/* * CDDL HEADER START * * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the * Common Development and Distribution License, Version 1.0 only * (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance * with the License. * * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions * and limitations under the License. * * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] * * CDDL HEADER END */ /* * Copyright 2004 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. * Use is subject to license terms. */ #pragma ident "%Z%%M% %I% %E% SMI" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* * Message authentication codes routines. */ /* * The following are the possible returned values common to all the routines * below. The applicability of some of these return values depends on the * presence of the arguments. * * CRYPTO_SUCCESS: The operation completed successfully. * CRYPTO_QUEUED: A request was submitted successfully. The callback * routine will be called when the operation is done. * CRYPTO_INVALID_MECH_NUMBER, CRYPTO_INVALID_MECH_PARAM, or * CRYPTO_INVALID_MECH for problems with the 'mech'. * CRYPTO_INVALID_DATA for bogus 'data' * CRYPTO_HOST_MEMORY for failure to allocate memory to handle this work. * CRYPTO_INVALID_CONTEXT: Not a valid context. * CRYPTO_BUSY: Cannot process the request now. Schedule a * crypto_bufcall(), or try later. * CRYPTO_NOT_SUPPORTED and CRYPTO_MECH_NOT_SUPPORTED: No provider is * capable of a function or a mechanism. * CRYPTO_INVALID_KEY: bogus 'key' argument. * CRYPTO_INVALID_MAC: bogus 'mac' argument. */ /* * crypto_mac_prov() * * Arguments: * mech: crypto_mechanism_t pointer. * mech_type is a valid value previously returned by * crypto_mech2id(); * When the mech's parameter is not NULL, its definition depends * on the standard definition of the mechanism. * key: pointer to a crypto_key_t structure. * data: The message to compute the MAC for. * mac: Storage for the MAC. The length needed depends on the mechanism. * tmpl: a crypto_ctx_template_t, opaque template of a context of a * MAC with the 'mech' using 'key'. 'tmpl' is created by * a previous call to crypto_create_ctx_template(). * cr: crypto_call_req_t calling conditions and call back info. * * Description: * Asynchronously submits a request for, or synchronously performs a * single-part message authentication of 'data' with the mechanism * 'mech', using * the key 'key', on the specified provider with * the specified session id. * When complete and successful, 'mac' will contain the message * authentication code. * * Context: * Process or interrupt, according to the semantics dictated by the 'crq'. * * Returns: * See comment in the beginning of the file. */ int crypto_mac_prov(crypto_mechanism_t *mech, crypto_data_t *data, crypto_key_t *key, crypto_ctx_template_t tmpl, crypto_data_t *mac, crypto_call_req_t *crq, kcf_provider_desc_t *pd, crypto_session_id_t sid) { kcf_req_params_t params; ASSERT(KCF_PROV_REFHELD(pd)); KCF_WRAP_MAC_OPS_PARAMS(¶ms, KCF_OP_ATOMIC, sid, mech, key, data, mac, tmpl); return (kcf_submit_request(pd, NULL, crq, ¶ms, B_FALSE)); } /* * Same as crypto_mac_prov(), but relies on the KCF scheduler to choose * a provider. See crypto_mac() comments for more information. */ int crypto_mac(crypto_mechanism_t *mech, crypto_data_t *data, crypto_key_t *key, crypto_ctx_template_t tmpl, crypto_data_t *mac, crypto_call_req_t *crq) { int error; kcf_mech_entry_t *me; kcf_req_params_t params; kcf_provider_desc_t *pd; kcf_ctx_template_t *ctx_tmpl; crypto_spi_ctx_template_t spi_ctx_tmpl = NULL; kcf_prov_tried_t *list = NULL; retry: /* The pd is returned held */ if ((pd = kcf_get_mech_provider(mech->cm_type, &me, &error, list, CRYPTO_FG_MAC_ATOMIC, CHECK_RESTRICT(crq), data->cd_length)) == NULL) { if (list != NULL) kcf_free_triedlist(list); return (error); } /* * For SW providers, check the validity of the context