/* * CDDL HEADER START * * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the * Common Development and Distribution License, Version 1.0 only * (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance * with the License. * * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions * and limitations under the License. * * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] * * CDDL HEADER END */ /* * Copyright 2005 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. * Use is subject to license terms. */ #pragma ident "%Z%%M% %I% %E% SMI" /* * NFS Version 4 client side SECINFO code. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* * Set up the security flavors supported in this release. * In the order of potential usage. */ #define SECINFO_SUPPORT_COUNT 6 /* sys, krb5, krb5i, krb5p, none, dh */ static char krb5_val[] = {'\x2A', '\x86', '\x48', '\x86', '\xF7', \ '\x12', '\x01', '\x02', '\x02'}; static sec_oid4 krb5_oid = {9, krb5_val}; static SECINFO4res *secinfo_support; /* XXX should come from auth.h, do the cleanup someday */ extern void sec_clnt_freeinfo(struct sec_data *); /* * "nfsstat -m" needs to print out what flavor is used for a mount * point. V3 kernel gets the nfs pseudo flavor from the userland and provides * nfsstat with such information. However, in V4, we do not have nfs pseudo * flavors mapping in the kernel for the rpcsec_gss data negotiated from * the nfs server. * * XXX * Hard coded the mapping in V4 for now. We should look into a possibility * to return the rpcsec_gss mechanism and service information to nfsstat and * perhaps have nfsstat print out the mech and service seperately... * * We should avoid referring to nfssec.conf file in V4. The original reason * for having /etc/nfssec.conf file is because V3 MOUNT protocol can only * return an integer for a flavor, thus the term "nfs pseudo flavor" is * defined and the nfssec.conf file is used to map the nfs pseudo flavor * to rpcsec_gss data (mech, service, default-qop). Now, V4 can return the * rpcsec_gss data instead of an integer, so in theory, V4 should not need * to depend on the nfssec.conf file anymore. */ #define NFS_FLAVOR_KRB5 390003 #define NFS_FLAVOR_KRB5I 390004 #define NFS_FLAVOR_KRB5P 390005 /* * Currently, 6 flavors are supported: sys, krb5, krb5i, krb5p, dh, none. * Without proper keys, krb5* or dh will fail. * * XXX kgss_indicate_mechs() should be able to tell us what gss mechanisms * are supported on this host (/etc/gss/mech), thus nfs should be able to * use them. However, the dh640 and dh1024 implementation are not nfs tested. * Should look into using kgss_indicate_mechs when new gss mechanism is added. */ void nfs4_secinfo_init(void) { secinfo4 *val; int i; secinfo_support = kmem_alloc(sizeof (SECINFO4res), KM_SLEEP); secinfo_support->SECINFO4resok_len = SECINFO_SUPPORT_COUNT; val = kmem_alloc( secinfo_support->SECINFO4resok_len * sizeof (secinfo4), KM_SLEEP); val[0].flavor = AUTH_SYS; val[0].flavor_info.oid.sec_oid4_len = 0; val[0].flavor_info.oid.sec_oid4_val = NULL; val[0].flavor_info.service = 0; val[0].flavor_info.qop = 0; /* add krb5, krb5i, krb5p */ for (i = 1; i <= 3; i++) { val[i].flavor = RPCSEC_GSS; val[i].flavor_info.oid = krb5_oid; /* struct copy */ val[i].flavor_info.service = i; val[i].flavor_info.qop = 0; } val[4].flavor = AUTH_DH; val[4].flavor_info.oid.sec_oid4_len = 0; val[4].flavor_info.oid.sec_oid4_val = NULL; val[4].flavor_info.service = 0; val[4].flavor_info.qop = 0; val[5].flavor = AUTH_NONE; val[5].flavor_info.oid.sec_oid4_len = 0; val[5].flavor_info.oid.sec_oid4_val = NULL; val[5].flavor_info.service = 0; val[5].flavor_info.qop = 0; #if !defined(lint) ASSERT(SECINFO_SUPPORT_COUNT == 6); #endif secinfo_support->SECINFO4resok_val = val; } /* * clean up secinfo_support */ void nfs4_secinfo_fini(void) { kmem_free(secinfo_support->SECINFO4resok_val, secinfo_support->SECINFO4resok_len * sizeof (secinfo4)); kmem_free(secinfo_support, sizeof (SECINFO4res)); } /* * Map RPCSEC_GSS data to a nfs pseudo flavor number defined * in the nfssec.conf file. * * mechanism service qop nfs-pseudo-flavor * ---------------------------------------------------- * kerberos_v5 none default 390003/krb5 * kerberos_v5 integrity default 390004/krb5i * kerberos_v5 privacy default 390005/krb5p * * XXX need to re-visit the mapping semantics when a new * security mechanism is to be added. */ int secinfo2nfsflavor(sec_oid4 *mech_oid, rpc_gss_svc_t service) { /* Is this kerberos_v5? */ if (bcmp(mech_oid->sec_oid4_val, krb5_oid.sec_oid4_val, krb5_oid.sec_oid4_len) != 0) { return (0); } /* for krb5, krb5i, krb5p mapping */ switch (service) { case RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE: return (NFS_FLAVOR_KRB5); case RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY: return (NFS_FLAVOR_KRB5I); case RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY: return (NFS_FLAVOR_KRB5P); default: break; } /* no mapping */ return (0); } /* * secinfo_create() maps the secinfo4 data coming over the wire * to sv_secinfo data structure in servinfo4_t */ static sv_secinfo_t * secinfo_create(servinfo4_t *svp, SECINFO4res *sec_info, char *servname) { uint_t i, seccnt, scnt; sec_data_t *sdata; sv_secinfo_t *sinfo; uint_t len = sec_info->SECINFO4resok_len; secinfo4 *value = sec_info->SECINFO4resok_val; if (len == 0) return (NULL); seccnt = len; /* * If there is no valid sv_dhsec data available but an AUTH_DH * is in the list, skip AUTH_DH flavor. */ if (!svp->sv_dhsec) { for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { if (value[i].flavor == AUTH_DH) seccnt--; } } if (seccnt == 0) return (NULL); sdata = kmem_alloc(sizeof (sec_data_t) * seccnt, KM_SLEEP); scnt = 0; for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { secinfo4 *val = &value[i]; gss_clntdata_t *data; rpcsec_gss_info *info; sdata[scnt].flags = 0; sdata[scnt].rpcflavor = val->flavor; switch (val->flavor) { case RPCSEC_GSS: data = kmem_alloc(sizeof (gss_clntdata_t), KM_SLEEP); data->realm[0] = '\0'; info = &val->flavor_info; data->service = (rpc_gss_service_t)info->service; data->qop = (uint_t)info->qop; data->mechanism.length = info->oid.sec_oid4_len; data->mechanism.elements = kmem_alloc(info->oid.sec_oid4_len, KM_SLEEP); bcopy(info->oid.sec_oid4_val, data->mechanism.elements, info->oid.sec_oid4_len); data->uname[0] = 'n'; data->uname[1] = 'f'; data->uname[2] = 's'; data->uname[3] = '\0'; (void) strcpy(data->inst, servname); sdata[scnt].data = (caddr_t)data; sdata[scnt].secmod = secinfo2nfsflavor(&info->oid, info->service); scnt++; break; case AUTH_DH: if (svp->sv_dhsec) { sdata[scnt] = *svp->sv_dhsec; scnt++; break; } /* no auth_dh data on the client, skip auth_dh */ continue; default: sdata[scnt].secmod = val->flavor; sdata[scnt].data = NULL; scnt++; break; } } ASSERT(seccnt == scnt); sinfo = kmem_alloc(sizeof (sv_secinfo_t), KM_SLEEP); sinfo->count = seccnt; sinfo->sdata = sdata; return (sinfo); } /* * secinfo_free() frees the malloc'd portion of a sv_secinfo_t in servinfo4_t. * * This is similar to sec_clnt_freeinfo() offered from rpcsec module, * except that sec_clnt_freeinfo() frees up an individual secdata. */ void secinfo_free(sv_secinfo_t *secinfo) { int i; if (secinfo == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < secinfo->count; i++) { if (secinfo->sdata[i].rpcflavor == RPCSEC_GSS) { gss_clntdata_t *data = (gss_clntdata_t *) secinfo->sdata[i].data; /* * An auth handle may already cached in rpcsec_gss module * per this secdata. Purge the cache entry before freeing * up this secdata. Can't use sec_clnt_freeinfo since * the allocation of secinfo is different from sec_data. */ (void) rpc_gss_secpurge((void *)&secinfo->sdata[i]); kmem_free(data->mechanism.elements, data->mechanism.length); kmem_free(data, sizeof (gss_clntdata_t)); } if (secinfo->sdata[i].rpcflavor == AUTH_DH) { secinfo->sdata[i].data = NULL; /* release ref to sv_dhsec */ /* * No need to purge the auth_dh cache entry (e.g. call * purge_authtab()) since the AUTH_DH data used here * are always the same. */ } } kmem_free(secinfo->sdata, sizeof (sec_data_t) * secinfo->count); kmem_free(secinfo, sizeof (sv_secinfo_t)); } /* * Check if there is more secinfo to try. * If TRUE, try again. */ static bool_t secinfo_check(servinfo4_t *svp) { (void) nfs_rw_enter_sig(&svp->sv_lock, RW_WRITER, 0); if (svp->sv_secinfo == NULL) { nfs_rw_exit(&svp->sv_lock); return (FALSE); } svp->sv_secinfo->index++; if (svp->sv_secinfo->index < svp->sv_secinfo->count) { svp->sv_flags |= SV4_TRYSECINFO; svp->sv_currsec = &svp->sv_secinfo->sdata[svp->sv_secinfo->index]; nfs_rw_exit(&svp->sv_lock); return (TRUE); } else { svp->sv_secinfo->index = 0; svp->sv_flags &= ~SV4_TRYSECINFO; svp->sv_currsec = NULL; nfs_rw_exit(&svp->sv_lock); return (FALSE); } } /* * Update the secinfo related fields in svp. * * secinfo_update will free the previous sv_secinfo and update with * the new secinfo. However, if the sv_secinfo is saved into sv_save_secinfo * before the recovery starts via save_mnt_secinfo(), sv_secinfo will not * be freed until the recovery is done. */ static void secinfo_update(servinfo4_t *svp, SECINFO4res *sec_info) { sv_secinfo_t *newsecinfo; /* * Create secinfo before freeing the old one to make sure * they are not using the same address. */ newsecinfo = secinfo_create(svp, sec_info, svp->sv_hostname); (void) nfs_rw_enter_sig(&svp->sv_lock, RW_WRITER, 0); if (svp->sv_secinfo && svp->sv_secinfo != svp->sv_save_secinfo) { secinfo_free(svp->sv_secinfo); } svp->sv_secinfo = newsecinfo; if (svp->sv_secinfo) { svp->sv_secinfo->index = 0; svp->sv_flags |= SV4_TRYSECINFO; svp->sv_currsec = &svp->sv_secinfo->sdata[svp->sv_secinfo->index]; } else { svp->sv_flags &= ~SV4_TRYSECINFO; svp->sv_currsec = NULL; } nfs_rw_exit(&svp->sv_lock); } /* * Save the original mount point security information. * * sv_savesec saves the pointer of sv_currsec which points to one of the * secinfo data in the sv_secinfo list. i.e. sv_currsec == &sv_secinfo[index]. * * sv_save_secinfo saves the pointer of sv_secinfo which is the list of * secinfo data returned by the server. */ void save_mnt_secinfo(servinfo4_t *svp) { (void) nfs_rw_enter_sig(&svp->sv_lock, RW_WRITER, 