/* * Copyright (C) 2017 - This file is part of libecc project * * Authors: * Ryad BENADJILA * Arnaud EBALARD * Jean-Pierre FLORI * * Contributors: * Nicolas VIVET * Karim KHALFALLAH * * This software is licensed under a dual BSD and GPL v2 license. * See LICENSE file at the root folder of the project. */ #include #ifdef WITH_SIG_ECFSDSA #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef VERBOSE_INNER_VALUES #define EC_SIG_ALG "ECFSDSA" #endif #include int ecfsdsa_init_pub_key(ec_pub_key *out_pub, const ec_priv_key *in_priv) { int ret, cmp; prj_pt_src_t G; nn_src_t q; MUST_HAVE((out_pub != NULL), ret, err); /* Zero init public key to be generated */ ret = local_memset(out_pub, 0, sizeof(ec_pub_key)); EG(ret, err); ret = priv_key_check_initialized_and_type(in_priv, ECFSDSA); EG(ret, err); q = &(in_priv->params->ec_gen_order); /* Sanity check on key compliance */ MUST_HAVE(!nn_cmp(&(in_priv->x), q, &cmp) && (cmp < 0), ret, err); /* Y = xG */ G = &(in_priv->params->ec_gen); /* Use blinding when computing point scalar multiplication */ ret = prj_pt_mul_blind(&(out_pub->y), &(in_priv->x), G); EG(ret, err); out_pub->key_type = ECFSDSA; out_pub->params = in_priv->params; out_pub->magic = PUB_KEY_MAGIC; err: return ret; } int ecfsdsa_siglen(u16 p_bit_len, u16 q_bit_len, u8 hsize, u8 blocksize, u8 *siglen) { int ret; MUST_HAVE((siglen != NULL), ret, err); MUST_HAVE((p_bit_len <= CURVES_MAX_P_BIT_LEN) && (q_bit_len <= CURVES_MAX_Q_BIT_LEN) && (hsize <= MAX_DIGEST_SIZE) && (blocksize <= MAX_BLOCK_SIZE), ret, err); (*siglen) = (u8)ECFSDSA_SIGLEN(p_bit_len, q_bit_len); ret = 0; err: return ret; } /* * Generic *internal* ECFSDSA signature functions (init, update and finalize). * Their purpose is to allow passing a specific hash function (along with * their output size) and the random ephemeral key k, so that compliance * tests against test vectors can be made without ugly hack in the code * itself. * * Global EC-FSDSA signature process is as follows (I,U,F provides * information in which function(s) (init(), update() or finalize()) * a specific step is performed): * *| IUF - ECFSDSA signature *| *| I 1. Get a random value k in ]0,q[ *| I 2. Compute W = (W_x,W_y) = kG *| I 3. Compute r = FE2OS(W_x)||FE2OS(W_y) *| I 4. If r is an all zero string, restart the process at step 1. *| IUF 5. Compute h = H(r||m) *| F 6. Compute e = OS2I(h) mod q *| F 7. Compute s = (k + ex) mod q *| F 8. If s is 0, restart the process at step 1 (see c. below) *| F 9. Return (r,s) * * Implementation notes: * * a) sig is built as the concatenation of r and s. r is encoded on * 2*ceil(bitlen(p)) bytes and s on ceil(bitlen(q)) bytes. * b) in EC-FSDSA, the public part of the key is not needed per se during * the signature but - as it is needed in other signature algs implemented * in the library - the whole key pair is passed instead of just the * private key. * c) Implementation of EC-FSDSA in an init()/update()/finalize() logic * cannot be made deterministic, in the sense that if s is 0 at step * 8 above, there is no way to restart the whole signature process * w/o rehashing m. So, even if the event is extremely unlikely, * signature process may fail to provide a signature of the data * during finalize() call. */ #define ECFSDSA_SIGN_MAGIC ((word_t)(0x1ed9635924b48ddaULL)) #define ECFSDSA_SIGN_CHECK_INITIALIZED(A, ret, err) \ MUST_HAVE((((void *)(A)) != NULL) && \ ((A)->magic == ECFSDSA_SIGN_MAGIC), ret, err) int _ecfsdsa_sign_init(struct ec_sign_context *ctx) { prj_pt_src_t G; nn_src_t q; nn *k; u8 *r; prj_pt kG; const ec_priv_key *priv_key; bitcnt_t p_bit_len; u8 i, p_len, r_len; int ret; kG.magic = WORD(0); /* First, verify context has been initialized */ ret = sig_sign_check_initialized(ctx); EG(ret, err); /* Zero init points */ ret = local_memset(&kG, 0, sizeof(prj_pt)); EG(ret, err); /* Additional sanity checks on input params from context */ ret = key_pair_check_initialized_and_type(ctx->key_pair, ECFSDSA); EG(ret, err); MUST_HAVE((ctx->h != NULL) && (ctx->h->digest_size <= MAX_DIGEST_SIZE) && (ctx->h->block_size <= MAX_BLOCK_SIZE), ret, err); /* Make things more readable */ priv_key = &(ctx->key_pair->priv_key); G = &(priv_key->params->ec_gen); q = &(priv_key->params->ec_gen_order); r = ctx->sign_data.ecfsdsa.r; k = &(ctx->sign_data.ecfsdsa.k); p_bit_len = priv_key->params->ec_fp.p_bitlen; MUST_HAVE(((u32)BYTECEIL(p_bit_len) <= NN_MAX_BYTE_LEN), ret, err); p_len = (u8)BYTECEIL(p_bit_len); r_len = (u8)ECFSDSA_R_LEN(p_bit_len); dbg_nn_print("p", &(priv_key->params->ec_fp.p)); dbg_nn_print("q", q); dbg_priv_key_print("x", priv_key); dbg_ec_point_print("G", G); dbg_pub_key_print("Y", &(ctx->key_pair->pub_key)); restart: /* 1. Get a random value k in ]0,q[ */ #ifdef NO_KNOWN_VECTORS /* NOTE: when we do not need self tests for known vectors, * we can be strict about random function handler! * This allows us to avoid the corruption of such a pointer. */ /* Sanity check on the handler before calling it */ MUST_HAVE((ctx->rand == nn_get_random_mod), ret, err); #endif MUST_HAVE((ctx->rand != NULL), ret, err); ret = ctx->rand(k, q); EG(ret, err); /* 2. Compute W = (W_x,W_y) = kG */ #ifdef USE_SIG_BLINDING /* We use blinding for the scalar multiplication */ ret = prj_pt_mul_blind(&kG, k, G); EG(ret, err); #else ret = prj_pt_mul(&kG, k, G); EG(ret, err); #endif ret = prj_pt_unique(&kG, &kG); EG(ret, err); dbg_nn_print("Wx", &(kG.X.fp_val)); dbg_nn_print("Wy", &(kG.Y.fp_val)); /* 3. Compute r = FE2OS(W_x)||FE2OS(W_y) */ ret = fp_export_to_buf(r, p_len, &(kG.X)); EG(ret, err); ret = fp_export_to_buf(r + p_len, p_len, &(kG.Y)); EG(ret, err); dbg_buf_print("r: ", r, r_len); /* 4. If r is an all zero string, restart the process at step 1. */ ret = 0; for (i = 0; i < r_len; i++) { ret |= r[i]; } if (ret == 0) { goto restart; } /* 5. Compute h = H(r||m). * * Note that we only start the hash work here by initializing the hash * context and processing r. Message m will be handled during following * update() calls. */ /* Since we call a callback, sanity check our mapping */ ret = hash_mapping_callbacks_sanity_check(ctx->h); EG(ret, err); ret = ctx->h->hfunc_init(&(ctx->sign_data.ecfsdsa.h_ctx)); EG(ret, err); /* Since we call a callback, sanity check our mapping */ ret = hash_mapping_callbacks_sanity_check(ctx->h); EG(ret, err); ret = ctx->h->hfunc_update(&(ctx->sign_data.ecfsdsa.h_ctx), r, r_len); EG(ret, err); ctx->sign_data.ecfsdsa.magic = ECFSDSA_SIGN_MAGIC; err: prj_pt_uninit(&kG); PTR_NULLIFY(G); PTR_NULLIFY(q); PTR_NULLIFY(k); PTR_NULLIFY(r); PTR_NULLIFY(priv_key); VAR_ZEROIFY(i); VAR_ZEROIFY(p_len); VAR_ZEROIFY(r_len); return ret; } int _ecfsdsa_sign_update(struct ec_sign_context *ctx, const u8 *chunk, u32 chunklen) { int ret; /* * First, verify context has been initialized and private * part too. This guarantees the context is an ECFSDSA * signature one and we do not update() or finalize() * before init(). */ ret = sig_sign_check_initialized(ctx); EG(ret, err); ECFSDSA_SIGN_CHECK_INITIALIZED(&(ctx->sign_data.ecfsdsa), ret, err); /* 5. Compute h = H(r||m) */ /* Since we call a callback, sanity check our mapping */ ret = hash_mapping_callbacks_sanity_check(ctx->h); EG(ret, err); ret = ctx->h->hfunc_update(&(ctx->sign_data.ecfsdsa.h_ctx), chunk, chunklen); EG(ret, err); err: return ret; } int _ecfsdsa_sign_finalize(struct ec_sign_context *ctx, u8 *sig, u8 siglen) { nn_src_t q, x; nn s, e, ex, *k; const ec_priv_key *priv_key; u8 e_buf[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; bitcnt_t p_bit_len, q_bit_len; u8 hsize, s_len, r_len; int ret, iszero, cmp; u8 *r; #ifdef USE_SIG_BLINDING /* b is the blinding mask */ nn b, binv; b.magic = binv.magic = WORD(0); #endif /* USE_SIG_BLINDING */ s.magic = e.magic = ex.magic = WORD(0); /* * First, verify context has been initialized and private * part too. This guarantees the context is an ECFSDSA * signature one and we do not finalize() before init(). */ ret = sig_sign_check_initialized(ctx); EG(ret, err); ECFSDSA_SIGN_CHECK_INITIALIZED(&(ctx->sign_data.ecfsdsa), ret, err); MUST_HAVE((sig != NULL), ret, err); /* Make things more readable */ priv_key = &(ctx->key_pair->priv_key); q = &(priv_key->params->ec_gen_order); x = &(priv_key->x); p_bit_len = ctx->key_pair->priv_key.params->ec_fp.p_bitlen; q_bit_len = ctx->key_pair->priv_key.params->ec_gen_order_bitlen; k = &(ctx->sign_data.ecfsdsa.k); r_len = (u8)ECFSDSA_R_LEN(p_bit_len); s_len = (u8)ECFSDSA_S_LEN(q_bit_len); hsize = ctx->h->digest_size; r = ctx->sign_data.ecfsdsa.r; /* Sanity check */ ret = nn_cmp(x, q, &cmp); EG(ret, err); /* This should not happen and means that our * private key is not compliant! */ MUST_HAVE((cmp < 0), ret, err); MUST_HAVE((siglen == ECFSDSA_SIGLEN(p_bit_len, q_bit_len)), ret, err); #ifdef USE_SIG_BLINDING ret = nn_get_random_mod(&b, q); EG(ret, err); dbg_nn_print("b", &b); #endif /* USE_SIG_BLINDING */ /* Since we call a callback, sanity check our mapping */ ret = hash_mapping_callbacks_sanity_check(ctx->h); EG(ret, err); /* 5. Compute h = H(r||m) */ /* Since we call a callback, sanity check our mapping */ ret = hash_mapping_callbacks_sanity_check(ctx->h); EG(ret, err); ret = ctx->h->hfunc_finalize(&(ctx->sign_data.ecfsdsa.h_ctx), e_buf); EG(ret, err); dbg_buf_print("h(R||m)", e_buf, hsize); /* 6. Compute e by converting h to an integer and reducing it mod q */ ret = nn_init_from_buf(&e, e_buf, hsize); EG(ret, err); ret = local_memset(e_buf, 0, hsize); EG(ret, err); ret = nn_mod(&e, &e, q); EG(ret, err); #ifdef USE_SIG_BLINDING /* Blind e with b */ ret = nn_mod_mul(&e, &e, &b, q); EG(ret, err); #endif /* USE_SIG_BLINDING */ /* 7. Compute s = (k + ex) mod q */ ret = nn_mod_mul(&ex, &e, x, q); EG(ret, err); #ifdef USE_SIG_BLINDING /* Blind k with b */ ret = nn_mod_mul(&s, k, &b, q); EG(ret, err); ret = nn_mod_add(&s, &s, &ex, q); EG(ret, err); #else ret = nn_mod_add(&s, k, &ex, q); EG(ret, err); #endif /* USE_SIG_BLINDING */ #ifdef USE_SIG_BLINDING /* Unblind s */ /* NOTE: we use Fermat's little theorem inversion for * constant time here. This is possible since q is prime. */ ret = nn_modinv_fermat(&binv, &b, q); EG(ret, err); ret = nn_mod_mul(&s, &s, &binv, q); EG(ret, err); #endif /* USE_SIG_BLINDING */ dbg_nn_print("s: ", &s); /* * 8. If s is 0, restart the process at step 1. * * In practice, as we cannot restart the whole process in * finalize() we just report an error. */ MUST_HAVE((!nn_iszero(&s, &iszero)) && (!iszero), ret, err); /* 9. Return (r,s) */ ret = local_memcpy(sig, r, r_len); EG(ret, err); ret = local_memset(r, 0, r_len); EG(ret, err); ret = nn_export_to_buf(sig + r_len, s_len, &s); err: nn_uninit(&s); nn_uninit(&e); nn_uninit(&ex); #ifdef USE_SIG_BLINDING nn_uninit(&b); nn_uninit(&binv); #endif /* * We can now clear data part of the context. This will clear * magic and avoid further reuse of the whole context. */ if(ctx != NULL){ IGNORE_RET_VAL(local_memset(&(ctx->sign_data.ecfsdsa), 0, sizeof(ecfsdsa_sign_data))); } PTR_NULLIFY(q); PTR_NULLIFY(x); PTR_NULLIFY(k); PTR_NULLIFY(priv_key); PTR_NULLIFY(r); VAR_ZEROIFY(hsize); VAR_ZEROIFY(p_bit_len); VAR_ZEROIFY(q_bit_len); VAR_ZEROIFY(r_len); VAR_ZEROIFY(s_len); return ret; } /* * Generic *internal* ECFSDSA verification functions (init, update and * finalize). Their purpose is to allow passing a specific hash function * (along with their output size) and the random ephemeral key k, so * that compliance tests against test vectors can be made without ugly * hack in the code itself. * * Global EC-FSDSA verification process is as follows (I,U,F provides * information in which function(s) (init(), update() or finalize()) * a specific step is performed): * *| IUF - ECFSDSA verification *| *| I 1. Reject the signature if r is not a valid point on the curve. *| I 2. Reject the signature if s is not in ]0,q[ *| IUF 3. Compute h = H(r||m) *| F 4. Convert h to an integer and then compute e = -h mod q *| F 5. compute W' = sG + eY, where Y is the public key *| F 6. Compute r' = FE2OS(W'_x)||FE2OS(W'_y) *| F 7. Accept the signature