/*- * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 * Dave Safford. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * */ #ifdef SRA #ifdef ENCRYPTION #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef NOPAM #include #else #include #endif #include "auth.h" #include "misc.h" #include "encrypt.h" #include "pk.h" char pka[HEXKEYBYTES+1], ska[HEXKEYBYTES+1], pkb[HEXKEYBYTES+1]; char *user, *pass, *xuser, *xpass; DesData ck; IdeaData ik; extern int auth_debug_mode; extern char line[]; static int sra_valid = 0; static int passwd_sent = 0; static unsigned char str_data[1024] = { IAC, SB, TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION, 0, AUTHTYPE_SRA, }; #define SRA_KEY 0 #define SRA_USER 1 #define SRA_CONTINUE 2 #define SRA_PASS 3 #define SRA_ACCEPT 4 #define SRA_REJECT 5 static int check_user(char *, char *); /* support routine to send out authentication message */ static int Data(Authenticator *ap, int type, void *d, int c) { unsigned char *p = str_data + 4; unsigned char *cd = (unsigned char *)d; if (c == -1) c = strlen((char *)cd); if (auth_debug_mode) { printf("%s:%d: [%d] (%d)", str_data[3] == TELQUAL_IS ? ">>>IS" : ">>>REPLY", str_data[3], type, c); printd(d, c); printf("\r\n"); } *p++ = ap->type; *p++ = ap->way; *p++ = type; while (c-- > 0) { if ((*p++ = *cd++) == IAC) *p++ = IAC; } *p++ = IAC; *p++ = SE; if (str_data[3] == TELQUAL_IS) printsub('>', &str_data[2], p - (&str_data[2])); return(net_write(str_data, p - str_data)); } int sra_init(Authenticator *ap __unused, int server) { if (server) str_data[3] = TELQUAL_REPLY; else str_data[3] = TELQUAL_IS; user = (char *)malloc(256); xuser = (char *)malloc(513); pass = (char *)malloc(256); xpass = (char *)malloc(513); if (user == NULL || xuser == NULL || pass == NULL || xpass == NULL) return 0; /* malloc failed */ passwd_sent = 0; genkeys(pka,ska); return(1); } /* client received a go-ahead for sra */ int sra_send(Authenticator *ap) { /* send PKA */ if (auth_debug_mode) printf("Sent PKA to server.\r\n" ); printf("Trying SRA secure login:\r\n"); if (!Data(ap, SRA_KEY, (void *)pka, HEXKEYBYTES)) { if (auth_debug_mode) printf("Not enough room for authentication data\r\n"); return(0); } return(1); } /* server received an IS -- could be SRA KEY, USER, or PASS */ void sra_is(Authenticator *ap, unsigned char *data, int cnt) { int valid; Session_Key skey; if (cnt-- < 1) goto bad; switch (*data++) { case SRA_KEY: if (cnt < HEXKEYBYTES) { Data(ap, SRA_REJECT, (void *)0, 0); auth_finished(ap, AUTH_USER); if (auth_debug_mode) { printf("SRA user rejected for bad PKB\r\n"); } return; } if (auth_debug_mode) printf("Sent pka\r\n"); if (!Data(ap, SRA_KEY, (void *)pka, HEXKEYBYTES)) { if (auth_debug_mode) printf("Not enough room\r\n"); return; } memcpy(pkb,data,HEXKEYBYTES); pkb[HEXKEYBYTES] = '\0'; common_key(ska,pkb,&ik,&ck); return; case SRA_USER: /* decode KAB(u) */ if (cnt > 512) /* Attempted buffer overflow */ break; memcpy(xuser,data,cnt); xuser[cnt] = '\0'; pk_decode(xuser,user,&ck); auth_encrypt_user(user); Data(ap, SRA_CONTINUE, (void *)0, 0); return; case SRA_PASS: if (cnt > 512) /* Attempted buffer overflow */ break; /* decode KAB(P) */ memcpy(xpass,data,cnt); xpass[cnt] = '\0'; pk_decode(xpass,pass,&ck); /* check user's password */ valid = check_user(user,pass); if(valid) { Data(ap, SRA_ACCEPT, (void *)0, 0); skey.data = ck; skey.type = SK_DES; skey.length = 8; encrypt_session_key(&skey, 1); sra_valid = 1; auth_finished(ap, AUTH_VALID); if (auth_debug_mode) { printf("SRA user accepted\r\n"); } } else { Data(ap, SRA_CONTINUE, (void *)0, 0); /* Data(ap, SRA_REJECT, (void *)0, 0); sra_valid = 0; auth_finished(ap, AUTH_REJECT); */ if (auth_debug_mode) { printf("SRA user failed\r\n"); } } return; default: if (auth_debug_mode) printf("Unknown SRA option %d\r\n", data[-1]); } bad: Data(ap, SRA_REJECT, 0, 0); sra_valid = 0; auth_finished(ap, AUTH_REJECT); } /* client received REPLY -- could be SRA KEY, CONTINUE, ACCEPT, or REJECT */ void sra_reply(Authenticator *ap, unsigned char *data, int cnt) { char uprompt[256],tuser[256]; Session_Key skey; size_t i; if (cnt-- < 1) return; switch (*data++) { case SRA_KEY: /* calculate common key */ if (cnt < HEXKEYBYTES) { if (auth_debug_mode) { printf("SRA user rejected for bad PKB\r\n"); } return; } memcpy(pkb,data,HEXKEYBYTES); pkb[HEXKEYBYTES] = '\0'; common_key(ska,pkb,&ik,&ck); enc_user: /* encode user */ memset(tuser,0,sizeof(tuser)); sprintf(uprompt,"User (%s): ",UserNameRequested); telnet_gets(uprompt,tuser,255,1); if (tuser[0] == '\n' || tuser[0] == '\r' ) strcpy(user,UserNameRequested); else { /* telnet_gets leaves the newline on */ for(i=0;i 0) {*(buf)++ = (c); --(len);} void sra_printsub(unsigned char *data, int cnt, unsigned char *buf, int buflen) { char lbuf[32]; int i; buf[buflen-1] = '\0'; /* make sure its NULL terminated */ buflen -= 1; switch(data[3]) { case SRA_CONTINUE: strncpy((char *)buf, " CONTINUE ", buflen); goto common; case SRA_REJECT: /* Rejected (reason might follow) */ strncpy((char *)buf, " REJECT ", buflen); goto common; case