0); if (svp->sv_currsec) { svp->sv_savesec = svp->sv_currsec; svp->sv_save_secinfo = svp->sv_secinfo; } else { ASSERT(svp->sv_save_secinfo == NULL); svp->sv_savesec = svp->sv_secdata; } nfs_rw_exit(&svp->sv_lock); } /* * Check if we need to restore what is saved in sv_savesec and sv_save_secinfo * to be the current secinfo information - sv_currsec and sv_secinfo. * * If op a node that is a stub for a crossed mount point, * keep the original secinfo flavor for the current file system, * not the crossed one. */ void check_mnt_secinfo(servinfo4_t *svp, vnode_t *vp) { bool_t is_restore; (void) nfs_rw_enter_sig(&svp->sv_lock, RW_WRITER, 0); is_restore = (vp == NULL || (VTOR4(vp)->r_flags & R4SRVSTUB)) && svp->sv_save_secinfo && (svp->sv_secinfo != svp->sv_save_secinfo); if (is_restore) { secinfo_free(svp->sv_secinfo); if (svp->sv_savesec == svp->sv_secdata) { ASSERT(svp->sv_save_secinfo == NULL); svp->sv_secinfo = NULL; svp->sv_currsec = NULL; } else { ASSERT(svp->sv_save_secinfo != NULL); svp->sv_secinfo = svp->sv_save_secinfo; svp->sv_currsec = svp->sv_savesec; } } else { if (svp->sv_save_secinfo && svp->sv_save_secinfo != svp->sv_secinfo) secinfo_free(svp->sv_save_secinfo); } svp->sv_save_secinfo = NULL; svp->sv_savesec = NULL; nfs_rw_exit(&svp->sv_lock); } /* * Use the security flavors supported on the client to try * PUTROOTFH until a flavor is found. * * PUTROOTFH could return NFS4ERR_RESOURCE and NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC that * may need a recovery action. This routine only handles NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC. * For other recovery action, it returns ok to the caller for retry. */ static int secinfo_tryroot_otw(mntinfo4_t *mi, cred_t *cr) { COMPOUND4args_clnt args; COMPOUND4res_clnt res; nfs_argop4 argop; int doqueue = 1; bool_t needrecov = FALSE; nfs4_error_t e = { 0, NFS4_OK, RPC_SUCCESS }; /* use the flavors supported on the client */ secinfo_update(mi->mi_curr_serv, secinfo_support); /* Compound {Putroofh} */ args.ctag = TAG_PUTROOTFH; args.array_len = 1; args.array = &argop; argop.argop = OP_PUTROOTFH; retry: NFS4_DEBUG(nfs4_client_call_debug, (CE_NOTE, "secinfo_tryroot_otw: %s call, mi 0x%p", needrecov ? "recov" : "first", (void*)mi)); rfs4call(mi, &args, &res, cr, &doqueue, RFSCALL_SOFT, &e); needrecov = nfs4_needs_recovery(&e, FALSE, mi->mi_vfsp); if (e.error && !needrecov) { return (e.error); } if (res.status == NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC) { (void) xdr_free(xdr_COMPOUND4res_clnt, (caddr_t)&res); if (secinfo_check(mi->mi_curr_serv)) goto retry; /* * Have tried all flavors supported on the client, * but still get NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC. Nothing more can * be done. */ return (geterrno4(res.status)); } if (needrecov) { NFS4_DEBUG(nfs4_client_recov_debug, (CE_NOTE, "secinfo_tryroot_otw: let the caller retry\n")); if (!e.error) (void) xdr_free(xdr_COMPOUND4res_clnt, (caddr_t)&res); return (0); } if (res.status) { (void) xdr_free(xdr_COMPOUND4res_clnt, (caddr_t)&res); return (geterrno4(res.status)); } /* * Done. * * Now, mi->sv_curr_server->sv_currsec points to the flavor found. * SV4_TRYSECINFO has been cleared in rfs4call. * sv_currsec will be used. */ (void) xdr_free(xdr_COMPOUND4res_clnt, (caddr_t)&res); return (e.error); } /* * Caculate the total number of components within