main thread of vtdaemon is a loop waiting for internal events * which come from door call threads: * * 1) VT_EV_AUTH to authenticate for target session: * * firstly switch to the vtdaemon special text console; * then prompt for password (target_owner on target_vt), * e.g. "User Bob's password on vt/#: ". * * if the password is correct (authentication succeeds), * then actually issue the VT switch; otherwise, ignore * the request. * * 2) VT_EV_LOCK to lock the graphical source session: * * activate screenlock for this graphical session. * vtdaemon just invokes existing front-end command line * tools (e.g. xscreensaver-command -lock for JDS) to * lock the display. * * 3) VT_EV_ACTIVATE to directly switch to the target session * * * There is a system/vtdaemon:default SMF service for vtdaemon. * * There's a "hotkeys" property (BOOLEAN) in the * system/vtdaemon:default SMF service, which allows authorized * users to dynamically enable or disable VT switch via hotkeys. * Its default value is TRUE (enabled). * * There's a "secure" property (BOOLEAN) in the * system/vtdaemon:default SMF service, which allows authorized * users to dynamically enable or disable hotkeys are secure. * If disabled, the user can freely switch to any session without * authentication. Its default value is TRUE (enabled). * * * By default, there's only 16 virtual console device nodes (from * /dev/vt/0 to /dev/vt/15). There's a property "nodecount" * (default value is 16) in the system/vtdaemon:default SMF * service, so authorized users can configure it to have more * or less virtual console device nodes. * * Xserver needs to switch back to previous active vt via VT_EV_X_EXIT * door event request when it's exiting, so vtdaemon always needs to * be there even if the hotkeys switch is disabled, otherwise the screen * will be just blank when Xserver exits. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* * The door file /var/run/vt/vtdaemon_door */ #define VT_TMPDIR "/var/run/vt" #define VT_DAEMON_ARG 0 #define VT_DAEMON_CONSOLE_FILE "/dev/vt/1" #define VT_IS_SYSTEM_CONSOLE(vtno) ((vtno) == 1) /* Defaults for updating expired passwords */ #define DEF_ATTEMPTS 3 int daemonfd; static boolean_t vt_hotkeys = B_TRUE; /* '-k' option to disable */ static boolean_t vt_secure = B_TRUE; /* '-s' option to disable */ static char vt_door_path[MAXPATHLEN]; static int vt_door = -1; /* protecting vt_hotkeys_pending and vt_auth_doing */ static mutex_t vt_mutex = DEFAULTMUTEX; static boolean_t vt_hotkeys_pending = B_FALSE; static boolean_t vt_auth_doing = B_FALSE; static adt_session_data_t **vt_ah_array = NULL; static int vtnodecount = 0; static int vt_audit_start(adt_session_data_t **, pid_t); static void vt_audit_event(adt_session_data_t *, au_event_t, int); static void vt_check_source_audit(void); static int vt_setup_signal(int signo, int mask) { sigset_t set; (void) sigemptyset(&set); (void) sigaddset(&set, signo); if (mask) return (sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &set, NULL)); else return (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &set, NULL)); } static void do_activate_screenlock(int display_num) { char dpy[16]; (void) snprintf(dpy, sizeof (dpy), "%d", display_num); (void) execl("/usr/lib/vtxlock", "vtxlock", dpy, NULL); } static void vt_activate_screenlock(int display) { pid_t pid; if ((pid = fork()) == -1) return; if (pid == 0) { /* child */ do_activate_screenlock(display); exit(0); } /* parent */ while (waitpid(pid, (int *)0, 0) != pid) continue; } /* * Find the login process and user logged in on the target vt. */ static void vt_read_utx(int target_vt, pid_t *pid, char name[]) { struct utmpx *u; char ttyntail[sizeof (u->ut_line)]; *pid = (pid_t)-1; if (VT_IS_SYSTEM_CONSOLE(target_vt)) /* system console */ (void) snprintf(ttyntail, sizeof (ttyntail), "%s", "console"); else (void) snprintf(ttyntail, sizeof (ttyntail), "%s%d", "vt/", target_vt); setutxent(); while ((u = getutxent()) != NULL) /* see if this is the entry we want */ if ((u->ut_type == USER_PROCESS) && (!nonuserx(*u)) && (u->ut_host[0] == '\0') && (strncmp(u->ut_line, ttyntail, sizeof (u->ut_line)) == 0)) { *pid = u->ut_pid; if (name != NULL) { (void) strncpy(name, u->ut_user, sizeof (u->ut_user)); name[sizeof (u->ut_user)] = '\0'; } break; } endutxent(); } static boolean_t vt_is_tipline(void) { static int is_tipline = 0; int fd; static char termbuf[MAX_TERM_TYPE_LEN]; static struct cons_getterm cons_term = { sizeof (termbuf), termbuf}; if (is_tipline != 0) return (is_tipline == 1); if ((fd = open("/dev/console", O_RDONLY)) < 0) return (B_FALSE); if (ioctl(fd, CONS_GETTERM, &cons_term) != 0 && errno == ENODEV) { is_tipline = 1; } else { is_tipline = -1; } (void) close(fd); return (is_tipline == 1); } static int validate_target_vt(int target_vt) { int fd; struct vt_stat state; if (target_vt < 1) return (-1); if ((fd = open(VT_DAEMON_CONSOLE_FILE, O_WRONLY)) < 0) return (-1); if (ioctl(fd, VT_GETSTATE, &state) != 0) { (void) close(fd); return (-1); } (void) close(fd); if (state.v_active == target_vt) { return (1); /* it's current active vt */ } if (target_vt == 1) { /* * In tipline case, the system console is always * available, so ignore this request. */ if (vt_is_tipline()) return (-1); target_vt = 0; } /* * The hotkey request and corresponding target_vt number can come * from either kernel or Xserver (or other user applications). * In kernel we've validated the hotkey request, but Xserver (or * other user applications) cannot do it, so here we still try * to validate it. * * VT_GETSTATE is only valid for first 16 VTs for historical reasons. * Fortunately, in practice, Xserver can only send the hotkey * request of target_vt number from 1 to 12 (Ctrl + Alt + F1 to F2). */ if (target_vt < 8 * sizeof (state.v_state)) { if ((state.v_state & (1 << target_vt)) != 0) { return (0); } else { return (-1); } } return (0); } static void vt_do_activate(int target_vt) { (void) ioctl(daemonfd, VT_ACTIVATE, target_vt); (void) mutex_lock(&vt_mutex); vt_hotkeys_pending = B_FALSE; (void) mutex_unlock(&vt_mutex); } /* events written to fd 0 and read from fd 1 */ #define VT_EV_AUTH 1 #define VT_EV_LOCK 2 #define VT_EV_ACTIVATE 3 /* events written to fd 1 and read from fd 0 */ #define VT_EV_TERMINATE_AUTH 4 typedef struct vt_evt { int ve_cmd; int ve_info; /* vtno or display num */ } vt_evt_t; static int eventstream[2]; boolean_t eventstream_init(void) { if (pipe(eventstream) == -1) return (B_FALSE); return (B_TRUE); } void eventstream_write(int channel, vt_evt_t *pevt) { (void) write(eventstream[channel], pevt, sizeof (vt_evt_t)); } static boolean_t eventstream_read(int channel, vt_evt_t *pevt) { ssize_t rval; rval = read(eventstream[channel], pevt, sizeof (vt_evt_t)); return (rval > 0); } static void vt_ev_request(int cmd, int info) { int channel; vt_evt_t ve; ve.ve_cmd = cmd; ve.ve_info = info; channel = (cmd == VT_EV_TERMINATE_AUTH) ? 1 : 0; eventstream_write(channel, &ve); } static void vt_clear_events(void) { int rval = 0; struct stat buf; vt_evt_t evt; while (rval == 0) { rval = fstat(eventstream[0], &buf); if (rval != -1 && buf.st_size > 0) (void) eventstream_read(0, &evt); else break; } } static int vt_conv(int, struct pam_message **, struct pam_response **, void *); /*ARGSUSED*/ static void catch(int x) { (void) signal(SIGINT, catch); } /* * The SIGINT (ctl_c) will restart the authentication, and re-prompt * the end user to input the password. */ static int vt_poll() { struct pollfd pollfds[2]; vt_evt_t ve; int ret; pollfds[0].fd = eventstream[0]; pollfds[1].fd = daemonfd; pollfds[0].events = pollfds[1].events = POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLRDBAND | POLLPRI; for (;;) { pollfds[0].revents = pollfds[1].revents = 0; ret = poll(pollfds, sizeof (pollfds) / sizeof (struct pollfd), -1); if (ret == -1 && errno != EINTR) { continue; } if (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR) return (-1); if (pollfds[0].revents) { (void) eventstream_read(0, &ve); return (0); } if (pollfds[1].revents) return (1); return (0); } } static char vt_getchar(int fd) { char c; int cnt; cnt = read(fd, &c, 1); if (cnt > 0) { return (c); } return (EOF); } static char * vt_getinput(int noecho) { int c; int i = 0; struct termio tty; tcflag_t tty_flags; char input[PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE]; if (noecho) { (void) ioctl(daemonfd, TCGETA, &tty); tty_flags = tty.c_lflag; tty.c_lflag &= ~(ECHO | ECHOE | ECHOK | ECHONL); (void) ioctl(daemonfd, TCSETAF, &tty); } while ((vt_poll()) == 1) { if ((c = vt_getchar(daemonfd)) != '\n' && c != '\r' && c != EOF && (i < PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE)) input[i++] = (char)c; else break; } input[i] = '\0'; if (noecho) { tty.c_lflag = tty_flags; (void) ioctl(daemonfd, TCSETAW, &tty); (void) fputc('\n', stdout); } return (strdup(input)); } /* * vt_conv: vtdaemon PAM conversation function. * SIGINT/EINTR is handled in vt_getinput()/vt_poll(). */ /*ARGSUSED*/ static int vt_conv(int num_msg, struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **response, void *appdata_ptr) { struct pam_message *m; struct pam_response *r; int i, k; if (num_msg >= PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "too many messages %d >= %d", num_msg, PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG); *response = NULL; return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } *response = calloc(num_msg, sizeof (struct pam_response)); if (*response == NULL) return (PAM_BUF_ERR); m = *msg; r = *response; for (i = 0; i < num_msg; i++) { int echo_off = 0; /* Bad message */ if (m->msg == NULL) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "message[%d]: %d/NULL\n", i, m->msg_style); goto err; } /* * Fix up final newline: * remove from prompts, add back for messages. */ if (m->msg[strlen(m->msg)] == '\n') m->msg[strlen(m->msg)] = '\0'; r->resp = NULL; r->resp_retcode = 0; switch (m->msg_style) { case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: echo_off = 1; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: (void) fputs(m->msg, stdout); r->resp = vt_getinput(echo_off); break; case PAM_ERROR_MSG: /* the user may want to see this */ (void) fputs(m->msg, stdout); (void) fputs("\n", stdout); break; case PAM_TEXT_INFO: (void) fputs(m->msg, stdout); (void) fputs("\n", stdout); break; default: syslog(LOG_ERR, "message[%d]: unknown type" "%d/val=\"%s\"", i, m->msg_style, m->msg); /* error, service module won't clean up */ goto err; } /* Next message/response */ m++; r++; } return (PAM_SUCCESS); err: /* * Service modules don't clean up responses if an error is returned. * Free responses here. */ r = *response; for (k = 0; k < i; k++, r++) { if (r->resp) { /* Clear before freeing -- maybe a password */ bzero(r->resp, strlen(r->resp)); free(r->resp); r->resp = NULL; } } free(*response); *response = NULL; return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } #define DEF_FILE "/etc/default/login" /* Get PASSREQ from default file */ static boolean_t vt_default(void) { int flags; char *ptr; boolean_t retval = B_FALSE; if ((defopen(DEF_FILE)) == 0) { /* ignore case */ flags = defcntl(DC_GETFLAGS, 0); TURNOFF(flags, DC_CASE); (void) defcntl(DC_SETFLAGS, flags); if ((ptr = defread("PASSREQ=")) != NULL && strcasecmp("YES", ptr) == 0) retval = B_TRUE; (void) defopen(NULL); } return (retval); } /* * VT_CLEAR_SCREEN_STR is the console terminal escape sequence used to * clear the current screen. The vt special console (/dev/vt/1) is * just reserved for vtdaemon, and the TERM/termcap of it is always * the local sun-color, which is always supported by our kernel terminal * emulator. */ #define