if and only if r equals r' * */ #define ECFSDSA_VERIFY_MAGIC ((word_t)(0x26afb13ccd96fa04ULL)) #define ECFSDSA_VERIFY_CHECK_INITIALIZED(A, ret, err) \ MUST_HAVE((((void *)(A)) != NULL) && \ ((A)->magic == ECFSDSA_VERIFY_MAGIC), ret, err) int _ecfsdsa_verify_init(struct ec_verify_context *ctx, const u8 *sig, u8 siglen) { bitcnt_t p_bit_len, q_bit_len; u8 p_len, r_len, s_len; int ret, iszero, on_curve, cmp; const u8 *r; nn_src_t q; fp rx, ry; nn *s; rx.magic = ry.magic = WORD(0); /* First, verify context has been initialized */ ret = sig_verify_check_initialized(ctx); EG(ret, err); /* Do some sanity checks on input params */ ret = pub_key_check_initialized_and_type(ctx->pub_key, ECFSDSA); EG(ret, err); MUST_HAVE((ctx->h != NULL) && (ctx->h->digest_size <= MAX_DIGEST_SIZE) && (ctx->h->block_size <= MAX_BLOCK_SIZE), ret, err); MUST_HAVE((sig != NULL), ret, err); /* Make things more readable */ q = &(ctx->pub_key->params->ec_gen_order); p_bit_len = ctx->pub_key->params->ec_fp.p_bitlen; q_bit_len = ctx->pub_key->params->ec_gen_order_bitlen; p_len = (u8)BYTECEIL(p_bit_len); r_len = (u8)ECFSDSA_R_LEN(p_bit_len); s_len = (u8)ECFSDSA_S_LEN(q_bit_len); s = &(ctx->verify_data.ecfsdsa.s); MUST_HAVE((siglen == ECFSDSA_SIGLEN(p_bit_len, q_bit_len)), ret, err); /* 1. Reject the signature if r is not a valid point on the curve. */ /* Let's first import r, i.e. x and y coordinates of the point */ r = sig; ret = fp_init(&rx, ctx->pub_key->params->ec_curve.a.ctx); EG(ret, err); ret = fp_import_from_buf(&rx, r, p_len); EG(ret, err); ret = fp_init(&ry, ctx->pub_key->params->ec_curve.a.ctx); EG(ret, err); ret = fp_import_from_buf(&ry, r + p_len, p_len); EG(ret, err); /* Let's now check that r represents a point on the curve */ ret = is_on_shortw_curve(&rx, &ry, &(ctx->pub_key->params->ec_curve), &on_curve); EG(ret, err); MUST_HAVE(on_curve, ret, err); /* 2. Reject the signature if s is not in ]0,q[ */ /* Import s as a nn */ ret = nn_init_from_buf(s, sig + r_len, s_len); EG(ret, err); /* Check that s is in ]0,q[ */ ret = nn_iszero(s, &iszero); EG(ret, err); ret = nn_cmp(s, q, &cmp); EG(ret, err); MUST_HAVE((!iszero) && (cmp < 0), ret, err); /* 3. Compute h = H(r||m) */ /* Initialize the verify context */ ret = local_memcpy(&(ctx->verify_data.ecfsdsa.r), r, r_len); EG(ret, err); /* Since we call a callback, sanity check our mapping */ ret = hash_mapping_callbacks_sanity_check(ctx->h); EG(ret, err); ret = ctx->h->hfunc_init(&(ctx->verify_data.ecfsdsa.h_ctx)); EG(ret, err); /* Since we call a callback, sanity check our mapping */ ret = hash_mapping_callbacks_sanity_check(ctx->h); EG(ret, err); ret = ctx->h->hfunc_update(&(ctx->verify_data.ecfsdsa.h_ctx), r, r_len); EG(ret, err); ctx->verify_data.ecfsdsa.magic = ECFSDSA_VERIFY_MAGIC; err: fp_uninit(&rx); fp_uninit(&ry); if (ret && (ctx != NULL)) { /* * Signature is invalid. Clear data part of the context. * This will clear magic and avoid further reuse of the * whole context. */ IGNORE_RET_VAL(local_memset(&(ctx->verify_data.ecfsdsa), 0, sizeof(ecfsdsa_verify_data))); } VAR_ZEROIFY(p_len); VAR_ZEROIFY(r_len); VAR_ZEROIFY(s_len); VAR_ZEROIFY(p_bit_len); VAR_ZEROIFY(q_bit_len); PTR_NULLIFY(r); PTR_NULLIFY(q); PTR_NULLIFY(s); return ret; } int _ecfsdsa_verify_update(struct ec_verify_context *ctx, const u8 *chunk, u32 chunklen) { int ret; /* * First, verify context has been initialized and public * part too. This guarantees the context is an ECFSDSA * verification one and we do not update() or finalize() * before init(). */ ret = sig_verify_check_initialized(ctx); EG(ret, err); ECFSDSA_VERIFY_CHECK_INITIALIZED(&(ctx->verify_data.ecfsdsa), ret, err); /* 3. Compute h = H(r||m) */ /* Since we call a callback, sanity check our mapping */ ret = hash_mapping_callbacks_sanity_check(ctx->h); EG(ret, err); ret = ctx->h->hfunc_update(&(ctx->verify_data.ecfsdsa.h_ctx), chunk, chunklen); err: return ret; } int _ecfsdsa_verify_finalize(struct ec_verify_context *ctx) { prj_pt_src_t G, Y; nn_src_t q; nn tmp, e, *s; prj_pt