/* * CDDL HEADER START * * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions * and limitations under the License. * * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] * * CDDL HEADER END */ /* * Copyright 2007 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. * Use is subject to license terms. */ #pragma ident "%Z%%M% %I% %E% SMI" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* near end to get min and max macros right */ #include /* n must be a power of 2 */ #define ROUNDUP(k, n) (((k) + (n) - 1) & ~((n) - 1)) #define SHA1BLOCKBITS 512 #define SHA1BLOCKBYTES (SHA1BLOCKBITS / 8) #define SHA1WORDS 5 #define SHA1BYTES (4 * SHA1WORDS) /* * Policy. ENTROPY_STARVATION is the maximum number of calls each * FIPS instance will accept without successfully getting more * entropy. It needs to be large enough to allow RNG operations to * not stall because of health checks, etc. But we don't want it too * large. FIPS 186-2 change 1 (5 October 2001) states that no more * that 2,000,000 DSA signatures (done using this algorithm) should be * done without reseeding. We make sure we add 64 bits of entropy at * most every 10000 operations, hence we will have stirred in 160 bits * of entropy at most once every 30000 operations. Normally, we stir * in 64 bits of entropy for every number generated. */ #define ENTROPY_STARVATION 10000ULL /* * Adds val1 and val2 and stores result into sum. The various input * pointers can be exactly aliased. (They cannot be offset and * overlapping, but no one would ever do that.) Values are big endian * by words and native byte order within words. The return value's * 2-bit is 0 if the result is zero, it's 1 bit is carry out. (This * is reused code. The return code is not used by n2rng.) Thus, * calling with both carryin and complement_val2 ones does a * subtraction. A null sum pointer parameter is allowed. The * subtraction features were required when this code was orginally * written so it could do a mod q operation. */ static int add160(uint32_t *sum, uint32_t const *val1, uint32_t const *val2, const unsigned carryin, const int complement_val2) { int i; uint32_t partialsum; uint32_t carry = (carryin > 0); uint32_t non_zero = 0; for (i = 4; i >= 0; --i) { partialsum = val1[i] + (complement_val2 ? ~val2[i] : val2[i]) + carry; if (carry) { carry = (partialsum <= val1[i]); } else { carry = (partialsum < val1[i]); } if (sum) { sum[i] = partialsum; } non_zero |= partialsum; } return (((non_zero != 0) * 2) | carry); } /* * Computes a new random value, which is stored in x_j; updates XKEY * in the *rs. XSEED_j is additional input. In principle, we should * protect XKEY, perhaps by putting it on a non-pagable page, but we * aways clobber XKEY with fresh entropy just before we use it. And * step 3d irreversibly updates it just after we use it. The only * risk is that if an attacker captured the state while the entropy * generator was broken, the attacker could predict future values. * There are two cases: 1. The attack gets root access to a live * system. But there is no defense against that. 2. The attacker * gets access to a crash dump. But by then no values are being * generated. * * Note that XSEEDj is overwritten with sensitive stuff, and must be * zeroed by the caller. We use two separate symbols (XVAL and * XSEEDj) to make each step match the notation in FIPS 186-2. */ static void fips_random_inner(fipsrandomstruct_t *frsp, uint32_t *x_j, uint32_t *XSEED_j) { int i; SHA1_CTX sha1_context; /* Alias to preserve terminology from FIPS 186-2 */ #define XVAL XSEED_j /* * K&R section A8.7: If the array has fixed size, the number * of initializers may not exceed the number of members in the * array; if there are fewer, the trailing members are * initialized with 0. */ static const char zero[SHA1BLOCKBYTES - SHA1BYTES] = {0}; /* * Step 3b: XVAL = (XKEY + XSEED_sub_j) mod 2^b. The mod is * implicit in the 160 bit representation. Note that XVAL and * XSEED_j are actually the same location. */ (void) add160(XVAL, frsp->XKEY, XSEED_j, 0, 0); /* * Step 3c: x_sub_j = G(t, XVAL) */ SHA1Init(&sha1_context); SHA1Update(&sha1_context, (unsigned char *)XVAL, SHA1BYTES); /* * Filling to 