VT_CLEAR_SCREEN_STR "\033[2J\033[1;1H" static void vt_do_auth(int target_vt) { char user_name[sizeof (((struct utmpx *)0)->ut_line) + 1] = {'\0'}; pam_handle_t *vt_pamh; int err; int pam_flag = 0; int chpasswd_tries; struct pam_conv pam_conv = {vt_conv, NULL}; pid_t pid; adt_session_data_t *ah; vt_read_utx(target_vt, &pid, user_name); if (pid == (pid_t)-1 || user_name[0] == '\0') return; if ((err = pam_start("vtdaemon", user_name, &pam_conv, &vt_pamh)) != PAM_SUCCESS) return; /* * firstly switch to the vtdaemon special console * and clear the current screen */ (void) ioctl(daemonfd, VT_ACTIVATE, VT_DAEMON_ARG); (void) write(daemonfd, VT_CLEAR_SCREEN_STR, strlen(VT_CLEAR_SCREEN_STR)); (void) ioctl(daemonfd, VT_SET_TARGET, target_vt); (void) mutex_lock(&vt_mutex); vt_auth_doing = B_TRUE; vt_hotkeys_pending = B_FALSE; (void) mutex_unlock(&vt_mutex); /* * Fetch audit handle. */ ah = vt_ah_array[target_vt - 1]; if (vt_default()) pam_flag = PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK; do { if (VT_IS_SYSTEM_CONSOLE(target_vt)) (void) fprintf(stdout, "\nUnlock user %s on the system console\n", user_name); else (void) fprintf(stdout, "\nUnlock user %s on vt/%d\n", user_name, target_vt); err = pam_authenticate(vt_pamh, pam_flag); (void) mutex_lock(&vt_mutex); if (vt_hotkeys_pending) { (void) mutex_unlock(&vt_mutex); break; } (void) mutex_unlock(&vt_mutex); if (err == PAM_SUCCESS) { err = pam_acct_mgmt(vt_pamh, pam_flag); (void) mutex_lock(&vt_mutex); if (vt_hotkeys_pending) { (void) mutex_unlock(&vt_mutex); break; } (void) mutex_unlock(&vt_mutex); if (err == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) { chpasswd_tries = 0; do { err = pam_chauthtok(vt_pamh, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK); chpasswd_tries++; (void) mutex_lock(&vt_mutex); if (vt_hotkeys_pending) { (void) mutex_unlock(&vt_mutex); break; } (void) mutex_unlock(&vt_mutex); } while ((err == PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR || err == PAM_TRY_AGAIN) && chpasswd_tries < DEF_ATTEMPTS); (void) mutex_lock(&vt_mutex); if (vt_hotkeys_pending) { (void) mutex_unlock(&vt_mutex); break; } (void) mutex_unlock(&vt_mutex); vt_audit_event(ah, ADT_passwd, err); } } /* * Only audit failed unlock here, successful unlock * will be audited after switching to target vt. */ if (err != PAM_SUCCESS) { (void) fprintf(stdout, "%s", pam_strerror(vt_pamh, err)); vt_audit_event(ah, ADT_screenunlock, err); } (void) mutex_lock(&vt_mutex); if (vt_hotkeys_pending) { (void) mutex_unlock(&vt_mutex); break; } (void) mutex_unlock(&vt_mutex); } while (err != PAM_SUCCESS); (void) mutex_lock(&vt_mutex); if (!vt_hotkeys_pending) { /* * Should be PAM_SUCCESS to reach here. */ (void) ioctl(daemonfd, VT_ACTIVATE, target_vt); vt_audit_event(ah, ADT_screenunlock, err); /* * Free audit handle. */ (void) adt_end_session(ah); vt_ah_array[target_vt - 1] = NULL; } (void) mutex_unlock(&vt_mutex); (void) pam_end(vt_pamh, err); if (user_name != NULL) free(user_name); (void) mutex_lock(&vt_mutex); vt_auth_doing = B_FALSE; vt_clear_events(); (void) mutex_unlock(&vt_mutex); } /* main thread (lock and auth) */ static void vt_serve_events(void) { struct pollfd pollfds[1]; int ret; vt_evt_t ve; pollfds[0].fd = eventstream[1]; pollfds[0].events = POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLRDBAND | POLLPRI; for (;;) { pollfds[0].revents = 0; ret = poll(pollfds, sizeof (pollfds) / sizeof (struct pollfd), -1); if (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR) { continue; } if (pollfds[0].revents && eventstream_read(1, &ve)) { /* new request */ switch (ve.ve_cmd) { case VT_EV_AUTH: vt_do_auth(ve.ve_info); break; case VT_EV_LOCK: vt_activate_screenlock(ve.ve_info); break; case VT_EV_ACTIVATE: /* directly activate target vt */ vt_do_activate(ve.ve_info); break; } } } } static void vt_check_target_session(uint32_t target_vt) { pid_t pid = (pid_t)-1; if (!vt_secure) { vt_ev_request(VT_EV_ACTIVATE, target_vt); return; } /* check the target session */ vt_read_utx(target_vt, &pid, NULL); if (pid == (pid_t)-1) { vt_ev_request(VT_EV_ACTIVATE, target_vt); return; } vt_ev_request(VT_EV_AUTH, target_vt); } static boolean_t vt_get_active_disp_info(struct vt_dispinfo *vd) { int fd; struct vt_stat state; char vtname[16]; if ((fd = open(VT_DAEMON_CONSOLE_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) return (B_FALSE); if (ioctl(fd, VT_GETSTATE, &state) != 0) { (void) close(fd); return (B_FALSE); } (void) close(fd); (void) snprintf(vtname, sizeof (vtname), "/dev/vt/%d", state.v_active); if ((fd = open(vtname, O_RDONLY)) < 0) return (B_FALSE); if (ioctl(fd, VT_GETDISPINFO, vd) != 0) { (void) close(fd); return (B_FALSE); } (void) close(fd); return (B_TRUE); } /* * Xserver registers its pid into kernel to associate it with * its vt upon startup for each graphical display. So here we can * check if the pid is of the Xserver for the current active * display when we receive a special VT_EV_X_EXIT request from * a process. If the request does not come from the current * active Xserver, it is discarded. */ static boolean_t vt_check_disp_active(pid_t x_pid) { struct vt_dispinfo vd; if (vt_get_active_disp_info(&vd) && vd.v_pid == x_pid) return (B_TRUE); return (B_FALSE); } /* * check if the pid is of the Xserver for the current active display, * return true when it is, and then also return other associated * information with the Xserver. */ static boolean_t vt_get_disp_info(pid_t x_pid, int *logged_in, int *display_num) { struct vt_dispinfo vd; if (!vt_get_active_disp_info(&vd) || vd.v_pid != x_pid) return (B_FALSE); *logged_in = vd.v_login; *display_num = vd.v_dispnum; return (B_TRUE); } static void vt_terminate_auth(void) { struct timespec sleeptime; sleeptime.tv_sec = 0; sleeptime.tv_nsec = 1000000; /* 1ms */ (void) mutex_lock(&vt_mutex); while (vt_auth_doing) { vt_ev_request(VT_EV_TERMINATE_AUTH, 0); if (vt_auth_doing) { (void) mutex_unlock(&vt_mutex); (void) nanosleep(&sleeptime, NULL); sleeptime.tv_nsec *= 2; (void) mutex_lock(&vt_mutex); } } (void) mutex_unlock(&vt_mutex); } static void vt_do_hotkeys(pid_t pid, uint32_t target_vt) { int logged_in; int display_num; if (validate_target_vt(target_vt) != 0) return; /* * Maybe last switch action is being taken and the lock is ongoing, * here we must reject the newly request. */ (void) mutex_lock(&vt_mutex); if (vt_hotkeys_pending) { (void) mutex_unlock(&vt_mutex); return; } /* cleared in vt_do_active and vt_do_auth */ vt_hotkeys_pending = B_TRUE; (void) mutex_unlock(&vt_mutex); vt_terminate_auth(); /* check source session for this hotkeys request */ if (pid == 0) { /* ok, it comes from kernel. */ if (vt_secure) vt_check_source_audit(); /* then only need to check target session */ vt_check_target_session(target_vt); return; } /* * check if it comes from current active X graphical session, * if not, ignore this request. */ if (!vt_get_disp_info(pid, &logged_in, &display_num)) { (void) mutex_lock(&vt_mutex); vt_hotkeys_pending = B_FALSE; (void) mutex_unlock(&vt_mutex); return; } if (logged_in && vt_secure) vt_ev_request(VT_EV_LOCK, display_num); vt_check_target_session(target_vt); } /* * The main routine for the door server that deals with secure hotkeys */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void server_for_door(void *cookie, char *args, size_t alen, door_desc_t *dp, uint_t n_desc) { ucred_t *uc = NULL; vt_cmd_arg_t *vtargp; /* LINTED E_BAD_PTR_CAST_ALIGN */ vtargp = (vt_cmd_arg_t *)args; if (vtargp == NULL || alen != sizeof (vt_cmd_arg_t) || door_ucred(&uc) != 0) { (void) door_return(NULL, 0, NULL, 0); return; } switch (vtargp->vt_ev) { case VT_EV_X_EXIT: /* * Xserver will issue this event requesting to switch back * to previous active vt when it's exiting and the associated * vt is currently