sG, eY; prj_pt_t Wprime; bitcnt_t p_bit_len, r_len; u8 r_prime[2 * NN_MAX_BYTE_LEN]; u8 e_buf[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; u8 hsize, p_len; const u8 *r; int ret, check; tmp.magic = e.magic = WORD(0); sG.magic = eY.magic = WORD(0); /* NOTE: we reuse sG for Wprime to optimize local variables */ Wprime = &sG; /* * First, verify context has been initialized and public * part too. This guarantees the context is an ECFSDSA * verification one and we do not finalize() before init(). */ ret = sig_verify_check_initialized(ctx); EG(ret, err); ECFSDSA_VERIFY_CHECK_INITIALIZED(&(ctx->verify_data.ecfsdsa), ret, err); /* Zero init points */ ret = local_memset(&sG, 0, sizeof(prj_pt)); EG(ret, err); ret = local_memset(&eY, 0, sizeof(prj_pt)); EG(ret, err); /* Make things more readable */ G = &(ctx->pub_key->params->ec_gen); Y = &(ctx->pub_key->y); q = &(ctx->pub_key->params->ec_gen_order); hsize = ctx->h->digest_size; s = &(ctx->verify_data.ecfsdsa.s); r = ctx->verify_data.ecfsdsa.r; p_bit_len = ctx->pub_key->params->ec_fp.p_bitlen; p_len = (u8)BYTECEIL(p_bit_len); r_len = (u8)ECFSDSA_R_LEN(p_bit_len); /* 3. Compute h = H(r||m) */ /* Since we call a callback, sanity check our mapping */ ret = hash_mapping_callbacks_sanity_check(ctx->h); EG(ret, err); ret = ctx->h->hfunc_finalize(&(ctx->verify_data.ecfsdsa.h_ctx), e_buf); EG(ret, err); /* * 4. Convert h to an integer and then compute e = -h mod q * * Because we only support positive integers, we compute * e = q - (h mod q) (except when h is 0). */ ret = nn_init_from_buf(&tmp, e_buf, hsize); EG(ret, err); ret = local_memset(e_buf, 0, hsize); EG(ret, err); ret = nn_mod(&tmp, &tmp, q); EG(ret, err); ret = nn_mod_neg(&e, &tmp, q); EG(ret, err); /* 5. compute W' = (W'_x,W'_y) = sG + tY, where Y is the public key */ ret = prj_pt_mul(&sG, s, G); EG(ret, err); ret = prj_pt_mul(&eY, &e, Y); EG(ret, err); ret = prj_pt_add(Wprime, &sG, &eY); EG(ret, err); ret = prj_pt_unique(Wprime, Wprime); EG(ret, err); /* 6. Compute r' = FE2OS(W'_x)||FE2OS(W'_y) */ ret = fp_export_to_buf(r_prime, p_len, &(Wprime->X)); EG(ret, err); ret = fp_export_to_buf(r_prime + p_len, p_len, &(Wprime->Y)); EG(ret, err); dbg_buf_print("r_prime: ", r_prime, r_len); /* 7. Accept the signature if and only if r equals r' */ ret = are_equal(r, r_prime, r_len, &check); EG(ret, err); ret = check ? 0 : -1; err: IGNORE_RET_VAL(local_memset(r_prime, 0, sizeof(r_prime))); nn_uninit(&tmp); nn_uninit(&e); prj_pt_uninit(&sG); prj_pt_uninit(&eY); /* * We can now clear data part of the context. This will clear * magic and avoid further reuse of the whole context. */ if(ctx != NULL){ IGNORE_RET_VAL(local_memset(&(ctx->verify_data.ecfsdsa), 0, sizeof(ecfsdsa_verify_data))); } /* Clean what remains on the stack */ PTR_NULLIFY(Wprime); PTR_NULLIFY(G); PTR_NULLIFY(Y); PTR_NULLIFY(q); PTR_NULLIFY(s); PTR_NULLIFY(r); VAR_ZEROIFY(p_len); VAR_ZEROIFY(r_len); VAR_ZEROIFY(hsize); return ret; } /* * NOTE: among all the EC-SDSA ISO14888-3 variants, only EC-FSDSA supports * batch verification as it is the only one allowing the recovery of the * underlying signature point from the signature value (other variants make * use of a hash of (parts) of this point. */ /* Batch verification function: * This function takes multiple signatures/messages/public keys, and * checks in an optimized way all the signatures. * * This returns 0 if *all* the signatures are correct, and -1 if at least * one signature is not correct. * */ static int _ecfsdsa_verify_batch_no_memory(const u8 **s, const u8 *s_len, const ec_pub_key **pub_keys, const u8 **m, const u32 *m_len, u32 num, ec_alg_type sig_type, hash_alg_type hash_type, const u8 **adata, const u16 *adata_len) { nn_src_t q = NULL; prj_pt_src_t G = NULL; prj_pt_t W = NULL, Y = NULL; prj_pt Tmp, W_sum, Y_sum; nn S, S_sum, e, a; u8 hash[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; const ec_pub_key *pub_key, *pub_key0; int ret, iszero, cmp; prj_pt_src_t pub_key_y; hash_context h_ctx; const