a given pathname. * Assuming the given pathname is not null. * e.g. returns 5 for "/a/b/c/d/e" or "a/b/c/d/e" * returns 0 for "/" */ static int comp_total(char *inpath) { int tnum = 0; char *slash; while (*inpath != '\0') { if (*inpath == '/') { inpath++; continue; } if ((slash = (char *)strchr(inpath, '/')) == NULL) { tnum++; break; } else { tnum++; inpath = slash + 1; } } return (tnum); } /* * Get the pointer of the n-th component in the given path. * Mark the preceeding '/' of the component to be '\0' when done. * Assuming nth is > 0. */ static void comp_getn(char *inpath, int nth, component4 *comp) { char *path = inpath, *comp_start, *slash = NULL; int count = 0; while ((count != nth) && (*path != '\0')) { comp_start = path; /* ignore slashes prior to the component name */ while (*path == '/') path++; if (*path != '\0') { comp_start = path; count++; } if ((slash = strchr(path, '/')) == NULL) break; else path = slash + 1; } if (count == nth) { if (slash) *slash = '\0'; comp->utf8string_len = strlen(comp_start); comp->utf8string_val = comp_start; if (comp_start != inpath) { comp_start--; *comp_start = '\0'; } } else { comp->utf8string_len = 0; comp->utf8string_val = NULL; } } /* * SECINFO over the wire compound operation * * compound {PUTROOTFH, {LOOKUP parent-path}, SECINFO component} * * This routine assumes there is a component to work on, thus the * given pathname (svp->sv_path) has to have at least 1 component. * * isrecov - TRUE if this routine is called from a recovery thread. * * nfs4secinfo_otw() only deals with NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC recovery. If this * is already in a recovery thread, then setup the non-wrongsec recovery * action thru nfs4_start_recovery and return to the outer loop in * nfs4_recov_thread() for recovery. If this is not called from a recovery * thread, then error out and let the caller decide what to do. */ static int nfs4secinfo_otw(mntinfo4_t *mi, cred_t *cr, servinfo4_t *svp, int isrecov) { COMPOUND4args_clnt args; COMPOUND4res_clnt res; nfs_argop4 *argop; nfs_resop4 *resop; lookup4_param_t lookuparg; uint_t path_len; int doqueue; int numops, num_argops; char *tmp_path; component4 comp; uint_t ncomp, tcomp; bool_t needrecov = FALSE; nfs4_error_t e = { 0, NFS4_OK, RPC_SUCCESS }; (void) nfs_rw_enter_sig(&svp->sv_lock, RW_READER, 0); ncomp = tcomp = comp_total(svp->sv_path); path_len = strlen(svp->sv_path); nfs_rw_exit(&svp->sv_lock); ASSERT(ncomp > 0); retry: tmp_path = kmem_alloc(path_len + 1, KM_SLEEP); (void) nfs_rw_enter_sig(&svp->sv_lock, RW_READER, 0); bcopy(svp->sv_path, tmp_path, path_len + 1); nfs_rw_exit(&svp->sv_lock); comp_getn(tmp_path, ncomp, &comp); args.ctag = TAG_SECINFO; lookuparg.l4_getattrs = LKP4_NO_ATTRIBUTES; lookuparg.argsp = &args; lookuparg.resp = &res; lookuparg.header_len = 1; /* Putrootfh */ lookuparg.trailer_len = 1; /* Secinfo */ lookuparg.ga_bits = NULL; lookuparg.mi = mi; /* setup LOOKUPs for parent path */ (void) nfs4lookup_setup(tmp_path, &lookuparg, 0); argop = args.array; /* put root fh */ argop[0].argop = OP_PUTROOTFH; /* setup SECINFO op */ num_argops = args.array_len; argop[num_argops - 1].argop = OP_SECINFO; argop[num_argops - 1].nfs_argop4_u.opsecinfo.name.utf8string_len = comp.utf8string_len; argop[num_argops - 1].nfs_argop4_u.opsecinfo.name.utf8string_val = comp.utf8string_val; doqueue = 