active. */ if (vt_check_disp_active(ucred_getpid(uc))) vt_do_hotkeys(0, vtargp->vt_num); break; case VT_EV_HOTKEYS: if (!vt_hotkeys) /* hotkeys are disabled? */ break; vt_do_hotkeys(ucred_getpid(uc), vtargp->vt_num); break; default: break; } ucred_free(uc); (void) door_return(NULL, 0, NULL, 0); } static boolean_t setup_door(void) { if ((vt_door = door_create(server_for_door, NULL, DOOR_UNREF | DOOR_REFUSE_DESC | DOOR_NO_CANCEL)) < 0) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "door_create failed: %s", strerror(errno)); return (B_FALSE); } (void) fdetach(vt_door_path); if (fattach(vt_door, vt_door_path) != 0) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "fattach to %s failed: %s", vt_door_path, strerror(errno)); (void) door_revoke(vt_door); (void) fdetach(vt_door_path); vt_door = -1; return (B_FALSE); } return (B_TRUE); } /* * check to see if vtdaemon is already running. * * The idea here is that we want to open the path to which we will * attach our door, lock it, and then make sure that no-one has beat us * to fattach(3c)ing onto it. * * fattach(3c) is really a mount, so there are actually two possible * vnodes we could be dealing with. Our strategy is as follows: * * - If the file we opened is a regular file (common case): * There is no fattach(3c)ed door, so we have a chance of becoming * the running vtdaemon. We attempt to lock the file: if it is * already locked, that means someone else raced us here, so we * lose and give up. * * - If the file we opened is a namefs file: * This means there is already an established door fattach(3c)'ed * to the rendezvous path. We've lost the race, so we give up. * Note that in this case we also try to grab the file lock, and * will succeed in acquiring it since the vnode locked by the * "winning" vtdaemon was a regular one, and the one we locked was * the fattach(3c)'ed door node. At any rate, no harm is done. */ static boolean_t make_daemon_exclusive(void) { int doorfd = -1; boolean_t ret = B_FALSE; struct stat st; struct flock flock; top: if ((doorfd = open(vt_door_path, O_CREAT|O_RDWR, S_IREAD|S_IWRITE|S_IRGRP|S_IROTH)) < 0) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "failed to open %s", vt_door_path); goto out; } if (fstat(doorfd, &st) < 0) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "failed to stat %s", vt_door_path); goto out; } /* * Lock the file to synchronize */ flock.l_type = F_WRLCK; flock.l_whence = SEEK_SET; flock.l_start = (off_t)0; flock.l_len = (off_t)0; if (fcntl(doorfd, F_SETLK, &flock) < 0) { /* * Someone else raced us here and grabbed the lock file * first. A warning here and exit. */ syslog(LOG_ERR, "vtdaemon is already running!"); goto out; } if (strcmp(st.st_fstype, "namefs") == 0) { struct door_info info; /* * There is already something fattach()'ed to this file. * Lets see what the door is up to. */ if (door_info(doorfd, &info) == 0 && info.di_target != -1) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "vtdaemon is already running!"); goto out; } (void) fdetach(vt_door_path); (void) close(doorfd); goto top; } ret = setup_door(); out: (void) close(doorfd); return (ret); } static boolean_t mkvtdir(void) { struct stat st; /* * We must create and lock everyone but root out of VT_TMPDIR * since anyone can open any UNIX domain socket, regardless of * its file system permissions. */ if (mkdir(VT_TMPDIR, S_IRWXU|S_IROTH|S_IXOTH|S_IRGRP|S_IXGRP) < 0 && errno != EEXIST) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "could not mkdir '%s'", VT_TMPDIR); return (B_FALSE); } /* paranoia */ if ((stat(VT_TMPDIR, &st) < 0) || !S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "'%s' is not a directory", VT_TMPDIR); return (B_FALSE); } (void) chmod(VT_TMPDIR, S_IRWXU|S_IROTH|S_IXOTH|S_IRGRP|S_IXGRP); return (B_TRUE); } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int i; int opt; priv_set_t *privset; int