SRA_ACCEPT: /* Accepted (name might follow) */ strncpy((char *)buf, " ACCEPT ", buflen); common: BUMP(buf, buflen); if (cnt <= 4) break; ADDC(buf, buflen, '"'); for (i = 4; i < cnt; i++) ADDC(buf, buflen, data[i]); ADDC(buf, buflen, '"'); ADDC(buf, buflen, '\0'); break; case SRA_KEY: /* Authentication data follows */ strncpy((char *)buf, " KEY ", buflen); goto common2; case SRA_USER: strncpy((char *)buf, " USER ", buflen); goto common2; case SRA_PASS: strncpy((char *)buf, " PASS ", buflen); goto common2; default: sprintf(lbuf, " %d (unknown)", data[3]); strncpy((char *)buf, lbuf, buflen); common2: BUMP(buf, buflen); for (i = 4; i < cnt; i++) { sprintf(lbuf, " %d", data[i]); strncpy((char *)buf, lbuf, buflen); BUMP(buf, buflen); } break; } } static int isroot(const char *usr) { struct passwd *pwd; if ((pwd=getpwnam(usr))==NULL) return 0; return (!pwd->pw_uid); } static int rootterm(char *ttyn) { struct ttyent *t; return ((t = getttynam(ttyn)) && t->ty_status & TTY_SECURE); } #ifdef NOPAM static int check_user(char *name, char *cred) { char *cp; char *xpasswd, *salt; if (isroot(name) && !rootterm(line)) { crypt("AA","*"); /* Waste some time to simulate success */ return(0); } if (pw = sgetpwnam(name)) { if (pw->pw_shell == NULL) { pw = (struct passwd *) NULL; return(0); } salt = pw->pw_passwd; xpasswd = crypt(cred, salt); /* The strcmp does not catch null passwords! */ if (pw == NULL || *pw->pw_passwd == '\0' || strcmp(xpasswd, pw->pw_passwd)) { pw = (struct passwd *) NULL; return(0); } return(1); } return(0); } #else /* * The following is stolen from ftpd, which stole it from the imap-uw * PAM module and login.c. It is needed because we can't really * "converse" with the user, having already gone to the trouble of * getting their username and password through an encrypted channel. */ #define COPY_STRING(s) (s ? strdup(s):NULL) struct cred_t { const char *uname; const char *pass; }; typedef struct cred_t cred_t; static int auth_conv(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *appdata) { int i; cred_t *cred = (cred_t *) appdata; struct pam_response *reply = malloc(sizeof(struct pam_response) * num_msg); if (reply == NULL) return PAM_BUF_ERR; for (i = 0; i < num_msg; i++) { switch (msg[i]->msg_style) { case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: /* assume want user name */ reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; reply[i].resp = COPY_STRING(cred->uname); /* PAM frees resp. */ break; case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: /* assume want password */ reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; reply[i].resp = COPY_STRING(cred->pass); /* PAM frees resp. */ break; case PAM_TEXT_INFO: case PAM_ERROR_MSG: reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; reply[i].resp = NULL; break; default: /* unknown message style */ free(reply); return PAM_CONV_ERR; } } *resp = reply; return PAM_SUCCESS; } /* * The PAM version as a side effect may put a new username in *name. */ static int check_user(char *name, char *cred) { pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; const void *item; int rval; int e; cred_t auth_cred = { name, cred }; struct pam_conv conv = { &auth_conv, &auth_cred }; e = pam_start("telnetd", name, &conv, &pamh); if (e != PAM_SUCCESS) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "pam_start: %s", pam_strerror(pamh, e)); return 0; } #if 0 /* Where can we find this value? */ e = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RHOST, remotehost); if (e != PAM_SUCCESS) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "pam_set_item(PAM_RHOST): %s", pam_strerror(pamh, e)); return 0; } #endif e = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0); switch (e) { case PAM_SUCCESS: /* * With PAM we support the concept of a "template" * user. The user enters a login name which is * authenticated by PAM, usually via a remote service * such as RADIUS or TACACS+. If authentication * succeeds, a different but related "template" name * is used for setting the credentials, shell, and * home directory. The name the user enters need only * exist on the remote authentication server, but the * template name must be present in the local password * database. * * This is supported by two various mechanisms in the * individual modules. However, from the application's * point of view, the template user is always passed * back as a changed value of the PAM_USER item. */ if ((e = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, &item)) == PAM_SUCCESS) { strcpy(name, item); } else syslog(LOG_ERR, "Couldn't get PAM_USER: %s", pam_strerror(pamh, e)); if (isroot(name) && !rootterm(line)) rval = 0; else rval = 1; break; case PAM_AUTH_ERR: case PAM_USER_UNKNOWN: case PAM_MAXTRIES: rval = 0; break; default: syslog(LOG_ERR, "auth_pam: %s", pam_strerror(pamh, e)); rval = 0; break; } if ((e = pam_end(pamh, e)) != PAM_SUCCESS) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "pam_end: %s", pam_strerror(pamh, e)); rval = 0; } return rval; } #endif #endif /* ENCRYPTION */ #endif /* SRA */