1; NFS4_DEBUG(nfs4_client_call_debug, (CE_NOTE, "nfs4secinfo_otw: %s call, mi 0x%p", needrecov ? "recov" : "first", (void*)mi)); rfs4call(mi, &args, &res, cr, &doqueue, RFSCALL_SOFT, &e); needrecov = nfs4_needs_recovery(&e, FALSE, mi->mi_vfsp); if (e.error && !needrecov) { nfs4args_lookup_free(argop, num_argops); kmem_free(argop, lookuparg.arglen * sizeof (nfs_argop4)); kmem_free(tmp_path, path_len + 1); return (e.error); } /* * Secinfo compound op may fail with NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC from * PUTROOTFH or LOOKUP. Special handling here to recover it. */ if (res.status == NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC) { if (res.array_len == 1) { /* * If a flavor can not be found via trying * all supported flavors on the client, no * more operations. */ ncomp = tcomp; nfs4args_lookup_free(argop, num_argops); kmem_free(argop, lookuparg.arglen * sizeof (nfs_argop4)); (void) xdr_free(xdr_COMPOUND4res_clnt, (caddr_t)&res); kmem_free(tmp_path, path_len + 1); if (e.error = secinfo_tryroot_otw(mi, cr)) { return (e.error); } goto retry; } ncomp = res.array_len - 1; nfs4args_lookup_free(argop, num_argops); kmem_free(argop, lookuparg.arglen * sizeof (nfs_argop4)); (void) xdr_free(xdr_COMPOUND4res_clnt, (caddr_t)&res); kmem_free(tmp_path, path_len + 1); goto retry; } /* * This routine does not do recovery for non NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC error. * However, if this is already in a recovery thread, then * set up the recovery action thru nfs4_start_recovery and * return ok back to the outer loop in nfs4_recov_thread for * recovery. */ if (needrecov) { bool_t abort; /* If not in a recovery thread, bail out */ if (!isrecov) { if (!e.error) { e.error = geterrno4(res.status); (void) xdr_free(xdr_COMPOUND4res_clnt, (caddr_t)&res); } nfs4args_lookup_free(argop, num_argops); kmem_free(argop, lookuparg.arglen * sizeof (nfs_argop4)); kmem_free(tmp_path, path_len + 1); return (e.error); } NFS4_DEBUG(nfs4_client_recov_debug, (CE_NOTE, "nfs4secinfo_otw: recovery in a recovery thread\n")); abort = nfs4_start_recovery(&e, mi, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, OP_SECINFO, NULL); if (!e.error) { e.error = geterrno4(res.status); (void) xdr_free(xdr_COMPOUND4res_clnt, (caddr_t)&res); } nfs4args_lookup_free(argop, num_argops); kmem_free(argop, lookuparg.arglen * sizeof (nfs_argop4)); kmem_free(tmp_path, path_len + 1); if (abort == FALSE) { /* * Return ok to let the outer loop in * nfs4_recov_thread continue with the recovery action. */ return (0); } return (e.error); } if (res.status) { nfs4args_lookup_free(argop, num_argops); kmem_free(argop, lookuparg.arglen * sizeof (nfs_argop4)); (void) xdr_free(xdr_COMPOUND4res_clnt, (caddr_t)&res); kmem_free(tmp_path, path_len + 1); return (geterrno4(res.status)); } /* * Success! Now get the SECINFO result. */ numops = res.array_len; resop = &res.array[numops-1]; /* secinfo res */ ASSERT(resop->resop == OP_SECINFO); if (resop->nfs_resop4_u.opsecinfo.SECINFO4resok_len == 0) { /* * Server does not return any flavor for this export point. * Return EACCES. */ nfs4args_lookup_free(argop, num_argops); kmem_free(tmp_path, path_len + 1); (void) xdr_free(xdr_COMPOUND4res_clnt, (caddr_t)&res); kmem_free(argop, num_argops * sizeof (nfs_argop4)); return (EACCES); } secinfo_update(mi->mi_curr_serv, &resop->nfs_resop4_u.opsecinfo); (void) nfs_rw_enter_sig(&svp->sv_lock, RW_READER, 