hash_mapping *hm; ec_shortw_crv_src_t shortw_curve; ec_alg_type key_type = UNKNOWN_ALG; bitcnt_t p_bit_len, q_bit_len; u8 p_len, q_len; u16 hsize; u32 i; Tmp.magic = W_sum.magic = Y_sum.magic = WORD(0); S.magic = S_sum.magic = e.magic = a.magic = WORD(0); FORCE_USED_VAR(adata_len); FORCE_USED_VAR(adata); /* First, some sanity checks */ MUST_HAVE((s != NULL) && (pub_keys != NULL) && (m != NULL), ret, err); /* We need at least one element in our batch data bags */ MUST_HAVE((num > 0), ret, err); /* Zeroize buffers */ ret = local_memset(hash, 0, sizeof(hash)); EG(ret, err); pub_key0 = pub_keys[0]; MUST_HAVE((pub_key0 != NULL), ret, err); /* Get our hash mapping */ ret = get_hash_by_type(hash_type, &hm); EG(ret, err); hsize = hm->digest_size; MUST_HAVE((hm != NULL), ret, err); for(i = 0; i < num; i++){ u8 siglen; const u8 *sig = NULL; ret = pub_key_check_initialized_and_type(pub_keys[i], ECFSDSA); EG(ret, err); /* Make things more readable */ pub_key = pub_keys[i]; /* Sanity check that all our public keys have the same parameters */ MUST_HAVE((pub_key->params) == (pub_key0->params), ret, err); q = &(pub_key->params->ec_gen_order); shortw_curve = &(pub_key->params->ec_curve); pub_key_y = &(pub_key->y); key_type = pub_key->key_type; G = &(pub_key->params->ec_gen); p_bit_len = pub_key->params->ec_fp.p_bitlen; q_bit_len = pub_key->params->ec_gen_order_bitlen; p_len = (u8)BYTECEIL(p_bit_len); q_len = (u8)BYTECEIL(q_bit_len); /* Check given signature length is the expected one */ siglen = s_len[i]; sig = s[i]; MUST_HAVE((siglen == ECFSDSA_SIGLEN(p_bit_len, q_bit_len)), ret, err); MUST_HAVE((siglen == (ECFSDSA_R_LEN(p_bit_len) + ECFSDSA_S_LEN(q_bit_len))), ret, err); /* Check the key type versus the algorithm */ MUST_HAVE((key_type == sig_type), ret, err); if(i == 0){ /* Initialize our sums to zero/point at infinity */ ret = nn_init(&S_sum, 0); EG(ret, err); ret = prj_pt_init(&W_sum, shortw_curve); EG(ret, err); ret = prj_pt_zero(&W_sum); EG(ret, err); ret = prj_pt_init(&Y_sum, shortw_curve); EG(ret, err); ret = prj_pt_zero(&Y_sum); EG(ret, err); ret = prj_pt_init(&Tmp, shortw_curve); EG(ret, err); ret = nn_init(&e, 0); EG(ret, err); ret = nn_init(&a, 0); EG(ret, err); } /* Get a pseudo-random scalar a for randomizing the linear combination */ ret = nn_get_random_mod(&a, q); EG(ret, err); /***************************************************/ /* Extract s */ ret = nn_init_from_buf(&S, &sig[2 * p_len], q_len); EG(ret, err); ret = nn_cmp(&S, q, &cmp); EG(ret, err); MUST_HAVE((cmp < 0), ret, err); dbg_nn_print("s", &S); /***************************************************/ /* Add S to the sum */ /* Multiply S by a */ ret = nn_mod_mul(&S, &a, &S, q); EG(ret, err); ret = nn_mod_add(&S_sum, &S_sum, &S, q); EG(ret, err); /***************************************************/ /* Compute Y and add it to Y_sum */ Y = &Tmp; /* Copy the public key point to work on the unique * affine representative. */ ret = prj_pt_copy(Y, pub_key_y); EG(ret, err); ret = prj_pt_unique(Y, Y); EG(ret, err); dbg_ec_point_print("Y", Y); /* Compute e */ ret = hm->hfunc_init(&h_ctx); EG(ret, err); ret = hm->hfunc_update(&h_ctx, &sig[0], (u32)(2 * p_len)); EG(ret, err); ret = hm->hfunc_update(&h_ctx, m[i], m_len[i]); EG(ret, err); ret = hm->hfunc_finalize(&h_ctx, hash); EG(ret, err); ret = nn_init_from_buf(&e, hash, hsize); EG(ret, err); ret = nn_mod(&e, &e, q); EG(ret, err); ret = nn_mod_neg(&e, &e, q); EG(ret, err); dbg_nn_print("e", &e); /* Multiply e by 'a' */ ret = nn_mod_mul(&e, &e, &a, q); EG(ret, err); ret = _prj_pt_unprotected_mult(Y, &e, Y); EG(ret, err); dbg_ec_point_print("eY", Y); /* Add to the sum */ ret = prj_pt_add(&Y_sum, &Y_sum, Y); EG(ret, err); /***************************************************/ W = &Tmp; /* Compute W from rx and ry */ ret = prj_pt_import_from_aff_buf(W, &sig[0], (u16)(2 * p_len), shortw_curve); EG(ret, err); /* Now multiply W by -a */ ret = nn_mod_neg(&a, &a, q); EG(ret, err); ret = _prj_pt_unprotected_mult(W, &a, W); EG(ret, err); /* Add to the sum */ ret = prj_pt_add(&W_sum, &W_sum, W); EG(ret, err); dbg_ec_point_print("aW", W); } /* Sanity check */ MUST_HAVE((q != NULL) && (G != NULL), ret, err); /* Compute S_sum * G */ ret = _prj_pt_unprotected_mult(&Tmp, &S_sum, G); EG(ret, err); /* Add P_sum and R_sum */ ret = prj_pt_add(&Tmp, &Tmp, &W_sum); EG(ret, err); ret = prj_pt_add(&Tmp, &Tmp, &Y_sum); EG(ret, err); /* The result should be point at infinity */ ret = prj_pt_iszero(&Tmp, &iszero); EG(ret, err); ret = (iszero == 1) ? 