/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * DES & Triple DES EDE key verification helpers */ #ifndef __CRYPTO_INTERNAL_DES_H #define __CRYPTO_INTERNAL_DES_H #include #include #include #include #include /** * crypto_des_verify_key - Check whether a DES key is weak * @tfm: the crypto algo * @key: the key buffer * * Returns -EINVAL if the key is weak and the crypto TFM does not permit weak * keys. Otherwise, 0 is returned. * * It is the job of the caller to ensure that the size of the key equals * DES_KEY_SIZE. */ static inline int crypto_des_verify_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key) { struct des_ctx tmp; int err; err = des_expand_key(&tmp, key, DES_KEY_SIZE); if (err == -ENOKEY) { if (crypto_tfm_get_flags(tfm) & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS) err = -EINVAL; else err = 0; } if (err) crypto_tfm_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_WEAK_KEY); memzero_explicit(&tmp, sizeof(tmp)); return err; } /* * RFC2451: * * For DES-EDE3, there is no known need to reject weak or * complementation keys. Any weakness is obviated by the use of * multiple keys. * * However, if the first two or last two independent 64-bit keys are * equal (k1 == k2 or k2 == k3), then the DES3 operation is simply the * same as DES. Implementers MUST reject keys that exhibit this * property. * */ static inline int des3_ede_verify_key(const u8 *key, unsigned int key_len, bool check_weak) { int ret = fips_enabled ? -EINVAL : -ENOKEY; u32 K[6]; memcpy(K, key, DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE); if ((!((K[0] ^ K[2]) | (K[1] ^ K[3])) || !((K[2] ^ K[4]) | (K[3] ^ K[5]))) && (fips_enabled || check_weak)) goto bad; if ((!((K[0] ^ K[4]) | (K[1] ^ K[5]))) && fips_enabled) goto bad; ret = 0; bad: memzero_explicit(K, DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE); return ret; } /** * crypto_des3_ede_verify_key - Check whether a DES3-EDE key is weak * @tfm: the crypto algo * @key: the key buffer * * Returns -EINVAL if the key is weak and the crypto TFM does not permit weak * keys or when running in FIPS mode. Otherwise, 0 is returned. Note that some * keys are rejected in FIPS mode even if weak keys are permitted by the TFM * flags. * * It is the job of the caller to ensure that the size of the key equals * DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE. */ static inline int crypto_des3_ede_verify_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key) { int err; err = des3_ede_verify_key(key, DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE, crypto_tfm_get_flags(tfm) & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS); if (err) crypto_tfm_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_WEAK_KEY); return err; } static inline int verify_skcipher_des_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key) { return crypto_des_verify_key(crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm), key); } static inline int verify_skcipher_des3_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key) { return crypto_des3_ede_verify_key(crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm), key); } static inline int verify_aead_des_key(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, int keylen) { if (keylen != DES_KEY_SIZE) return -EINVAL; return crypto_des_verify_key(crypto_aead_tfm(tfm), key); } static inline int verify_aead_des3_key(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, int keylen) { if (keylen != DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE) return -EINVAL; return crypto_des3_ede_verify_key(crypto_aead_tfm(tfm), key); } #endif /* __CRYPTO_INTERNAL_DES_H */