0); if (svp->sv_secinfo == NULL) { nfs_rw_exit(&svp->sv_lock); /* * This could be because the server requires AUTH_DH, but * the client does not have netname/syncaddr data * from sv_dhsec. */ nfs4args_lookup_free(argop, num_argops); kmem_free(argop, lookuparg.arglen * sizeof (nfs_argop4)); (void) xdr_free(xdr_COMPOUND4res_clnt, (caddr_t)&res); kmem_free(tmp_path, path_len + 1); return (EACCES); } nfs_rw_exit(&svp->sv_lock); /* * If this is not the original request, try again using the * new secinfo data in mi. */ if (ncomp != tcomp) { ncomp = tcomp; nfs4args_lookup_free(argop, num_argops); kmem_free(argop, lookuparg.arglen * sizeof (nfs_argop4)); (void) xdr_free(xdr_COMPOUND4res_clnt, (caddr_t)&res); kmem_free(tmp_path, path_len + 1); goto retry; } /* Done! */ nfs4args_lookup_free(argop, num_argops); kmem_free(argop, lookuparg.arglen * sizeof (nfs_argop4)); (void) xdr_free(xdr_COMPOUND4res_clnt, (caddr_t)&res); kmem_free(tmp_path, path_len + 1); return (0); /* got the secinfo */ } /* * Get the security information per mount point. * Use the server pathname to get the secinfo. */ int nfs4_secinfo_path(mntinfo4_t *mi, cred_t *cr, int isrecov) { int error = 0; int pathlen; servinfo4_t *svp = mi->mi_curr_serv; /* * Get the server pathname that is being mounted on. */ (void) nfs_rw_enter_sig(&svp->sv_lock, RW_READER, 0); ASSERT(svp->sv_path != NULL); pathlen = strlen(svp->sv_path); /* * If mounting server rootdir, use available secinfo list * on the client. No SECINFO call here since SECINFO op * expects a component name. */ if (pathlen == 1 && svp->sv_path[0] == '/') { if (svp->sv_secinfo == NULL) { nfs_rw_exit(&svp->sv_lock); secinfo_update(svp, secinfo_support); return (0); } nfs_rw_exit(&svp->sv_lock); if (secinfo_check(svp)) return (0); /* try again */ /* no flavors in sv_secinfo work */ return (EACCES); } nfs_rw_exit(&svp->sv_lock); /* * Get the secinfo from the server. */ error = nfs4secinfo_otw(mi, cr, svp, isrecov); if (error) { (void) nfs_rw_enter_sig(&svp->sv_lock, RW_WRITER, 0); if (svp->sv_secinfo) { if (svp->sv_save_secinfo == svp->sv_secinfo) { svp->sv_save_secinfo = NULL; svp->sv_savesec = NULL; } secinfo_free(svp->sv_secinfo); svp->sv_secinfo = NULL; svp->sv_currsec = NULL; svp->sv_flags &= ~SV4_TRYSECINFO; } if (svp->sv_save_secinfo) { secinfo_free(svp->sv_save_secinfo); svp->sv_save_secinfo = NULL; svp->sv_savesec = NULL; } nfs_rw_exit(&svp->sv_lock); } return (error); } /* * (secinfo) compound based on a given filehandle and component name. * * i.e. (secinfo) PUTFH (fh), SECINFO nm */ int nfs4_secinfo_fh_otw(mntinfo4_t *mi, nfs4_sharedfh_t *fh, char *nm, cred_t *cr) { COMPOUND4args_clnt args; COMPOUND4res_clnt res; nfs_argop4 argop[2]; nfs_resop4 *resop; int num_argops, doqueue; nfs4_error_t e = { 0, NFS4_OK, RPC_SUCCESS }; servinfo4_t *svp; ASSERT(strlen(nm) > 0); num_argops = 2; /* Putfh, Secinfo nm */ args.ctag = TAG_SECINFO; args.array_len = num_argops; args.array = argop; /* putfh fh */ argop[0].argop = OP_CPUTFH; argop[0].nfs_argop4_u.opcputfh.sfh = fh; /* setup SECINFO op */ argop[1].argop = OP_CSECINFO; argop[1].nfs_argop4_u.opcsecinfo.cname = nm; doqueue = 1; rfs4call(mi, &args, &res, cr, &doqueue, RFSCALL_SOFT, &e); if (e.error) return (e.error); if (res.status) { (void) xdr_free(xdr_COMPOUND4res_clnt, (caddr_t)&res); return (geterrno4(res.status)); } /* * Success! Now get the