template * It is very rare that the generation number mis-matches, so * is acceptable to fail here, and let the consumer recover by * freeing this tmpl and create a new one for the key and new SW * provider */ if ((pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_SW_PROVIDER) && ((ctx_tmpl = (kcf_ctx_template_t *)tmpl) != NULL)) { if (ctx_tmpl->ct_generation != me->me_gen_swprov) { if (list != NULL) kcf_free_triedlist(list); KCF_PROV_REFRELE(pd); return (CRYPTO_OLD_CTX_TEMPLATE); } else { spi_ctx_tmpl = ctx_tmpl->ct_prov_tmpl; } } /* The fast path for SW providers. */ if (CHECK_FASTPATH(crq, pd)) { crypto_mechanism_t lmech; lmech = *mech; KCF_SET_PROVIDER_MECHNUM(mech->cm_type, pd, &lmech); error = KCF_PROV_MAC_ATOMIC(pd, pd->pd_sid, &lmech, key, data, mac, spi_ctx_tmpl, KCF_SWFP_RHNDL(crq)); KCF_PROV_INCRSTATS(pd, error); } else { KCF_WRAP_MAC_OPS_PARAMS(¶ms, KCF_OP_ATOMIC, pd->pd_sid, mech, key, data, mac, spi_ctx_tmpl); error = kcf_submit_request(pd, NULL, crq, ¶ms, KCF_ISDUALREQ(crq)); } if (error != CRYPTO_SUCCESS && error != CRYPTO_QUEUED && IS_RECOVERABLE(error)) { /* Add pd to the linked list of providers tried. */ if (kcf_insert_triedlist(&list, pd, KCF_KMFLAG(crq)) != NULL) goto retry; } if (list != NULL) kcf_free_triedlist(list); KCF_PROV_REFRELE(pd); return (error); } /* * Single part operation to compute the MAC corresponding to the specified * 'data' and to verify that it matches the MAC specified by 'mac'. * The other arguments are the same as the function crypto_mac_prov(). */ int crypto_mac_verify_prov(crypto_mechanism_t *mech, crypto_data_t *data, crypto_key_t *key, crypto_ctx_template_t tmpl, crypto_data_t *mac, crypto_call_req_t *crq, kcf_provider_desc_t *pd, crypto_session_id_t sid) { kcf_req_params_t params; ASSERT(KCF_PROV_REFHELD(pd)); KCF_WRAP_MAC_OPS_PARAMS(¶ms, KCF_OP_MAC_VERIFY_ATOMIC, sid, mech, key, data, mac, tmpl); return (kcf_submit_request(pd, NULL, crq, ¶ms, B_FALSE)); } /* * Same as crypto_mac_verify_prov(), but relies on the KCF scheduler to choose * a provider. See crypto_mac_verify_prov() comments for more information. */ int crypto_mac_verify(crypto_mechanism_t *mech, crypto_data_t *data, crypto_key_t *key, crypto_ctx_template_t tmpl, crypto_data_t *mac, crypto_call_req_t *crq) { int error; kcf_mech_entry_t *me; kcf_req_params_t params; kcf_provider_desc_t *pd; kcf_ctx_template_t *ctx_tmpl; crypto_spi_ctx_template_t spi_ctx_tmpl = NULL; kcf_prov_tried_t *list = NULL; retry: /* The pd is returned held */ if ((pd = kcf_get_mech_provider(mech->cm_type, &me, &error, list, CRYPTO_FG_MAC_ATOMIC, CHECK_RESTRICT(crq), data->cd_length)) == NULL) { if (list != NULL) kcf_free_triedlist(list); return (error); } /* * For SW providers, check the validity of the context template * It is very rare that the generation number mis-matches, so * is acceptable to fail here, and let the consumer recover by * freeing this tmpl and create a new one for the key and new SW * provider */ if ((pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_SW_PROVIDER) && ((ctx_tmpl = (kcf_ctx_template_t *)tmpl) != NULL)) { if (ctx_tmpl->ct_generation != me->me_gen_swprov) { if (list != NULL) kcf_free_triedlist(list); KCF_PROV_REFRELE(pd); return (CRYPTO_OLD_CTX_TEMPLATE); } else { spi_ctx_tmpl = ctx_tmpl->ct_prov_tmpl; } } /* The fast path for SW providers. */ if (CHECK_FASTPATH(crq, pd)) { crypto_mechanism_t lmech; lmech = *mech; KCF_SET_PROVIDER_MECHNUM(mech->cm_type, pd, &lmech); error = KCF_PROV_MAC_VERIFY_ATOMIC(pd, pd->pd_sid, &lmech, key, data, mac, spi_ctx_tmpl, KCF_SWFP_RHNDL(crq)); KCF_PROV_INCRSTATS(pd, error); } else { KCF_WRAP_MAC_OPS_PARAMS(¶ms, KCF_OP_MAC_VERIFY_ATOMIC, pd->pd_sid, mech, key, data, mac, spi_ctx_tmpl); error = kcf_submit_request(pd, NULL, crq, ¶ms, KCF_ISDUALREQ(crq)); } if (error != CRYPTO_SUCCESS && error != CRYPTO_QUEUED && IS_RECOVERABLE(error)) { /* Add pd to the