64 bytes is requried by FIPS 186-2 Appendix 3.3. * It also triggers SHA1Transform (the steps a-e of the spec). * * zero is a const char[], but SHA1update does not declare its * second parameter const, even though it does not modify it, * so we cast to suppress a compiler warning. */ SHA1Update(&sha1_context, (unsigned char *)zero, SHA1BLOCKBYTES - SHA1BYTES); /* * The code below directly accesses the state field of * sha1_context, which is of type SHA1_CTX, defined in sha1.h. * This has been deemed acceptable, because that typedef is * Consolidation Private, and n2rng is in the same * consolidation. */ /* copy out to x_j */ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { x_j[i] = sha1_context.state[i]; } /* * Step 3d: XKEY = (1 + XKEY + x_sub_j) mod 2^b. b=160. The * mod 2^160 is implicit in the 160 bit representation. The * one is added via the carry-in flag. */ (void) add160(frsp->XKEY, frsp->XKEY, x_j, 1, 0); #undef XVAL } int fips_random(n2rng_t *n2rng, uint8_t *out, size_t nbytes) { int i; fipsrandomstruct_t *frsp; int rv; union { uint32_t as32[SHA1WORDS]; uint64_t as64[ROUNDUP(SHA1WORDS, 2) >> 1]; } entropy = {0}; uint32_t tempout[SHA1WORDS]; for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i += SHA1BYTES) { frsp = &n2rng->n_frs.fipsarray[ atomic_inc_32_nv(&n2rng->n_frs.fips_round_robin_j) % N2RNG_FIPS_INSTANCES]; /* * Since in the new scheme of things, the RNG latency * will be high on reads after the first, we get just * one word of entropy per call. */ if ((rv = n2rng_getentropy(n2rng, (void *)&entropy.as64[1], sizeof (uint64_t))) != 0) { /* * If all rngs have failed, dispatch task to unregister * from kcf and put the driver in an error state. If * recoverable errors persist, a configuration retry * will be initiated. */ if (rv == EPERM) { n2rng_failure(n2rng); return (EIO); } /* Failure with possible recovery */ entropy.as64[1] = 0; } /* * The idea here is that a Niagara2 chip is highly * parallel, with many strands. If we have just one * instance of the FIPS data, then only one FIPS * computation can happen at a time, serializeing all * the RNG stuff. So we make N2RNG_FIPS_INSTANCES, * and use them round-robin, with the counter being * n2rng->n_frs.fips_round_robin_j. We increment the * counter with an atomic op, avoiding having to have * a global muxtex. The atomic ops are also * significantly faster than mutexes. The mutex is * put inside the loop, otherwise one thread reading * many blocks could stall all other strands. */ frsp = &n2rng->n_frs.fipsarray[ atomic_inc_32_nv(&n2rng->n_frs.fips_round_robin_j) % N2RNG_FIPS_INSTANCES]; mutex_enter(&frsp->mtx); if (entropy.as64[1] == 0) { /* * If we did not get any entropy, entropyword * is zero. We get a false positive with * probablitity 2^-64. It's not worth a few * extra stores and tests eliminate the false * positive. */ if (++frsp->entropyhunger > ENTROPY_STARVATION) { mutex_exit(&frsp->mtx); n2rng_unconfigured(n2rng); return (EIO); } } else { frsp->entropyhunger = 0; } /* nbytes - i is bytes to go */ fips_random_inner(frsp, tempout, entropy.as32); bcopy(tempout, &out[i], min(nbytes - i, SHA1BYTES)); mutex_exit(&frsp->mtx); } /* Zeroize sensitive information */ entropy.as64[1] = 0; bzero(tempout, SHA1BYTES); return (0); } /* * Initializes one FIPS RNG instance. Must be called once for each * instance. */ int n2rng_fips_random_init(n2rng_t *n2rng, fipsrandomstruct_t *frsp) { /* * All FIPS-approved algorithms will operate as cryptograpic * quality PRNGs even if there is no entropy source. (In * fact, this the only one that accepts entropy on the fly.) * One motivation for this is that they system keeps on * delivering cryptographic quality random numbers, even if * the entropy source fails. */ int rv; rv = n2rng_getentropy(n2rng, (void *)frsp->XKEY, ROUNDUP(SHA1BYTES, 8)); if (rv) { return (rv); } frsp->entropyhunger = 0; mutex_init(&frsp->mtx, NULL, MUTEX_DRIVER, NULL); return (0); } void n2rng_fips_random_fini(fipsrandomstruct_t *frsp) { mutex_destroy(&frsp->mtx); /* * Zeroise fips data. Not really necessary, since the * algorithm has backtracking resistance, but do it anyway. */ bzero(frsp, sizeof (fipsrandomstruct_t)); }