SECINFO result. */ resop = &res.array[1]; /* secinfo res */ ASSERT(resop->resop == OP_SECINFO); if (resop->nfs_resop4_u.opsecinfo.SECINFO4resok_len == 0) { /* * Server does not return any flavor for this export point. * Return EACCES. */ (void) xdr_free(xdr_COMPOUND4res_clnt, (caddr_t)&res); return (EACCES); } secinfo_update(mi->mi_curr_serv, &resop->nfs_resop4_u.opsecinfo); svp = mi->mi_curr_serv; (void) nfs_rw_enter_sig(&svp->sv_lock, RW_READER, 0); if (mi->mi_curr_serv->sv_secinfo == NULL) { nfs_rw_exit(&svp->sv_lock); /* * This could be because the server requires AUTH_DH, but * the client does not have netname/syncaddr data * from sv_dhsec. */ (void) xdr_free(xdr_COMPOUND4res_clnt, (caddr_t)&res); return (EACCES); } nfs_rw_exit(&svp->sv_lock); /* Done! */ (void) xdr_free(xdr_COMPOUND4res_clnt, (caddr_t)&res); return (0); /* got the secinfo */ } /* * Making secinfo operation with a given vnode. * * This routine is not used by the recovery thread. * Mainly used in response to NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC from lookup. */ int nfs4_secinfo_vnode_otw(vnode_t *dvp, char *nm, cred_t *cr) { ASSERT(strlen(nm) > 0); return (nfs4_secinfo_fh_otw(VTOMI4(dvp), VTOR4(dvp)->r_fh, nm, cr)); } /* * Making secinfo operation with a given vnode if this vnode * has a parent node. If the given vnode is a root node, use * the pathname from the mntinfor4_t to do the secinfo call. * * This routine is mainly used by the recovery thread. */ int nfs4_secinfo_vnode(vnode_t *vp, cred_t *cr, int isrecov) { svnode_t *svp = VTOSV(vp); char *nm; int error = 0; /* * If there is a parent filehandle, use it to get the secinfo, * otherwise, use mntinfo4_t pathname to get the secinfo. */ if (svp->sv_dfh) { nm = fn_name(svp->sv_name); /* get the actual component name */ error = nfs4_secinfo_fh_otw(VTOMI4(vp), svp->sv_dfh, nm, cr); kmem_free(nm, MAXNAMELEN); } else { error = nfs4_secinfo_path(VTOMI4(vp), cr, isrecov); } return (error); } /* * We are here because the client gets NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC. * * Get the security information from the server and indicate * a set of new security information is here to try. * Start with the server path that's mounted. */ int nfs4_secinfo_recov(mntinfo4_t *mi, vnode_t *vp1, vnode_t *vp2) { int error = 0; cred_t *cr, *lcr = NULL; servinfo4_t *svp = mi->mi_curr_serv; /* * If the client explicitly specifies a preferred flavor to use * and gets NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC back, there is no need to negotiate * the flavor. */ (void) nfs_rw_enter_sig(&svp->sv_lock, RW_READER, 0); if (! (svp->sv_flags & SV4_TRYSECDEFAULT)) { error = geterrno4(NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC); nfs_rw_exit(&svp->sv_lock); } else { cr = crgetcred(); if (svp->sv_secdata->uid != 0) { lcr = crdup(cr); (void) crsetugid(lcr, svp->sv_secdata->uid, crgetgid(cr)); } nfs_rw_exit(&svp->sv_lock); if (vp1 == NULL && vp2 == NULL) { error = nfs4_secinfo_path(mi, cr, TRUE); if (lcr && error == EACCES) error = nfs4_secinfo_path(mi, lcr, TRUE); } else if (vp1) { error = nfs4_secinfo_vnode(vp1, cr, TRUE); if (lcr && error == EACCES) error = nfs4_secinfo_vnode(vp1, lcr, TRUE); } /* else */ /* ??? */ crfree(cr); if (lcr != NULL) crfree(lcr); } mutex_enter(&mi->mi_lock); mi->mi_recovflags &= ~MI4R_NEED_SECINFO; mutex_exit(&mi->mi_lock); return (error); }