/*- * Copyright (c) 1999-2002, 2008-2009 Robert N. M. Watson * Copyright (c) 2001 Ilmar S. Habibulin * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. * Copyright (c) 2005 Samy Al Bahra * Copyright (c) 2006 SPARTA, Inc. * Copyright (c) 2008 Apple Inc. * All rights reserved. * * This software was developed by Robert Watson and Ilmar Habibulin for the * TrustedBSD Project. * * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network * Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network * Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), * as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. * * This software was enhanced by SPARTA ISSO under SPAWAR contract * N66001-04-C-6019 ("SEFOS"). * * This software was developed at the University of Cambridge Computer * Laboratory with support from a grant from Google, Inc. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include #include "opt_mac.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include struct label * mac_cred_label_alloc(void) { struct label *label; label = mac_labelzone_alloc(M_WAITOK); MAC_POLICY_PERFORM(cred_init_label, label); return (label); } void mac_cred_init(struct ucred *cred) { if (mac_labeled & MPC_OBJECT_CRED) cred->cr_label = mac_cred_label_alloc(); else cred->cr_label = NULL; } void mac_cred_label_free(struct label *label) { MAC_POLICY_PERFORM_NOSLEEP(cred_destroy_label, label); mac_labelzone_free(label); } void mac_cred_destroy(struct ucred *cred) { if (cred->cr_label != NULL) { mac_cred_label_free(cred->cr_label); cred->cr_label = NULL; } } /* * When a thread becomes an NFS server daemon, its credential may need to be * updated to reflect this so that policies can recognize when file system * operations originate from the network. * * At some point, it would be desirable if the credential used for each NFS * RPC could be set based on the RPC context (i.e., source system, etc) to * provide more fine-grained access control. */ void mac_cred_associate_nfsd(struct ucred *cred) { MAC_POLICY_PERFORM_NOSLEEP(cred_associate_nfsd, cred); } /* * Initialize MAC label for the first kernel process, from which other kernel * processes and threads are spawned. */ void mac_cred_create_swapper(struct ucred *cred) { MAC_POLICY_PERFORM_NOSLEEP(cred_create_swapper, cred); } /* * Initialize MAC label for the first userland process, from which other * userland processes and threads are spawned. */ void mac_cred_create_init(struct ucred *cred) { MAC_POLICY_PERFORM_NOSLEEP(cred_create_init, cred); } int mac_cred_externalize_label(struct label *label, char *elements, char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen) { int error; MAC_POLICY_EXTERNALIZE(cred, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen); return (error); } int mac_cred_internalize_label(struct label *label, char *string) { int error; MAC_POLICY_INTERNALIZE(cred, label, string); return (error); } /* * When a new process is created, its label must be initialized. Generally, * this involves inheritance from the parent process, modulo possible deltas. * This function allows that processing to take place. */ void mac_cred_copy(struct ucred *src, struct ucred *dest) { MAC_POLICY_PERFORM_NOSLEEP(cred_copy_label, src->cr_label, dest->cr_label); } /* * When the subject's label changes, it may require revocation of privilege * to mapped objects. This can't be done on-the-fly later with a unified * buffer cache. */ void mac_cred_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel) { MAC_POLICY_PERFORM_NOSLEEP(cred_relabel, cred, newlabel); } MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(cred_check_relabel, "struct ucred *", "struct label *"); int mac_cred_check_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel) { int error; MAC_POLICY_CHECK_NOSLEEP(cred_check_relabel, cred, newlabel); MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(cred_check_relabel, error, cred, newlabel); return (error); } MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(cred_check_setuid, "struct ucred *", "uid_t"); int mac_cred_check_setuid(struct ucred *cred, uid_t uid) { int error; MAC_POLICY_CHECK_NOSLEEP(cred_check_setuid, cred, uid); MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(cred_check_setuid, error, cred, uid); return (error); } MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(cred_check_seteuid, "struct ucred *", "uid_t"); int mac_cred_check_seteuid(struct ucred *cred, uid_t euid) { int error; MAC_POLICY_CHECK_NOSLEEP(cred_check_seteuid, cred, euid); MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(cred_check_seteuid, error, cred, euid); return (error); } MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(cred_check_setgid, "struct ucred *", "gid_t"); int mac_cred_check_setgid(struct ucred *cred, gid_t gid) { int error; MAC_POLICY_CHECK_NOSLEEP(cred_check_setgid, cred, gid); MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(cred_check_setgid, error, cred, gid); return (error); } MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(cred_check_setegid, "struct ucred *", "gid_t"); int mac_cred_check_setegid(struct ucred *cred, gid_t egid) { int error; MAC_POLICY_CHECK_NOSLEEP(cred_check_setegid, cred, egid); MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(cred_check_setegid, error, cred, egid); return (error); } MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE3(cred_check_setgroups, "struct ucred *", "int", "gid_t *"); int mac_cred_check_setgroups(struct ucred *cred, int ngroups, gid_t *gidset) { int error; MAC_POLICY_CHECK_NOSLEEP(cred_check_setgroups, cred, ngroups, gidset); MAC_CHECK_PROBE3(cred_check_setgroups, error, cred, ngroups, gidset); return (error); } MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE3(cred_check_setreuid, "struct ucred *", "uid_t", "uid_t"); int mac_cred_check_setreuid(struct ucred *cred, uid_t ruid, uid_t euid) { int error; MAC_POLICY_CHECK_NOSLEEP(cred_check_setreuid, cred, ruid, euid); MAC_CHECK_PROBE3(cred_check_setreuid, error, cred, ruid, euid); return (error); } MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE3(cred_check_setregid, "struct ucred *", "gid_t", "gid_t"); int mac_cred_check_setregid(struct ucred *cred, gid_t rgid, gid_t egid) { int error; MAC_POLICY_CHECK_NOSLEEP(cred_check_setregid, cred, rgid, egid); MAC_CHECK_PROBE3(cred_check_setregid, error, cred, rgid, egid); return (error); } MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE4(cred_check_setresuid, "struct ucred *", "uid_t", "uid_t", "uid_t"); int mac_cred_check_setresuid(struct ucred *cred, uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid) { int error; MAC_POLICY_CHECK_NOSLEEP(cred_check_setresuid, cred, ruid, euid, suid); MAC_CHECK_PROBE4(cred_check_setresuid, error, cred, ruid, euid, suid); return (error); } MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE4(cred_check_setresgid, "struct ucred *", "gid_t", "gid_t", "gid_t"); int mac_cred_check_setresgid(struct ucred *cred, gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid) { int error; MAC_POLICY_CHECK_NOSLEEP(cred_check_setresgid, cred, rgid, egid, sgid); MAC_CHECK_PROBE4(cred_check_setresgid, error, cred, rgid, egid, sgid); return (error); } MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(cred_check_visible, "struct ucred *", "struct ucred *"); int mac_cred_check_visible(struct ucred *cr1, struct ucred *cr2) { int error; MAC_POLICY_CHECK_NOSLEEP(cred_check_visible, cr1, cr2); MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(cred_check_visible, error, cr1, cr2); return (error); }