active; openlog("vtdaemon", LOG_PID | LOG_CONS, 0); /* * Check that we have all privileges. It would be nice to pare * this down, but this is at least a first cut. */ if ((privset = priv_allocset()) == NULL) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "priv_allocset failed"); return (1); } if (getppriv(PRIV_EFFECTIVE, privset) != 0) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "getppriv failed", "getppriv"); priv_freeset(privset); return (1); } if (priv_isfullset(privset) == B_FALSE) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "You lack sufficient privilege " "to run this command (all privs required)"); priv_freeset(privset); return (1); } priv_freeset(privset); while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ksrc:")) != EOF) { switch (opt) { case 'k': vt_hotkeys = B_FALSE; break; case 's': vt_secure = B_FALSE; break; case 'c': vtnodecount = atoi(optarg); break; default: break; } } (void) vt_setup_signal(SIGINT, 1); if (!mkvtdir()) return (1); if (!eventstream_init()) return (1); (void) snprintf(vt_door_path, sizeof (vt_door_path), VT_TMPDIR "/vtdaemon_door"); if (!make_daemon_exclusive()) return (1); /* only the main thread accepts SIGINT */ (void) vt_setup_signal(SIGINT, 0); (void) sigset(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); (void) signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN); (void) signal(SIGINT, catch); for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) (void) close(i); (void) setsid(); if ((daemonfd = open(VT_DAEMON_CONSOLE_FILE, O_RDWR)) < 0) { return (1); } if (daemonfd != 0) (void) dup2(daemonfd, STDIN_FILENO); if (daemonfd != 1) (void) dup2(daemonfd, STDOUT_FILENO); if (vtnodecount >= 2) (void) ioctl(daemonfd, VT_CONFIG, vtnodecount); if ((vt_ah_array = calloc(vtnodecount - 1, sizeof (adt_session_data_t *))) == NULL) return (1); (void) ioctl(daemonfd, VT_GETACTIVE, &active); if (active == 1) { /* * This is for someone who restarts vtdaemon while vtdaemon * is doing authentication on /dev/vt/1. * A better way is to continue the authentication, but there * are chances that the status of the target VT has changed. * So we just clear the screen here. */ (void) write(daemonfd, VT_CLEAR_SCREEN_STR, strlen(VT_CLEAR_SCREEN_STR)); } vt_serve_events(); /*NOTREACHED*/ } static int vt_audit_start(adt_session_data_t **ah, pid_t pid) { ucred_t *uc; if (adt_start_session(ah, NULL, 0)) return (-1); if ((uc = ucred_get(pid)) == NULL) { (void) adt_end_session(*ah); return (-1); } if (adt_set_from_ucred(*ah, uc, ADT_NEW)) { ucred_free(uc); (void) adt_end_session(*ah); return (-1); } ucred_free(uc); return (0); } /* * Write audit event */ static void vt_audit_event(adt_session_data_t *ah, au_event_t event_id, int status) { adt_event_data_t *event; if ((event = adt_alloc_event(ah, event_id)) == NULL) { return; } (void) adt_put_event(event, status == PAM_SUCCESS ? ADT_SUCCESS : ADT_FAILURE, status == PAM_SUCCESS ? ADT_SUCCESS : ADT_FAIL_PAM + status); adt_free_event(event); } static void vt_check_source_audit(void) { int fd; int source_vt; int real_vt; struct vt_stat state; pid_t pid; adt_session_data_t *ah; if ((fd = open(VT_DAEMON_CONSOLE_FILE, O_WRONLY)) < 0) return; if (ioctl(fd, VT_GETSTATE, &state) != 0 || ioctl(fd, VT_GETACTIVE, &real_vt) != 0) { (void) close(fd); return; } source_vt = state.v_active; /* 1..n */ (void) close(fd); /* check if it's already locked */ if (real_vt == 1) /* vtdaemon is taking over the screen */ return; vt_read_utx(source_vt, &pid, NULL); if (pid == (pid_t)-1) return; if (vt_audit_start(&ah, pid) != 0) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "audit start failed "); return; } /* * In case the previous session terminated abnormally. */ if (vt_ah_array[source_vt - 1] != NULL) (void) adt_end_session(vt_ah_array[source_vt - 1]); vt_ah_array[source_vt - 1] = ah; vt_audit_event(ah, ADT_screenlock, PAM_SUCCESS); }