linked list of providers tried. */ if (kcf_insert_triedlist(&list, pd, KCF_KMFLAG(crq)) != NULL) goto retry; } if (list != NULL) kcf_free_triedlist(list); KCF_PROV_REFRELE(pd); return (error); } /* * crypto_mac_init_prov() * * Arguments: * pd: pointer to the descriptor of the provider to use for this * operation. * sid: provider session id. * mech: crypto_mechanism_t pointer. * mech_type is a valid value previously returned by * crypto_mech2id(); * When the mech's parameter is not NULL, its definition depends * on the standard definition of the mechanism. * key: pointer to a crypto_key_t structure. * tmpl: a crypto_ctx_template_t, opaque template of a context of a * MAC with the 'mech' using 'key'. 'tmpl' is created by * a previous call to crypto_create_ctx_template(). * ctxp: Pointer to a crypto_context_t. * cr: crypto_call_req_t calling conditions and call back info. * * Description: * Asynchronously submits a request for, or synchronously performs the * initialization of a MAC operation on the specified provider with * the specified session. * When possible and applicable, will internally use the pre-computed MAC * context from the context template, tmpl. * When complete and successful, 'ctxp' will contain a crypto_context_t * valid for later calls to mac_update() and mac_final(). * The caller should hold a reference on the specified provider * descriptor before calling this function. * * Context: * Process or interrupt, according to the semantics dictated by the 'cr'. * * Returns: * See comment in the beginning of the file. */ int crypto_mac_init_prov(kcf_provider_desc_t *pd, crypto_session_id_t sid, crypto_mechanism_t *mech, crypto_key_t *key, crypto_spi_ctx_template_t tmpl, crypto_context_t *ctxp, crypto_call_req_t *crq) { int error; crypto_ctx_t *ctx; kcf_req_params_t params; ASSERT(KCF_PROV_REFHELD(pd)); /* First, allocate and initialize the canonical context */ if ((ctx = kcf_new_ctx(crq, pd, sid)) == NULL) return (CRYPTO_HOST_MEMORY); /* The fast path for SW providers. */ if (CHECK_FASTPATH(crq, pd)) { crypto_mechanism_t lmech; lmech = *mech; KCF_SET_PROVIDER_MECHNUM(mech->cm_type, pd, &lmech); error = KCF_PROV_MAC_INIT(pd, ctx, &lmech, key, tmpl, KCF_SWFP_RHNDL(crq)); KCF_PROV_INCRSTATS(pd, error); } else { KCF_WRAP_MAC_OPS_PARAMS(¶ms, KCF_OP_INIT, sid, mech, key, NULL, NULL, tmpl); error = kcf_submit_request(pd, ctx, crq, ¶ms, B_FALSE); } if ((error == CRYPTO_SUCCESS) || (error == CRYPTO_QUEUED)) *ctxp = (crypto_context_t)ctx; else { /* Release the hold done in kcf_new_ctx(). */ KCF_CONTEXT_REFRELE((kcf_context_t *)ctx->cc_framework_private); } return (error); } /* * Same as crypto_mac_init_prov(), but relies on the KCF scheduler to * choose a provider. See crypto_mac_init_prov() comments for more * information. */ int crypto_mac_init(crypto_mechanism_t *mech, crypto_key_t *key, crypto_ctx_template_t tmpl, crypto_context_t *ctxp, crypto_call_req_t *crq) { int error; kcf_mech_entry_t *me; kcf_provider_desc_t *pd; kcf_ctx_template_t *ctx_tmpl; crypto_spi_ctx_template_t spi_ctx_tmpl = NULL; kcf_prov_tried_t *list = NULL; retry: /* The pd is returned held */ if ((pd = kcf_get_mech_provider(mech->cm_type, &me, &error, list, CRYPTO_FG_MAC, CHECK_RESTRICT(crq), 0)) == NULL) { if (list != NULL) kcf_free_triedlist(list); return (error); } /* * For SW providers, check the validity of the context template * It is very rare that the generation number mis-matches, so * is acceptable to fail here, and let the consumer recover by * freeing this tmpl and create a new one for the key and new SW * provider */ if ((pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_SW_PROVIDER) && ((ctx_tmpl = (kcf_ctx_template_t *)tmpl) != NULL)) { if (ctx_tmpl->ct_generation != me->me_gen_swprov) { if (list != NULL) kcf_free_triedlist(list); KCF_PROV_REFRELE(pd); return (CRYPTO_OLD_CTX_TEMPLATE); } else { spi_ctx_tmpl = ctx_tmpl->ct_prov_tmpl; } } error = crypto_mac_init_prov(pd, pd->pd_sid, mech, key, spi_ctx_tmpl, ctxp, crq); if (error != CRYPTO_SUCCESS && error != CRYPTO_QUEUED && IS_RECOVERABLE(error)) { /* Add pd to the linked list of providers tried. */ if (kcf_insert_triedlist(&list, pd, KCF_KMFLAG(crq)) != NULL) goto retry; } if (list != NULL) kcf_free_triedlist(list); KCF_PROV_REFRELE(pd); return (error); } /* * crypto_mac_update() * * Arguments: * context: A crypto_context_t initialized by mac_init(). * data: The message part to be MAC'ed * cr: crypto_call_req_t calling conditions and call back info. * * Description: * Asynchronously submits a request for, or synchronously performs a * part of a MAC operation. * * Context: * Process or interrupt, according to the semantics dictated by the 'cr'. * * Returns: * See comment in the beginning of the file. */ int crypto_mac_update(crypto_context_t context, crypto_data_t *data, crypto_call_req_t *cr) { crypto_ctx_t *ctx = (crypto_ctx_t *)context; kcf_context_t *kcf_ctx; kcf_provider_desc_t *pd; int error; kcf_req_params_t params; if ((ctx == NULL) || ((kcf_ctx = (kcf_context_t *)ctx->cc_framework_private) == NULL) || ((pd = kcf_ctx->kc_prov_desc) == NULL)) { return (CRYPTO_INVALID_CONTEXT); } KCF_PROV_REFHOLD(pd); /* The fast path for SW providers. */ if (CHECK_FASTPATH(cr, pd)) { error = KCF_PROV_MAC_UPDATE(pd, ctx, data, NULL); KCF_PROV_INCRSTATS(pd, error); } else { KCF_WRAP_MAC_OPS_PARAMS(¶ms, KCF_OP_UPDATE, pd->pd_sid, NULL, NULL, data, NULL, NULL); error = kcf_submit_request(pd, ctx, cr, ¶ms, B_FALSE); } KCF_PROV_REFRELE(pd); return (error); } /* * crypto_mac_final() * * Arguments: * context: A crypto_context_t initialized by mac_init(). * mac: Storage for the message authentication code. * cr: crypto_call_req_t calling conditions and call back info. * * Description: * Asynchronously submits a request for, or synchronously performs a * part of a message authentication operation. * * Context: * Process or interrupt, according to the semantics dictated by the 'cr'. * * Returns: * See comment in the beginning of the file. */ int crypto_mac_final(crypto_context_t context, crypto_data_t *mac, crypto_call_req_t *cr) { crypto_ctx_t *ctx = (crypto_ctx_t *)context; kcf_context_t *kcf_ctx; kcf_provider_desc_t *pd; int error; kcf_req_params_t params; if ((ctx == NULL) || ((kcf_ctx = (kcf_context_t *)ctx->cc_framework_private) == NULL) || ((pd = kcf_ctx->kc_prov_desc) == NULL)) { return (CRYPTO_INVALID_CONTEXT); } KCF_PROV_REFHOLD(pd); /* The fast path for SW providers. */ if (CHECK_FASTPATH(cr, pd)) { error = KCF_PROV_MAC_FINAL(pd, ctx, mac, NULL); KCF_PROV_INCRSTATS(pd, error); } else { KCF_WRAP_MAC_OPS_PARAMS(¶ms, KCF_OP_FINAL, pd->pd_sid, NULL, NULL, NULL, mac, NULL); error = kcf_submit_request(pd, ctx, cr, ¶ms, B_FALSE); } KCF_PROV_REFRELE(pd); /* Release the hold done in kcf_new_ctx() during init step. */ KCF_CONTEXT_COND_RELEASE(error, kcf_ctx); return (error); } /* * See comments for crypto_mac_update() and crypto_mac_final(). */ int crypto_mac_single(crypto_context_t context, crypto_data_t *data, crypto_data_t *mac, crypto_call_req_t *cr) { crypto_ctx_t *ctx = (crypto_ctx_t *)context; kcf_context_t *kcf_ctx; kcf_provider_desc_t *pd; int error; kcf_req_params_t params; if ((ctx == NULL) || ((kcf_ctx = (kcf_context_t *)ctx->cc_framework_private) == NULL) || ((pd = kcf_ctx->kc_prov_desc) == NULL)) { return (CRYPTO_INVALID_CONTEXT); } KCF_PROV_REFHOLD(pd); /* The fast path for SW providers. */ if (CHECK_FASTPATH(cr, pd)) { error = KCF_PROV_MAC(pd, ctx, data, mac, NULL); KCF_PROV_INCRSTATS(pd, error); } else { KCF_WRAP_MAC_OPS_PARAMS(¶ms, KCF_OP_SINGLE, pd->pd_sid, NULL, NULL, data, mac, NULL); error = kcf_submit_request(pd, ctx, cr, ¶ms, B_FALSE); } KCF_PROV_REFRELE(pd); /* Release the hold done in kcf_new_ctx() during init step. */ KCF_CONTEXT_COND_RELEASE(error, kcf_ctx); return (error); }