0 : -1; err: PTR_NULLIFY(q); PTR_NULLIFY(pub_key); PTR_NULLIFY(pub_key0); PTR_NULLIFY(shortw_curve); PTR_NULLIFY(pub_key_y); PTR_NULLIFY(G); PTR_NULLIFY(W); PTR_NULLIFY(Y); prj_pt_uninit(&W_sum); prj_pt_uninit(&Y_sum); prj_pt_uninit(&Tmp); nn_uninit(&S); nn_uninit(&S_sum); nn_uninit(&e); nn_uninit(&a); return ret; } static int _ecfsdsa_verify_batch(const u8 **s, const u8 *s_len, const ec_pub_key **pub_keys, const u8 **m, const u32 *m_len, u32 num, ec_alg_type sig_type, hash_alg_type hash_type, const u8 **adata, const u16 *adata_len, verify_batch_scratch_pad *scratch_pad_area, u32 *scratch_pad_area_len) { nn_src_t q = NULL; prj_pt_src_t G = NULL; prj_pt_t W = NULL, Y = NULL; nn S, a; nn_t e = NULL; u8 hash[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; const ec_pub_key *pub_key, *pub_key0; int ret, iszero, cmp; prj_pt_src_t pub_key_y; hash_context h_ctx; const hash_mapping *hm; ec_shortw_crv_src_t shortw_curve; ec_alg_type key_type = UNKNOWN_ALG; bitcnt_t p_bit_len, q_bit_len = 0; u8 p_len, q_len; u16 hsize; u32 i; /* NN numbers and points pointers */ verify_batch_scratch_pad *elements = scratch_pad_area; u64 expected_len; S.magic = a.magic = WORD(0); FORCE_USED_VAR(adata_len); FORCE_USED_VAR(adata); /* First, some sanity checks */ MUST_HAVE((s != NULL) && (pub_keys != NULL) && (m != NULL), ret, err); MUST_HAVE((scratch_pad_area_len != NULL), ret, err); MUST_HAVE(((2 * num) >= num), ret, err); MUST_HAVE(((2 * num) + 1) >= num, ret, err); /* Zeroize buffers */ ret = local_memset(hash, 0, sizeof(hash)); EG(ret, err); /* In oder to apply the algorithm, we must have at least two * elements to verify. If this is not the case, we fallback to * the regular "no memory" version. */ if(num <= 1){ if(scratch_pad_area == NULL){ /* We do not require any memory in this case */ (*scratch_pad_area_len) = 0; ret = 0; goto err; } else{ ret = _ecfsdsa_verify_batch_no_memory(s, s_len, pub_keys, m, m_len, num, sig_type, hash_type, adata, adata_len); goto err; } } expected_len = ((2 * num) + 1) * sizeof(verify_batch_scratch_pad); MUST_HAVE((expected_len < 0xffffffff), ret, err); if(scratch_pad_area == NULL){ /* Return the needed size: we need to keep track of (2 * num) + 1 NN numbers * and (2 * num) + 1 projective points, plus (2 * num) + 1 indices */ (*scratch_pad_area_len) = (u32)expected_len; ret = 0; goto err; } else{ MUST_HAVE((*scratch_pad_area_len) >= expected_len, ret, err); } pub_key0 = pub_keys[0]; MUST_HAVE((pub_key0 != NULL), ret, err); /* Get our hash mapping */ ret = get_hash_by_type(hash_type, &hm); EG(ret, err); hsize = hm->digest_size; MUST_HAVE((hm != NULL), ret, err); for(i = 0; i < num; i++){ u8 siglen; const u8 *sig = NULL; ret = pub_key_check_initialized_and_type(pub_keys[i], ECFSDSA); EG(ret, err); /* Make things more readable */ pub_key = pub_keys[i]; /* Sanity check that all our public keys have the same parameters */ MUST_HAVE((pub_key->params) == (pub_key0->params), ret, err); q = &(pub_key->params->ec_gen_order); shortw_curve = &(pub_key->params->ec_curve); pub_key_y = &(pub_key->y); key_type = pub_key->key_type; G = &(pub_key->params->ec_gen); p_bit_len = pub_key->params->ec_fp.p_bitlen; q_bit_len = pub_key->params->ec_gen_order_bitlen; p_len = (u8)BYTECEIL(p_bit_len); q_len = (u8)BYTECEIL(q_bit_len); /* Check given signature length is the expected one */ siglen = s_len[i]; sig = s[i]; MUST_HAVE((siglen == ECFSDSA_SIGLEN(p_bit_len, q_bit_len)), ret, err); MUST_HAVE((siglen == (ECFSDSA_R_LEN(p_bit_len) + ECFSDSA_S_LEN(q_bit_len))), ret, err); /* Check the key type versus the algorithm */ MUST_HAVE((key_type == sig_type), ret, err); if(i == 0){ /* Initialize our sums to zero/point at infinity */ ret = nn_init(&a, 0); EG(ret, err); ret = nn_init(&elements[(2 * num)].number, 0); EG(ret, err); ret = prj_pt_copy(&elements[(2 * num)].point, G); EG(ret, err); } /* Get a pseudo-random scalar a for randomizing the linear combination */ ret = nn_get_random_mod(&a, q); EG(ret, err); /***************************************************/ /* Extract s */ ret = nn_init_from_buf(&S, &sig[2 * p_len], q_len); EG(ret, err); ret = nn_cmp(&S, q, &cmp); EG(ret, err); MUST_HAVE((cmp < 0), ret, err); dbg_nn_print("s", &S); /***************************************************/ /* Add S to the sum */ /* Multiply S by a */ ret = nn_mod_mul(&S, &a, &S, q); EG(ret, err); ret = nn_mod_add(&elements[(2 * num)].number, &elements[(2 * num)].number, &S, q); EG(ret, err); /***************************************************/ /* Compute Y */ Y = &elements[num + i].point; /* Copy the public key point to work on the unique * affine representative. */ ret = prj_pt_copy(Y, pub_key_y); EG(ret, err); ret = prj_pt_unique(Y, Y); EG(ret, err); dbg_ec_point_print("Y", Y); /* Compute e */ e = &elements[num + i].number; ret = nn_init(e, 0); EG(ret, err); ret = hm->hfunc_init(&h_ctx); EG(ret, err); ret = hm->hfunc_update(&h_ctx, &sig[0], (u32)(2 * p_len)); EG(ret, err); ret = hm->hfunc_update(&h_ctx, m[i], m_len[i]); EG(ret, err); ret = hm->hfunc_finalize(&h_ctx, hash); EG(ret, err); ret = nn_init_from_buf(e, hash, hsize); EG(ret, err); ret = nn_mod(e, e, q); EG(ret, err); ret = nn_mod_neg(e, e, q); EG(ret, err); dbg_nn_print("e", e); /* Multiply e by 'a' */ ret = nn_mod_mul(e, e, &a, q); EG(ret, err); /***************************************************/ W = &elements[i].point; /* Compute W from rx and ry */ ret = prj_pt_import_from_aff_buf(W, &sig[0], (u16)(2 * p_len), shortw_curve); EG(ret, err); ret = nn_init(&elements[i].number, 0); EG(ret, err); ret = nn_copy(&elements[i].number, &a); EG(ret, err); ret = nn_mod_neg(&elements[i].number, &elements[i].number, q); EG(ret, err); dbg_ec_point_print("W", W); } /* Sanity check */ MUST_HAVE((q != NULL) && (G != NULL) && (q_bit_len != 0), ret, err); /********************************************/ /****** Bos-Coster algorithm ****************/ ret = ec_verify_bos_coster(elements, (2 * num) + 1, q_bit_len); if(ret){ if(ret == -2){ /* In case of Bos-Coster time out, we fall back to the * slower regular batch verification. */ ret = _ecfsdsa_verify_batch_no_memory(s, s_len, pub_keys, m, m_len, num, sig_type, hash_type, adata, adata_len); EG(ret, err); } goto err; } /* The first element should contain the sum: it should * be equal to zero. Reject the signature if this is not * the case. */ ret = prj_pt_iszero(&elements[elements[0].index].point, &iszero); EG(ret, err); ret = iszero ? 0 : -1; err: PTR_NULLIFY(q); PTR_NULLIFY(e); PTR_NULLIFY(pub_key); PTR_NULLIFY(pub_key0); PTR_NULLIFY(shortw_curve); PTR_NULLIFY(pub_key_y); PTR_NULLIFY(G); PTR_NULLIFY(W); PTR_NULLIFY(Y); nn_uninit(&S); nn_uninit(&a); return ret; } int ecfsdsa_verify_batch(const u8 **s, const u8 *s_len, const ec_pub_key **pub_keys, const u8 **m, const u32 *m_len, u32 num, ec_alg_type sig_type, hash_alg_type hash_type, const u8 **adata, const u16 *adata_len, verify_batch_scratch_pad *scratch_pad_area, u32 *scratch_pad_area_len) { int ret; if(scratch_pad_area != NULL){ MUST_HAVE((scratch_pad_area_len != NULL), ret, err); ret = _ecfsdsa_verify_batch(s, s_len, pub_keys, m, m_len, num, sig_type, hash_type, adata, adata_len, scratch_pad_area, scratch_pad_area_len); EG(ret, err); } else{ ret = _ecfsdsa_verify_batch_no_memory(s, s_len, pub_keys, m, m_len, num, sig_type, hash_type, adata, adata_len); EG(ret, err); } err: return ret; } #else /* WITH_SIG_ECFSDSA */ /* * Dummy definition to avoid the empty translation unit ISO C warning */ typedef int dummy; #endif /* WITH_SIG_ECFSDSA */