/* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Code for uid-swapping. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ /* * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. * Use is subject to license terms. */ #include "includes.h" RCSID("$OpenBSD: uidswap.c,v 1.23 2002/07/15 17:15:31 stevesk Exp $"); #include #include "log.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "servconf.h" /* * Note: all these functions must work in all of the following cases: * 1. euid=0, ruid=0 * 2. euid=0, ruid!=0 * 3. euid!=0, ruid!=0 * Additionally, they must work regardless of whether the system has * POSIX saved uids or not. */ #if defined(_POSIX_SAVED_IDS) && !defined(BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS) /* Lets assume that posix saved ids also work with seteuid, even though that is not part of the posix specification. */ #define SAVED_IDS_WORK /* Saved effective uid. */ static uid_t saved_euid = 0; static gid_t saved_egid = 0; #endif /* Saved effective uid. */ static int privileged = 0; static int temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0; static int ngroups_max = -1; static gid_t *saved_egroups, *user_groups; static int saved_egroupslen = -1, user_groupslen = -1; /* * Temporarily changes to the given uid. If the effective user * id is not root, this does nothing. This call cannot be nested. */ void temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *pw) { /* Save the current euid, and egroups. */ #ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK saved_euid = geteuid(); saved_egid = getegid(); debug("temporarily_use_uid: %u/%u (e=%u/%u)", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, (u_int)saved_euid, (u_int)saved_egid); if (saved_euid != 0) { privileged = 0; return; } #else if (geteuid() != 0) { privileged = 0; return; } #endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK */ privileged = 1; temporarily_use_uid_effective = 1; if (ngroups_max < 0) { ngroups_max = sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX); saved_egroups = malloc(ngroups_max * sizeof (gid_t)); user_groups = malloc(ngroups_max * sizeof (gid_t)); if (saved_egroups == NULL || user_groups == NULL) fatal("malloc(gid array): %.100s", strerror(errno)); } saved_egroupslen = getgroups(ngroups_max, saved_egroups); if (saved_egroupslen < 0) fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); /* set and save the user's groups */ if (user_groupslen == -1) { if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) fatal("initgroups: %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name, strerror(errno)); user_groupslen = getgroups(ngroups_max, user_groups); if (user_groupslen < 0) fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); } /* Set the effective uid to the given (unprivileged) uid. */ if (setgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) < 0) fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); #ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK /* Set saved gid and set real gid */ if (setregid(pw->pw_gid, -1) == -1) debug("setregid(%u, -1): %.100s", (uint_t)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)); /* Set saved uid and set real uid */ if (setreuid(pw->pw_uid, -1) == -1) debug("setreuid(%u, -1): %.100s", (uint_t)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno)); #else /* Propagate the privileged gid to all of our gids. */ if (setgid(getegid()) < 0) debug("setgid %u: %.100s", (u_int) getegid(), strerror(errno)); /* Propagate the privileged uid to all of our uids. */ if (setuid(geteuid()) < 0) debug("setuid %u: %.100s", (u_int) geteuid(), strerror(errno)); #endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK */ /* Set effective gid */ if (setegid(pw->pw_gid) == -1) fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno)); /* Set effective uid */ if (seteuid(pw->pw_uid) == -1) fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno)); /* * If saved set ids work then * * ruid == euid == pw->pw_uid * saved uid = previous euid * rgid == egid == pw->pw_gid * saved gid = previous egid */ } /* * Restores to the original (privileged) uid. */ void restore_uid(void) { /* it's a no-op unless privileged */ if (!privileged) { debug("restore_uid: (unprivileged)"); return; } if (!temporarily_use_uid_effective) fatal("restore_uid: temporarily_use_uid not effective"); #ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK debug("restore_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)saved_euid, (u_int)saved_egid); /* Set the effective uid back to the saved privileged uid. */ if (seteuid(saved_euid) < 0) fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_euid, strerror(errno)); if (setuid(saved_euid) < 0) fatal("setuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_euid, strerror(errno)); if (setegid(saved_egid) < 0) fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_egid, strerror(errno)); if (setgid(saved_egid) < 0) fatal("setgid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_egid, strerror(errno)); #else /* SAVED_IDS_WORK */ /* * We are unable to restore the real uid to its unprivileged value. * Propagate the real uid (usually more privileged) to effective uid * as well. */ setuid(getuid()); setgid(getgid()); #endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK */ if (setgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) < 0) fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0; } /* * Permanently sets all uids to the given uid. This cannot be called while * temporarily_use_uid is effective. Note that when the ChrootDirectory option * is in use we keep a few privileges so that we can call chroot(2) later while * already running under UIDs of a connecting user. */ void permanently_set_uid(struct passwd *pw, char *chroot_directory) { priv_set_t *pset; if (temporarily_use_uid_effective) fatal("%s: temporarily_use_uid effective", __func__); debug("%s: %u/%u", __func__, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)pw->pw_gid); if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) fatal("initgroups: %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name, strerror(errno)); if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) fatal("setgid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)); /* * If root is connecting we are done now. Note that we must have called * setgid() in case that the SSH server was run under a group other than * root. */ if (pw->pw_uid == 0) return; /* * This means we will keep all privileges after the UID change. */ if (setpflags(PRIV_AWARE, 1) != 0) fatal("setpflags: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Now we are running under UID of the user. */ if (setuid(pw->pw_uid) < 0) fatal("setuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno)); /* * We will run with the privileges from the Inheritable set as * we would have after exec(2) if we had stayed in NPA mode * before setuid(2) call (see privileges(5), user_attr(4), and * pam_unix_cred(5)). We want to run with P = E = I, with I as * set by pam_unix_cred(5). We also add PRIV_PROC_CHROOT, * obviously, and then PRIV_PROC_FORK and PRIV_PROC_EXEC, since * those two might have been removed from the I set. Note that * we are expected to finish the login process without them in * the I set, the important thing is that those not be passed on * to a shell or a subsystem later if they were not set in * pam_unix_cred(5). */ if ((pset = priv_allocset()) == NULL) fatal("priv_allocset: %s", strerror(errno)); if (getppriv(PRIV_INHERITABLE, pset) != 0) fatal("getppriv: %s", strerror(errno)); /* We do not need PRIV_PROC_CHROOT unless chroot()ing. */ if (chroot_requested(chroot_directory) && priv_addset(pset, PRIV_PROC_CHROOT) == -1) { fatal("%s: priv_addset failed", __func__); } if (priv_addset(pset, PRIV_PROC_FORK) == -1 || priv_addset(pset, PRIV_PROC_EXEC) == -1) { fatal("%s: priv_addset failed", __func__); } /* Set only P; this will also set E. */ if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, pset) == -1) fatal("setppriv: %s", strerror(errno)); /* We don't need the PA flag anymore. */ if (setpflags(PRIV_AWARE, 0) == -1) fatal("setpflags: %s", strerror(errno)); priv_freeset(pset); }